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ABSTRACT 
 
PHILIPP STELZEL: Rethinking Modern German History: Critical Social History as a 
Transatlantic Enterprise, 1945-1989 
(under the direction of Konrad H. Jarausch) 
 
My dissertation “Rethinking Modern German History: Critical Social History as a 
Transatlantic Enterprise, 1945-1989” analyzes the intellectual exchange between German and 
American historians from the end of World War II to the 1980s. Several factors fostered the 
development of this scholarly community: growing American interest in Germany (a result of 
both National Socialism and the Cold War); a small but increasingly influential cohort of 
émigré historians researching and teaching in the United States; and the appeal of American 
academia to West German historians of different generations, but primarily to those born 
between 1930 and 1940. Within this transatlantic intellectual community, I am particularly 
concerned with a group of West German social historians known as the “Bielefeld School” 
who proposed to re-conceptualize history as Historical Social Science (Historische 
Sozialwissenschaft). Adherents of Historical Social Science in the 1960s and early 1970s also 
strove for a critical analysis of the roots of National Socialism. Their challenge of the West 
German historical profession was therefore both interpretive and methodological. 
My dissertation aims to revise the extant historiography in two main areas: First, in 
contrast to the prevailing interpretation—which views American historians of modern 
Germany as a monolithic group of left-liberal scholars—I emphasize their methodological, 
interpretive, and political breadth. Second, I question some of the predominant assumptions 
about the so-called “Bielefeld School,” in particular the supposedly high degree to which 
their interpretations of modern German history conformed with those of their American 
colleagues. Instead, I argue that the “American connection”, which the Bielefeld School’s 
protagonists emphasized repeatedly, served a strategic purpose: it pitted their new, “critical,” 
and “internationalized” historiographical project against a parochial and old-fashioned West 
German historical profession. Ultimately, my dissertation not only investigates an important 
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chapter of post-World War II transatlantic intellectual history, but also explores the political 
dimensions of historiography and aims to provoke historians to greater self-consciousness 
about the nature of their work. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Ending the peculiarities of German historiography? 
 
At the first annual meeting of the Verband der Historiker Deutschlands (German 
Historians’ Association) after the end of World War II, on September 12, 1949, its chairman 
Gerhard Ritter outlined the “present situation and future tasks of the German historical 
profession.”1 Oscillating between assertiveness and defensiveness, Ritter conceded that 
German historiography previously had focused too much on political history and 
Geistesgeschichte (history of ideas), and that a closer cooperation with the social sciences 
was the order of the day. Moreover, while “truly great statesmen” such as Frederick the Great 
and Otto von Bismarck now more than ever had to serve the purpose of fostering German 
self-confidence, German historians at the same time had to eschew the blatant apologia 
characterizing much of post-World War I scholarship. 
In retrospect, it is obvious that the West German historical profession as a whole did 
not achieve many of these ambitious aims during the next two decades. Traditional political 
history still prevailed, and with the political and economic prospects of West Germany 
steadily improving, the West German historians’ willingness to reexamine their interpretive 
and methodological assumptions declined almost as steadily.2 Gerhard Ritter himself never 
                                                
1 His address was later published as “Gegenwärtige Lage und Zukunftsaufgaben der deutschen 
Geschichtswissenschaft,” Historische Zeitschrift 170 (1950), 1-22. 
2 See the standard work of Winfried Schulze, Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945 (München, 1989). 
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delivered the results he had demanded, and while other historians, such as Friedrich 
Meinecke, initially were more willing than Ritter to reevaluate modern German history for 
the roots of National Socialism, their ambitions soon gave way to a more defensive stance. 
Meinecke’s essay Die deutsche Katastrophe, written in 1945 and published in 1946, went 
comparatively far in its critique of various aspects of Prussian and German history, but his 
later writings clearly fell behind these promising beginnings.1 
To be sure, the West German historical profession of the 1950s received a few new 
impulses, arguably most importantly from the establishment of Zeitgeschichte as a discipline 
with its focus on National Socialism.2 Despite his role at the Universität Königsberg in the 
1930s and his ideological proximity to many aspects of National Socialism prior to his 
emigration to the United States, Hans Rothfels became a crucial figure in the development of 
Zeitgeschichte in West Germany after his return.3 Initially, the very conservative political 
outlook of leading figures like Rothfels defined the limits of the scholarly 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung (coming to terms with the past) at places such as the Institut für 
Zeitgeschichte as well as at most West German universities. Thus, while Rothfels, for 
example, insisted on the legitimacy of resistance to National Socialism in his publications of 
the late 1940s—which many contemporary Germans still viewed as treason—his 
                                                
1 Compare Friedrich Meinecke, Die deutsche Katastrophe. Betrachtungen und Erinnerungen (Wiesbaden, 
1946), and his essay “Irrwege in unserer Geschichte,” Der Monat 2 (1949), 3-6. 
2 Regarding West German Zeitgeschichte, this dissertation follows neither the hagiographic account of Horst 
Möller nor the at times ahistorical critique of Nicolas Berg. Compare Möller, “Das Institut für Zeitgeschichte 
und die Entwicklung der Zeitgeschichtsschreibung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” in Möller/Udo Wengst 
(eds.), 50 Jahre Institut für Zeitgeschichte (München, 1999): 1-68; and Berg, Der Holocaust und die 
westdeutschen Historiker: Erforschung und Erinnerung (Göttingen, 2003). 
3 See his programmatic article “Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe”, which appeared in the first issue of the Institute’s 
journal Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 1 (1953), 1-8. 
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interpretation of the resistance movement clearly did not do justice to its varying political 
background and motivations.4  
In addition, Catholic historians tried to promote a counter-narrative to the 
predominant Protestant master narrative of modern German history.5 This master narrative 
had entailed, among other aspects, a strong focus on the German Empire with Prussia at its 
center, and generally neglected the Southern and Southwestern states. French and German 
efforts to strengthen the pro-European and pro-Catholic position within West German 
historiography led to the foundation of the Institut für Europäische Geschichte in Mainz in 
1950. While these developments somewhat broadened the topical scope of West German 
historiography and modified some interpretations, such as the formerly prevailing Bismarck-
hagiography, they did not contribute much to a methodological renewal of the profession. 
Finally, Ludwig Dehio, the first postwar editor of the profession’s leading organ Historische 
Zeitschrift, also embarked on a cautiously reformist course. Yet the resistance he encountered 
emphasizes the limited degree to which the West German historical profession was willing 
and able to rethink its interpretive and methodological foundations.6 Ernst Schulin’s 
assessment of a “politically and morally tamed historicism” that dominated West German 
historiography during the first two postwar decades still seems accurate.7  
                                                
4 Hans Rothfels, The German Resistance to Hitler: An Appraisal (Hinsdale, Ill., 1948).  
5 Schulze, Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft, 207-227; Sebastian Conrad, Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen 
Nation: Geschichtsschreibung in Westdeutschland und Japan, 1945 – 1960 (Göttingen, 1999), 71-87. 
6 Schulze, Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft, 87-109. 
7 Ernst Schulin, “Zur Restauration und langsamen Weiterentwicklung der deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft 
nach 1945,” in Id., Traditionskritik und Rekonstruktionsversuch. Studien zur Entwicklung von 
Geschichtswissenschaft und historischem Denken (Göttingen, 1979), 139.  
 4 
With only few exceptions, historians with impeccable conservative credentials—to 
say the least—were the ones who helped modernize the West German historical profession. 
Jerry Muller’s dictum regarding the postwar “deradicalization” of West German 
conservatism captures the situation among historians very well.8 “Deradicalized” 
conservatives such as Theodor Schieder, Karl Dietrich Erdmann, and Werner Conze became 
the West German historical profession’s leading figures beginning in the late 1950s. All of 
them had made at least some concessions to the Nazi regime, and all of them managed to 
cover the brown spots in their biographies throughout their long and successful careers in the 
Federal Republic.9 After 1945, these historians became long-term editors of the profession’s 
main journals—Schieder of Historische Zeitschrift (1959-1984), Erdmann of Geschichte in 
Wissenschaft und Unterricht (1950-1989)—or coordinated large-scale research, as did 
Werner Conze at the University of Heidelberg. Erdmann, Schieder, and Conze successively 
served as chairmen of the Verband der Historiker Deutschlands (VHD, Association of 
German Historians) between 1962 and 1976. Conze and especially Schieder trained a large 
number of historians who later came to advocate interpretive and methodological positions 
very different from their teachers. Conze also proved to be at least a cautious methodological 
modernizer; he began to develop his project of Strukturgeschichte during the 1950s. 
However one might evaluate its “brown roots”, which undoubtedly existed, one should still 
                                                
8 Jerry Muller, The Other God That Failed: Hans Freyer and the Deradicalization of German Conservatism 
(Princeton, 1987). 
9 Martin Kröger/Roland Thimme, Die Geschichtsbilder des Karl Dietrich Erdmann. Vom Dritten Reich zur 
Bundesrepublik (München, 1996); Winfried Schulze/Otto Gerhard Oexle (eds.), Deutsche Historiker im 
Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt am Main, 1999). 
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recognize that Strukturgeschichte signaled a methodological departure from much of 
previous German historiography.10  
This brief outline suggests that West German historiography of the 1950s overall 
defies a simplistic categorization. In many ways, the developments during this decade 
resemble those within the West German society at large. Most historians of the Federal 
Republic now argue that in many areas of society, liberalization processes began hesitantly 
during the later 1950s rather than in the 1960s, or more specifically, in 1968. But they also 
acknowledge that during the 1960s these processes accelerated and took on a new quality.11 
Similarly, while one has to recognize the historiographical changes of the late 1940s and 
1950s, it was not until the 1960s or even the 1970s that the West German historical 
profession significantly advanced towards the far-reaching goals Ritter had already proposed 
in 1949.  
The assessment of West German historians’ interpretive reorientation—from 
“apologia” toward a “revisionist” stance—obviously remains a matter of the observer’s own 
position. Yet it is evident that the methodological changes Ritter had demanded soon after 
the war did not take place until the 1960s. It was yet another generation of historians, born 
between the late 1920s and early 1940s that carried out this task. Many if not most of these 
historians developed and maintained close relationships with American historians of modern 
Germany. Thus, as historians agree about the role of the United States in the democratization 
                                                
10 See Thomas Etzemüller, Sozialgeschichte als politische Geschichte: Werner Conze und die Neuorientierung 
der westdeutschen Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945 (München, 2001); Lutz Raphael, “Trotzige Ablehnung, 
produktive Mißverständnisse und verborgene Affinitäten. Westdeutsche Antworten auf die Herausforderungen 
der ‘Annales’-Historiographie (1945-1960)”, in Heinz Duchhardt und Gerhard May (eds.), 
Geschichtswissenschaft um 1950 (Mainz, 2002), 65-80. 
11 See Ulrich Herbert (ed.), Wandlungsprozesse in Westdeutschland. Belastung, Integration, Liberalisierung 
1945-1980 (Göttingen, 2002). 
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process of the West German society,12 American scholars of German history usually receive 
credit for their contributions to the historiographical Vergangenheitsbewältigung. Expressing 
a commonly held view, Hans-Ulrich Wehler has remarked that  
“The transatlantic dialogue between American and German historians since 
the late 1940s is based on the fundamental experiences of the political 
generation that lived through the Nazi dictatorship, World War II, the postwar 
years and the founding of the Federal Republic. These common experiences 
led to close contacts; I am someone who has benefited immensely from them. 
The generations of Carl Schorske, Leonard Krieger, Hajo Holborn, Arno 
Mayer, Jim Sheehan, Henry Turner, Gerald Feldman, Charles Maier, and 
others, have influenced in a lasting way the political generations in Germany 
to which I belong.”13 
 
Indeed, Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s career exemplifies the development and the intensity 
of the transatlantic dialogue very well: Wehler first came to the United States as a Fulbright 
Student in 1952, when he spent a year at Ohio University, Athens. After completing his PhD 
in the Federal Republic, he returned in 1962, funded by the American Council of Learned 
Societies (ACLS), to conduct research for a study of American imperialism at Stanford 
University and at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. At Stanford he met Carl 
Schorske and, more importantly, Hans Rosenberg, who would become the most important 
American scholar for Wehler and many other social historians of his generation.14 Wehler, at 
that time Assistent of Theodor Schieder, even received a job offer at the University of 
California at Berkeley in 1963, mediated through Hans Rosenberg, which he eventually 
                                                
12 See, for example, Hermann-Josef Rupieper, Die Wurzeln der westdeutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie: der 
amerikanische Beitrag, 1945-1952 (Opladen, 1993). 
13 Andreas Daum, “German Historiography in a Transatlantic perspective: interview with Hans-Ulrich Wehler,” 
Bulletin of the German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C. 26 (2001), 121. 
14 I use “German” and “American” in this study to indicate where historians pursued their careers rather than to 
refer to their personal backgrounds. Otherwise Hans Rosenberg, born in Cologne and a student of Friedrich 
Meinecke’s, would not qualify as American.  
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turned down.15 He did, however, repeatedly return to the United States, as a visiting professor 
at Harvard (1972 and 1989), Princeton (1976), and Stanford (1983/84). Several American 
contributions to Wehler’s 1996 Festschrift also testify to his close contacts with the 
American historical profession.16 Finally, in 2000, the American Historical Association 
awarded Wehler its honorary foreign membership. 
As Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s remark indicates, after an almost complete standstill during 
the 1930s and early 1940s, scholarly contacts and cooperation between the two countries 
increased steadily, and for many German historians of Wehler’s generation the United States 
soon became an attractive place.  Participating in student exchange programs and, later in 
their careers, holding visiting professorships became increasingly desirable. It is not an 
exaggeration to state that in the field of modern German history, West German historians 
developed closer ties with their American colleagues than with historians of any other 
country. More generally, the intellectual dialogue between American and West German 
historians after 1945 was fundamentally shaped by the events and processes Hans-Ulrich 
Wehler mentioned. The different generations involved in this dialogue contributed to and 
experienced it in a multitude of ways.  
Shortly after the end of World War II, many American scholars had wondered if and 
how their German colleagues would overcome the nationalism and intellectual isolation that 
had characterized the vast majority of the German historical profession since 1933 if not 
since 1918. Already in 1941, Oscar J. Hammen had concluded his analysis of German 
                                                
15 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Eine lebhafte Kampfsituation: ein Interview mit Manfred Hettling und Cornelius Torp 
(München, 2006), 42. 
16 Manfred Hettling/Paul Nolte (eds.), Nation und Gesellschaft in Deutschland: Historische Essays (München, 
1996), which includes contributions by James J. Sheehan, Henry A. Turner, and Gerald D. Feldman. 
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historiography in the 1920s and 1930s with the claim that “the obvious rejection of ‘western’ 
ideas and institutions, the ‘revision’ of the liberal historiography of the nineteenth century by 
German historians since 1933, are but the intensification of tendencies which already were 
pronounced before the advent of the Nazi regime.”17 Not surprisingly, then, American 
historians paid close attention to the first attempts of their German contemporaries to explain 
the rise of National Socialism. 
In the Americans’ view, some German historians did better than others: Friedrich 
Meinecke’s 1946 essay Die deutsche Katastrophe garnered a generally favorable reception, 
and its author was awarded the American Historical Association’s honorary foreign 
membership in the following year.18 But Meinecke was, despite or rather because of his 
iconic status, not perceived as the typical representative of the German historical profession. 
That role was to remain with Gerhard Ritter, the first postwar chairman of the West German 
Historians’ Association and a very active public intellectual.19 Ritter had by no means been 
ardently opposed to all aspects of National Socialism, but had been imprisoned after 
Stauffenberg’s failed plot against Hitler in July 1944, due to a loose association with the 
Goerdeler resistance circle. After the end of the war Ritter was determined to prove that 
National Socialism had been a decisive break with all German traditions, and not an integral 
part – or even the logical culmination – of modern German history. His rather crude 
                                                
17 Oscar J. Hammen, “German Historians and the Advent of the National Socialist State,” Journal of Modern 
History 13 (1941), 188. 
18 Already in 1933, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences had made Meinecke a Foreign Honorary 
Member; in 1935 he had become an Honorary Member of the Massachusetts Historical Society and in 1936, 
Harvard University awarded Meinecke an honorary doctorate. 
19 For Ritter’s role in the postwar West German historical profession, see the comprehensive biography by 
Christoph Cornelissen, Gerhard Ritter: Geschichtswissenschaft und Politik im 20. Jahrhundert (Düsseldorf, 
2001). 
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apologia, referring to National Socialism as “not an authentic Prussian plant, but an Austrian-
Bavarian import,”20 met with considerable resistance among American historians. Felix 
Gilbert thus criticized the “rather nationalistic bias in Ritter’s tendency to excuse dangerous 
and deplorable German developments and even to consider them justified if somewhat 
similar developments have occurred in other countries.”21 
Fifteen years later, American scholars of modern Germany assumed a significant role 
in a debate that not only upset the West German historical profession but also generated a 
public debate in which countless newspaper readers wrote letters to the editor and which 
prompted even the German Bundestag to address the controversial issue. In 1961, the 
German historian Fritz Fischer had published his groundbreaking study on the German 
Empire’s war aims during the First World War, Griff nach der Weltmacht. In this study, 
Fischer pointed to continuities between Germany’s war aims in both World Wars and argued, 
moreover, that the German Empire bore an important part of the responsibility for the 
outbreak of the First World War.22 Seen by many as almost a traitor, Fischer faced strong 
headwind from his German colleagues, who initially contented themselves with attacking 
him in scholarly journals. Eventually, however, they resorted to sabotaging Fischer’s lecture 
tour to several American universities that had been planned for the spring of 1964 by 
convincing the German Foreign Office (which was supposed to fund Fischer’s trip) that it 
was not in West Germany’s “national interest” for Fischer to present his views abroad. 
                                                
20 Gerhard Ritter, Geschichte als Bildungsmacht: ein Beitrag zur historisch-politischen Neubesinnung 
(Stuttgart, 1946), 29. 
21 Felix Gilbert, “Review of Gerhard Ritter, Geschichte als Bildungsmacht: ein Beitrag zur historisch-
politischen Neubesinnung,“ American Historical Review 53 (1948), 788. 
22 Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht: die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914-1918 
(Düsseldorf, 1961). 
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Several American historians responded by publishing an open letter in the German weekly 
Die Zeit condemning the cancellation. They then secured sufficient financial means through 
the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) to invite Fischer to lecture in the United 
States. Eventually Fritz Stern backed Fischer at a panel discussion at the German 
Historikertag in 1964, underscoring the need to examine continuities in modern German 
history instead of de-contextualizing National Socialism from the course of German 
history.23 
Such episodes appear to emphasize the degree to which the rethinking of modern 
German history in the postwar decades has been a transatlantic enterprise. More importantly, 
both American reactions to Gerhard Ritter’s apologetic writings in the late 1940s and the 
American support for Fritz Fischer in the mid-1960s suggest that American historians of 
modern Germany generally favored interpretations that sought to critically reconsider 
German history for the origins of National Socialism. Therefore it is not surprising that 
historians have told the story of post-1945 German-American historiographical relations as a 
story of West Germans proceeding, with steady American help, on their “long way West.” 
While this popular master narrative certainly covers many aspects of the German-American 
scholarly community’s development, the historiographical story is much more complicated. 
Even the Fischer-Kontroverse, usually the prime example of the transatlantic fight for the 
good historiographical cause, unfolded in a more complex manner: writing to Hans Herzfeld 
several weeks after Fischer’s United States lecture tour, Hans Rosenberg provided a candid – 
and devastating – assessment: “Fischer’s appearance here [at Berkeley], as I indicated 
                                                
23 For American involvement in the notorious Fischer-Kontroverse, see my article “Fritz Fischer and the 
American Historical Profession: tracing the Transatlantic Dimension of the Fischer-Kontroverse,” Storia della 
Storiografia 44 (2003), 67-84. 
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already, turned out to be a great intellectual and scholarly disappointment [eine große geistig-
wissenschaftliche Enttäuschung]. Had the German Foreign Office not tried to silence him, he 
would have encountered strong criticism over here. But given the political background we all 
turned a blind eye on his assumptions and at times sloppy methods, even though we by no 
means endorse them.”24 This example suggests that American support for German 
iconoclasts was not necessarily unconditional. A comprehensive and plausible account of the 
transatlantic community of scholars therefore needs to move beyond a simplistic 
interpretation that suggests American and progressive German historians working steadily 
toward the same goal. In the pages that follow, I will trace this story from the early postwar 
years up into the 1980s. 
Through the transatlantic scholarly community of German history, several 
generations of German historians have developed, or in some cases, resumed close ties with 
their American colleagues. To name but a few, Gerhard Ritter (born 1888) repeatedly spent 
long periods of time in the United States, as did Fritz Fischer (born 1908). In the spring term 
of 1960, Walther Hubatsch (born 1915) taught at the University of Kansas. However, as 
Hans-Ulrich Wehler (born 1931) suggested in the interview quoted above, the American 
scholarly community of modern German history has been and remains a particularly 
important source of inspiration for historians of his generation. These scholars, born between 
ca. 1930 and 1940, encountered the United States relatively early in their careers, either as 
students or as post-doctoral fellows. Historians of this generation, whom Paul Nolte recently 
labeled the “Historians of the Federal Republic,” have shaped the West German historical 
                                                
24 Hans Rosenberg to Hans Herzfeld, 24 May 1964, BAK, NL Herzfeld, Box 12. 
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profession from the late 1960s and early 1970 up to the present day.25 Moreover, most of 
these historians saw themselves not only as scholars but also as public intellectuals and 
therefore repeatedly left the ivory tower to contribute to controversial political debates, from 
the signing of the Ostverträge in the early 1970s to the possible membership of Turkey in the 
European Union since 2005. 
From a historiographical perspective, however, the actual accomplishment of this 
generation was to suggest an alternative to the “German conception of history,” to invoke the 
title of Georg Iggers seminal work on German historicism.26 While German historians of 
Wehler’s generation followed different paths in their pursuit of “history beyond historicism” 
(Wolfgang J. Mommsen),27 the project most closely associated with American academia was 
the “Bielefeld School” of Historical Social Science (Historische Sozialwissenschaft). This 
historical school arguably went furthest in it repudiation of both the interpretive and 
methodological traditions of German historiography, and its protagonists claimed to develop 
their alternative in a close dialogue with their American colleagues.28  
It has already become apparent that this study views the German-American scholarly 
community as one consisting of American and West German scholars. This focus is less a 
result of anti-Marxism or the author’s West German obliviousness of East Germany’s 
existence, but rather due to the fact that with very few exceptions, East German historians did 
                                                
25 Paul Nolte, “Die Historiker der Bundesrepublik: Rückblick auf eine ‘lange Generation,’” Merkur 53 (1999), 
413-431. 
26 Georg Iggers, The German Conception of History: The National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder 
to the Present (Middletown, 1968). 
27 This was the title of Mommsen’s inaugural lecture at the Universität Düsseldorf. See Wolfgang J. Mommsen, 
Die Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Historismus (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1971) 
28 See, for example, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Eine lebhafte Kampfsituation: ein Gespräch mit Manfred Hettling und 
Cornelius Torp (München, 2006). 
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not travel to the United States until the 1980s, and that personal intellectual exchange 
through letters was likewise extremely limited.29 East German scholars and their works are, 
however, a part of this dissertation insofar as American and West German scholars received, 
discussed, rejected, or sometimes even relied on them. For the West Germans, rejection was 
the predominant attitude, while some Americans, especially Andreas Dorpalen and Georg 
Iggers, strove for a more differentiated response. 
Ultimately, my dissertation offers an account of the transatlantic scholarly community 
of modern German history in the first four decades after the Second World War and 
simultaneously contributes to the historicizing of the Bielefeld School as an important 
scholarly group within West German historiography. Both the transatlantic connections of 
West German historians and the Bielefeld School of Historical Social Science are key issues 
in postwar historiography, and both have thus far largely escaped historians’ attention. By 
analyzing the Bielefeld School and the transatlantic scholarly community in connection, I 
want to add a transnational dimension to the flourishing field of the history of the West 
German historical profession. 
 
Historiography 
Accounts of the field of German history in the United States, usually essays and 
articles rather than monographs, are still very scarce. In addition, some of these few 
historiographical surveys examine European history in general rather than German history in 
                                                
29 See Georg Iggers, Two Lives in Uncertain Times: Facing the Challenges of the 20th Century as Scholars & 
Citizens (New York, 2006), 143-168; Fritz Klein, Drinnen und Draußen: ein Historiker in der DDR (Frankfurt 
am Main, 2000), 274-290. 
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particular.30 Several articles have traced various aspects of the field of German history or 
outlined its development as a whole, but they have for obvious reasons relied on monographs 
and articles exclusively, and have not considered archival sources. Generally, a consensus 
exists that American scholarly interest in modern European and especially modern German 
history increased considerably because “the collapse of democracy and the abandonment of 
liberalism certainly was the major historical theme for American historians during the 
decades after 1945.”31 This growing attention manifested itself institutionally: as Kenneth 
Barkin has stated, “the three decades following World War II witnessed the solid 
establishment of German history as a critical part of the curriculum of every major American 
university.”32 
While the increasing interest in Germany’s past and future led to a quantitative 
extension of the field German history, a number of émigré historians helped strengthen its 
quality. Prior to the Second World War, historians such as Bernadotte Schmitt, Sidney Fay, 
and William Langer had already proven the level of distinction of American scholars of 
German history. In addition, the debate about the outbreak and the course of World War I 
revealed that American historiography on modern Germany was far from uniform and 
                                                
30 Exceptions include Fritz Stern, “German History in America, 1884 – 1984,” Central European History 19 
(1986), 131-163; Charles E. McClelland, “German Intellectual History,” Central European History 19 (1986), 
164-173; Gerald D. Feldman, “German Economic History,” Central European History 19 (1986), 174-185; 
Konrad H. Jarausch, “German Social History – American Style,” Journal of Social History 19 (1985), 349-359. 
For German history as part of the European field see Leonard Krieger, “European History in America,” in John 
Higham (ed.), History (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1965), 233-313; Volker R. Berghahn/Charles S. Maier, “Modern 
Europe in American Historical Writing,” in Anthony Molho/Gordon Wood (eds.), Imagined Histories: 
American Historians Interpret the Past (Princeton, 1998), 393-414. 
31 Berghahn/Maier, “Modern Europe in American Historical Writing,” 402. 
32 Kenneth D. Barkin, “German Émigré Historians in America: the Fifties, Sixties, and Seventies”, in Hartmut 
Lehmann/James J. Sheehan (eds.), An Interrupted Past: German-Speaking Refugee Historians in the United 
States after 1933 (Cambridge, UK, 1991), 153. 
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comprised a variety of positions.33 But émigré historians who arrived in the United States 
mostly during the 1930s added a new perspective.  
On the one hand, a number of first generation émigrés, who had received their 
academic training in Germany, left their mark on the American historical profession.34 These 
scholars, many of whom had been students of Friedrich Meinecke at the University of Berlin 
in the 1910s and 1920s, include Hans Rothfels, Gerhard Masur, Dietrich Gerhard, Hajo 
Holborn, Felix Gilbert, and Hans Rosenberg.35 Especially Holborn, Gilbert, and Rosenberg 
turned out to be influential both as scholars and as teachers, as numerous recollections 
reveal.36 Therefore literature on these historians often resorts to a “great men make 
historiography” approach.37 In addition, with the exception of Rothfels this first generation of 
émigrés generally appears politically liberal and thus in favor of an in-depth revision of 
historiography on modern Germany. Such an evaluation, however, does not do full justice to 
the individuals belonging to this generation who had different ideas regarding the ideal extent 
and character of historiographical revision.   
                                                
33 Compare Bernadotte Schmitt, The Coming of War, 2 vol. (New York, 1930), and Sidney B. Fay, The Origins 
of the World War, 2 volumes, (New York, 1929). 
34 See the essays in Lehmann/Sheehan (eds.), An Interrupted Past. 
35 See the collection of letters recently published by Gerhard A. Ritter, Friedrich Meinecke: Akademischer 
Lehrer und emigrierte Schüler: Briefe und Aufzeichnungen 1910 – 1977 (München, 2006). See also Felix 
Gilbert’s account “The Historical Seminar of the University of Berlin in the Twenties,” in Lehmann/Sheehan, 
An Interrupted Past, 67-70. 
36 Hartmut Lehmann (ed.), Felix Gilbert as Scholar and Teacher (Washington, DC: German Historical Institute 
1992); Eugene Genovese, “Hans Rosenberg at Brooklyn College: A Communist Student’s Recollection of the 
Classroom as a War Zone,” Central European History 24 (1991), 51-57; Shulamit Volkov, “Hans Rosenberg as 
a Teacher: A Few Personal Notes,” Central European History 24 (1991), 58-64; as well as the numerous 
articles in the issue “In Memory of Hajo Holborn, 1902-1969” Central European History 3 (1970). 
37 See especially Ritter’s introduction to Friedrich Meinecke: Akademischer Lehrer und emigrierte Schüler, 
105-111. 
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On the other hand, already in the early 1950s the second generation of émigré 
historians began their careers. Scholars such as George Mosse, Klaus Epstein, Peter Gay, 
Fritz Stern, Gerhard Weinberg, and Georg Iggers had been born in Germany (or in Austria, 
such as Raul Hilberg, and Poland, such as Theodore Hamerow) but received their academic 
training in the United States. While some of them have published memoirs covering at least 
parts of their careers, only George Mosse’s has received scholarly scrutiny thus far.38 
Recently, Steven Aschheim has examined Mosse, Stern, Gay, and Walter Laqueur as a group 
with distinctive autobiographical characteristics, which he argues explain the brand of 
intellectual and cultural history they later developed.39 While my dissertation follows 
Aschheim’s interpretation of these historians’ intellectual development, it will offer a more 
comprehensive assessment of the generation of émigrés, which comprised scholars of very 
different methodological orientations. Ultimately, this dissertation will place greater 
emphasis on the question of the second generation of émigrés’ significance in both the field 
of modern German history in the United States and the transatlantic scholarly community. 
Linked to the trajectory of the field of German history in the United States is the 
development of scholarly relations between American historians and their German colleagues 
after the Second World War. Reflecting upon a century of German history in the United 
States in 1984, Fritz Stern described the scholarly relations between American and German 
                                                
38 The memoirs include Raul Hilberg, The Politics of Memory: the Journey of a Holocaust Historian (Chicago, 
1996); Peter Gay, My German Question: Growing Up in Nazi Berlin (New Haven, 1998); George L. Mosse, 
Confronting History: A Memoir (Madison, 2000); Wilma and Georg Iggers, Two Lives in Uncertain Times: 
Facing the Challenges of the 20th Century as Scholars & Citizens (New York, 2006); Fritz Stern, Five 
Germanys I Have Known (New York, 2006). An evaluation of Mosse’s work provides the collection by Stanley 
Payne et al (eds.), What History Tells: George L. Mosse and the Culture of Modern Europe (Madison, 2004). 
39 Steven Aschheim, “The Tensions of Historical Wissenschaft: The Émigré Historians and the Making of 
German Cultural History,” in Id., Beyond the Border: The German-Jewish Legacy Abroad (Princeton, 2007), 
45-80. 
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historians during this period as moving “from dependency through a kind of academic 
emancipation and political antagonism to equality and collaboration.”40 By and large, one can 
hardly dispute Stern’s view of the development after 1945. For the 1930s and early 1940s, 
however, John L. Harvey has recently suggested a much greater affinity between many 
American historians of Europe (not only Germany) and their German colleagues favoring the 
Nationalist or even National Socialist Right.41 But even Harvey concedes that the 1950s 
marked a watershed, when a new generation of scholars of German history assumed their 
positions. Building upon these older and more recent views, my dissertation will assess the 
degree to which the writing of modern German history indeed became a common 
transatlantic project. 
This very emphasis on the writing, or rather the re-writing of modern German history 
as a common transatlantic enterprise, especially beginning in the 1960s, has in recent years 
almost become a cliché. As Ernst Schulin put it succinctly, “Anglo-American critical interest 
in German history influenced and assisted in the modernization of West German historical 
writing.”42 Virtually every single account of postwar German-American historiography 
echoes this point of view.43 However, a comprehensive analysis of this subject will reveal a 
                                                
40 Stern, “German History in America, 1884 – 1984,” 132. 
41 John L. Harvey, “Our Nazi Past: American Professors of European History in Collaboration with the Nazi 
State,” paper delivered at the Annual Conference of the German Studies Association, San Diego, Oct 5, 2007. 
See also Harvey’s The Common Adventure of Mankind: Academic Historians and an Atlantic Identity in the 
Twentieth Century (PhD Dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 2003). 
42 Ernst Schulin, “German and American Historiography in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” in 
Lehmann/Sheehan, An Interrupted Past, 31. 
43 See Wolfgang J. Mommsen, The Return to the Western Tradition: German Historiography since 1945 
(Washington, D.C., 1991); Georg Iggers, “Introduction”, in Ibid., The Social History of Politics: Critical 
Perspectives in West German Historical Writing Since 1945 (Leamington Spa, 1985), 1-45; Andreas Daum, 
“German Historiography in Transatlantic perspective: interview with Hans-Ulrich Wehler”, Bulletin of the 
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more complex picture. In his study on the intellectual exchange between American and 
European social reformers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Daniel T. 
Rodgers has identified “perception, misperception, translation, transformation, co-optation, 
preemption, and contestation” as its defining features.44 All of them seem to constitute the 
field of post-1945 German-American historiography as well. 
In recent years, historians have published extensively on the first decade and a half of 
post-1945 West German historiography.45 Several influential historians have found their 
biographers, while other studies have taken a broader view and focused on historical schools 
or particular trends within the entire profession.46 Even though these studies differ 
significantly in their focus on methodological, interpretive, and political aspects as well as in 
their evaluations, they have in sum provided a fairly nuanced picture of the immediate 
postwar West German historical profession. Winfried Schulze’s account of West German 
historiography during the first postwar decade and a half, published in 1989, set the 
interpretive tone: after some initial attempts to reconsider previously held methodological 
and interpretive assumptions, the overwhelming majority of West German historians during 
                                                                                                                                                  
German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C., 26 (2001), 121f.; Jürgen Kocka, Sozialgeschichte: Begriff – 
Entwicklung – Probleme (Göttingen, 1977), 40. 
44 Daniel T. Rodgers, “An Age of Social Politics,” in Thomas Bender (ed.), Rethinking American History in a 
Global Age (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2002), 260. 
45 The starting point is still Schulze, Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945. 
46 See the biographies by Christoph Cornelissen, Gerhard Ritter: Geschichtswissenschaft und Politik im 20. 
Jahrhundert (Düsseldorf, 2001); Jan Eckel, Hans Rothfels: Eine intellektuelle Biographie im 20. Jahrhundert 
(Göttingen, 2005); Eduard Mühle, Für Volk und deutschen Osten: der Historiker Hermann Aubin und die 
Ostforschung (Düsseldorf, 2005). A broader view is taken by Thomas Etzemüller, Sozialgeschichte als 
politische Geschichte: Werner Conze und die Neuorientierung der westdeutschen Geschichtswissenschaft nach 
1945 (München, 2001); and by Sebastian Conrad, Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Nation: 
Geschichtsschreibung in Westdeutschland und Japan, 1945 – 1960 (Göttingen, 1999); Nicolas Berg, Der 
Holocaust und die westdeutschen Historiker: Erforschung und Erinnerung (Göttingen, 2003); and Norbert Frei 
(ed.), Martin Broszat, der “Staat Hitlers,” und die Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus (Göttingen, 2007). 
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the 1950s returned to traditional political history, and the very few dissenters met with 
considerable resistance.47 
By contrast, the 1960s and 1970s have thus far not received appropriate attention, and 
therefore this dissertation’s emphasis will lie on these decades. Given the tremendous 
quantitative changes taking place within the historical profession during that time, this lack 
of attention is highly surprising: between 1960 and 1975, the number of professorships 
quadrupled, and the number of Assistenten grew by six times.48 In addition, since the 1960s 
generally figure as the decade during which the West German historians overcame – or at 
least began to overcome – the parochialism of the immediate postwar years, it is high time to 
historicize this period. After all, political, economic, and cultural historians have already 
shifted their attention to the Federal Republic during the 1970s.49  
Most of the historiographical texts on the 1960s are either contributions by historians 
who were involved in the fierce debates of the 1970s, or later attempts at (self-)historicizing 
by the same scholars.50 Interpretively, the controversies have centered on the evaluation of 
the German Empire and its historical links with Nazi Germany – the notorious “continuities 
                                                
47 Schulze, Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945, 302-303. 
48 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, “Zur Lage der Geschichtswissenschaft in der Bundesrepublik 1949-1979,” in Id., 
Historische Sozialwissenschaft und Geschichtsschreibung: Studien zu Aufgaben und Traditionen deutscher 
Geschichtswissenschaft (Göttingen, 1980), 31. An Assistant is roughly equivalent to the rank of assistant 
professor. However, an Assistent generally also performs research as well as administrative tasks for an 
Ordinarius/full professor, on whom he or she is dependent. 
49 See, for example, Konrad H. Jarausch (ed.), Das Ende der Zuversicht. Die siebziger Jahre als Geschichte 
(Göttingen, 2008); Andselm Doering-Manteuffel/Lutz Raphael, Nach dem Boom. Perspektiven auf die 
Zeitgeschichte seit 1970 (Göttingen, 2008). 
50 The most prolific observer, as well as one of the main protagonists, of these developments is Hans-Ulrich 
Wehler. His writings include Geschichte als Historische Sozialwissenschaft (Frankfurt am Main, 1973); 
“Moderne Politikgeschichte oder ‘Grosse Politik der Kabinette’?“ Geschichte und Gesellschaft 1 (1975), 344-
369;  “Kritik und kritische Antikritik,“ Historische Zeitschrift 225 (1977), 347 – 384; Historisches Denken am 
Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts (Göttingen, 2000). 
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in German history.”51 Methodologically, historians have argued about the advantages and 
disadvantages of history’s connection with the social sciences, as well as the question of 
whether diplomatic history should be constituted as a subfield of an all-encompassing 
“history of society” (Gesellschaftsgeschichte). While Hans-Ulrich Wehler has been the most 
vocal proponent of the latter, he has of course not been the only one. Jürgen Kocka’s 
programmatic volume Sozialgeschichte belongs in the same category, just like a number of 
articles of articles by scholars who belong to the same age cohort without being partisan to 
the Bielefeld School in the narrow sense.52  Finally, the debate’s political dimension revolved 
around the validity of “critical historiography,” which the Bielefeld School’s protagonists 
emphasized and which their opponents rejected at least as adamantly.53 Building upon not 
only the protagonists’ works but also institutional and personal papers, this dissertation will 
thus provide the first in-depth analysis of this story’s various dimensions. 
 
                                                
51 See Fritz Fischer, Bündnis der Eliten. Zur Kontinuität der Machtstrukturen in Deutschland 1871 – 1945, 
(Düsseldorf, 1979). A key critique provides Thomas Nipperdey, “1933 und die Kontinuität in der deutschen 
Geschichte,” Historische Zeitschrift 222 (1978), 86-111. 
52 Jürgen Kocka, Sozialgeschichte: Begriff—Entwicklung—Probleme (Göttingen, 1977); Wolfgang J. 
Mommsen, Die Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Historismus (Düsseldorf, 1971); Dieter Groh, Kritische 
Geschichtswissenschat in emanzipatorischer Absicht. Überlegungen zur Geschichte als Sozialwissenschaft 
(Stuttgart, 1973); Imanuel Geiss, Studien über Geschichte und Geschichtswissenschaft (Frankfurt am Main, 
1972); Arnold Sywottek, Geschichtswissenschaft in der Legitimationskrise: ein Überblick über die Diskussion 
um Theorie und Didaktik der Geschichte in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1969-1973 (Bonn, 1974). 
53 Andreas Hillgruber, “Politische Geschichte in moderner Sicht“, Historische Zeitschrift 216 (1973), 529 – 
552; Klaus Hildebrand, “Geschichte oder ‘Gesellschaftsgeschichte’? Die Notwendigkeit einer politischen 
Geschichtsschreibung von den internationalen Beziehungen“, Historische Zeitschrift 223 (1976), 328 – 357; 
Thomas Nipperdey, “Wehlers ‘Kaiserreich’. Eine kritische Auseinandersetzung“, Geschichte und Gesellschaft 1 
(1975), 539 – 560; Karl-Georg Faber, „Geschichtswissenschaft als retrospektive Politik? Bemerkungen zu 
einem Aufsatz von Hans-Ulrich Wehler,“ Geschichte und Gesellschaft 6 (1980), 574-585. 
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Between the “primacy of methodology” and “radical constructivism” 
As Christoph and Sebastian Conrad have pointed out, a “primacy of methodology” 
has long dominated historiographical studies.54 Their authors have generally attempted to 
legitimize or de-legitimize a particular methodological approach. In this dissertation, I view 
the methodological dimension differently: I am more interested in the particular role debates 
about methodology played within the transatlantic scholarly community than in assessing the 
heuristic value of particular methods and theories. While the latter is unquestionably 
significant, it all-too-often assumes a self-serving character. Instead, one should ask, for 
example, whether and why historians used foreign methodological trends to bolster their own 
position within the domestic debate. 
As the history of historiography has become a widening and flourishing field, it has 
also become subject to an intensive theoretical and methodological debate.55 At the forefront 
of methodological reflection, Thomas Etzemüller has suggested “radical constructivism” as 
heuristically most promising for historiographical studies. Etzemüller asks: “what constitutes 
historiography – a past reality which is (re-)constructed by historians, and which guides this 
reconstruction? Or is it the practices of historians in the present, independent from what they 
label as ‘past’ and what they assume to be ‘reality’?”56 Etzemüller believes the latter to be the 
case, and has subsequently developed a “radical constructivist” heuristic model based on 
Ludwik Fleck’s Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache, Michel 
                                                
54 See Christoph Conrad/Sebastian Conrad, “Wie vergleicht man Historiographien?”, in Id. Die Nation 
schreiben: Geschichtswissenschaft im internationale Vergleich (Göttingen, 2002), 25. 
55 The most recent publication is Jan Eckel/Christoph Etzemüller (eds.), Neue Zugänge zur Geschichte der 
Geschichtswissenschaft (Göttingen, 2007). 
56 Etzemüller, “’Ich sehe was was Du nicht siehst’: wie entsteht historische Erkenntnis?”, in Eckel/Etzemüller 
(eds.), Neue Zugänge zur Geschichte der Geschichtswissenschaft, 27. 
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Foucault’s discourse analysis, and Pierre Bourdieu’s habitus concept.57 Etzemüller’s study on 
Werner Conze’s social history has profoundly influenced my thinking about historiography, 
and Fleck, Foucault, and Bourdieu have sharpened historians’ awareness of the various 
conditions in the present that guide the historians’ approaches to the past. Yet the claim that 
one cannot find any access to a past reality (Etzemüller does not deny that such a reality 
exists) does not seem convincing to me. While older historiographical studies have not given 
the constructivist element of historiography its appropriate weight, recent works have 
overemphasized this very factor. 
Of the three theoreticians mentioned above, this dissertation is particularly indebted 
to Ludwik Fleck. His classic Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache 
(genesis and development of a scientific fact) offers two heuristically valuable models, the 
“thought style” (Denkstil) and the “thought collective” (Denkkollektiv). Fleck defines a 
“thought collective” as “community of people who are in a constant process of exchanging 
thoughts” and who therefore share certain perceptions and assumptions.58 This common way 
of perceiving the world is what Fleck terms “thought style.” This style usually finds its 
expression in a distinct vocabulary which scholars of a single thought collective share. 
Fleck’s understanding of a thought collective seems somewhat rigid, as he argues that 
perception/cognition (Erkenntnis) and the subsequent genesis of a new thought are only 
possible within a thought collective, and not individually. While this position appears too 
                                                
57 Ludwik Fleck, Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache: Einführung in die Lehre vom 
Denkstil und Denkkollektiv (Frankfurt am Main, 1993); Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge (New 
York, 1972); Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice:  (Cambridge, UK, 1977). 
58 Fleck, Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache, 54/55. 
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radical, Fleck’s emphasis on the social and historical dimensions of scholarly communities is 
important and informs this study.   
Theoretically, an entire scholarly community may form such a thought collective, 
agreeing on basic assumptions and methods. Yet considering the epistemological and 
methodological differences between the historians under review in this study, it seems 
preferable to analyze a single historical school, such as the Bielefelder Schule, as one distinct 
thought collective. Then one can ask more precisely: how did this particular group of 
historians make sense of their world, i.e. both modern German history and the Federal 
Republic, as opposed to historians with very different methodological and political positions? 
What language did they develop and employ to describe the phenomena they were 
analyzing? 
Fleck’s thought style model has drawn the historians’ attention to the social 
dimension of knowledge production, and his insights link with Pierre Bourdieu’s field 
concept: it aims at uncovering the social conditions that help generate historical knowledge.59 
Rather than viewing an academic field as a “scientific community” (with an emphasis on 
community) in which scholars are primarily cooperating with one another, the field concept 
stresses its antagonistic quality and describes the scientific process as a struggle for social 
recognition. Therefore the field concept looks at social milieus, institutions, and networks, in 
which scholars of a certain field operate. It does not neglect the intellectual dimension of 
historiography, but rather combines an intellectual and a social focus. The field concept is 
equally interested in the producers of historical knowledge and their products. But rather 
                                                
59 For the following, see Olaf Blaschke/Lutz Raphael, “Im Kampf um Positionen: Änderungen im Feld der 
französischen und deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945,” in Eckel/Etzemüller (eds.), Neue Zugänge zur 
Geschichte der Geschichtswissenschaft, 69-109. 
 24 
than simply to assume that the “best” or most convincing historical work will receive the 
appropriate recognition, it seeks to uncover the power relationships within the academic 
fields that help promote certain views and tend to suppress others.  
 These reflections also have consequences for this dissertation itself, which is a 
product of the very field it analyzes. Rather than claiming an “objective” position that 
preceding observers have not been able to attain, the study follows Peter Novick’s position 
on this issue of objectivity. In his seminal That Noble Dream, Novick contends that the ideal 
of historical objectivity is neither true nor false, neither right nor wrong: “I find it not just 
essentially contested, but essentially confused.”60 As he has subsequently shown, “the 
evolution of historians’ attitudes on the objectivity question has always been closely tied to 
changing social, political, cultural, and professional contexts.”61 Therefore all a historical 
work, including this one, can aim at is plausibility, and accordingly the goal of this 
dissertation is to provide a plausible analysis of the German-American community of 
historians after World War II.  
Social, economic, cultural, and intellectual contacts between the United States and 
Europe in the 20th century, and in particular after 1945, have come under scholarly scrutiny 
during the last two decades, resulting in the Westernization/Americanization debate. Hence a 
study on a German-American community of historians between the 1940s and the 1970s has 
to be placed within this context. Historians have understood Westernization as a process of 
intercultural transfer between Europe and the United States that began in the late 18th and 
                                                
60 Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession 
(Cambridge, UK, 1988), 6. 
61 Novick, That Noble Dream, 628. 
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early 19th centuries. Westernization has at times meant phases of European influence on the 
United States, and at other times phases of American influence on Europe. Anselm Doering-
Manteuffel has defined Westernization as the “development of common values in societies 
on both sides of the North Atlantic.”62 By contrast, Americanization usually refers to a 
process in which non-American countries and societies are at the receiving end, without in 
turn influencing the Unites States. This is true despite the fact that the process is often seen as 
taking place as selective appropriation.63 In the most general sense, the West German 
historical profession thus certainly underwent a Westernization process rather than an 
Americanization process. German émigrés had a considerable impact on the American field 
of German history, and German historians became increasingly receptive to developments 
within the American historical profession. Yet the Americanization concept can still be 
useful for this study, precisely because of its elusiveness, following Rob Kroes, who defines 
the term as “a shorthand reference to what is essentially a black box in the simple diagram of 
cultural transmission and reception.”64 As we will see, West German historians’ ideas of the 
United States and the American historical profession often differed greatly from one another 
– at least in part a result of the pluralized character of the American field. And as in the realm 
of popular culture, selective appropriation also took place within the scholarly community. 
Finally, one should mention that the term has been used in the context of Americanization 
                                                
62 Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, Wie westlich sind die Deutschen? Amerikanisierung und Westernisierung im 20. 
Jarhundert (Göttingen, 1999), 12.  
63 Philipp Gassert, “Amerikanismus, Antiamerikanismus, Amerikanisierung: neue Literatur zur Sozial-, 
Wirtschafts- und Kulturgeschichte des amerikanischen Einflusses in Deutschland und Europa,” Archiv für 
Sozialgeschichte 39 (1999), 532. 
64 Rob Kroes, “Introduction”, in Id., If You’ve Seen One, You’ve Seen the Mall: Europeans and American Mass 
Culture (Urbana and Chicago, 1996), xi. 
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debates mostly to analyze allegedly deplorable developments in Europe and elsewhere. In the 
extant literature on West German historiography, in contrast, historians have referred to 
Americanization or American influences as an unquestionably positive feature. 
A comprehensive history of the historical profession, or any other academic field, 
must not separate questions of content from questions of style. In this context, the Norwegian 
social scientist Johan Galtung has drawn attention to specific national academic styles. 
Galtung has famously contrasted four distinctive intellectual styles, constructing the ideal 
types of the “Saxonic”, the “Teutonic”, the “Gallic”, and the “Nipponic” intellectual style.65 
Among other elements, Galtung distinguished between the rather conversational style of 
debate in Anglo-American academia and the more contentious style of debate within its 
German counterpart. Of course, such distinctions should be taken with at least a grain of salt. 
But it is important to ask now only what lay at the heart of a particular scholarly controversy 
but how these debates were carried out – especially in a study that transcends national 
borders. 
Since this dissertation focuses equally on the intellectual and social processes 
constituting historiography, it also combines a quantitative and a qualitative dimension. On 
the one hand, any comprehensive analysis of a historiographical field requires some degree 
of statistical coverage. For example, one can judge the interest in a particular topic or period 
or the prominence of certain methodological trends by the number of articles that were 
published in scholarly journals, and by the number of monographs that appeared. Of course, 
such an analysis also has to consider who edited journals and reviewed books for publication 
                                                
65 Johan Galtung, “Structure, Culture, and Intellectual Style: an Essay Comparing Saxonic, Teutonic, Gallic, 
and Nipponic Approaches”, in Social Science Information 20, 6 (1981), 817-856. 
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and thus significantly influenced or even controlled what was published. Here, considerations 
of “quality” (itself a problematic category) were not always decisive.66 While a 
comprehensive evaluation of journals and publisher’s lists form the basis of the dissertation’s 
quantitative aspect, historians’ personal papers are indispensable for a look “behind the 
scenes” that reveals professional power structures. While nobody would deny the impact of 
these structures, influential scholars in particular are often unwilling to acknowledge them, as 
the admission would contradict the ideal of objectivity.67 
My analysis of both the post-1945 German-American scholarly community and the 
controversial developments within the German historical profession in the late 1960s and 
1970s considers their interpretive as well as methodological, institutional, and political 
dimensions. These dimensions of course overlap in various ways and are treated separately 
only in order to discuss the dissertation’s source basis. 
Regarding the institutional dimension, I have examined the papers of the American 
Historical Association and of its German counterpart, the Verband der Historiker 
Deutschlands. Apart from covering matters pertaining to its organization, the AHA papers at 
the Library of Congress also contain some editorial files of the American Historical Review. 
For the AHR’s German equivalent, Historische Zeitschrift, the personal papers of its long-
term editor Theodor Schieder (he held that position between 1957 and 1984) have proven 
                                                
66 In 1964, Theodor Schieder, editor of Historische Zeitschrift, decided to publish an article by Fritz Fischer 
only because he was afraid that a failure to do so might appear as censorship of a historian who held views on 
the German Empire’s policies during World War I which were very unpopular among his German colleagues. 
Schieder explicitly referred to the “distorted view of the German historical profession” many American 
colleagues had, as they were distinguishing “between progressive and reactionary historians.” See Schieders 
letter to Gerhard Ritter, 9 November 1964, Nachlass Theodor Schieder, Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter 
BAK), Box 243. 
67 For the American historical profession, the key study is Novick, That Noble Dream. 
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enormously insightful. Since Schieder also served as chairman of the Verband der Historiker 
Deutschlands, his papers shed light on the association’s development as well. 
For both the methodological and the interpretive dimensions, I am relying primarily 
on the body of scholarly work that the historians belonging to the German-American 
scholarly community have produced. An analysis of the leading German and American 
scholarly journals illustrates prevailing trends at a given time. But again, historians’ personal 
papers supply important additional information. The tendency to discuss interpretive and 
methodological questions in letters overall might have declined after the 1950s, when the 
phone became he main medium to exchange these views. George Mosse, for example, 
preferred to call rather than to write to his colleagues and his papers accordingly contain very 
little of relevance in this respect. And yet, one finds counter-examples even in the mid-1970s, 
and these have been very illuminating. 
The bulk of the personal papers of German historians on which this dissertation draws 
are located at the Bundesarchiv Koblenz. It would have been impossible to analyze the 
papers of all historians belonging to the German-American scholarly community. Some have 
not left any personal papers, and the existing Nachlässe are extremely scattered. Yet the 
historians whose papers I have been able to evaluate belonged to different generations and 
held widely varying methodological and political views. Thus, this dissertation draws on the 
personal papers of a fairly representative sample of historians, and will be able to provide 
plausible conclusions about the entire field of modern German history. Of course, the focus 
remains on the West German historical profession’s transatlantic dimension, as the study 
cannot provide a synthetical history of the field.  Yet by analyzing both challenge and 
response, the project Historische Sozialwissenschaft as well as its critics, this dissertation will 
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add to our understanding of the West German historical profession during the 1960s and 
1970s. 
A final note on the erkenntnisleitende Interessen (the knowledge-guiding, or 
knowledge-constituting interests) of this dissertation is in order: The writing of 
historiographical accounts in order to legitimize a new approach is an inherently problematic 
undertaking, and as we will see, this applied to the protagonists of the Bielefelder Schule as 
much as to their contemporary and later critics.68 This dissertation will not provide an ex-
post-facto contribution to the debate between protagonists of Historische Sozialwissenschaft 
and their opponents among the diplomatic and political historians. Neither does it constitute a 
belated contribution to the German Methodenstreit between social historians and cultural 
historians.69 Finally, even though historians generally distinguish between affirmative and 
critical historiography, my dissertation attempts to provide both. On the one hand, I hope to 
illustrate how much the postwar transatlantic community has contributed to the 
historiography on modern Germany. On the other hand, this sympathetic view of many 
members of this scholarly community should be compatible with its critical historicization. 
After all, as Allan Megill has stated, “the true historian needs to be committed to both 
objectivity and commitment, because ‘discernment of multiple perspectives is a condition of 
                                                
68 Wolfgang Weber has emphasized the same for the Bielefeder Schule’s relationship to its conservative 
predecessors. See Weber, Priester der Klio: Historisch-sozialwissenschaftliche Studien zur Herkunft und 
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69 See, for example, Ute Daniel, Kompendium Kulturgeschichte: Theorien, Praxis, Schlüsselwörter (Frankfurt a 
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understanding human affairs,’ and thus is ‘also a prerequisite of attaining reliable historical 
knowledge.’”70 
 
Organization 
This study begins with an outline of the West German historical profession’s 
development after 1945. While this story is quite well known, I will present it from a 
transatlantic perspective, incorporating the personal and institutional contacts between 
American and West German historians into the narrative. During the immediate postwar 
years, American scholars often objected to apologetic tendencies among their West German 
colleagues and generally demanded a reevaluation of modern German history. Yet were they 
open to forming scholarly ties with almost all German historians, or just those with 
impeccable political credentials, while ignoring Germans whose biographies contained 
brown spots? Conversely, did German historians of all political and methodological brands – 
or just the most liberal-minded – attempt to establish, or reestablish, relations with American 
colleagues? If the Cold War constituted the primary cause for the integration of West 
Germany into the Western bloc, it might also have affected the country’s historical 
profession in a similar way. Accordingly, West German historians might have realized that, 
in contrast to the interwar years, intellectual isolation was no longer a feasible option. This 
would not mean that one could necessarily speak of the West German historians’ 
“Westernization”—or even “Americanization—after 1945.71 But it is impossible to ignore 
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the fact that the American perception of German historiography now mattered more to the 
West Germans than it previously had. 
The second chapter moves across the Atlantic. It outlines the field of modern German 
history in the United States, which was changing in two significant ways during the postwar 
years. On the one hand, it expanded quantitatively. Not only did the overall number of 
professorships increase, but German history also received more attention than before, since 
the rise of National Socialism in a highly civilized country demanded explanation. On the 
other hand, the professoriate underwent a transformation: émigré scholars helped 
internationalize the field, and American scholars from different ethnic and social 
backgrounds were able to enter the profession. This chapter will therefore explore how these 
significant changes affected the way modern German history was written in the United States 
during these years. It surveys the “leading schools” in the United States, i.e. PhD-granting 
institutions with specialists in German history. This limitation comes at a price; we will not 
attain a comprehensive impression of the kind of German history that was taught at American 
institutions of higher education. Yet this chapter will cover the institutions whose scholars 
produced widely-read studies on modern Germany, who trained future generations of 
historians, who wrote reviews in academic journals, and whom German historians viewed as 
representing the American historical profession 
While German history in the United States was rapidly expanding, West German 
historians of all ages came into contact with the American historical profession. Accordingly, 
the third chapter explores how exactly these encounters unfolded. Established scholars 
sometimes reactivated their pre-war contacts with American colleagues, sometimes ventured 
into unknown territory. Some spent one or two semesters as visiting professors in the United 
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States, while others went on shorter lecture tours. A number of scholars participated in 
faculty exchange programs, sponsored by those American organizations that explicitly or 
implicitly wanted to familiarize German academics with “Western” approaches. This chapter 
seeks to determine whether and how these older scholars were influenced by their contacts 
with American academia and the United States more generally. The cases of these 
individuals differ insofar as they did not always show the openness so characteristic of the 
younger generation. In some cases, it will also become apparent that the Germans went to the 
United States in order to promote certain views on German history. Apart from the 
established scholars, a number of young German historians encountered the American 
historical profession, as well as related fields, as students throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 
They have since, without exception, emphasized how formative these early experiences were, 
and have usually maintained close relationships with American colleagues throughout their 
careers. Therefore this chapter explores the exact nature of the experiences of these young 
Germans historians. Did they develop an interest in the area or period they had studied while 
in the United States? Did they borrow methodologically from American scholars they had 
encountered during their visits? Or did certain interpretations prevalent in the United States 
have an impact on their later scholarship? 
The fourth chapter returns to the Federal Republic and examines the historiographical 
developments of the 1960s and early 1970s, again from a transatlantic perspective. Many 
German historians perceived this period as one of acute crisis, because the social sciences 
seemed to threaten Clio’s role as a Leitwissenschaft – an academic discipline that also played 
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a significant role in public debates.72 Even worse, history as a subject in high schools came 
under increasing pressure as educational reformers attempted to integrate it into a more 
comprehensive social studies course. Thus some scholars felt compelled to reflect upon and 
defend the very necessity of history.73 However, the sense of crisis was not only triggered by 
these extra-academic developments but also partly a result of dramatic changes within the 
field. Some historians strongly objected to the methodological reforms that younger scholars 
in particular proposed. The most controversial reformist project concerned the attempt of a 
few historians at the Universität Bielefeld to redefine history as a social science. Focusing on 
the rise of the so-called Bielefelder Schule and its project Historische Sozialwissenschaft 
during these years, this chapter asks to what extent these reforms took place in a transatlantic 
context: were American historians of modern Germany active participants, sources of 
inspiration, or attentive observers? My analysis in this chapter will proceed along three 
dimensions: interpretive, methodological, and political. Interpretively, the fierce debates 
between the historiographical camps revolved around continuities, or the lack thereof, in 
modern German history, more specifically between 1871 and 1945. At the center was the 
question of whether Germany had followed a “special path” (Sonderweg), marked by 
economic modernity and political backwardness, in comparison with Great Britain and 
France. Methodologically, proponents of Historische Sozialwissenschaft argued, against 
more traditional political and diplomatic historians, for a greater interdisciplinary orientation 
of the profession, which eventually led to the integration of political history into a synthetical 
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social history or history of society (Gesellschaftsgeschichte).74 The political dimension 
concerns first the academic politics of that period as they played out at the Historikertage 
(the biannual conventions of the German Historians’ Association) and on other occasions. 
More specifically, I will ask how the protagonists of Historische Sozialwissenschaft 
attempted to establish themselves within the profession, and how the German “traditionalist” 
historians responded to the iconoclasts’ challenge. Second, the study takes a broader 
perspective and examines theses historians’ ideas about their role in society. This debate 
revolved around the question of whether scholars should provide their readers with 
affirmative or rather critical histories.75 But it also touches upon the issue of the historian as a 
public intellectual. 
The fifth and final chapter again looks at the West German historical profession from 
a transatlantic perspective. By the mid- to late 1970s, the Bielefelder Schule had established 
itself institutionally and interpretively within the field. As these historians were becoming 
part of the academic establishment themselves, they in turn came under attack from new, 
oppositional historiographical groups such British neo-Marxists and West German historians 
of everyday life (Alltagshistoriker) and women’s historians.76 This chapter briefly explores 
these fierce debates and then takes stock of the long-term impact that the Bielefelder Schule 
has had on the West German historical profession. Because its protagonists have, as public 
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intellectuals, participated in many debates outside of the ivory tower, their contribution to the 
intellectual life of the Federal Republic more generally also receives attention. Arguably, 
now is a very apt moment to do this, since Hans-Ulrich Wehler in 2008 published the fifth 
and last volume of his monumental Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, which incidentally 
deals with German history during the very period under consideration in this study.77 The 
project Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte has now been realized, most of the dust has settled, 
and the historicization can begin. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Postwar West German Historiography with a Transatlantic Touch 
 
On 8 October 1951, Martin Göhring, founding director of the recently established 
Institut für Europäische Geschichte (IEG) in Mainz wrote to Guy Stanton Ford, secretary 
general of the American Historical Association. Göhring stated that he was motivated “by the 
question of organizing close contacts between American, English, French and German 
historians for the purpose of intensifying historical research, particularly in the field of 
modern history.” He emphasized that it was “our intention […] to achieve a revision of 
history’s interpretation by means of international cooperation, one of the most urgent tasks of 
our day.”1 Apart from fostering an international community of scholars, Göhring also hoped 
to secure American financial support for the establishment of a library at the institute. 
It certainly made sense for Göhring to appeal to the AHA. While the Mainz institute 
had been founded as the result of a French occupation initiative, it had early on received 
support by the United States High Commission as well.2 Against the background of a 
German historical profession with a Prussian-Protestant bent, this had been an attempt at a 
“de-Prussification” (Entpreussung was the commonly used term) of modern German history. 
                                                
1 Martin Göhring to Guy Stanton Ford, 8 October 1951, Library of Congress (hereafter LoC), American 
Historical Association (AHA) papers, Box 174, Secretary File. 
2 For the history of the institute’s foundation, see Schulze, Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945, 243 
and 274-277; Ernst Schulin, “Universalgeschichte und abendländische Entwürfe,” in Heinz Duchhardt/Gerhard 
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While few American historians believed in a simple one-way street from Luther—or 
Frederick the Great or anyone else—to Hitler, most held the view that their German 
colleagues had to reevaluate many of their cherished assumptions about the course of modern 
German history. In addition, quite a few argued that a broader, European rather than a strictly 
national perspective was now the order of the day. By the mid- to late 1950s the IEG had 
become an institution where American scholars saw these needs fulfilled.1  
American historians of modern Germany played an important role in the 
reconstitution of the German historical profession during the immediate postwar years, either 
as active participants or as attentive observers. In some cases, Americans had had come into 
contact with Germany through their military service, in other instances émigré historians 
took a lively interest in the postwar development of West Germany as well as of the German 
historical profession.2 Moreover, some German scholars were actively seeking contacts with 
their American colleagues, either reestablishing older ties, or reorienting themselves under 
drastically altered circumstances. These postwar tendencies illustrate that German history no 
longer “belonged” to German historians alone. German scholars realized that they could not 
ignore American (as well as other foreign) views on their past. By no means did these 
academics immediately replace their defensive and nationalist attitudes with post-national 
ones. Accordingly, the claim that a foreign historian because of his or her nationality was 
unable to properly understand and empathize with the peculiar course of German history 
                                                
1 See Chester V. Easum,  “Review of Martin Göhring, ed., Europa. Erbe und Aufgabe,” Journal of Modern 
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2 Hajo Holborn, American Military Government: Its Organization and Policies (Washington, D.C.: Infantry 
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could be heard well into the early 1960s. But even the most conservative West Germans 
realized that their American colleagues were not a quantité negligeable anymore, and thus it 
was preferable to maintain a steady dialogue with them.  
This chapter will therefore provide a survey of the West German historical 
profession’s development and of American views on this process between 1945 and the early 
1960s. Yet before one can assess the consequences of the postwar changes and the role of the 
transatlantic network for the West German historical profession, it is necessary to briefly 
consider the Nazi years and the extent to which the historical profession had complied with 
the regime. For 1945 did not mark a Stunde Null (“zero hour” or tabula rasa) for German 
society, and the same was true for the historical profession. Only then is it possible to 
evaluate the reconstitution of the profession immediately after the end of World War II. 
Likewise, an analysis of the reconstitution and the subsequent development of West German 
universities during the postwar years will help to explain the broader institutional context in 
which the West German historians operated. 
 
The Nazi Years 
Only belatedly did West German historians begin late to tackle the role of the 
historical profession in Nazi Germany: the 1960s saw the publication of the first scholarly 
and journalistic accounts emphasizing the degree to which German historians had either 
made concessions to or even enthusiastically supported the regime. Karl Ferdinand Werner’s 
essay on German medievalists and Helmut Heiber’s monumental study on Walther Frank’s 
Reichsinstitut für die Geschichte des neuen Deutschlands shed light on two important aspects 
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of the larger issue.3 Werner revealed the extent to which German medievalists had projected 
the origins of the German nation backwards, which coincided with the crude ideas of some 
among the Nazi leadership.4 Heiber provided a thoroughly comprehensive account of Walter 
Frank’s failed attempt to establish a purely National Socialist research institution. Yet 
Werner’s and Heiber’s insights coexisted for the next three decades with the immediate 
postwar argument that the historical profession as a whole had adhered to highest academic 
standards while keeping strict political distance from the regime.5  
After a series of publications in the 1990s, this view is no longer tenable.6 As Hans 
Rothfels argued already in 1965, “the fierce opposition of many historians toward the 
republican-democratic state and the parliamentary system represented a point of affinity with 
National Socialist propaganda.”7 Ironically, the émigré Rothfels himself in the 1990s stood at 
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the center of one of the fiercest debates about historians’ involvement with the Nazi regime, 
and his evaluation applied very well to his own attitude during the early 1930s.8 
 Following the establishment of the Nazi regime, only very few university historians 
had joined the NSDAP, which after World War II served as proof for the intellectual 
independence of the historical profession. Without a question, this position merely reflected 
wishful thinking. One simply cannot measure ideological proximity to Nazi ideology by 
counting the number of Nazi party members among historians. As was the case in German 
society at large, many historians shared important values and sentiments expressed by 
National Socialism without being completely committed to the regime. Gerhard Ritter 
provides an excellent case in point: at the end of World War II, Ritter had been imprisoned 
by the Gestapo because of loose contacts with a resistance circle, and he subsequently 
claimed to speak with particular moral authority. And yet Ritter had in his writings made 
numerous concessions to the Nazi regime. His biography of Frederick the Great, published in 
1936, contained several passages with only thinly veiled approval of Nazi German foreign 
policies.9 Even Friedrich Meinecke’s record is somewhat mixed: in 1935, he had been 
removed from the editorship of Historische Zeitschrift because of his moderate politics. Yet 
he welcomed the Anschluss of Austria in 1938, celebrated the German victory over France in 
1940 as a punishment for the Versailles Treaty, and he made several other remarks that can 
be labeled at best ambivalent.10 While most German historians, like their academic 
                                                
8 See Jan Eckel, Hans Rothfels. Eine intellektuelle Biographie im 20. Jahrhundert (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2005); 
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colleagues in other fields, abhorred the primitive style of National Socialism, they still agreed 
with considerable parts of the Nazi party’s political platform. This agreement illustrates the 
overlap of various forms of conservatism and neo-conservatism with National Socialism.11 
Considering the state and development of the German historical profession during the 
Weimar Republic, the historians’ reaction to the Nazi rise to power did not come as a 
surprise. As Wolfgang J. Mommsen concluded, “there was a strong tendency to denounce the 
Weimar system as alien to the German historical tradition and imposed by the victorious 
Western powers against the wishes of the majority of Germans.”12 Compared to other 
academic fields, the “Aryanization” of the historical profession had had only limited personal 
consequences, due to the small number of Jewish scholars. The Nazi regime had to dismiss 
only three professors in the areas of modern and medieval history—Ernst Kantorowicz, Hans 
Rothfels, and Richard Salomon. The numbers of dismissed scholars in ancient and legal 
history were slightly higher; due to the less politicized nature of these fields Jews were more 
likely to receive appointments.13 
 The German historical profession had always been staunchly conservative, 
nationalist, and while generally not openly and militantly anti-Semitic, unwilling to grant 
Jewish scholars access to professorships. During the Weimar Republic, conditions for Jewish 
scholars had improved slightly. Yet an Ordinarius such as Friedrich Meinecke, who took on 
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and supported a significant number of Jewish students, had still been exceptional.14 The case 
of Meinecke’s student Gerhard Masur reveals the difficulties which scholars of Jewish 
origins were still facing: Masur had been born to parents of Jewish background who had 
converted to Protestantism. After the end of World War I, Masur joined the anti-Republican 
and anti-democratic Freikorps, and in 1920 he participated in the Kapp-Putsch, an attempt to 
overthrow the parliamentary Weimar democracy. Thus Masur fit well into the interwar 
historical profession politically, and methodologically he was no revolutionary, either. Yet in 
1927, the Universität Frankfurt am Main rejected his Habilitation attempt on anti-Semitic 
grounds.15 While other universities were less anti-Semitic—Hans Rosenberg became a 
Privatdozent (adjunct lecturer) at the Universität Köln—the overall number of Jewish 
scholars remained negligible, especially in modern German history. Yet, the purge ensuing 
after 1933 affected not only historians already holding professorships but also, and mostly, 
those in the advanced stages of their academic training and those who had finished their 
second book but were still teaching as Privatdozenten. Fritz T. Epstein, a specialist in 
Russian history, was forced to emigrate just after completing his Habilitation, which he could 
no longer submit after the establishment of the Nazi regime. To name but a few, Hans Baron 
and Dietrich Gerhard taught as Privatdozenten; Felix Gilbert, Edgar Rosen, and George W. 
F. Hallgarten had received their PhDs but not yet finished their second book. 
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Notable changes after 1933 also concerned editorships of some scholarly journals and 
positions within research institutions outside the universities. Friedrich Meinecke lost his 
position as editor of Historische Zeitschrift to Karl Alexander von Müller, a committed 
National Socialist, who proclaimed in his first editorial note that “the historical profession 
does not come empty-handed to the new German state and its youth.”16 His role in the 
Gleichschaltung of the profession’s leading journal did not keep Müller from being honored 
by one of his students in the same journal after 1945.17 Wilhelm Mommsen lost his position 
as editor of Vergangenheit and Gegenwart, as he was deemed politically unreliable.18 All in 
all, it is fair to offer a somewhat ambivalent conclusion: on the one hand the Nazi regime 
clearly did not succeed in its attempted Gleichschaltung of the German historical profession, 
and this failure was due to differences in style and content alike. Yet on the other hand the 
overwhelming majority of historians found themselves in at least partial agreement with Nazi 
policies—thus the failure to bring them in line did not have profoundly negative 
consequences for the regime. 
Since the impact of National Socialism on German historians was somewhat limited, 
the profession survived denazification relatively unscathed. Twenty-four academics 
temporarily lost their position, but, as Winfried Schulze has argued, this was less surprising 
than their swift reintegration of many of them.19 The return of “tainted” colleagues did often 
depend more on sheer luck or political and professional connections than the degree of 
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complicity. Wilhelm Mommsen, the father of the historian twins Hans and Wolfgang J. 
Mommsen, lost his chair at the University of Marburg, while Percy Ernst Schramm and 
Egmont Zechlin soon resumed their positions. Politically “clean” historians were often more 
than happy to vouch for their “tainted” colleagues. Fritz Wagner, who like Theodor Schieder 
had received his PhD under Karl Alexander von Müller, and whose distance from the Nazi 
regime prevented him from obtaining a chair during World War II, provided a Persilschein 
(an unofficial yet often decisive statement) for Schieder.20 It seems that for most German 
historians political differences were clearly outweighed by a shared sense of belonging to an 
academic community. In general, the ambivalent legacy of National Socialism made the 
rehabilitation of historical scholarship difficult, because it seemed not to require as drastic a 
restructuring as in other areas.  
 
Institutional developments 
Institutionally, the fifteen postwar years can be divided into a period of reconstruction 
(1945-1950) and a period of expansion (1950-1960). The reopening of the universities took 
place very swiftly, and while the Allies initially placed severe restrictions on the teaching of 
history in high schools, the universities were not affected by such measures. Already in 1949 
a historian at the University of Bonn thus offered a seminar on “German historiography since 
1945”—apparently he thought there was some ground to cover.21 During the period of 
expansion, the number of full professors (Ordinarien) rose from ca. 50 (1950) to 80 (1960), 
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before nearly tripling to 210 (1975).22 These numbers encompass all historical periods and 
geographical areas; for modern German history Wolfgang Weber lists 26 (1950), 33 (1960), 
and 71 (1970) full professors.23 
The postwar years also saw the establishment of a number of research institutions, 
some affiliated with universities, others existing independently. The foundation of the Institut 
für Zeitgeschichte, originally named Institut für die Geschichte der nationalsozialistischen 
Politik, proved particularly controversial.24 While politicians engaged in the process tended 
to emphasize the pedagogic responsibilities of a future institute, informing German citizens 
about the crimes of National Socialism and thus strengthening German democracy, historians 
insisted on scholarly autonomy. Referring to the politicization of academia during the Nazi 
years, they opposed any political intervention in their work. At first glance, this may seem to 
have been an entirely convincing position of historians concerned with their academic 
freedom. Yet this interpretation captures only part of the story. 
The “political”—as opposed to the “academic”—position was not driven by ulterior 
motives but rather democratic concerns. Some of the politicians involved in the controversy 
were well aware of the ambiguous role many historians had played during both the interwar 
and the Nazi years. The Social Democratic Ministerpräsident (governor) of Hesse, for 
example, referred to the “poor political service” that German scholars had performed in the 
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past.25 But even politicians from the conservative Christian Democrats clashed with 
historians, above all Gerhard Ritter, and it seems fair to say that the actual point of contention 
was not whether the institute should contribute to the education of the German public, but 
how exactly this education was supposed to take shape. Even if German historians in these 
debates often hid behind their cherished “scholarly objectivity” in order to counter political 
demands, they at the same time attempted to establish themselves as public intellectuals and 
thus reach beyond the ivory tower.26   
The landscape of scholarly journals experienced profound changes as well. New, 
untainted scholars took the positions of disgraced editors who had served during the Nazi 
regime. Ludwig Dehio, who had spent the war years in inner emigration, replaced Nazi 
historian Karl Alexander von Müller as editor of Historische Zeitschrift. With Geschichte in 
Wissenschaft und Unterricht (GWU) an entirely new journal emerged. Mediating between 
higher education and secondary education, it addressed in particular high school teachers of 
history, but also assumed a significant role in scholarly debates. And yet, for scholars 
working on modern Germany the number of journals remained fairly limited, and the 
decisions what would be published remained with a small number of influential scholars. 
Among them were Theodor Schieder, editor of Historische Zeitschrift between 1959 and 
1984, and Karl Dietrich Erdmann, who held the same position for Geschichte in Wissenschaft 
und Unterricht between 1950 and 1989. A new enterprise of a very different kind was the 
review journal Das historisch-politische Buch (HPB). Established in 1953 by members of the 
Ranke Gesellschaft, the HPB—like the Gesellschaft itself—essentially served as a venue for 
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those few historians whose Nazi past hindered or even prevented their postwar careers in 
West Germany.27 Several German historians objected to the use of Leopold von Ranke’s 
name, as the recourse to “objectivity” a la Ranke hardly succeeded in veiling the nationalist 
to National Socialist positions held by the Gesellschaft’s members.28 Openly apologetic 
views, espoused above all by the former president of the University of Hamburg Gustav 
Adolf Rein, characterized the Ranke Gesellschaft’s yearbook even more than the review 
journal.29 In contrast to these dubious organs, the new journal Vierteljahrshefte für 
Zeitgeschichte (VfZ), edited by Hans Rothfels, became a very important publication devoted 
initially to the interwar period and the Nazi years.  
While some scholarly journals were affected materially by the dire conditions of the 
immediate postwar years, the reconstitution of the historians’ professional association 
unfolded amidst political problems.30 The Association of German Historians (Verband 
deutscher Historiker) had been established in 1895, but had lost its function during the 
1930s, when Nazi historians had attempted to reorganize the profession according to the 
needs of the regime. Now, after the end of the war, the question of how—as well as if—an 
association should be organized contained both a domestic and an international dimension. 
Internationally, it seemed necessary to represent German historians through a common, 
official organization, or so the overwhelming majority of historians believed. After all, this 
promised to accelerate their formal reintegration into the International Committee of 
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Historical Sciences (ICHS).31 Yet the organization’s establishment on a national level proved 
to be much more controversial, since a number of different factions or camps competed for 
influence. 
A first, informal meeting of a number of influential historians took place in Göttingen 
in November 1946. The participants’ ideas regarding the institutional and intellectual future 
of the profession differed remarkably. While Peter Rassow of University of Cologne 
advocated writing European rather than German history, many of his colleagues insisted on 
the need to provide the German people with a nation-centered history, which they saw as 
particularly important at a time when the future of the German state was unclear. Gerhard 
Ritter, who had just argued along those lines in his recently published essay Geschichte als 
Bildungsmacht, suggested a careful revision of previously held historiographical assumptions 
without abandoning the focus on the German nation.32 Finally, some participants were 
concerned more with the past than with the profession’s future: Percy Ernst Schramm of the 
University of Göttingen aroused strong resistance when he defended the necessity of the 
Ardennes Offensive of December 1944.33 
The controversies surrounding the establishment of a professional organization were 
also often of confessional nature. Catholic historians had always been a minority within the 
profession, comprising approximately 30% of all professorships.34 After the end of World 
War II, calls for a “de-Prussification” of German history did not only demand a less 
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nationalist, but also a less Protestant perspective. Accordingly, Catholic historians were 
opposed to Gerhard Ritter’s ambitious attempts to secure a leading position within the 
postwar German historical profession, since they associated the Protestant nationalist 
Ritter—correctly—with both orientations. Karl Buchheim of the Technical University of 
Munich voiced doubts shared by several colleagues when he claimed it to be impossible to 
achieve a historiographical reorientation if Ritter were to play a leading role in this 
undertaking.35 
Ultimately, it would take two more years until the Association of German Historians 
(Verband der Historiker Deutschlands, VHD) came into existence. In October 1948, 
members of the two oldest German historical institutions, the Historical Commission of the 
Bavarian Academy of Sciences (founded in 1858) and the board of editors of Monumenta 
Germaniae Historica (an institution devoted to the study of medieval history, founded in 
1819) assembled in Munich and decided to reestablish a national professional organization, 
which was supposed to hold its first convention in September 1949. At the meeting in 
October 1948, a foundational committee consisting of four historians emerged and suggested 
electing Gerhard Ritter chairman, despite the fact that resistance against his candidacy had 
arisen inside as well as outside the historical profession.36 Apart from the aforementioned 
reservations by Catholic historians, the French occupation authorities (Ritter taught at 
Freiburg University, located in the French zone) suspected Ritter of “nationalist” and 
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“authoritarian” tendencies.37 In June of 1949, these authorities had even claimed that they 
regarded the “centralist and authoritarian” foundation of the VHD as illegal.38 Since they 
regarded Ritter as “political representative of a nationalist reaction” he temporarily 
contemplated withdrawing his candidacy. Yet broad support of a dozen leading historians at 
an informal meeting during the convention in Munich convinced him otherwise, and the 
VHD’s members elected Ritter chairman on September 14, 1949.  
Despite these initial difficulties, the convention itself unfolded successfully. While 
the political division of Germany had already been established, many historians from the 
Soviet zone attended the convention. To be sure, several historians (among them Friedrich 
Meinecke and Wilhelm Schüssler) had already left the Soviet zone, and Fritz Hartung of the 
University of Berlin (now located in the city’s Eastern part and soon to be renamed 
“Humboldt University”) had requested retirement for political reasons.39 Thus only few 
“bourgeois” historians still held academic appointments at universities in what soon became 
the German Democratic Republic. Yet the permanent split into two ideologically opposed 
camps lay still ahead. 
The early 1950s saw a series of contradictory developments: on the one hand, the 
East German regime and the historians who supported it wholeheartedly attempted to bring 
all East German scholars in line. As Martin Sabrow has shown in his study on the first two 
decades of the East German historical profession, the regime did not simply coerce Clio into 
a politicized and subservient field. Rather, this was a process that unfolded from within at 
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least as much as it was forced upon it from outside.40 On the other hand, East German 
historians were unsure whether the best course of action was isolation from their West 
German colleagues, or rather aggressive competition, in order to demonstrate the superiority 
of Marxist-Leninist historiography over its “bourgeois” counterpart. Accordingly, East 
Germans skipped the second historians’ convention in Marburg two years after Munich, only 
to attend the third meeting in Bremen in 1953 with a large delegation. The East German 
historical profession’s official organ, Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, established in 
1953, exacerbated the tensions between East and West by publishing harsh attacks on leading 
West German historians. For example, the report on the Bremen convention castigated 
Theodor Schieder’s “imperialist claim for German domination in Eastern Europe” and 
labeled him a “reactionary opponent of bourgeois democracy.”41 In turn, these West Germans 
succumbed to the heated atmosphere of the early Cold War, overlooking the differences 
between dogmatic Communist party hacks and unorthodox Marxists with whom a scholarly 
dialogue might have been possible. An additional reason for this almost non-existing 
dialogue was the scarcity of leftist historians in the Federal Republic. 
By 1955, an institutional split between East and West had become more and more 
likely. The VHD’s executive board passed a resolution not to allow a large number of 
Marxist historians to join the association, worried that these would eventually form a 
majority within the VHD and thus determine its future course. East Germans in turn 
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contemplated the establishment of an association of their own. This led to a problem 
regarding the historians’ representation in the ICHS, which had made it clear in 1956 that if 
an East German historical association emerged the VHD could no longer claim to represent 
all German historians and would thus be forced to leave the ICHS.42 During the next two 
years, East German party-line historians radicalized their campaign against the few 
remaining “bourgeois” colleagues in the GDR, in some cases even threatening to revoke 
academic degrees. The intensified struggle against “counter-revolutionary” and “revisionist” 
elements was a result not only of the hardliners’ dominance within the East German scholarly 
community, but also of political directives given by the SED’s Central Committee after the 
reform Communist experiment in Hungary had ended so violently.43 These developments 
alone most likely would have sufficed to cause a permanent break between historians from 
the two Germanies. Yet for fairness’ sake, one should mention that in the Federal Republic 
dogmatic anti-Marxists within the VHD won over those colleagues representing a more 
pragmatic, conciliatory line. 
  The VHD convention in Trier in 1958 saw the final culmination of this incipient 
division. Aware of the developments within the GDR, the VHD’s executive board passed a 
declaration refusing to let speak any East German historian who intended to make political 
statements or supported the new, hard line. Appalled by this form of “censorship”, the East 
German delegation left the convention and soon afterwards established its own association, 
the German Society of Historians (Deutsche Historikergesellschaft).44 This institutional split 
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brought back the question of who was to represent German historians on an international 
level. Here, the West Germans were clearly in a better position, as the VHD’s former 
chairman Gerhard Ritter (succeeded in 1953 by Hermann Aubin) had become a member of 
the ICHS’s Bureau in 1955. Other West Germans attempted to mobilize international support 
for their position—for example Hans Rothfels, who tried to convince Boyd Shafer, executive 
secretary of the American Historical Association (AHA), to reject the East German 
membership application.45 Ultimately, the West Germans were successful: the Bureau of the 
ICHS, opposed to an East German accession, refused to let the general assembly of the next 
international congress debate the issue and decided instead to postpone the debate until the 
following congress. East German historians ultimately gained international recognition only 
in 1970.46 
By the late 1950s, the West German historical profession had thus regained at least 
some of its international standing. As the escalating Cold War accelerated the political and 
military integration of West Germany into the Western bloc, it had similarly fortunate 
consequences for the West German historical profession. German historians themselves 
realized that intellectual isolation was no longer a viable option. Invoking the political 
situation in the early 1950s, Martin Göhring in his aforementioned letter to the AHA 
emphasized the “importance of strengthening of “conscience of unity and community of the 
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European peoples who still enjoy their freedom.”47 Under the new political circumstances, 
American historians may have been more receptive to an intellectual reintegration of their 
German colleagues. Internally, the profession had not only consolidated itself, but also 
expanded slightly, as the number of professorships had increased. In addition, a number of 
autonomous research institutions and projects testified to the significance West Germany 
attributed to its historians. Yet despite these quantitative changes, it was still a relatively 
small number of scholars who occupied influential positions. It is to these major figures that 
we now turn. 
 
The personal dimension 
An account of the postwar German historical profession discussing the significance of 
a few leading scholars might run the risk of appearing old-fashioned. After all, the times 
when only great men were believed to make history—or historiography in this case—have 
been passé for a while. Yet if one considers the structure of the profession, especially in the 
decade and a half after 1945, this approach seems unavoidable: prior to the expansion of the 
field in the 1960s and 1970s as a result of the founding of new universities and the 
enlargement of the existing ones, a few West German historians wielded tremendous power, 
whether as officers in professional associations, editors of scholarly journals, or due to their 
standing as Ordinarien (full professors) at venerable universities. And apart from the 
profession’s major figures, it is worth asking who was part of this scholarly community—and 
who was not. 
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Approaching the historical profession through a generational lens helps us understand 
the specific experiences historians shared. The older generation influential after 1945 
consisted of historians born in the late 1880s and early1890s. Their values had been shaped 
during the late German Empire, which meant that many only reluctantly accepted the 
democratic state of Weimar. World War I had for most of them epitomized a caesura of far-
reaching consequences.48 Scholars such as Gerhard Ritter, Siegfried A. Kaehler, Hans 
Rothfels, and Egmont Zechlin all had fought in the war, some of them as volunteers. Rothfels 
had lost a leg in the war, Zechlin an arm. When German historians in the 1960s argued about 
causes, conduct, and consequences of the Great War, many representatives of this generation 
had not only a scholarly but also a personal stake in the debate. Some of them managed to 
occupy influential positions well into the 1960s; Ritter (1949-1953) and Rothfels (1958-
1962) served as chairmen of the VHD, as did Hermann Aubin (1953-1958), who also for 
more than four decades (1926-1967) edited the main journal for social and economic history, 
the Vierteljahrsschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte. 
The next generation that would dominate the West German historical profession from 
the mid-to-late 1950s to the late 1970s and even beyond comprised scholars born around 
1910. Theodor Schieder, Werner Conze, Karl-Dietrich Erdmann were the three leading 
figures of this generation. All of them chaired the VHD, Erdmann from 1962 to 1967, 
Schieder between 1967 and 1972, and Conze from 1972 to 1976. Schieder edited the 
profession’s main organ, Historische Zeitschrift, from 1957 to 1984, Erdmann edited 
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Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht even longer, between 1950 and 1989. Conze, 
soon after moving to the University of Heidelberg in 1957, established a working group for 
social history, the Arbeitskreis für moderne Sozialgeschichte, which strove to establish and 
strengthen a new kind of structural and social history.49 Especially Conze and Schieder 
trained a significant number of historians who subsequently shaped the West German 
historical profession themselves.50 The fact that both Schieder and Conze had been students 
of Hans Rothfels at the University of Königsberg in the early 1930s testifies to the close-knit 
character of the German historical profession.51 
If one counts a large number of students as proof of an influential academic career, 
Fritz Fischer (born 1908) needs to be added to this list. Even though he insisted on portraying 
himself as an outsider, and despite the fact that he lacked the institutional clout which Conze, 
Erdmann, and Schieder possessed, Fischer through his 1960s studies on the origins and the 
course of World War I attracted one hundred PhD students whose dissertations substantiated 
and reinforced Fischer’s own views.52 Historians disagree on whether a distinct “Fischer 
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School” existed;53 yet from the early 1970s onwards, Fischer’s students taught at most 
universities in Northern Germany.54 
Apart from generational differences, confessional differences continued to split the 
profession. As historians came to realize the need to reconsider the German past, Catholic 
historians emphasized the Protestant bias characterizing the overwhelming majority of 
scholars in Germany. And the percentage of Catholic historians—who demanded a new 
perspective on German history—had increased, since the territorial changes after World War 
II had made West Germany a less Protestant, more Catholic country than the German Empire 
and Weimar Germany. German universities were state universities, and the respective states’ 
ministries for culture and education were often involved in appointments of university 
professors. Political orientation as well as religious affiliation therefore played a role in many 
cases.55 The most striking example of religious influence on academic appointments were the 
so-called Konkordatslehrstühle (“concordat chairs”), in which the appointee had to be 
Catholic. Such chairs existed at the Universities Bonn, Freiburg, Munich, Münster, 
Tübingen, and Würzburg.56 
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The leading voice among the Catholic historians was Franz Schnabel, author of a 
celebrated multi-volume history of Germany in the 19th century.57 A former high school 
teacher, Schnabel throughout the Weimar Republic had been an outsider within the 
profession, teaching engineers at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. His republican 
sympathies—Schnabel had vehemently protested against Chancellor von Papen’s coup d’état 
in Prussia in 1932—prompted the Nazi regime to ban him from publishing his works in 1936. 
Schnabel was appointed professor at the University of Munich in 1947 where he taught until 
his retirement in 1962. From 1951 to 1959, Schnabel chaired the prestigious Historical 
Commission of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences. It is important to emphasize, however, 
that Schnabel never propagated a narrow Catholic view on German history; as a Catholic 
liberal he was mostly concerned with providing a counterpoint to the prevailing Prussia-
centered historiography which interpreted the foundation of the kleindeutsch German Empire 
in 1871 as a historical necessity and tended to glorify Otto von Bismarck. 
Missing from this picture of professional leadership were those scholars who had 
been forced to emigrate by the Nazi regime. With very few exceptions, these historians did 
not return after 1945. In recent years historians have argued how much effort German 
universities undertook in order to undo some of the intellectual damage National Socialism 
has caused by forcing many talented scholars out of the country. Two factors taken together 
may account for the low number of émigré historians returning to Germany. The first one 
was a general lack of interest among German historians to reintegrate them—it seems to have 
been the clear priority to provide for those scholars who had taught at universities that no 
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longer lay on German territory. Historians from the Universities of Strasbourg and 
Königsberg, for example, swiftly transferred to universities in the future West Germany.58  
A certain wariness regarding a possible return among those few émigrés who had 
been offered a position constituted the second factor. After all, most of them had had 
enormous difficulties to establish themselves in their new home countries—Hajo Holborn’s 
fast and impressive career at Yale was the exception to the rule. Thus they found it difficult 
to give up what they had secured for themselves, even more so since in exchange, material 
insecurity and potential political instability in the emerging West German state would have 
awaited them. Hans Rosenberg’s example is illuminating: Late in 1947, Rosenberg received 
an offer from the University of Cologne. Even though his position at Brooklyn College was 
far from ideal, carrying a heavy teaching load of fifteen hours per week, he declined to return 
to Germany, apparently for “family reasons.”59 Soon afterwards, however, Rosenberg 
regretted his decision, as he made clear in a letter to his Doktorvater Friedrich Meinecke.60 
Thirty years later, Hans-Ulrich Wehler emphasized the loss the West German historical 
profession had suffered by not attracting Rosenberg.61 Wehler argued that a permanent return 
of Rosenberg to West Germany would have accelerated the establishment of social history 
within the German historical profession. Only after his retirement from Berkeley (where he 
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had been appointed Shepard Professor of History in 1959) Rosenberg moved back to the 
Federal Republic and settled in Freiburg. Rosenberg did, however, spend several semesters in 
Germany as a visiting professor, at the Free University Berlin in 1950/51, and at the 
University of Marburg in 1955. In Berlin, Rosenberg quickly assembled a circle of promising 
younger historians including Gerhard A. Ritter, Gerhard Schulz, Wolfgang Sauer, Karl 
Dietrich Bracher, Gilbert Ziebura, Otto Büsch, and Franz Ansprenger.62 
Yet even after the Federal Republic had arisen out of the ruins of the war, its appeal 
to émigré historians remained limited. In 1961, the Meinecke student Gerhard Masur 
declined an offer to succeed Hans Rothfels at University of Tübingen, despite the fact that 
this position was arguably more prestigious than his professorship at Sweet Briar College in 
Virginia. In a letter to Rothfels, Masur emphasized that he above all was not ready to give up 
his American citizenship, which he would have had to do had he returned permanently to 
Tübingen.63 As the only scholar who found a found a permanent compromise to this 
dilemma, Dietrich Gerhard divided his time between St. Louis (where he taught European 
history at Washington University) and Cologne (where he taught American history). 
While most historians, as we have seen, stayed in their new homeland for a number of 
reasons, it was still not a coincidence that those who did return were the most conservative 
ones. Within the field of modern German history, only two scholars assumed permanent 
academic positions in West Germany. After returning from Sweden, Hans-Joachim Schoeps 
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held a professorship for intellectual and religious history at the University of Erlangen. An 
ardent monarchist and Prussian loyalist, Schoeps remained at the margins of the historical 
profession.64 
The opposite was true for Hans Rothfels, whose influence on at least two succeeding 
generations of historians can hardly be overestimated.65 Long-time editor of the journal 
Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, heavily involved in the Institut für Zeitgeschichte, 
professor at the University of Tübingen, and recipient of numerous awards and honors, 
Rothfels was a towering figure within the German historical profession. Having established 
himself at the University of Chicago after somewhat more difficult beginnings at Brown 
University, Rothfels, by returning to Germany faced a relatively high professional price in 
comparison to most of his fellow émigrés. Yet Rothfels also knew that he was precisely the 
person the German historical profession needed after the end of the war. His émigré 
experience lent him moral legitimacy, while his staunch conservatism—Rothfels’ pre-war 
volkish neo-Conservatism had been considerably ameliorated as a result of his time in the 
United States—made him fit well into an overwhelmingly conservative field. Yet most 
important was the historical profession’s reputation Rothfels helped restore, and his 
colleagues were only too aware of this fact.66  
                                                
64 On Schoeps, see Frank-Lothar Kroll, “Geistesgeschichte in interdisziplinärer Sicht. Der Historiker Hans-
Joachim Schoeps,” in Id., Das geistige Preußen. Zur Ideengeschichte eines Staates (Paderborn, 2001), 209–240. 
65 The controversy about Hans Rothfels has mostly centered on his political views during the Weimar and early 
Nazi years, when he taught at the University of Königsberg. 
66 Walther Peter Fuchs, professor at the University of Erlangen, expressed a view shared by many of his 
colleagues when he wrote in a birthday letter to Rothfels: “lassen Sie mich bei dieser Gelegenheit noch einen 
anderen Gedanken aussprechen. Die deutschen Histor[i]ker haben sich durch ihr Verhalten im 3. Reich weithin 
um den Kredit in der Welt gebracht. Umso mehr schulden wir Ihnen Dank, dass Sie es vor Jahren auf sich 
genommen haben, in unsere Mitte zurückzukehren. Sie haben uns alle damit einen unschätzbaren Dienst 
erwiesen. Nehmen Sie mir, einem ganz kleinen Historiker, es bitte nicht übel, wenn er diesen Gedanken einmal 
 
 62 
Rothfels’ keynote speech at the first postwar Historikertag, which sought to 
reconstitute the historical profession institutionally, epitomizes these issues. The appearance 
of a scholar who had been forced to leave Germany only a decade earlier, and had 
subsequently become a highly respected member of the American historical profession, was 
awkward, since not all of his former colleagues had survived the Nazi years with their 
academic integrity intact. Moreover, and at least as importantly, Rothfels had given the 
closing speech at the last Historikertag prior to the Nazi seizure of power, held in Göttingen 
in 1932. His speech at the Munich convention in 1949 thus was supposed to be understood as 
providing the link to the good traditions of a “better Germany.”67 Rothfels had initially 
hesitated to attend or even speak at the convention, since he did not want to be perceived by 
his colleagues as a “re-educator.”68 Yet Gerhard Ritter and Hermann Aubin managed to 
change his mind, arguing that it was not only his proven expertise on the Iron Chancellor but 
also the “new perspective” that he had acquired abroad that made Rothfels the ideal choice.  
The topic of his speech, “Bismarck and the nineteenth century”, reveals that the 
evaluation of the “Iron Chancellor” as the founder of the German national state preoccupied 
many historians immediately after the war. Rothfels argued that his émigré experience 
provided him with an intellectual advantage, for he had been able to develop a “universal-
historical” instead of a merely “national” perspective on Germany history.69 Therefore he 
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interpreted Bismarck not only as a German, but also as a European statesman, whose policies 
were not directed towards German hegemony. The ending of Rothfels’ speech was 
particularly paradigmatic for a distinctly conservative approach to German history. Rothfels 
invoked Leopold von Ranke, in whose footsteps many scholars attempted to follow, and then 
quoted from a letter of Ranke’s to Bismarck: “The historian can learn from you.”70  
 
Rethinking Modern German History 
“History is written by the victors” is one of the most overused historical truisms. 
Triumphalist American accounts of the Cold War, written after the collapse of Communism, 
reveal that such history is often not too illuminating.71 Already after Germany’s victory over 
France in 1871 Jacob Burckhardt had famously quipped that the “history of the world since 
Adam” would now be reinterpreted in German terms.72 Yet as Reinhart Koselleck has 
emphasized, the losers also need to write—or rather re-write—history, and their defeat forces 
them to look more critically at the past and eventually enables them to arrive at new 
historical insights.73 To what extent, we might then ask, did West German historians take up 
this challenge? 
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Of course, rethinking German history also required sources, and here the West 
German historians were again reminded of the increasing erosion of German “control” over 
the interpretation of their own past. After World War II, German historians were not in 
possession of all of their nation’s archival files, as the Allies had captured a considerable part 
of them and shipped them overseas in order to make sure that Nazi crimes would be 
punished. For obvious reasons, this was of pivotal importance for the German historical 
profession. Historians have often used the control as well as the selective release of 
documents to influence the historiographical discourse on delicate and politically charged 
subject matters: After World War I, the multi-volume edition Grosse Politik der 
Europäischen Kabinette, consisting of diplomatic correspondence between the German 
Empire and other European states, was published to underscore German innocence regarding 
the outbreak of the war. This was one important contribution to the rejection of the notorious 
“war guilt paragraph” of the Versailles Treaty.74 While German historian after 1945 did not 
attempt to contest Nazi Germany’s responsibility for World War II, they still considered the 
lack of access to archival documents unacceptable. Therefore they fought vigorously for the 
immediate return of their files, while the Americans were not convinced that this was the 
preferable option. This “struggle for the files” lasted well into the 1950s.75  
Observers of postwar West German historiography disagree sharply on the extent to 
which the historians succeeded or failed to reconsider some of their main tenets. In 
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evaluating these diverging positions, one must keep in mind for which purposes they were 
developed: many of the very critical assessments of postwar historiography appeared in the 
later 1960s and 1970s, when the West German historical profession underwent 
methodological and interpretive changes. Historians representing or at least welcoming this 
development sought to contrast the new historiographical enterprises with those older 
traditions they strove to overcome. These iconoclasts did not simply represent one particular 
“school” and thus advocated a common program. Rather, it was the generation born between 
ca. 1930 and 1940, which attempted to set themselves apart from their predecessors.76 While 
Charles Maier in the 1990s deplored the lack of “intellectual parricide” in German 
historiographical debates, the 1970s certainly did not suffer from the same tendencies.77  
Similarly, historians who stress the accomplishments of the immediate postwar years and 
attempt to construct a more linear development of historiographical change tend to reject the 
methodological and interpretive positions of the iconoclasts.78 In short, most of these 
historiographical overviews are as much programmatic statements as they are analyses of 
past developments. In contrasting the opposing positions, one can draw a parallel between 
the West German society’s alleged failure to come to terms with the past, and the historical 
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profession’s alleged failure to satisfactorily answer the most pressing question: how was 
Adolf Hitler possible?  
 As a representative of the critical position, Hans Mommsen stated that “German 
historians were essentially concerned with reformulating the historical questions of the 
1920s.”79 Accordingly, the political legacy of the early 19th century Prussian reformer Baron 
vom Stein became a popular subject. While historians stressed vom Stein’s idea of local 
government (Selbstverwaltung), in line with the occupational powers, they neglected its anti-
parliamentarian tendency.80 In addition, the German revolution of 1848 received increased 
attention, because of its centenary as well as because the revolution had now become part of 
a positive part of German history, however short-lived it had turned out to be. Generally, the 
emphasis lay on constitutional and democratic achievements of the revolution rather than on 
the national and social conflicts that accompanied it. Finally, as Hans Rothfels’ keynote 
speech at the first postwar Historikertag had suggested, historians focused again on Otto von 
Bismarck. While most of them did not downplay the negative consequences of the Iron 
Chancellor’s domestic policies, hindering or even preventing a successful inner nation-
building, his role as founder of the German Empire was of particular interest given the 
uncertain prospects of the postwar (West) German state. Moreover, Bismarck’s supposedly 
modest and skillful conduct of foreign affairs, enlarging and then consolidating the German 
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Empire, appeared even more appealing after Hitler’s destructive as well as self-destructive 
policies.81 
A few scholars took a broader view and attempted to interpret the history of Germany 
since the French Revolution, offering an explanation of the rise of National Socialism as well 
as recommendations for the new German state. Among these historians were Friedrich 
Meinecke and Gerhard Ritter. Both Ritter’s and Meinecke’s reflections on the roots of 
National Socialism were at least in part responses to alternative interpretations from mostly 
British and American historians and journalists during World War II, who claimed that 
German history had taken a calamitous course with Frederick the Great, Martin Luther, or 
even earlier.82 Not surprisingly, Gerhard Ritter emphatically rejected these notions, which he 
termed “Vansittartism,” after the British Undersecretary of the Foreign Office, Robert 
Vansittart, whose 1941 broadcast addresses containing similar arguments were published as 
“Black Record.”83  
Meinecke in his Die deutsche Katastrophe as well as Ritter in his Geschichte als 
Bildungsmacht and the more comprehensive Europa und die deutsche Frage described 
themselves as representatives of the “other,” i.e. the better Germany.84 Meinecke stated that 
“it is the intellectually and politically oppositional camp to Hitler that raises its voice in this 
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book,”85 while Ritter portrayed himself as standing between a “moralizing and tendentious 
historiography” on the one hand and a “court historiography” on the other.86 The first term 
Ritter attributed to overly critical non-German evaluations of German history, the second 
term referred to what he considered as apologetic German historiography. Both Meinecke 
and Ritter emphasized that one could not explain National Socialism simply by relating it to 
German developments, but that a European perspective was necessary, and both took 
generally a “history of ideas” approach. Meinecke focused primarily on the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries while Ritter briefly discussed the legacy of Lutheranism and 
Prussianism (Luthertum and Preussentum)87 and then concentrated on the development of 
German nationalism in the nineteenth century and the consequences of the First World War 
for Germany. Ritter, who shortly after the end of World War II became a historical-political 
advisor for the leadership of the EKD (the Evangelische Kirche Deutschlands, the German 
Protestant Church), strongly rejected any connections that had been suggested between 
Lutheranism and National Socialism, since he saw the rise of the latter closely related to the 
forces of “modern secularism.”88  
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Meinecke and Ritter differed significantly in their evaluation of Prussianism. 
Meinecke saw basically two forces within the Prussian state, a positive, “cultured” force, and 
another force that was negative and “adverse to culture.” With the end of the Prussian 
reforms in 1819 the latter had emerged triumphant. Closely linked to the assessment was 
Meinecke’s view of the Prussian military tradition, which he saw as having adopted a 
“dangerous one-sidedness” in the early nineteenth century, emphasizing merely 
professionalism, efficiency, and technical competence.89 Ritter, in contrast, although 
conceding that the Prussian military spirit’s emphasis on obedience might have facilitated the 
rise of National Socialism or made the Germans more receptive to it, argued that eventually 
National Socialism “did not grow on Prussian-Protestant soil, but on the soil of radical, 
revolutionary democracy.”90 The Israeli historian Jacob Talmon would shortly afterwards 
develop a similar argument regarding the genealogy of totalitarianism.91 And while Ritter 
argued that historians had to rethink the “problem of Prussian-German militarism,” he at the 
same time believed that “National Socialism [was] not a Prussian plant, but an Austrian-
Bavarian import.”92  
In addition to this claim that National Socialist ideology, was actually imported from 
Austria, Ritter also emphasized the importance of the French Revolution in order to 
understand the emergence of totalitarianism and thus National Socialism: “No event in 
German history, but the great French Revolution has shaken the firm ground of European 
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political traditions.”93 The Revolution produced egalitarian mass democracy, and “historical 
experience shows that the democratic principle as such offers no protection against 
dictatorship; on the contrary: egalitarian democracy is the most important political 
precondition for it.”94 The French Revolution, according to Ritter, had in another respect laid 
the ground for the developments of the twentieth century: “When the old authoritarian state 
was transformed into the democratic nation-state and the churches were dislodged from their 
central position, the way was open, in principle, to the development of the modern total 
state.”95 Ritter used this argument to indirectly relativize the specific German developments 
and instead to emphasize common European developments. Yet Meinecke tended to 
scrutinize nineteenth and twentieth century German rather than European history, for he 
believed it was more important to “sweep in front of one’s own door” than to ask for “being 
granted extenuating circumstances.”96 A disturbing feature in Meinecke’s account, however, 
was a repeated reference to a negative influence of German Jews on the course of German 
history, even though he also strongly condemned anti-Semitism.97 
What, then, was the turning point in German history? For Ritter, it was clearly the 
aftermath of World War I, even though he stated that already the war itself had caused an 
“exaggerated national consciousness” as a mass phenomenon in Germany.98 But only in the 
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1920s, when the masses (Massenmenschentum, a key term in Ritter’s vocabulary) rose, as 
they did throughout Europe at that time, could a demagogue like Adolf Hitler achieve power. 
And while this answer to the question of why National Socialism was eventually successful 
in Germany seems unsatisfying, it can be explained by the fact that Ritter wrote in response 
to the British and American studies cited above and was thus more interested in refuting their 
claims about a German disposition to National Socialist ideas than in providing an original 
answer himself. Meinecke, in contrast, was more willing to reevaluate previously cherished 
events in German history such as Bismarck’s unification of Germany in 187199 and to 
concede that the Pan-German League in the late Empire and the Vaterlandspartei during 
World War I could be seen as a prelude for the rise of the National Socialists.100 And while 
Meinecke emphasized coincidence as an important factor for the eventual success of the 
Nazis he did not hesitate to assign blame to particular political actors, namely to 
Reichspräsident Paul von Hindenburg and to the chairman of the German National People’s 
Party (DNVP), Alfred Hugenberg.101 A final difference between Ritter and Meinecke 
concerned the tone of their writings: the latter wrote a more contemplative prose, while 
Ritter’s style can be termed more combative – maybe just a result of their tempers, but 
probably also a reflection of their respective attitudes. In fairness to Ritter, one should also 
mention his later magnum opus Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, which constituted a serious 
attempt to grapple with the intricacies of militarism in German history.102 
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Even broader in its scope was Ludwig Dehio’s Gleichgewicht oder Hegemonie 
(Balance or Hegemony) which attempted to make sense of five hundred years of European 
history. Dehio, according to Nazi definition a “quarter Jew,” had spent the war years at a 
Berlin archive, not allowed to publish anything. Having become the director of the State 
Archive Marburg in 1946, he also edited Historische Zeitschrift between 1949 and 1956. In 
Gleichgewicht oder Hegemonie Dehio argued that since the fifteenth century, the European 
state system had come under assault six times: Charles V, Philip II, Louis XIV, Napoleon I, 
and finally William II and Hitler had pursued hegemony in Europe, until the defeat of Nazi 
Germany and the emergence of the Cold War had ended this era of European power 
politics.103 While Dehio’s study remained within the confines of “power politics” without a 
discussion of economic and social factors, Gleichgewicht oder Hegemonie appeared 
comparatively revisionist in interpretive respects. After all, his argument that the 
development of German militarism had led to two successive bids for European hegemony 
was very much at odds with the position of historians such as Ritter. This became apparent 
again when Ritter published the first volumes of his magnum opus on German militarism, 
Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, which Dehio reviewed very critically.104 
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In contrast, works on the German resistance served a slightly different purpose. Of 
course, both Ritter and Hans Rothfels who tackled this topic, wanted to convince the world – 
or at least their foreign colleagues – that there had indeed existed an “other” and better 
Germany. Especially Rothfels wrote his study for an American audience (where it was 
published first). But at the same time they also addressed a German public, for the men 
behind the 20th July 1944 plot, let alone more leftist resistance fighters, were still considered 
by many Germans to be traitors. The two main studies appearing at the time were quite 
different in scope: Hans Rothfels’s The German Opposition to Hitler, emerging out of a 
lecture he had delivered at the University of Chicago in 1947, was published in 1948 and was 
a shorter essay, less based on archival and other unpublished sources than Gerhard Ritter’s 
more comprehensive Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung, published in 
1954.105 Rothfels began his study “for the sake of historical justice,” since in his opinion “the 
German opposition to Hitler was not only much broader than has been conceded so far, but 
also more extensive than could have been expected under conditions of terror.”106 Ritter, on 
the other hand, had certainly a similar agenda, since he had known Goerdeler and had been 
asked by his family and relatives of other participants in the 20th July 1944 plot to write its 
history.107 And yet he claimed that he wanted to focus more on the ideas and values behind 
the resistance since he believed in their usefulness for a future Germany as well as a future 
Europe: “The spirit of these men, the moral and political opinions which drove them into 
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opposition, must be kept alive among us, too, if our own work of reconstruction is to 
prosper.”108 
Given the unequal length of the two books, it might be surprising to note that 
Rothfels’s was the more comprehensive one. For even though he placed the resistance groups 
involved in the 20th July 1944 plot at the center of his study, he also emphasized that student 
groups such as Weisse Rose and socialist/communist-leaning groups such as Arvid Harnack’s 
Rote Kapelle had been important. Considering Rothfels’s political convictions and the fact 
that Rote Kapelle had been in contact with the Soviet Union during World War II, his 
recognition of their “awareness of a European mission” and their “basis of an ideally 
conceived communism” is remarkable.109 But it might also have been his desire to depict a 
German resistance that had pervaded all parts of the German society, since he even argued 
that intellectuals and artists who chose the option of so-called “inner emigration” (that is, 
they kept a low profile and disengaged themselves from the regime) should be counted as a 
part of the resistance. Eventually, his study attempted to counter those accounts that were in 
Germany often perceived as accusations of Kollektivschuld (collective guilt).110 Rothfels thus 
rejected notions of a particular German submissiveness and furthermore denied that anti-
Semitism in Nazi Germany “met with more or less general approval or connivance.”111 
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Ritter largely agreed with Rothfels’s evaluation of the Resistance; he praised the 
latter’s study in a Historische Zeitschrift review.112 But he was much less able than Rothfels 
to overcome – or at least put into perspective – his own political positions. It is certainly not 
surprising that Goerdeler became the hero of the study, but when Ritter evaluated the 
Goerdeler Circle’s plans for postwar Germany, it became increasingly difficult to distinguish 
between his own and Goerdeler’s positions, since Ritter identified so strongly with the 
latter’s ideas.113 Much less empathetic, in contrast, was his analysis of the socialist and 
communist resistance. Ritter’s assessment of the Rote Kapelle reads as follows: “With the 
German resistance they had nothing at all to do. They were simply in the service of the 
enemy.” Thus, after the Gestapo discovered the conspiracy, he concluded, “the resultant trial 
could have no other end than a mass execution.”114 But apart from such statements, which 
probably reveal more about the author’s conservative nationalism than about his subject, a 
remarkable feature of Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung was the fact 
that Ritter did not only portray the conservative resistance as the only legitimate one, but that 
he also recommended Goerdeler’s plans for a post-Hitler Germany as appropriate and even 
necessary for the Federal Republic.115 
A cursory glance at these works reveals the difficulty of their easy categorization. 
Labels such as “liberal” or “conservative” seem appropriate yet vague. What can be said, 
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though, is that Meinecke, Ritter, and Rothfels all argued against a linear continuity in 
German history culminating into the Nazi dictatorship. At the same time, these historians 
rejected the notion of a Kollektivschuld (collective guilt) of the German people. But who had 
made such a claim? Apart from a few books published as war propaganda and A.J.P. 
Taylor’s diatribe on the Course of German History, one would be hard pressed to identify 
such voices among professional historians. Norbert Frei has therefore argued that the alleged 
accusation of collective guilt often served as a straw man, allowing for rebuttals that were not 
necessarily more nuanced than the position they attempted to reject.116   
Among the unquestionable innovations of the immediate postwar period was the 
establishment of contemporary history (Zeitgeschichte) as a particular field of historical 
inquiry. Defined by Hans Rothfels as the “period of contemporaries” (Epoche der 
Mitlebenden), Zeitgeschichte encompassed at the time essentially the period 1917-1945. Due 
to the resistance of the historical profession, it was initially pursued more outside than within 
the universities’ history departments, above all at the Munich-based Institut für 
Zeitgeschichte. In his comparative study on the West German and the Japanese historical 
professions between 1945 and 1960, Sebastian Conrad has suggested potentially problematic 
consequences. While the universities taught general German history and the history of the 
twentieth century without a particular focus on the Nazi years, National Socialism became 
“quarantined” at new research institutions. Accordingly, one could view it as a phenomenon 
sui generis rather than within the context and as a result of German history. If history (the 
situation in political science was slightly different) lecture courses or seminars tackled 
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National Socialism, or if professors directed dissertations on that period, the focus remained 
generally limited to either the Resistance or World War II.117  
The focus on the Fischer-Kontroverse as the beginning of “revisionist 
historiography” has at times led to a neglect of the 1950s. While this decade saw fewer 
historiographical innovations than the 1960s or the 1970s, not all German historians 
continued the Rankean path. The debate about the role of Chancellor Brüning in the demise 
of the Weimar Republic constitutes a case in point.118 While Werner Conze insisted that the 
failure of Brüning’s policies were primarily a result of unfortunate circumstances, Karl 
Dietrich Bracher maintained that the Center Party politician had helped weaken the already 
frail Republic and ultimately bore part of the responsibility for the increasing political 
radicalization during his tenure as Chancellor. Yet Bracher, who began his academic career 
as an ancient historian before switching to contemporary history, did not only pose an 
interpretive challenge to the “establishment.”119 His was also methodological, since he 
combined historical with political science approaches to analyze the demise of the Weimar 
Republic. After receiving his PhD in 1948, Bracher had spent two years as a postdoctoral 
fellow at Harvard University. The Harvard years not only deepened Bracher’s interest in and 
knowledge of the social sciences, but they also introduced him to an academic community 
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that was considerably more internationally oriented than his alma mater Tübingen.120 At first 
glance, Bracher’s interdisciplinary approach might have appealed to Conze, who appeared 
generally open to the social sciences and at the time had begun to develop his own 
conception of social history or Strukturgeschichte.121 And indeed, Conze in a review of 
Bracher’s study emphasized the merits of the methodological borrowings from the social 
sciences. Yet he simultaneously rejected Bracher’s use of allegedly “ahistorical categories” 
which he thought did not do justice to the reality of the 1920s.122 Conze in particular took 
issue with Bracher’s position on the state of German democracy and accused him of 
measuring the German development against a universalist democratic ideal. Bracher also, 
and more importantly, blamed many of the problems weakening the Weimar Republic on the 
legacy of the German Empire, in particular the authoritarian constitutional tradition. This 
negative view on the German Empire led Conze to deplore Bracher’s “distortions” which 
supposedly prevented him from taking an “unbiased approach” to German history.123 While 
it is impossible to reconstruct the details of this heated debate, one of Conze’s arguments 
against Bracher’s position deserves particular attention. By applying the standards of 
“Western democracies” to the situation of 1929/30, Conze claimed, Bracher failed to 
understand the peculiar circumstances of the Weimar Republic during its final phase. Their 
disagreement thus stemmed from diverging political positions as well as generational 
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backgrounds. Bracher posited the establishment and the preservation of a functioning 
democracy as necessity; Conze rejected this position as “ahistorical.”124 
In the West German historical profession of the 1950s, most established scholars 
tended to side with Conze, while the younger generation embraced Bracher. Historische 
Zeitschrift did not allow Bracher to respond to Conze’s scathing review. Even though Die 
Auflösung der Weimarer Republik in the years following its publication underwent several 
reprints and to this day remains essential for anyone interested in Weimar’s demise, Bracher 
throughout his career was never offered a chair in history.125 He continued instead to publish 
his highly regarded studies on the Nazi establishment of power and a synthetical work on the 
Nazi dictatorship as a professor of political science at Bonn University. While one thus might 
see this episode as further proof the historical profession’s conservatism, one should at least 
concede that the first challenges to the orthodoxy were launched well before the Fischer-
Kontroverse. It is also noteworthy that they came from historically interested political 
scientists, who were trying to gain a foothold in the academy.  
Another way of reflecting on the historical discourse of the postwar years is to ask 
what German historians chose not to write about, even though it might have been reasonable 
to assume that they would. Above all, this concerns the place of the Holocaust in German 
historiography. As we have seen, in recent years, interest in collaboration between German 
historians and the Nazi regime has led to a number of illuminating studies. The historian-
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journalist Götz Aly has even suggested that a few historians played a role in the Holocaust, 
due to their service to the regime as planning experts.126 Subsequently, scholars began to 
investigate whether and how German historians during the immediate postwar years tackled 
the Holocaust in their work. Nicolas Berg has offered an extremely critical assessment, 
focusing on West German Holocaust historiography—or the lack thereof—between the late 
1940s and the 1980s.127 Berg interprets this neglect as a result of two main developments. On 
the one hand, West German historians focused on the Nazis’ rise to power rather than the 
persecution and subsequent extermination of the European Jews. Often, as we have seen, 
they arrived at rather general explanations regarding the inherent dangers of mass democracy 
and the European heritage of fascism and National Socialism. At the same time, they 
successfully managed to exclude Jewish voices—usually without any institutional support or 
even affiliation—from the academic discourse, claiming that as victims they lacked the 
necessary “objectivity” and “distance” indispensable for a reliable historical analysis.128  
Berg’s scathing critique has undeniable merits, and it is impossible to ignore the fact 
that West German historians only slowly began to analyze National Socialist extermination 
policies. Strains of anti-Semitism were clearly visible among some scholars, and the general 
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suspicion against émigré historians (of which only Hans Rothfels was exempt) only 
reinforced the dichotomy between “German” and “other” perspectives on the German past. 
But Berg’s intervention presupposes the achievements of the generation he criticizes, and is 
therefore ahistorical in spirit. Finally, it is worth remembering that during the 1950s and even 
1960s a scholarly pioneer such as Raul Hilberg remained an outsider within the American 
historical profession.129 Warned by his dissertation adviser Franz Neumann not to write about 
the Holocaust, Hilberg after the successful completion of his dissertation faced enormous 
obstacles in his attempt to publish his manuscript. Without a doubt, West Germans—like 
their East German counterparts—were not yet ready to face the moral challenges of 
Holocaust historiography.130 But during late 1940s and 1950s a reluctance to deal with this 
topic prevailed that transcended German borders. 
 
A Transatlantic Network? 
It is one of the main arguments of this dissertation that American scholars of German 
history assumed a significant role in the reconstitution of the postwar historical profession in 
West Germany. Yet in contrast to previous accounts, the study suggests that it was not just 
the representatives of a critical, “revisionist” perspective on German historians who 
benefitted from contacts with their American colleagues. In order to understand the 
transatlantic scholarly community emerging after the end of the war, we need to take a 
broader view. 
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To be sure, shortly after the end of World War II, many American scholars were 
indeed wondering how their German colleagues might overcome the nationalism and 
intellectual isolation characteristic of the vast majority of the German historical profession 
since 1933, if not since 1914. As early as 1941, Oscar J. Hammen had concluded his analysis 
of German historiography in the interwar years with the observation that “the obvious 
rejection of ‘western’ ideas and institutions, the ‘revision’ of the liberal historiography of the 
nineteenth century by German historians since 1933, are but the intensification of tendencies 
which already were pronounced before the advent of the Nazi regime.”131 Thus, it was hardly 
surprising that American historians paid close attention to the first attempts of their German 
contemporaries to explain the rise of National Socialism. 
In the Americans’ view, some German historians did better than others: Friedrich 
Meinecke’s 1946 essay Die deutsche Katastrophe enjoyed a generally favorable reception, 
and the following year, its author was awarded the American Historical Association’s 
(AHA’s) honorary foreign membership.132 Despite the fact that Meinecke soon took a much 
more defensive stance regarding the reevaluation of modern German history, Americans 
clearly considered him a “good German.”133 On the other hand, Gerhard Ritter’s crude 
apologia, referring to National Socialism as “not an authentic Prussian plant, but an Austrian-
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Bavarian import,”134 met with considerable resistance among American historians. Felix 
Gilbert thus criticized the “rather nationalistic bias in Ritter’s tendency to excuse dangerous 
and deplorable German developments and even to consider them justified if somewhat 
similar developments have occurred in other countries.”135 
The collection of essays German History: Some New German Views, edited by Hans 
Kohn of Brooklyn College in 1954, and its reception provide some insights into American 
views of German history and historiography during that decade. In his introduction, Kohn 
emphasized the historically significant role German academics and particularly historians had 
played in shaping anti-democratic and anti-Western attitudes. Therefore, he argued, the 
question of whether they would now contribute to the integration of West Germany into the 
democratic Western community was an important one.136 The volume, while undoubtedly 
offering “new views,” was hardly representative of the German historical profession in the 
1950s. Not only were most of the profession’s big players absent from the collection, but 
Franz Schnabel’s take on the “Bismarck Problem” and Johann Albrecht von Rantzau’s 
devastating critique of the “glorification of the state in German historical writing” also 
expressed positions that the overwhelming majority of West German Ordinarien would have 
rejected out of hand.137 Kohn had rightly anticipated his volume would “make some stir in 
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German university circles,”138 and these circles responded accordingly, as Ludwig Dehio, the 
editor of Historische Zeitschrift (HZ), had warned Kohn.139 Instead of engaging with the 
volume’s essays, the HZ reviewer merely targeted Kohn’s introduction and argued that the 
exaggerated revisionist tendencies of the first postwar years now had to give way to a more 
sober analysis (“einer sachlicheren Ergründung der Zusammenhänge”)—something Kohn in 
his opinion had failed to provide.140 American historians, by contrast, welcomed these 
German attempts to rewrite modern German history.141 One reviewer, however, noted that 
the concept of “the West,” against which the German development was measured and found 
wanting, remained curiously vague and required a much more precise definition if the 
comparison was to yield meaningful results.142 This has since been a recurring argument 
against all kinds of studies examining Germany’s deviation from the “Western 
development,” as will become apparent below. 
At the same time, German historians had also become acutely aware of the 
importance of American judgments about their scholarship—even if they might disagree with 
their tendency. German scholars of all political and methodological brands—and not just the 
most liberal-minded— therefore attempted to establish, or reestablish, relations with 
American colleagues. Gerhard Ritter, self-appointed spokesperson of the postwar West 
German historical profession, immediately after 1945 resumed contacts with American 
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historians. In so doing, he proved to be a fairly effective proponent of nationalist-
conservative causes.143 Ritter’s self-confidence in these matters continues to amaze: 
attempting to secure an English translation of his Europa und die Deutsche Frage in 1948, he 
told Fritz T. Epstein that he would be “very grateful if you could get Stanford [University] 
Press to accept it for publication. After all, my views represent the communis opinio of all 
German academic historians.”144 In reality, Ritter did not even attain the consensus of all 
conservative scholars in postwar Germany, as one could see through his failure to achieve a 
more prominent role within the newly established Institut für Zeitgeschichte.145 And yet, 
some Americans accepted Ritter’s self-confident claim to speak for the entire postwar 
German historical profession. Andreas Dorpalen, one of the leading observers of nineteenth- 
and twentieth-century German historiography, even argued that “the combination of 
adaptability in foreign affairs and conservatism in domestic policy which his [Ritter’s] 
speeches and writings reveal seems characteristic of the climate of opinion in the Bonn 
Republic. Thus Ritter’s work continues not only to deal with German history but to be a 
representative part of that history.”146 West German historians themselves by the early 1960s 
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would rather have identified Theodor Schieder, Werner Conze, or Karl Dietrich Erdmann as 
fulfilling the role Dorpalen attributed to Ritter.  
Dorpalen’s overly generous assessment illustrates that Ritter’s eventual selection as 
honorary foreign member of the American Historical Association (AHA) was less surprising 
than it seems in retrospect. In fact, the AHA’s secretary, Guy Stanton Ford, had already 
suggested Ritter in 1952, but the committee chose Franz Schnabel, a Catholic yet liberal 
outsider among the West German historians.147 When Ritter’s name came up again in 1958 
(along with those of the medievalists Walter Goetz and Percy Ernst Schramm), the selection 
committee’s chairman, Felix Gilbert, astutely summarized the pros and cons:  
“I think there is no doubt that Ritter is regarded to be the leading German 
historian at the present time and I don’t think we can nominate, if we 
nominate someone from Germany, anyone else but him. Ritter has certainly 
done most important work. I would say that his History of the University of 
Heidelberg and his recent work on German militarism belong to the small 
group of really outstanding historical works of the twentieth century. What 
can be said against Ritter is that probably his literary style is not so 
distinguished that his works can be regarded as classics of historical literature. 
Moreover his political views have aroused quite a lot of opposition. He was 
very much a German Nationalist and went along with the Nazis for quite a 
while although he then went into opposition and was even placed in prison. I 
don’t know whether we ought to take these political considerations into 
account at all. He has certainly done a lot to strengthen the cooperation of the 
German historians with the international world in the period since the Second 
World War.”148  
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148 Letter Felix Gilbert to Boyd Shafer, November 14, 1958, LoC, AHA papers, Box 489, Secretary File. 
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Eventually, the committee did not let these political considerations affect their 
decision in choosing Ritter.149 Of course, one should not overrate the significance of such 
honorary gestures, as they were certainly influenced by a number of very different factors—
scholarly as well as political. Yet it remains remarkable that a historian like Ritter, labeled 
even by his sympathetic biographer as a wissenschaftspolitischer Frontkämpfer, could 
receive such an honor only a decade and a half after the end of the war.150 
There are several possible explanations for this surprising fact. Maybe only few 
Americans—such as the émigrés—were aware of the academic as well as political positions 
their German colleagues had taken during the Nazi years. Alternatively, most of them knew 
but were willing to forget about past mistakes for the sake of future professional cooperation. 
When Felix Gilbert reviewed Gerhard Ritter’s Europa und die deutsche Frage, he rejected 
the Ritter’s “polemic against what the author considers the Anglo-Saxon view of history”, 
but then added in a somewhat conciliatory manner: “But to hold the author's eagerness to 
state the German case too much against him and to criticize the book too sharply because one 
would prefer a better rounded and documented presentation, shows a lack of appreciation of 
the importance of initiating immediately serious scholarly discussions in Germany and of the 
difficulties against which scholarly production has to struggle there today.”151 In other words, 
                                                
149 Committee chairman Paul H. Clyde reported to Boyd Shafer that in the second round of votes “one 
committee member preferred to abstain from voting in the case of Ritter.” Shafer replied, “I think you should 
recommend Ritter with the explanation that one member declined to vote.” Letters of October 13 and 16, 1959, 
LoC, AHA papers, Box 661, Secretary’s and Executive Secretary’s File. 
150 Cornelissen, Gerhard Ritter, 457. 
151 Felix Gilbert, “Review of Gerhard Ritter, Europa und die deutsche Frage”, American Historical Review 54 
(1949), 594 and 595. 
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for the sake of international scholarly dialogue some historians seemed to be willing to 
accept or at least engage views they sharply disagreed with. 
John L. Harvey has offered yet another interpretation, much less flattering for 
American historians of Germany, speaking of an “entangled conservatism” connecting 
scholars on both sides of the Atlantic. Germans and—some, by no means all, one has to 
emphasize—Americans “shared common dispositions about politics, social prejudices, or 
reactions to the emergence of contemporary popular culture.”152 Throughout the 1930s, even 
the most anti-democratic German views did not lead these American historians to distance 
themselves from their German colleagues. Harvey argues that “the trust that German 
historians placed in their American counterparts could even include the disclosure of 
personal allegiances to National Socialism, with an understanding that such admissions 
would cause no harm for future scholastic intercourse.”153 Accordingly, Egmont Zechlin 
(University of Hamburg) in 1933 freely admitted to Harvard historian William Langer that he 
was writing articles for the Nazi party newspaper Völkischer Beobachter, and that he had just 
joined the SA’s motor squad. Even more surprising was the case of the medievalist Percy 
Ernst Schramm who during a research visit at Princeton University (he had received 
Princeton’s Benjamin Shreve Fellowship) in the spring and summer of 1933 had defended 
the political conditions in Germany after the Nazi takeover. Schramm insisted that the Nazi 
authorities were only “protecting citizens against Bolshevism”, and denied the “rumors of 
persecution” of Jewish Germans.154 Yet this blatant propaganda did not keep the Princeton 
                                                
152 John L. Harvey, The Common Adventure of Mankind, 499. 
153 Harvey, The Common Adventure of Mankind, 533. 
154 Cited after Harvey, The Common Adventure of Mankind, 497. 
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medievalist Gray C. Boyce from paying Schramm a complimentary research visit to 
Göttingen University the following year. 
After the war, Harvey argues, Americans expressed remarkably little interest in the 
problematic backgrounds of many of their German contemporaries. What made American 
indifference all the more surprising is the fact that during the mid- and late 1930s and early 
1940s several articles in American journals had detailed the degree to which German 
historians had either collaborated or at least made concessions during the Nazi regime.155 
Harvey concludes that we should view the postwar decade as a transition period: while the 
interwar conservatism characterizing much of the American writing of German history still 
existed, the more liberal critique which dominated the 1960s was only slowly emerging.156 
This inevitably raises the question of what the German historians arriving in the United 
States as exchange students in the early to late 1950s encountered. Did their experience 
match with later assessments of postwar American academia in general and historiography 
on modern Germany in particular? These are the questions at the center of the next chapter. 
 
                                                
155 See Hammen, “German Historians and the Advent of the National Socialist State.” 
156 Harvey, The Common Adventure of Mankind, 551. 
CHAPTER 2 
 
Postwar German Historiography in the United States  
 
During the final years of World War II, American politicians, bureaucrats, and 
intellectuals began to contemplate the crucial question of what to do with a defeated 
Germany. Contrary to public memory about this issue, “during World War II the United 
States never achieved a politically coherent consensus on whether the enemy was the Nazi 
regime or the German nation as a whole.”1 As a result of these varying American attitudes 
toward the Germans, conflicting interpretations shaped American warfare and postwar 
planning. For the future course of action it mattered immensely whether National Socialism 
was the logical result of eternal Prussian-German militarism, had developed out German 
culture, or was simply the unfortunate consequence of the takeover of the German nation by 
a “band of thugs.” Ultimately, the wartime discourse on Germany resulted in a multifaceted 
and somewhat ambiguous approach, combining material and political reconstruction, 
intellectual and educational reforms, and confrontation with the crimes of National 
Socialism.2  
The postwar relationship between West German and American historians unfolded 
under different circumstances, since the latter did not attain the position of an intellectual 
                                                
1 Michaela Hoenicke Moore, Know Your Enemy: The American Debate on Nazism, 1933-1945 (Cambridge, 
UK, 2009), 341. 
2 Hoenicke Moore, Know Your Enemy, 177-340 and 344-345. For the educational realm, see Brian M. Puaca, 
Learning Democracy: Education Reform in West Germany 1945-1965 (New York, 2009).  
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occupation authority. Still, Americans were concerned with similar questions regarding the 
Germans’ reintegration into the international scholarly community. When Felix Gilbert, at 
the time an associate professor at Bryn Mawr College, published his bibliographical survey 
on German historiography during World War II in 1947, he proclaimed that it would not be 
“easy for German historiography to regain a place in the world of international scholarship.” 
Discerning “a number of factors that place[d] the revival of German historiographical activity 
under a severe handicap,” Gilbert concluded: “It would appear that German historiography 
will have to make an entirely new beginning, the results of which will hardly become 
apparent in the near future.”1 Of course, Gilbert only referred to works produced by German 
historians—his article discussed the extent to which they had compromised academic 
standards during the Nazi years. Moreover, he placed recent German historiography in its 
broader historical context, identifying the neglect of social and economic development as a 
deficiency characteristic of German historians for several decades.2 Yet in doing so Gilbert 
implicitly raised the question of what the task of American historians of Germany should be 
in the postwar years: should they assume the role of attentive observers of German 
historiographical production or act as active participants in a reemerging transatlantic 
community of scholars? Should they maybe even provide intellectual “developmental aid” to 
their German colleagues, helping establish a more critical historiography? These are the 
questions at the center of this chapter. 
                                                
1 Felix Gilbert, “German Historiography during the Second World War: a bibliographical survey”, American 
Historical Review 53 (1947) , 50-58, quotes on 57 and 58. 
2 Of course, his devastating critique owed some of its force to the time when it was written. Several decades 
later, Gilbert almost fondly recalled his student days in 1920s Berlin. See his “The Historical Seminar of the 
University of Berlin in the 1920s”, in Lehmann/Sheehan (eds.), An Interrupted Past, 67-70. 
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Again, as in the previous chapter, the survey of the field of modern German history in 
the United States examines its institutional, personal, and interpretive dimension. The chapter 
thus begins with a discussion of the Conference Group for Central European History and the 
journals that published articles and book reviews on modern Germany. It then focuses on 
those history departments where German history played an important role and where future 
historians of Germany were trained. Within this institutional context, the impact of first and 
second-generation émigré historians will be discussed.3 Moreover, the chapter evaluates the 
interpretive contours of postwar historiography on Germany, ultimately illustrating the 
changes in the way scholars wrote about modern Germany since the 1940s. All of these 
transformations unfolded at a time when the impact of National Socialism and the early Cold 
War drastically increased public as well as scholarly interest in Germany.  
For contemporary observers, this development was not a forgone conclusion: In his 
presidential address at the American Historical Association’s annual convention in 1945, 
Carlton J. Hayes had demanded increased American attention to European history. Hayes 
pointed out the small number of dissertations written in European—in comparison to 
American—history and thought it to be “astonishing and paradoxical” that at a time when the 
United States had abandoned its economic and military isolationism it should “keep alive and 
actually intensify an intellectual isolationism.”4 
                                                
3 First generation émigrés, born around the turn of the century, received their PhDs in Weimar Germany. 
Historians of the second generation, born between the 1910s and 1920s, studied history after arriving in the 
United States (or in England and the United States, in the case of George Mosse).  
4 Carlton J. Hayes, “The American Frontier—Frontier of What?” American Historical Review 51 (1945), 199-
216, quote on 203. 
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Given the international focus adopted and maintained by American history 
departments in the next decades, it is obvious that Hayes’ fears proved unfounded. As 
Kenneth Barkin has stated, “the three decades following World War II witnessed the solid 
establishment of German history as a critical part of the curriculum of every major 
university.”5 Consequently, many history departments hired historians specializing in modern 
German history. At the same time, the influx of émigré historians diversified the field; and 
while some of these historians started their careers in the United States at smaller colleges 
and with enormous teaching loads, they eventually managed to move on to universities where 
they advised graduate students and thus exerted greater influence on the profession’s 
development. 
 
The institutional dimension 
The previous comment regarding the various kinds of academic institutions in the 
United States points to a significant structural difference between the German and the 
American fields. Undoubtedly, the academic prestige of German universities varies; a PhD 
received at the Universities of Tübingen or Heidelberg may still be considered higher than 
the same degree from the Universities of Siegen or Passau.6 In addition, appointments at 
Technische Hochschulen or Technische Universitäten (Institutes of Technology) are less 
                                                
5 Kenneth D. Barkin, “German Émigré Historians in America: the Fifties, Sixties, and Seventies”, in Hartmut 
Lehmann/James J. Sheehan (eds.), An Interrupted Past: German-Speaking Refugee Historians in the United 
States after 1933 (Cambridge, UK, 1991), 153. An even broader overview provides Fritz Stern, who like Barkin 
emphasizes the increasing interest in German history during and after World War II, in his “German History in 
America, 1884 – 1984,” Central European History 19 (1986), 131-163. 
6 For a younger historian seeking a professorship, the name (and influence) of the academic adviser, the 
Doktorvater, has historically played a very important role as well. 
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coveted than at “regular” universities.7  Yet the German university system has never known 
the distinction between colleges and graduate schools, and it has been possible to complete a 
PhD in history at almost every academic institution. By contrast, the American university 
system is characterized by a significantly greater variety of institutions with very different 
academic foci. This chapter therefore surveys the “leading schools” in the United States, 
PhD-granting institutions with specialists in German history. This limitation comes at a price; 
we will not attain a comprehensive impression of the kind of German history that was taught 
at American institutions of higher education. Yet this chapter will cover the schools whose 
academics produced widely-read studies on modern Germany, who trained future generations 
of historians, who reviewed in academic journals, and whom German historians viewed as 
representing the American historical profession.  
During the first part of the twentieth century the American historical profession was 
dominated by scholars who were male, white, and Protestant.8 To be sure, several many 
Catholic colleges and universities existed, as well as so-called “historically black” 
institutions. But the profession’s most influential figures did not yet reflect the country’s 
ethnic or religious diversity. Rather, they often mirrored cultural and ethnic prejudices 
rampant in early twentieth century American society. As John L. Harvey has revealed, 
prejudices against Eastern Europeans, Jews, African Americans, as well as the French were 
far more common than historians today would like to admit.9 Until the end of World War II, 
                                                
7 The case of Franz Schnabel illustrates this point. He taught for several years at the TH Karlsruhe before 
moving on to the University of Munich – his alternative interpretation of Bismarck is said to have kept him 
from receiving a position at a more prestigious university earlier in his career.  
8 Stephen Steinberg, The Academic Melting Pot (New York, 1974), chapter 1. For egregious examples of anti-
Semitism in the interwar American historical profession, see Peter Novick, That Noble Dream, 172-174. 
9 John L. Harvey, The Common Adventure of Mankind, 506-516.  
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these sentiments affected the career prospects of who today would be called “minority 
scholars.” Émigrés who ultimately had successful careers in the United States initially 
encountered these obstacles. When Hans Rosenberg turned to William Langer for assistance 
in establishing himself professionally in the United States, Langer replied: “Painful though it 
may be to you, I ought also to say that there is not a little anti-Semitic feeling here. It goes 
back a long way and is not the result of recent developments. But we have always had great 
difficulty in placing young Jews in academic positions.”10 American Jewish students ran into 
similar difficulties. In the late 1930s, when the Columbia University undergraduate Carl 
Schorske expressed his desire to embark upon an academic career, the literary scholar Lionel 
Trilling who himself had had been confronted with anti-Semitism, nearly exploded at him.11 
John Hope Franklin’s experience at Harvard echoes this sentiment—he recalled being 
surprised by anti-Semitic comments among graduate students in the early 1940s.12  
The enormous expansion of higher education in the United States after World War II 
helped diversify academia—comparable to the development in Germany in the 1960s.13 
Between 1940 and 1970, the overall number of professorships increased fivefold, while AHA 
membership increased by 60% during the 1940s, again during the 1950s, and by over 90% in 
the 1960s. In the 1930s, about 150 history PhDs were awarded annually, however, by the 
mid-1950s the number had grown to 350 and then to 600 a decade later. According to Peter 
                                                
10 William L. Langer to Hans Rosenberg, August 27 1935, Harvard University Archives, William L. Langer 
Papers, Personal Correspondence, Box 1. Langer added “If you feel nevertheless that you wish to come, it goes 
without saying that I shall exert myself to the utmost to assist you.” 
11 Carl Schorske, Thinking with History: Explorations in the Passage to Modernism (Princeton, 1998), 21. 
12 John Hope Franklin, Mirror to America: the Autobiography of John Hope Franklin (New York, 2005), 64-65.  
13 All numbers from Novick, That Noble Dream, 362. 
 96 
Novick, “academic hiring became more meritocratic and more universalistic.”14 
Discrimination against Catholic and especially Jewish historians declined, and in 1952, Louis 
Gottschalk served as the first Jewish president of the AHA. The class background of history 
graduate students and subsequently professors became more diverse as well. On the other 
hand, the percentage of women in the profession fell remarkably: whereas women had 
received 20% of history doctorates between the 1920 and 1940s, by the 1950s this number 
had dropped to 10%. 
As already indicated, the focus of American historians of Europe shifted after the end 
of World War II: whereas traditionally Great Britain and France had been at the center of 
most scholars’ attention, with much of Europe laying in ruins “American historians set busily 
to work to find out what had gone wrong.”15 In this context, German history unsurprisingly 
seemed relevant, and this recognition had institutional consequences, with more and more 
history departments employing at least one specialist of modern Germany.16 By the mid-
1960s, the demise of the colonial empires shifted the historiographical focus again, this time 
away from Europe. But the two postwar decades European history in general and German 
history in particular experienced its prime. 
Further institutional evidence of the growing number of historians with a focus on 
Germany was the establishment of the Conference Group for Central European History. The 
Conference Group developed out of the American Committee for the Study of War 
                                                
14 Novick, That Noble Dream, 364. 
15 William H. McNeill, “Modern European History,” in Michael Kammen (ed.), The Past Before Us: 
Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States (Ithaca and London, 1980), 107. 
16 Barkin, “German Émigré Historians in America: the Fifties, Sixties, and Seventies”, 153; Fritz Stern, 
“German History in America, 1884-1984,” Central European History 19 (1986), 158. 
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Documents, which had been organized in 1955 by a number of scholars (including Carl J. 
Friedrich, Koppel Pinson, Raymond Sontag, Boyd Shafer from the AHA, Fritz T. Epstein, 
and Walter Dorn) in order to oversee as well as finance the filming of the German documents 
captured during World War II or seized soon thereafter by the United States.17 Based on two 
independent initiatives by Hans Kohn and George W.F. Hallgarten, the Committee in 1957 
became part of the American Historical Association, which administered the funds for the 
filming of the documents. After transforming into the Conference Group the following year, 
it became the principal organization for historians of Central Europe in North America.18 
American historians of Germany were able to publish their research in a number of 
journals. Given the comprehensive scope of the American Historical Review, this journal 
generally contained only a small number of articles on modern German history, but its 
review section considered several recent works in the area—both in English and in German. 
The first issue of the year 1951, for example, reviewed seven German studies on early 
modern and modern German history, considering not only major works such as Ludwig 
Dehio’s Gleichgewicht und Hegemonie, but also a volume on the nineteenth century historian 
Onno Klopp, a relatively unknown figure even in Germany.19 While at the American 
Historical Review’s German counterpart Historische Zeitschrift article manuscripts in the 
mid-1960s were still accepted or rejected solely by its editor Theodor Schieder, the AHR 
                                                
17 The long controversies surrounding these files have been documented by Astrid Eckert, Kampf um die Akten: 
die Westalliierten und die Rückgabe von deutschem Archivgut nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, 2004).  
18 The first elected officers were Hans Kohn (Chairman); William O. Shanahan (Vice-Chairman); Hajo Holborn 
and Arthur May (Board Members), and Oron J. Hale (Secretary-Treasurer). See the note in Journal of Central 
European Affairs 18 (1958), 69. 
19 Onno Klopp (1822-1903), was a critic of the leading Prussian and kleindeutsche historians such as Heinrich 
von Sybel. Originally in the service of King George V. of Hannover, Klopp later moved to Vienna where he 
became personal tutor of Archduke Francis Ferdinand. 
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already relied on outside reviewers. Even if the process was not double-blind (an article’s 
author did not know who the reviewers were, yet the reviewers knew the identity of the 
author), it was comparatively fair.20  
Soon after the war, the second major venue, the Journal of Modern History, published 
a number of articles on recent German history, as if the scholarly reckoning with the Nazi 
past had begun immediately after the Allied victory. The journal had existed since 1929, 
when Chester P. Higby remarked that “in spite of the European origin of the great majority of 
Americans, in the United States comparatively little interest to the history of Europe ha[d] 
been paid until quite recently.”21 Not surprisingly, then, the interest in German history 
dramatically increased during and immediately after World War II—the question of how the 
Nazi rise to power had been possible would receive a great deal of attention in this journal. 
The JMH also generally reviewed a considerable number of studies written in German; in 
1941 Oscar Hammen published his comprehensive critique of the relationship between 
German historians and the Nazi regime.22 
Other important journals included the Journal of Central European Affairs, the 
Review of Politics, and World Politics, each of which had a different scholarly scope. The 
Journal of Central European Affairs had been founded after the German invasion of France 
in 1940, when the publication of the Revue des Etudes Slaves in Paris and of the Slavonic 
                                                
20 See the editorial correspondence of Historische Zeitschrift during the 1950s and 1960s, BAK, NL Theodor 
Schieder, Boxes 233-244. By contrast, when Walter LaFeber in 1961 submitted his article “The Background of 
Cleveland’s Venezuelan Policy: a Re-interpretation”, three historians (Samuel Flagg Bemis, Julius W. Pratt, and 
Nelson W. Blake) reviewed the manuscript. See Library of Congress, AHA Papers, Box 513, AHR editorial 
correspondence. 
21 Chester P. Higby, “The Present Status of Modern European History in the United States,” Journal of Modern 
History 1 (1929), 3. 
22 Oscar Hammen, “German Historians and the Advent of the National Socialist State,” Journal of Modern 
History 13 (1941), 161-188. 
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Review in London had stopped.23 As the journal’s editor, S. Harrison Thomson explained 
upon its suspension in 1964, the intent had been “to set up a forum where a study of the 
history and problems of the whole area of Central Europe, then silenced under Nazi tyranny, 
could be presented.”24 During the twenty-three years of its existence, the journal published a 
significant number of articles on late nineteenth and early twentieth-century German history. 
Moreover, its review section was remarkably comprehensive and included a large number of 
studies written in German. The “notes and documents” section also covered annual 
conferences of a number of German historical and area studies associations. Two years after 
the Journal of Central European Affairs ceased publication, the Conference Group for 
Central European History decided to sponsor a new journal, Central European History, 
which together with the Austrian History Yearbook (established in 1965 by R. John Rath) 
and the East European Quarterly (founded in 1966) was supposed to cover Central Europe.25 
Hajo Holborn and Theodore Hamerow were instrumental in getting Central European 
History off the ground. Similar to the procedure followed by the American Historical Review 
in the 1960s, CEH established the anonymous review process from its inception.26 
By contrast, the Review of Politics, published by the University of Notre Dame since 
1939, claimed that, “without neglecting the analysis of institutions and techniques, [was] 
primarily interested in the philosophical and historical approach to political realities”27 The 
                                                
23 Edvard Benes, former President of Czechoslovakia and now head of the Provisional Czechoslovak 
Government based in London, contributed the very first article, “The New Central Europe,” Journal of Central 
European Affairs 1 (1941), 1-4. 
24 See the concluding remarks by S. Harrison Thomson in Journal of Central European Affairs 23 (1964), 411. 
25 “From the editors”, Central European History 1 (1968), 3. 
26 Douglas E. Unfug, personal note to the author, August 29, 2009. Unfug served as editor from 1968 to 1990.  
27 Editorial statement, The Review of Politics 1 (1939), 1. 
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political scientist and émigré Waldemar Gurian was the founder and subsequently the driving 
force behind this journal which was strictly speaking a political-science rather than a 
historical publication.28 The majority of issues during the immediate postwar years contained 
articles on either the roots of National Socialism or its aftermath. Moreover, it generally 
featured reviews of recent American as well as German literature on modern Germany. 
Compared to the AHR or the Journal of Modern History, which had no particular ideological 
bent, the Review of Politics can be characterized as a more conservative journal, both 
regarding its authors and the topics chosen. Immediately after the war, Gerhard Ritter 
published an English translation of his rather euphemistic account of German academics in 
Nazi Germany, which denied the ideological proximity of most scholars to the regime.29 
Published by a Catholic university, it also paid increased attention to literature on 
Catholicism.30 
Another journal, which distinguished itself as an interdisciplinary publication (many 
authors were political scientists or sociologists) but which served as a venue for many 
historical articles was World Politics.31 Established in 1948 and published by the Yale 
Institute of International Studies, the journal contained extraordinarily comprehensive review 
essays analyzing what could be considered the big books on modern Germany during the 
                                                
28 On Gurian, see Heinz Hürten, Waldemar Gurian: Ein Zeuge der Krise unserer Welt in der ersten Hälfte des 
20. Jahrhunderts (Mainz, 1972). See also the account by Margaret Fitzsimmons, “Profile of Crisis: the Review 
of Politics, 1939-1963,” in Review of Politics 25 (1963), 419-430. 
29 Gerhard Ritter, “The German Professor in the Third Reich,” Review of Politics 8 (1946), 242-254. 
30 See, for example, early reviews in Review of Politics 8 (1946), 551-552 (a study on Nazi policies against the 
Catholic Church as well as Catholic resistance), and 10 (1948), 244-246 (two studies on Catholic resistance in 
Nazi Germany). 
31 The very first issue, for example, contained articles by the pioneer of Comparative Politics Gabriel Almond, 
the founder of the Realist school in Political Science Hans Morgenthau, economist Jacob Viner, and military 
historian Alfred Vagts. 
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time.32 Moreover, it often published articles on contemporary affairs in West Germany, 
covering, for example, the development of the West German party system and the trade 
unions. 
 
Centers of German History 
While the American landscape of colleges and universities is vast, the training of 
future historians took place at a comparatively small number of graduate institutions. Aware 
of the danger of creating the impression of a “great men make historiography” interpretation, 
what follows is a survey of the “big players” within the American historical profession. In 
this context, it is worth remembering that graduate training in the United States unfolded in a 
more open manner than in Germany in the sense that there was less political, ideological, or 
methodological proximity between the advisers and their students.33 Without implying a 
ranking of history departments by presenting them in a particular order, this section proceeds 
from region to region. It first focuses on the Ivies, then examines departments located in the 
Mid-West, before moving South and ultimately to the West Coast.   
At Harvard, William Langer and Sidney B. Fay wrote on and taught German history, 
and while labels such as “pro-German” are problematic due to their relative vagueness, both 
historians held views diametrically opposed to the “from Luther to Hitler” interpretation, 
                                                
32 Two issues in 1959, for example, featured comprehensive reviews of Leonard Krieger’s The German Idea of 
Freedom, Peter Gay’s The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, and Carl Schorske’s German Social Democracy 
1905-1917. 
33 The following section draws in parts on John L. Harvey’s The Common Adventure of Mankind, 548-564. For 
a comparative sketch of the social dimension of German and American (as well as British and French) historical 
professions during the first half of the twentieth century, see Wolfgang Weber, “Sozialgeschichtliche Aspekte 
des historiographischen Wandels,” in Wolfgang Küttler/Jörn Rüsen/Ernst Schulin (eds.), Geschichtsdiskurs. 
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90-107. 
 102 
which saw the Nazi years as the culmination of a long deviation from the “Western” 
development.34 During the interwar years, Fay had provided the “revisionist” counterpoint to 
Bernadotte E. Schmitt’s view on the origins of World War I.35 Fay, taking a firm stand 
against the Versailles Treaty—including the war guilt clause—had provided an in-depth 
discussion of the underlying and the immediate causes of the war. In the first respect Fay had 
blamed, above all, the system of secret alliances, and in the latter he stated Austria-
Hungary’s responsibility while underlining that “Germany did not plot a European War, did 
not want one, and made genuine, though too belated efforts, to avert one.”36 This magnum 
opus got Fay the position at Harvard in 1929, where he taught until his retirement in 1946. 
Yet Fay also reached beyond the ivory tower: in 1940, he had written an article for the New 
York Times’ Sunday edition entitled “The German Character”, which argued that it would be 
“a mistake to identify the Nazis with the whole German people” and that “one must 
distinguish between the Nazi party members, their active supporters, and their terrorized 
opponents.” Ultimately, the Sunday Times editor Lester Markel and Fay agreed that the time 
was not right to publish the article.37 Fay also wrote a brief, sympathetic history of 
                                                
34 This does not imply that other American historians adhered to this view. William Montgomery McGovern 
who in 1941 published From Luther to Hitler was a political scientist and anthropologist at Northwestern 
University, and his book received mixed reviews in historical journals.  The other two studies generally 
mentioned in a similar vein were written by the British historians A.J.P. Taylor and Rohan d’Olier Butler (both 
at Oxford University)  
35 Compare See Bernadotte Schmitt, The Coming of War, 2 volumes, (New York, 1966, first edition 1930); and 
Sidney B. Fay, The Origins of the World War, 2 volumes, (New York, 1929). For the broader context of the 
“war guilt” debate of the interwar years, see Wolfgang Jäger, Historische Forschung und politische Kultur in 
Deutschland. Die Debatte 1914 – 1980 über den Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkriegs, (Göttingen, 1984), 58-59. 
36 Fay, The Origins of the World War, Vol. II, 553. Interestingly, the German Foreign Ministry bought a part of 
the edition of Fay’s book to distribute them abroad. See Ulrich Heinemann, Die verdrängte Niederlage. 
Politische Öffentlichkeit und Kriegsschuldfrage in der Weimarer Republik, (Göttingen, 1983), 113. 
37 Sidney B. Fay to Lester Markel, May 30, 1940; Lester Markel to Sidney B. Fay, June 6, 1940; and Sidney B. 
Fay to Lester Markel, June 13, 1940; Harvard University Archives, Sidney B. Fay Papers, HUG 4385.20, Box 
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Brandenburg-Prussia, and he translated Friedrich Meinecke’s essay Die deutsche 
Katastrophe into English.38 In the translator’s preface to the paperback edition published in 
1963, Fay emphasized Meinecke’s achievement of providing a brief yet penetrating account 
of Germany’s road to National Socialism: “It seeks neither to justify nor to condemn, but to 
understand. And, like a good historian, Meinecke sees things not purely white or black, but 
as the merging of lighter and darker shades in the grey web of history.”39 
William L. Langer, Fay’s longtime colleague at Harvard—he taught there from 1927 
to 1964—specialized in international rather than German history but always had a keen 
interest in modern Germany, and he advised several graduate students working within this 
area.40 During World War II, Langer headed the Research & Analysis Branch of the Office 
of Strategic Services, the precursor of the CIA.41 This unit produced a number of regional 
studies for the purposes of the planned occupation; later, it helped prepare the Nuremberg 
Trials.42 Langer also edited an extremely successful series of textbooks—The Rise of Modern 
                                                
38 Sidney B. Fay, The Rise of Brandenburg-Prussia to 1786 (New York, 1937). 
39 Friedrich Meinecke, The German Catastrophe: Reflections and Recollections (Cambridge, MA, 1950; 
paperback edition Boston, 1963), vii.  
40 On Langer, see the long bibliographical and intellectual-biographical introduction by Carl Schorske in 
Id./Elizabeth Schorske, Explorations in Crisis: Papers on International History (Cambridge, MA, 1969), ix-xliv. 
Langer’s students included Carl Schorske, H. Stuart Hughes, Hans W. Gatzke, and Klemens von Klemperer. 
41 The standard account of Langer’s branch is Barry Katz, Foreign Intelligence: Research and Analysis in the 
Office of Strategic Services (Cambridge, MA, 1989). 
42 Tim B. Müller, “Die gelehrten Krieger und die Rockefeller-Revolution: Intellektuelle zwischen 
Geheimdienst, Neuer Linken und dem Entwurf einer neuen Ideengeschichte,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 33 
(2007), 198-227. In this capacity, Langer oversaw the work of scholars such as Crane Brinton, Carl Schorske, 
Stuart Hughes, Leonard Krieger, Franklin Ford, Gordon Craig, Arthur Schlesinger, Walt Rostow, Charles 
Kindleberger, Barrington Moore, Franz Neumann, Herbert Marcuse, Otto Kirchheimer, Felix Gilbert, and Hajo 
Holborn. 
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Europe—that became known colloquially as the “Langer Series.”43 Toward the end of his 
career, Langer became, against his will, involved in the controversy surrounding David L. 
Hoggan who had received his PhD at Harvard in 1948. In 1961 Hoggan published Der 
erzwungene Krieg (The Forced War), which placed the responsibility for the outbreak of 
World War II on the supposedly conspirational diplomacy of Great Britain and Poland. Early 
in his career, Hoggan had received considerable support from Langer.44 When the publication 
of Der erzwungene Krieg caused a scandal in both Germany and the United States, Langer 
quickly repudiated the book, despite the fact that it strongly resembled the actual PhD thesis 
he had approved fifteen years earlier.45 
Probably as important as graduate mentor at Harvard as Langer was Franklin Ford, 
who advised scholars such as Fritz K. Ringer, Charles S. Maier, and Thomas Childers. As a 
result of his service for the OSS in Germany Ford had acquired access to captured German 
documents and was therefore able to write what was arguably the first scholarly treatment of 
the German resistance.46 Ford received his PhD at Harvard in 1950, and, after a brief stint at 
Bennington College, returned to his alma mater in 1953, where he taught until 1985. 
                                                
43 On this enterprise, see John L. Harvey, “Mission Impossible? Progress, ‘The New History,’ and European 
Identity in The Rise of Modern Europe,” in Stefan Berger/Chris Lorenz (eds.), The Nation and Its Other: 
Microstudies in National History (London/New York, forthcoming). 
44 Langer had written a glowing recommendation for Hoggan when he applied for a job at Berkeley. See the 
letter William L. Langer to Raymond Sontag, April 29, 1952, Harvard Archives, William L. Langer papers, Box 
13, Personal Correspondence. 
45 For the American side, see the review by Gerhard Weinberg and the subsequent exchange between Weinberg, 
Hoggan, and Hoggan’s defender Harry Elmer Barnes in American Historical Review 68 (1962), 104-105 and 
914-918. A devastating German review was Gotthard Jasper’s “Über die Ursachen des Zweiten Weltkrieges: zu 
den Büchern von A.J.P. Taylor and David L. Hoggan,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 10 (1962), 311-340. 
46 Franklin L. Ford, “The Twentieth of July in the History of the German Resistance,” American Historical 
Review 51 (1946), 609-626. 
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Primarily a scholar of seventeenth and eighteenth century France, he also managed to oversee 
the completion of several dissertations in modern German history.47 
At Columbia, Carlton J. Hayes’ long era ended in 1950—he had received his PhD at 
Columbia in 1909, started teaching immediately afterwards, and had never left the university, 
except to serve as the American ambassador to Spain between 1942 and 1944.48 Not a 
specialist of modern Germany, Hayes was primarily interested in the political and cultural 
history of modern Western Europe and especially modern nationalism, but nevertheless 
advised a number of dissertations on German history.49 Shepard Clough, his younger 
colleague (PhD 1930), had done some postgraduate work at the University of Heidelberg. 
Primarily interested in modern Italy, he still served as dissertation adviser for graduate 
students working on German history. Indeed, graduate students writing on modern Germany 
often had advisers who were not themselves historians of this field, or no historians at all: 
Fritz Stern completed his dissertation under the supervision of cultural historian Jacques 
Barzun, while Peter Gay and Raul Hilberg received guidance from Franz Neumann in the 
Political Science department.50 
                                                
47 While he did not publish any monographs on modern Germany, Ford authored articles on the German 
resistance and Leopold von Ranke, and he reviewed widely in the area of modern German history and 
historiography. 
48 On Hayes, see Carter Jefferson, “Carlton J.H. Hayes,” in Hans A. Schmitt (ed.), Historians of Modern Europe 
(Baton Rouge, La., 1971) 15-35, as well as Charles R. Halstead, “Historians in Politics: Carlton J.H. Hayes as 
American Ambassador to Spain, 1942-1945,” Journal of Contemporary History 10 (1975), 383-405.   
49 His students include Walter C. Langsam (PhD 1930), who taught first at Columbia from 1927 to 1938, then at 
Union College. Langsam later became a university administrator, serving as president of the University of 
Cincinnati between 1955 and 1971; Robert Ergang (PhD 1931), who later taught at NYU; and William O. 
Shanahan (PhD, 1945), who taught at the University of Notre Dame (1941-1960), the University of Oregon 
(1960-1966) and Hunter College/Graduate Center, City University of New York (1966-1982).  
50 Raul Hilberg discusses Neumann’s role in The Politics of Memory: the Journey of a Holocaust Historian 
(Chicago, 1996). 
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When Gordon Craig arrived at Princeton in 1941, he was among a number of young 
scholars joining the history department around the same time and who would come to shape 
it in the following decades. Craig had been trained at Princeton himself (Raymond Sontag 
had advised his dissertation on Great Britain’s policy of non-intervention in the late 1860s), 
had briefly taught at Yale and, after Sontag’s departure for Berkeley, taken his Doktorvater’s 
position.51 During an extended stay in Europe in 1935—he had been awarded a Rhodes 
Fellowship—Craig also experienced Nazi Germany first hand. As an analyst for the OSS, 
Craig penned the pamphlet “Know Your Enemy.” These personal and immediate encounters 
certainly influenced Craig’s future intellectual engagement with German history and 
contemporary West Germany. Yet while he initially tended toward a Sonderweg approach of 
modern German history, his later works were characterized by a more sympathetic 
interpretation.52 Craig left Princeton for Stanford in 1956, but during his tenure advised a 
number of graduate students.53  
German history at Yale from the mid-1930s to the mid-1960s was almost 
synonymous with the name of Hajo Holborn, since he had by far the largest number of 
students. Besides Holborn, his student Leonard Krieger (PhD 1949) taught there from 1946 
to 1962, when he left for Chicago. Krieger specialized in intellectual history—The German 
                                                
51 See the obituary by James Sheehan in Central European History 40 (2007), 133-137. 
52 In 1950, Craig had praised Friedrich Meinecke’s attempt to reevaluate Prussian-German militarism in Die 
Deutsche Katastrophe but criticized his reluctance “to conclude that Hitlerism was, in fact, a logical outcome of 
Germany’s development in the nineteenth century,” review of Friedrich Meinecke, The German Catastrophe,” 
American Political Science Review 44 (1950),1030. Similarly, Craig’s classic study The Politis of the Prussian 
Army 1640-1945 (London/New York, 1955) was an exercise in outlining continuities in Prussian and German 
history.  
53 While at Princeton, Craig advises historians such as Henry A. Turner; at Stanford, Craig’s students included 
Roger Chickering. 
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Idea of Freedom became a classic—as well as historiography.54 Hans W. Gatzke did not join 
Yale’s history faculty until 1964 (he had taught at Johns Hopkins since 1947). And even 
though he eventually became a pioneer in African studies, one should also mention Harry R. 
Rudin who had authored an important study on German colonialism as well as a study on the 
armistice 1918 and who remained interested in both subject matters.55 
At Chicago, Bernadotte E. Schmitt, the doyen of World War I historiography, retired 
in 1946 and somewhat ironically was replaced by Hans Rothfels, whose views on German 
history could hardly have been more different from his predecessor’s. Schmitt’s work on 
World War I tended to cast the German Empire in a rather unflattering light, and during 
World War II he advocated a hard line toward a defeated Germany.56 This was obviously a 
position worlds-apart from Rothfels’ whose first postwar book on the German resistance 
served the purpose to reveal to the American public that the resistance to the Nazi regime 
was a phenomenon encompassing all strata of German society.57 Rothfels was until his 
departure for the University of Tübingen in 1953 mainly responsible for teaching German 
history at Chicago.58 His colleague S. William Halperin, who taught nineteenth and twentieth 
century European history, was primarily interested in Italy (he had written monographs on 
relations between the Vatican and the Italian State, and on Italian fascism).  Yet he also 
                                                
54 Leonard Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition (Boston, 1957); Id., Ranke: 
the Meaning of History (Chicago, 1977); John Higham/Felix Gilbert/Leonard Krieger, History (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ, 1965). 
55 Harry R. Rudin, Germans in the Cameroons, 1884-1914 (New Haven, 1938); Id., Armistice 1918 (New 
Haven, 1944). 
56 See Schmitt’s pamphlet What Shall We Do With Germany? (Chicago, 1943), which elicited a strong response 
among his readers. See the correspondence in his papers, LoC, Bernadotte E. Schmitt Papers, Box 5.  
57 Hans Rothfels, The German Opposition to Hitler: An Appraisal (Hinsdale, IL, 1948). See also Jan Eckel, 
Hans Rothfels. Eine intellektuelle Biographie im 20. Jahrhundert (Göttingen, 2005), 243-260. 
58 Georg G. Iggers, Note to the author, 7 August 2009. 
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published a book on Weimar Germany with the programmatic title Germany Tried 
Democracy.59 In Chicago’s German department, Rothfels’ fellow émigré Arnold Bergsträsser 
pursued an interdisciplinary course: a sociologist and economist by training, he moved 
between political science and history and held a chair for German literature and history.60 
Like Rothfels, Bergsträsser was an ardent conservative and eventually returned to Germany 
where he played a similarly significant role for the development of postwar West German 
political science.61  
In the Midwest, the University of Minnesota was a center for German history, where 
Lawrence Steefel and Harold C. Deutsch were both long-term members of the history 
department. Steefel was a specialist on European diplomacy in the 1860s—his dissertation 
analyzed the conflicts surrounding Schleswig and Holstein early in this decade, and a later 
study examined the origins of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71—taught from 1923 to 
1959.62 Deutsch, whose tenure at Minnesota lasted from 1929 to 1972, was originally a 
scholar of Napoleonic France but later decided to specialize in even more recent diplomatic 
history. In 1935/36, he had spent a year in Europe as a Social Science research fellow, and 
during World War II he had been one of the many historians enlisting in the OSS’s Research 
                                                
59 S. William Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy: a Political History of the Weimar Republic 1918-1933 
(New York, 1946).  
60 Wilma and Georg Iggers, Two Lives in Uncertain Times: Facing the Challenges of the 20th Century as 
Scholars and Citizens (New York/Oxford, 2006), 46-47 and 59-60. 
61 See the account by fellow émigré Ernst Fraenkel, “Arnold Bergsträsser und die deutsche 
Politikwissenschaft,” in Dieter Oberndörfer (ed.), Arnold Bergstraesser: Weltpolitik als Wissenschaft. 
Geschichtliches Bewußtsein und politische Erziehung (Köln, 1965), 252-259. 
62 Lawrence D. Steefel, The Schleswig Holstein Question (Cambridge, MA, 1932); Id., Bismarck, the 
Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870 (Cambridge, MA, 1962). Among 
Steefel’s students was the Metternich scholar Enno E. Kraehe, who received his PhD from the University of 
Minnesota in 1948 and taught at University of Kentucky, the University of North Carolina, and finally the 
University of Virginia. 
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and Analysis Branch (he served as chief of political research for Europe, Africa and the Near 
East for the Office). After the war, Deutsch was involved with interviewing German political 
and military prisoners, many of whom were later tried and executed for war crimes at the 
Nuremburg trials.63 Like many of his colleagues, Deutsch thus experienced the dramatic 
events of his time firsthand, but unlike some of them, he did not only turn to German history 
but focused on precisely the issues he had witnessed. After a study on the July 1944 plot 
against Hitler, The Conspiracy against Hitler in the Twilight War he wrote a study on the 
beginnings of the military’s disenchantment with the Nazi leadership, Hitler and His 
Generals: The Hidden Crisis, January-June 1938.64  
During his tenure at Ohio State University from 1929 to 1956, Walter L. Dorn was 
the specialist in modern Germany, particularly Prussia.65 In 1940, Dorn published a volume 
in the series The Rise of Modern Europe (also known as the “Langer Series”) on Europe 
between 1740 and 1763, which he adopted, according to the reviewer in the American 
Historical Review, “almost a Teutonic rather than an American point of view.”66 During 
World War II, Dorn had served in the OSS, and after the war he became a personal adviser to 
General Lucius D. Clay, head of the Office of the Military Government for Germany 
(OMGUS), during the implementation of the denazification program.67 In the 1950s Dorn 
                                                
63 Biographical sketch Harold Charles Deutsch, University of Minnesota Archives. 
64 Harold C. Deutsch, The Conspiracy against Hitler in the Twilight War (Minneapolis, 1968); Id., Hitler and 
His Generals: The Hidden Crisis, January-June 1938 (Minneapolis, 1974). 
65 “Walter Louis Dorn 1894-1961,” Political Science Review 76 (1961), 481-482. 
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Quarterly 72 (1957), 481-501. Dorn published the text in German as “Die Debatte über die amerikanische 
 
 110 
was a member of the American Committee for the Study of War Documents and in 1956 he 
moved to Columbia University, where he taught until his death in 1961. Equally involved in 
the transatlantic community, even though his was intellectual rather than political or military, 
was Dorn’s colleague Harold J. Grimm. 68 A historian of the Reformation who taught at Ohio 
State from 1937 to 1972, Grimm was well-connected to German Reformation scholars—
Gerhard Ritter was a close friend—and he became one of the main figures in the 
reestablishment of Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte, co-edited by the German Verein für 
Reformationsgeschichte and its American counterpart, the Society for Reformation Research. 
This was a postwar attempt to create a truly international intellectual enterprise, yet for the 
Germans it also had the pleasant side effect of rehabilitating scholars such as Heinrich 
Bornkamm, who had proven their ideological proximity to National Socialism.69  
By the mid-twentieth century, the University of Madison’s reputation rested primarily 
on a number of outstanding historians in American history, including Merle Curti, Howard 
K. Beale, William B. Hesseltine, Merrill Jensen, Fred Harvey Harrington, and later William 
A. Williams.70 European and particularly German history had not yet achieved the 
                                                                                                                                                  
Besatzungspolitik,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 6 (1958), 60-77. See also Lutz Niethammer (ed.), 
Walter L. Dorn: Inspektionsreisen in der US-Zone: Notizen, Denkschriften und Erinnerungen aus dem Nachlass 
(Stuttgart, 1973). 
68 Phillip N. Bebb, “In Memoriam: Harold J. Grimm,” Sixteenth Century Journal 14 (1983), 497-498. 
69 See the programmatic statement by Heinrich Bornkamm, Gerhard Ritter, Roland H. Bainton, and Harold J. 
Grimm, “Unser Programm,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 42 (1951), 7-10. A historical account provides 
John L. Harvey, “Reformationsgeschichte Reformed? The Rebirth of Archiv of Reformationsgeschichte from 
Five Decades Past,” paper delivered at the Annual Conference of the Society of Reformation Research, 
Minneapolis, October 24-28, 2007. For Bornkamm, see Kurt Nowak, “Zeiterfahrung und 
Kirchengeschichtsschreibung. Heinrich Bornkamm im Dritten Reich,” Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 103 
(1992), 46-80. 
70 For a personal recollection of the department’s development, see the transcript of an oral history of Fred 
Harvey Harrington, department chair 1952-1955 and president of the university 1962-1970, UW Madison Oral 
History Project 135, Vol. 2, 1982.  
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significance it would have by the 1960s, when George L. Mosse, Theodor Hamerow, and 
Robert Koehl turned Madison into arguably one of the most interesting places to study 
modern Germany. Yet Chester V. Easum, who taught at the University of Wisconsin from 
1930 to 1964, had a truly transatlantic outlook as well, having written his dissertation on the 
German revolutionary and American statesman Carl Schurz.71 Later he published a 
biography of Prince Henry of Prussia and a textbook on the first half of the twentieth century, 
both of which emphasized political and military history.72 Easum was also another scholar 
whose interest in German history and contemporary Germany went beyond the strictly 
intellectual realm. From 1954-1956 Easum had political contact with Germany as the 
Cultural Attaché in the United States High Commission and then the United States Embassy. 
In this capacity he attempted to establish contacts between the Embassy and German 
universities, frequently lecturing at institutions of higher learning. 
Probably even more influential politically than Chester Easum was Oron P. Hale, who 
taught at the University Virginia from 1929 to 1972.73 Hale, like so many of his colleagues, 
became involved in military intelligence during World War II. After the war had ended, he 
joined George N. Shuster’s team in interviewing high-ranking Nazis including Göring, von 
Ribbentrop, and Dönitz. During the 1950s, Hale was appointed first deputy state 
commissioner, then state commissioner of Bavaria. In this capacity he operated with the 
                                                
71 Chester V. Easum, The Americanization of Carl Schurz (Chicago, 1929); it also appeared in German as Carl 
Schurz: vom deutschen Einwanderer zum amerikanischen Staatsmann (Weimar, 1937). 
72 Chester V. Easum, Prince Henry of Prussia: Brother of Frederick the Great (Madison, WI 1942); Id., A Half-
Century of Conflict (New York, 1952). 
73 Larry D. Wilcox, “Oron J. Hale 1902-1991,” Central European History 23 (1990), 379-382. Obviously, 
Hale’s obituary did not appear prior to his death. Yet at the time, Central European History was behind its 
publication schedule. 
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United State High Commission for Germany and supervised Marshall Plan operations in 
Bavaria, as well as refugee and displaced persons affairs, and the relations of U.S. forces in 
Bavaria with local agencies.74 After his return to the United States, he worked within the 
American Committee for the Study of War Documents and subsequently the Conference 
Group for Central European History (where he was chairman in 1964) and its journal 
Central European History (where he served on the board of editors). Throughout his career, 
Hale was particularly interested in the role of the media in politics – he published two studies 
on the decades prior to World War I and later an analysis of the press in Nazi Germany (the 
latter benefitted from Hale’s interviews with Max Amann, founder of the Nazi press 
empire).75 
Further South, at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, modern Germany 
did not constitute a strength of the history department until the late 1960s. The history 
department at the time had not yet hired a historian of modern Germany. An accomplished 
teacher who developed a year-long Western Civilization course, Carl H. Pegg’s focus 
remained on Europe rather than Germany.76 Enno E. Kraehe who specialized in nineteenth 
century Central European history and gained recognition through a multi-volume biography 
of Metternich, arrived at the University of North Carolina in 1964, but left in 1968 for the 
University of Virginia.  John L. Snell, a graduate of UNC as well as a twentieth century 
                                                
74 In 1969, Hale was awarded the Commander’s Cross of the Order of Merit by the Federal Republic. 
75 Oron J. Hale, Germany and the Diplomatic Revolution: a Study in Diplomacy and the Press (New York, 
1931); Id., Publicity and Diplomacy, with Special Reference to Germany and England, 1890-1914 (New York, 
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diplomatic historian, joined the department 1968, but died prematurely four years later.77 
Only when Gerhard L. Weinberg moved to North Carolina from the University of Michigan 
in 1972 did the department begin to develop its reputation as a place where future historians 
of modern Germany were trained.  
Immediately after World War II, Berkeley had not achieved the rank in German 
history that it would possess by the late 1960s, when Hans Rosenberg, Carl Schorske, and the 
young Gerald Feldman taught there. Yet Raymond Sontag, who had joined Berkeley’s 
history department in 1941 (after seventeen years at Princeton) and who remained there until 
1963, served as advisor to students of German history.78 A diplomatic historian of Europe, he 
had studied in Germany during the Ruhr Crisis of 1923 and later published a study on the 
German-British antagonism during the second half of the nineteenth century.79 Between 1946 
and 1949, Sontag served as American editor-in-chief of the intergovernmental project dealing 
with the captured German state documents.80 
 
Arrival of the Émigrés   
All these scholars shaped the field German history in the United States, which the 
German or Central European émigré historians entered in the mid- to late 1930s. The émigré 
historians fall into two distinct groups—those who received their PhDs before emigrating to 
                                                
77 See Fritz T. Epstein’s obituary “John L. Snell,” Historische Zeitschrift 215 (1972), 522. 
78 Among his students was Vernon Lidtke. 
79 Raymond J. Sontag, Germany and England: Background of Conflict, 1848-1894 (New York, 1938). Sontag 
discusses his personal experience as a student in Europe in the preface of his study on interwar Europe, A 
Broken World 1919-1939 (New York, 1971), xvi. 
80 See Eckert, Kampf um die Akten, 112-114. From this work resulted the multivolume series, Documents on 
German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, as well as the separate documentary volume, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-
1941. 
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the United States, and those who at least completed, but in most cases only began their 
academic training after leaving Central Europe.81 The first group consisted almost 
exclusively of students of Friedrich Meinecke.82 Among them, Hajo Holborn stands out in 
several respects: almost immediately upon his arrival in the United States in 1934, Holborn 
received a job at Yale, where he taught for more than three decades.83 A particularly 
noteworthy honor was his election as president of the American Historical Association in 
1967—at the time making him one of only four foreign-born scholars to have held this 
position.84 Most importantly, however, Holborn advised more than fifty dissertations, and his 
students would play significant roles in the field from the 1950s to the 1980s. They include 
Henry Cord Meyer, Leonard Krieger, Otto Pflanze, Theodore Hamerow, Arno Mayer, and 
Charles McClelland.85 His three-volume History of Modern Germany became required 
reading for German history graduate students throughout the United States. Maybe more than 
any of his fellow émigrés of the same generation, Holborn saw himself as a mediator 
between the United States and West Germany, academically as well as politically. As he 
                                                
81 Limiting the analysis to scholars from German territories would exclude important figures such as Hans Kohn 
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wrote in the introduction of his History of Modern Germany, “my transformation into an 
American has given me a broader perspective on all things German.”86 
While his career did not develop in such a straightforward manner as Holborn’s, Hans 
Rosenberg’s87 case was remarkable in a different respect: he was one of very few émigré 
historians who left a deep impact on both sides of the Atlantic.88 After initially immigrating 
to England in 1933, Rosenberg crossed the Atlantic in 1935. Having been unemployed for 
almost a year, Rosenberg found a job at Illinois College in Jacksonville, Illinois.89 In 1938 he 
moved to New York City where he taught at Brooklyn College for 21 years. His heavy 
teaching load hampered his ability to research and write, but during those years Rosenberg 
taught a significant number of undergraduates, many of whom later entered the profession 
recalling the rigorous training he had provided them with.90 When Rosenberg moved to 
Berkeley in 1959, where he held the Shepard chair, he also began advising graduate 
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students.91 Through visiting professorships he also maintained contact with Germany: most 
notably he spent a year at Free University Berlin in 1949/1950, where he quickly became 
surrounded by a group of promising students, including Gerhard A. Ritter, Otto Büsch, 
Gerhard Schulz, Wolfgang Sauer, Gilbert Ziebura, Helga Grebing, and Franz Ansprenger.92 
Rosenberg became the godfather of the emerging Historische Sozialwissenschaft in the 
1970s—to what extent this designation reflected Rosenberg’s own point of view, is a 
different question, which will be addressed in the fourth chapter. Rosenberg enormous 
popularity among West German social historians culminated in Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s 
attempt to have Rosenberg deliver the closing lecture at the Historikertag of the German 
Historians’ Association 1974, as belated recognition of Rosenberg’s accomplishments as 
scholar and teacher, which he had to cancel due to illness. 
Another Meinecke student, Dietrich Gerhard, led an even more transatlantic life than 
Hans Rosenberg.93 After he had immigrated to the United States, Gerhard became an 
assistant professor at Washington University where he taught until his retirement in 1965.  
Yet as he had written to Meinecke soon after the war, he was also interested in reconnecting 
with German academia.94 After several visiting professorships in the early 1950s, Gerhard in 
1955 became professor for American Studies and head of the Amerikainstitut at the 
University of Cologne. In 1961 took the position of director of the newly established Max-
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Planck-Institut für Geschichte in Göttingen. Among the émigrés of the first generation, 
Gerhard arguably had probably the broadest thematic scope, both in his research and in his 
teaching. While in Cologne, he taught American history (he also helped establish the 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Amerikastudien), and in St. Louis he remained the Europeanist. In 
1967, Carl Bridenbaugh, a historian of colonial America at Brown University, suggested 
Gerhard for honorary foreign membership of the American Historical Association.95 
Bridenbaugh’s suggestion was ultimately rejected, but can still be considered a testament to 
Gerhard’s reputation among scholars of North American history. 
Maybe the only historian to match Dietrich Gerhard’s wide range of interest was 
Felix Gilbert, a descendant of Moses Mendelssohn and Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy.96 After 
starting out as the biographer of the nineteenth century Prussian historian Johann Gustav 
Droysen, Gilbert later became primarily a specialist on the Italian Renaissance. In addition, 
he also wrote about twentieth century European diplomacy and German historiography. Last 
but not least, his To the Farewell Address became required reading for any scholar interested 
in early American foreign policy.97 Having worked as Edward Mead Earle’s assistant at the 
Institute for Advanced Studies between 1937 and 1943, Gilbert served for two years in the 
OSS.98 After the end of the war Gilbert taught for sixteen at Bryn Mawr College.99 Yet it was 
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in his capacity as member of the Institute for Advanced Study (1962-1975) that Gilbert 
assumed a significant role in the German-American scholarly community, by bringing 
younger German historians to the United States. 
Some of the first generation émigrés remained in less prominent and visible positions 
but nevertheless played significant roles in the transatlantic scholarly community. Fritz T. 
Epstein serves as a good example for this type of scholar. Epstein, a specialist in Eastern 
European and Russian history, had been forced to emigrate just before the completion and 
defense of his Habilitation at the University of Frankfurt, and never managed to secure a 
permanent appointment in West Germany.100 While he held several visiting appointments in 
both the Federal Republic and the United States (including Berlin, Bonn, Hamburg, 
Berkeley), Epstein did not receive a permanent professorship until 1963 when he was offered 
a chair in European diplomatic history at Indiana University.101 Yet he was arguably among 
the more important figures in the transatlantic scholarly community during the postwar years, 
establishing personal contacts for both American and German historians on both sides of the 
Atlantic.102 Epstein also often attempted to have German studies translated into English by 
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contacting American publishers.103 While he did not supervise a large number of 
dissertations, he became an unofficial mentor of many aspiring American graduate 
students.104 Epstein also did not hesitate to share his vast bibliographical knowledge with 
other historians, as the voluminous correspondence contained in his personal papers attests.   
While this first generation of émigrés continued to play an important role through the 
1970s in both the American historical profession and the German-American scholarly 
community, the second generation—born in Germany yet educated in the United States—
began their careers in the early 1950s. Maybe it was this hybrid background which has kept 
historians thus far from acknowledging these second generation émigrés as a distinct group. 
Yet a glance at their biographies makes their significance and impact over several decades—
from the late 1950s into the 1990s—abundantly clear. 
Fritz Stern completed his PhD at Columbia while teaching at Cornell, but he soon 
returned to New York where he would remain a member of the history department for the 
next 44 years (he retired in 1997).105 Despite initial reservations toward the West German 
society, Stern soon assumed contacts with German academics. During the summer of 1954, 
he taught as a visiting professor at Free University Berlin, struck by the stark contrast 
between “the prevailing silences of much public discourse” and his students’ “willingness to 
confront the complexities of the past and to explore Germany’s troubled relationship with the 
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West.”106 With a “permanent visiting professorship” at the University of Konstanz, which 
Stern received in 1967, his position in the transatlantic community of historians became more 
institutionalized. While Stern had already represented the American community of historians 
of Germany at the German Historians’ Convention in 1964, discussing Fritz Fischer’s study 
Griff nach der Weltmacht, by the 1990s he had come to embody for a broader German public 
what American historians thought about Germany. He famously addressed the German 
Federal Parliament in 1987, served as senior adviser to U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke 
and remained a familiar voice in German newspapers.107 Author of two influential 
monographs on the German Empire—a study of cultural pessimism and a dual biography of 
Chancellor Bismarck and his Jewish banker Gerson Bleichröder—he nevertheless preferred 
the genre of the historical essay.108 Along with Hans Kohn, Leonard Krieger, and George 
Mosse, Stern represented a type of cultural and intellectual history of modern Germany that 
did not have an equivalent in the Federal Republic.109 
George Mosse started his career as a scholar of English constitutional history and 
political thought in the sixteenth and seventeen centuries at the University of Iowa, where he 
taught from 1944 to 1955.110 These years marked the transition of Iowa’s history 
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department—as well as of many others across the United States—from a place where a small 
number of “gentlemen scholars” wielded decisive influence to an institution which 
underwent a significant expansion. In addition, the department also began to place more 
weight on research without neglecting teaching responsibilities. Yet this period ultimately 
proved formative for Mosse as well. Iowa—the state much more than university—thoroughly 
“Americanized” him: he immersed himself in public life by serving as a commencement 
speaker and moderating a Sunday radio program. By 1956, Mosse had transferred to the 
University of Wisconsin, whose history department at the time sought to rejuvenate and 
strengthen its European history program. In Madison, Mosse became one of the pioneers of 
the study of fascism, and later of the history of sexuality.111 Yet while he indeed helped turn 
Wisconsin’s history department into one of the most interesting places to study European 
history, Mosse also sought close intellectual contact with scholars of the United States. The 
cultural historian Merle Curti exerted a decisive influence, and with William A. Williams, the 
main representative of the  “Wisconsin School,” Mosse taught a joint seminar on Marxism 
which led to Williams’ study The Great Evasion—the evasion of Marx’ legacy in the United 
States.112   
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Mosse’s long-term colleague at Madison was Theodor Hamerow, who in contrast to 
most émigré historians under review in this study, had Polish rather than German roots.113 
Born in Warsaw in 1920, Hamerow had spent his childhood in Poland and Germany and 
arrived in the United States in 1930. After having received his PhD under Hajo Holborn’s 
supervision at Yale in 1951, he spent a year in Germany through the University of Maryland 
overseas program, where he heard Franz Schnabel lecture at the University of Munich.114 
Hamerow then taught for several years at the University of Illinois (1952-1958), before 
moving to the University of Wisconsin where he spent the remainder of his career. He made 
his mark on the profession as a social and economic historian of nineteenth century Germany 
yet after his retirement wrote about the German resistance to National Socialism as well as 
the Holocaust.115 Hamerow also assumed a leading role within the Conference Group of 
Central European History and was instrumental in the establishment of its journal—Central 
European History.116 
While not all émigré historians of the second generation early in their careers 
maintained or established working relationships with colleagues in West Germany, Klaus 
Epstein immediately immersed himself in the transatlantic intellectual community.117 The 
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son of Fritz T. Epstein graduated with a PhD from Harvard in 1953, and started his career 
there until he received an appointment at Brown University in 1960. Already in 1955/56, 
Epstein spent a year at the University of Hamburg on a Fulbright lectureship. Even though 
Epstein died tragically in a car accident in 1967, he left behind a large number of writings: 
his dissertation on the controversial Center Party politician Matthias Erzberger analyzed the 
transition from the German Empire to the Weimar Republic. At the time of his death, Epstein 
was working on a comprehensive project on Conservatism in German history, of which the 
first volume dealt with the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.118 Apart from these 
monographs, he authored a number of articles, and longer review essays--the latter had 
become almost his trademark.119  
Gerhard Weinberg was always more than “just” a historian of modern Germany; 
beginning as a specialist of Nazi foreign policy, he later became one of the leading 
authorities on World War II and developed a truly global scope.120 He had been a student of 
Hans Rothfels at the University of Chicago and spent most of his later career at the 
University of Michigan (1959-1972) and the University of North Carolina (1972-1997). In 
the early 1950s Weinberg had been hired by Fritz T. Epstein to participate in the War 
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Documentation Project (WDP) dealing with captured German documents.121 While he never 
became as frequent a visitor to Germany as some of his fellow émigrés, Weinberg 
participated in the scholarly dialogue through frequent publications in German journals, often 
battling apologetic historical interpretations widely popular in West Germany. In the 1950s, 
he strongly opposed German historians who claimed that Operation Barbarossa, Nazi 
Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union, had been a “preventive war.” Ten years later, 
Weinberg was similarly outspoken in his condemnation of David L. Hoggan’s attempt to 
portray the outbreak of World War II as a result of the supposedly conspiratorial diplomacy 
of Great Britain and Poland.122 
Another tireless mediator between the American and German academic communities 
was Georg Iggers, who, like Weinberg, received his PhD at the University of Chicago. 
Unlike Weinberg, Iggers studied in the “Committee for the History of Culture,” where Louis 
Gottschalk served as his adviser.123 After several teaching positions at smaller black colleges 
in Arkansas and Lousiana (where Iggers also immersed himself in work on behalf of civil 
rights issues), he eventually moved to SUNY Buffalo in 1964, where he taught until his 
retirement in 1997. One of the foremost authorities on German historiography and historical 
thought, Iggers established his reputation through his enormously influential critique of what 
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he considered “the basic theoretical premises of the main current of German 
historiography”—German historicism.124 In the 1970s, through his own writings, Iggers 
helped popularize the works of a younger generation of German social historians, 
including—but not limited to—the Bielefelder Schule. Moreover, Iggers was among the first 
Western historians to establish scholarly contacts with Communist colleagues in East 
Germany as well as in China, maintaining that it was important to distinguish between 
orthodox party hacks and less dogmatic scholars with whom a fruitful dialogue was both 
possible and desired.   
All second-generation émigré historians covered so far share the experiences of 
forced emigration due to their Jewish background. Yet Hans W. Gatzke’s case differed: 
neither Jewish nor politically on the Left, he was awarded a fellowship for a year’s study in 
the United States by the German Academic Exchange Service upon graduating from high 
school in 1934. Even though Gatzke continued his studies in Germany, his previous 
experiences at Williams College were positive enough to make him immigrate to the United 
States in 1937 when he realized the direction in which the Nazi regime was moving 
Germany.125 World War II interrupted Gatzke’s graduate training at Harvard, where he 
received his PhD in 1947. After seventeen years of teaching at Johns Hopkins, he was 
appointed to a professorship at Yale where he joined his fellow émigré Hajo Holborn. A 
diplomatic historian throughout his career, Gatzke established his scholarly reputation 
through the publication of his dissertation, which analyzed the German Empire’s economic 
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and political war aims in the West during World War I.126 Published in 1950, the study 
foreshadowed the works produced in the 1960s by Fritz Fischer and his students. Given the 
significance of Gatzke’s book, it remains remarkable yet unsurprising that it was never 
translated into German. His subsequent works dealt with Gustav Stresemann, Russian-
German relations in the interwar period, as well as with German-American relations in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
While one can label most of the émigré historians of both generations “liberals” in the 
broad American sense of the term, they were still a more diverse group than past accounts 
have indicated. Hans Rothfels was not the only exception to the rule. Gerhard Masur had 
been a Freikorps member and had participated in the Kapp Putsch of 1920, and his post-
World War II views were still rather conservative. His ideological proximity to Rothfels also 
helps explain why Rothfels tried to persuade Masur to succeed him at the University of 
Tübingen.127 And Felix E. Hirsch, who had completed his Ph.D. under Hermann Oncken, 
distinguished himself not only as a tireless reviewer but also as an eager proponent of Gustav 
Stresemann. For Hirsch, Stresemann personified the prototypical “good European” as well as 
the positive aspects of the Weimar Republic. Hirsch generally believed that the first German 
democracy deserved a kinder treatment than historians had been willing to grant it after 1945. 
At the same time, Hirsch was attempting to save his Doktorvater Oncken from oblivion, 
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though without much success.128 Yet in his efforts to make American colleagues acquainted 
with what he considered the positive aspects of both German history and German 
historiography, Hirsch was very much in tune with his fellow émigrés. Felix Gilbert, for 
example, edited essays by Otto Hintze and wrote the introduction to the English translation 
of Meinecke’s Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat.129 Thus, when at the AHA meeting in 
1960, Fritz K. Ringer delivered a stinging indictment of the German historical profession 
during the German Empire and the Weimar Republic and included Friedrich Meinecke in his 
critique, Meinecke’s students in the audience—all émigré historians teaching in the United 
States—were not amused. Several elderly gentlemen with thick German accents rose to 
defend their Doktorvater against what they perceived as an entirely unjustified attack.130 
Another historian who does not fit the prevailing notion of the left-liberal émigré was 
Joachim Remak. Born in Berlin in 1920, he escaped from Nazi Germany in 1938. Remak 
pursued undergraduate studies at UC Berkeley before entering graduate school at Stanford, 
where he received his PhD in 1955. After several years at Stanford, he first taught at Lewis & 
Clark College in Oregon (1958-1965), before accepting a position at UC Santa Barbara, 
where he stayed until his retirement. Beginning with his dissertation on the assassination of 
Archduke Francis Ferdinand in 1914, Remak throughout his career remained primarily an 
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expert on World War I.131 While American historians in the 1960s provided crucial support 
for the embattled Fritz Fischer, Remak emerged a few years later as his main critic on this 
side of the Atlantic and proclaimed in 1971 that “Fritz Fischer’s decade has ended.”132 
Remak clearly believed that Fischer was pushing revisionism too far, and the popular 
emphasis on continuities in German history between 1871 and 1945 did not convince him, 
either.  A notoriously polemical reviewer, Remak welcomed Geoff Eley’s and David 
Blackbourn’s attack on the Sonderweg paradigm as “an annoying book with a valid 
thesis.”133 
These efforts of émigré historians to ensure that the American historical profession 
maintained or developed a differentiated view on German history and historiography are 
noteworthy. They prove that the obsession of some West German historians with the 
supposed emigrantisches Ressentiment, which had begun right after the end of the war, was 
completely unfounded. This notion of alleged émigré resentments clouding their scholarly 
work remained, however, until the mid-1960s, a popular way to dismiss disagreeable views 
of German history, even if the preferred way to express it was in private correspondence 
rather than in public. Thus Gerhard Ritter rejected Helmuth Plessner’s Verspätete Nation, 
considering it “not real history, but the product of an émigré’s imagination.”134 For Ritter, 
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Plessner’s geographical distance from Germany had led to a lack of empathy without which 
objective history could not be written. This accusation of lacking empathy could then apply 
not only to émigrés but also to others, non-German historians writing German history. To 
what extent did American historians show “empathy” toward Germany and its history after 
1945? 
 
Rethinking modern German history 
It has already become clear that during the postwar years the project of reinterpreting 
modern German history occupied many scholars, for the question of how the Nazi rise to 
power had been possible was hard to avoid. Accordingly, if one considers the books from the 
late 1940s through the early 1960s that are still widely read today, it is obvious that the vast 
majority analyze aspects of the roots of National Socialism, at least in a broad sense. As Fritz 
Stern has put it for the historians (and social scientists) formerly working for the OSS, many 
of whom subsequently taught at Columbia University, they “shared [a] sense that the study of 
the German past, and hence of the path to National Socialism, was an imperative of historical 
investigation and moral understanding.”135 Apart from the obvious urgency to analyze and 
reinterpret the course of German history particularly in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, by the early 1950s there were still very few historical works available in English—
“a remarkable opportunity for my generation”, as Fritz Stern has written.136 
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While what follows is primarily concerned with the broad interpretive contours of 
postwar American historiography on modern Germany, this dimension needs to be 
understood together with the methodological developments during the same time. Regarding 
the latter, it seems that—contrary to the prevailing view—American historians were not 
across the board significantly more “modern” or advanced than their German colleagues.137 
All too often, historians tend to view methodological, interpretive (and sometimes even 
political) progressivism as simply two sides of the same coin. Yet as the debate surrounding 
German historians during National Socialism has made clear, a certain methodology can 
never be associated a priori with a distinct interpretive or political position. Historians (as 
well as social scientists) working on behalf of the Nazi regime employed “modern” methods 
for “reactionary” means.138 Conversely, interpretive changes sometimes develop independent 
of and without methodological innovations—Fritz Fischer’s studies on World War I 
constitute a case in point. 
To reduce the historiography on modern Germany of several decades to a common 
denominator inevitably has to remain a futile undertaking. Yet the designation least 
inappropriate for this large body of works would lead to a dialectic argument: many if not 
most American historians continued to wrestle with the question of National Socialism’s 
origins. Yet the answers they developed took on very different forms.  
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Textbooks 
Among the first postwar attempts to make sense of National Socialism in its 
European context was Hajo Holborn’s concise The Political Collapse of Europe, published in 
1951. Even though the study was much broader in scope, tracing the European decline and 
the accompanying emergence of the bipolar world order, it devoted considerable space to 
Germany’s role in this decline. Developing out of an article Holborn had published two years 
earlier, the study was widely reviewed and generally very well received.139 Hannah Arendt 
praised the book as a successful attempt to remind his audience that the interwar years were 
not only characterized by the rise and fall of the murderous Nazi regime but by the failure of 
democracy in most of Europe.140 Holborn’s study therefore served as a corrective to several 
wartime publications treating German history in isolation from its European context and 
tracing the beginnings of National Socialism back to the Reformation. Yet it did not simply 
“Europeanize” the German dictatorship as Gerhard Ritter attempted to do around the same 
time. Ritter had emphasized that totalitarianism developed out of the French Revolution and 
that National Socialism should be considered “not a Prussian plant, but an Austrian-Bavarian 
import.”141  
Among the few syntheses on modern Germany from the immediate postwar period 
was Koppel Pinson’s Modern Germany. A student of Carlton Hayes’ (to whom the book was 
dedicated) and specialist of German nationalism, Pinson devoted almost equal attention to 
the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. Writing “from the standpoint of one 
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who finds liberal democracy, humanitarianism, and the ethical ideals of the Judeo-Christian 
tradition most congenial to his own frame of mind,” he identified the “unifying theme” of his 
work as “that of the tragic efforts made by liberalism and democracy to assert themselves in 
modern German history.”142 Pinson’s Modern Germany was decidedly more substantial and 
nuanced than A.J.P. Taylor’s notorious The Course of German History and was accordingly 
very well received.143 Even the reviewer in Historische Zeitschrift acknowledged that Pinson 
had provided “one of the most serious foreign attempts to grapple with the difficult problems 
of nineteenth and twentieth century German history.”144  
This review by the German historian Hans Herzfeld was remarkable: during the 
Weimar years, Herzfeld had been an ultra-nationalist historian and proponent of the 
notorious Dolchstosslegende (stab-in-the-back myth), to which he had even devoted a 
“scholarly” study.145 Herzfeld, who in 1938 had been dismissed from his professorship at the 
University of Halle due to a Jewish grandfather, indeed modified his views after World War 
II. Yet this review was still emblematic of the postwar tendency of many German historians 
to demand understanding and empathy (Verständnis and Einfühlen) toward the complexities 
of modern Germany. Unsurprisingly, a popular charge against foreign scholars was the lack 
of precisely these qualities, which then made it easy to reject their views. In the case of 
Pinson’s Modern Germany, Herzfeld at least acknowledged the author’s efforts to provide an 
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“objective” analysis of recent German history, but he “inevitably”—as Herzfeld put it—fell 
short in some respects as well.146  
Judgments such as this reveal a persistent belief among German scholars that the 
different personal backgrounds and experiences of both American-born and émigré historians 
might pose some obstacles to an appropriate Einfühlen into the conditions of German history. 
Even some émigré historians, such as Klaus Epstein himself, would not shy away from such 
a claim: in a review essay on three American studies of German socialism in the early 
twentieth century Epstein argued that American scholars sympathizing with the left wing of 
the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) had, because of their nationality, 
difficulties understanding the no-win situation in which the moderate Social Democrats had 
found themselves. In Epstein’s words, “American historians are handicapped when dealing 
with German developments by the deep-rooted American faith that all problems can be 
solved by intelligence and good will . . . American historians have underestimated the 
impersonal forces and conditions which have made German socialists act the way they did, 
and they have engaged in the futile search for villains.”147 Ironically, one of the historians 
charged with having such a handicap was Epstein’s fellow émigré Peter Gay. 
 
Prussia and the Iron Chancellor 
As in West Germany—and even more so in its Eastern counterpart—the history of 
Prussia occupied many American scholars. Gordon Craig’s seminal The Politics of the 
Prussian Army, published in 1955, exemplifies this trend. Rather than to dissect a supposedly 
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identifiable German character, Craig analyzed how German political life had come to be 
characterized by “authoritarian government, militarism, and aggression.”148 In a formulation 
of almost Sonderwegian character, he claimed that after the end of the military reform period 
of the early nineteenth century—not accompanied by political reforms—the Prussian army 
had become the strongest opponent of political change. In Craig’s own words, “the 
subsequent political development of Prussia and Germany was dependent, to a far greater 
extent than is true of any other country, upon the organization of the army, its relationship to 
the sovereign power and the will of its leaders.”149 While Craig abstained from a 
sensationalist denunciation of “Prussian militarism,” he nevertheless did not shy away from 
clear judgments. About the behavior of the German military leadership during the crucial 
years 1933 and 1934 he wrote that it lacked “any trace of the moral courage, the spiritual 
independence, and the deep patriotism which had marked the careers of such great soldiers of 
the past as Scharnhorst, Boysen, and Gneisenau.”150 As earlier statements by Craig illustrate, 
the Princeton historian was, soon after World War II, very much convinced of the necessity 
of rethinking the basic tenets of the German past. A few years prior to the publication of his 
study on the Prussian army, Craig had praised Friedrich Meinecke’s attempt to reevaluate 
Prussian-German militarism in Die Deutsche Katastrophe but criticized his reluctance “to 
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conclude that Hitlerism was, in fact, a logical outcome of Germany’s development in the 
nineteenth century.”151 Later in his career Craig would adopt positions very different from 
the ones outlined here. His views from the 1950s are therefore all the more remarkable.  
A student of Hajo Holborn’s, Walter B. Simon, advanced an interpretation of early 
nineteenth century Prussia very similar to Craig’s. In his dissertation on the constitutional, 
agrarian, and military aspects of the Prussian reform movement, Simon evaluated the 
movement as “on balance a failure,” for while it was undoubtedly not devoid of 
accomplishments, “it fell far short of the objective that its moving spirits had set themselves 
and because its successes were on the whole minor compared to its frustrations.”152 Very 
much in the spirit of the times, Simon emphasized the long-term consequences of the 
reforms’ failure: the survival of “the authoritarian principle in the social structure” and of 
“the feudal principle in the social structure” was what “led Prussia on to the later ‘turning 
points’ of 1848 and 1866.’”153 In this respect, Simon argued along the lines of Friedrich 
Meinecke’s Deutsche Katastrophe, which had seen 1819 as the year when the “kulturwidrige 
Seite” (“dark side”) of Prussia triumphed over the “kulturfähige Seite” (“bright side”), with 
far-reaching and long-lasting consequences.154 And while Simon did not measure the 
Prussian development against that of an idealized “West” (he stated explicitly that “it would 
not, indeed, have been possible for Prussia in 1819 to duplicate British or French politics and 
society”) he nevertheless argued that “it would have been possible for Prussia in 1819 to 
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have turned her back definitely on the authoritarian principle in her political structure and on 
the feudal principle in her social structure” and that the failed reforms of the 1810s laid the 
groundwork for Bismarck’s subsequent “ministerial absolutism.”155 
Immediately after World War II, William O. Shanahan published his Columbia 
University dissertation analyzing the so-called Krümper system, with which the Prussian 
military leadership managed to circumvent the military restrictions placed on Prussia by the 
Treaty of Paris in 1808. After World War I, Shanahan argued in his study, the Allies had 
tried to learn from Prussia’s swift military recovery in the early nineteenth century, yet the 
1920s and 1930s had proven their failure. Therefore Shanahan expressed his hope that this 
time, in 1945, “his interpretation … may help devise a more certain means of restraining 
German military ambition.”156 While this pronouncement may sound rather presentist, 
Shanahan’s concern about the future of German militarism apparently did not weaken the 
study, which Hans Rothfels reviewed quite positively.157 And the military historian Alfred 
Vagts noted in his review that “the per se legitimate inclination of the historians of seeing 
parallels between Prussia-Germany of 1807-13 and of 1919-39 has been suppressed, maybe 
too much so.”158  At the same time, Shanahan clearly distanced himself from most German 
historians who had written on the same period, remarking that they had viewed “Stein as a 
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phenomenon of German nationalism rather than a prophet or spokesman for liberal political 
institutions.”159  
In contrast to Simon and Shanahan who traced Prussia’s development during the early 
nineteenth century, Eugene N. Anderson focused on the conflicts between liberalism and 
conservatism in Prussia during the late 1850s and early 1860s.160 The issues at the heart of 
these struggles, according to Anderson, had been caste and privilege, the police state, 
militarism, the political and economic interests in unification, and finally the notorious 
Verfassungskonflikt (constitutional conflict) in the Prussian state parliament. Author of an 
earlier work on Nationalism and the Cultural Crisis in Prussia 1806-1815, Anderson’s 
sympathies were clearly on the side of the Liberals.161 Nevertheless he argued that the 
Liberals had weakened themselves decisively by clinging to an elitist understanding of 
politics—and thus the three-class voting system—instead of seeking mass support, which 
would have forced them to support the introduction of the universal suffrage. In this respect, 
Anderson argued along the lines of Eckart Kehr and Hans Rosenberg, whom he had 
befriended during the 1920s and early 1930s, when he spent a few years at the University of 
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Berlin. When Rosenberg immigrated to the United States, Anderson provided him with the 
names of potential employers and contacts and wrote letters of recommendation.162  
In the previous chapter, we saw that the evaluation of Otto von Bismarck occupied 
many historians in postwar Germany. Whether a genius diplomat who appeared even more 
outstanding after his predecessors had gambled away the German Empire he helped 
establish, or the insidious Chancellor who out of ulterior motives ruthlessly pursued policies 
against Catholics, Poles, and other minorities—no German historian questioned his historical 
significance. Among the Americans, it was the young Otto Pflanze who joined the debate 
surrounding the Iron Chancellor. While he later adopted a more favorable perspective on 
Bismarck, joining German conservatives in their rejection of Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s 
interpretation, his early writings expressed a different view. In an article on “Bismarck and 
German Nationalism” Pflanze quite explicitly drew a line from Bismarck via Ludendorff to 
Hitler, distinguished between Bismarck’s strand of nationalism and early nineteenth century 
liberal nationalism and concluded: “The German conservatives … became themselves the 
prisoners of the nationalistic sentiment with which they sought to broaden their popular 
support… Out of this unfortunate chemistry of more than a century came the unstable 
compound of National Socialism. Many were the chemists who unknowingly had a hand in 
its creation. Bismarck was certainly one of them.”163 Pflanze’s harsh verdicts on Bismarck 
inevitably met with a negative response among historians such as Hans Rothfels who 
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expressed his discontent with Pflanze’s “very mediocre article” in a letter to Fritz T. 
Epstein.164 
 
Weimar and Nazi Germany 
Understandably, Americans also turned their attention to the Weimar Republic. 
William Halperin’s study, published in 1946, provided the first synthesis of the first German 
democracy’s rise and fall. Beginning with an account of the German Empire and World War 
I, Halperin focused mainly on political, economic, and social developments between 1918 
and 1933. His sympathies were overall on the side of the Social Democrats, whom he saw as 
the main defenders of the Republic. Nevertheless, Halperin argued that the reformist—
instead of revolutionary—course, which leading Social Democrats had pursued during the 
transition period from Empire to Republic, constituted a grave mistake with far-reaching 
consequences.165  Yet he also expressed admiration for Stresemann’s achievement as foreign 
minister, in particular for his reconciliatory course toward France. In a review of a reprint 
edition almost twenty years later, Gordon Craig still characterized it as “the clearest and most 
comprehensive introduction to the politics of the period which it covers.”166 Nevertheless, 
one reviewer castigated Halperin for his alleged bias toward the conservative elites who—as 
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Halperin argued—were instrumental in installing Hitler as Chancellor in 1933. Ross J. 
Hoffman, a Fordham University historian, reminded the readers that these elites had, after all, 
attempted to assassinate Hitler in 1944, and that the German Communists “favored Hitler’s 
coming to power because they believed it [would] hasten their own hour of opportunity.”167 
Hoffman insisted that it was “financial extravagance and socialist legislation” that had 
contributed to the democracy’s demise and that the conservatives, the “genuine opponents of 
National Socialism”, adhered to the “traditional decencies, liberties, and sanities of Western 
Christian Civilization.”168 With this evaluation, Hoffman was very much in tune with 
German conservatives such as Gerhard Ritter, Hans Rothfels, and later Karl Dietrich 
Erdmann. 
That German and American historians could also be in absolute interpretive 
agreement with each other is evidenced by their responses to William Shirer’s simplistic yet 
immensely successful The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. While the reactions of German 
and American media as well as the general public differed dramatically, historians on both 
sides of the Atlantic provided similarly devastating evaluations of the study.169 Klaus 
Epstein’s comprehensive assessment in The Review of Politics turned out as least as negative 
as Martin Broszat’s in Historische Zeitschrift, and its tone was even more blunt. Epstein 
argued that Shirer’s “one-sided misjudgments on Germany’s political history appear[ed] 
relatively insignificant when compared with his systematic prejudice when dealing with 
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Germany’s cultural heritage” and accused Shirer of “rewarming of the wartime tale that 
German history is a one-way road leading from Luther to Hitler.”170 The review in the 
American Historical Review was hardly more positive.171  
 
Studying the German Mind 
The texts discussed thus far testify to the impressive state of German historiography 
in the United States. Other important works examined the history of social democracy—Peter 
Gay’s study on Eduard Bernstein and Carl Schorske’s analysis of the disintegration of the 
German labor movement in the early twentieth century are prime examples.172 Yet the main 
contributions of American scholars took place in the realm of intellectual and cultural 
history. They deserve special attention not only as scholarly achievements per se, but also as 
examples of a genre that was underrepresented among West German historians during the 
same period. It would also take a comparatively long time for these studies to be recognized 
in the Federal Republic, through either reviews or translations. What was particularly 
remarkable about these studies was the absence of anything comparable written by German 
historians. 
Leonard Krieger, in his The German Idea of Freedom, addressed the question of 
whether the “Germans’ failure to achieve, under their own power, a liberal democracy in the 
western sense mean[t] simply the triumph of conservatism over generic liberalism in 
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Germany or was a peculiar German attitude toward liberty involved in its defeat.”173 Krieger 
clearly believed the latter, for he argued that an “age-old association of liberty with the 
authoritarian state” characterized German history.174 Beginning in the seventeenth, but 
concentrating on the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Krieger traced the development 
of conceptions of liberty held by prominent German thinkers such as Kant, Hegel, Stein, 
Hardenberg, and Humboldt. Krieger did not write intellectual history detached from its social 
context, however; in this respect, his advisor Hajo Holborn might have influenced him.175 
The German Idea of Freedom, although not comparative, emphasized the German deviation 
from the western, that is, British and French, development, for the Germans failed to 
establish a liberal democracy in the western sense. American historians received The German 
Idea of Freedom very favorably, stressing above all Krieger’s ability to illuminate the 
interplay between ideas and their context. One reviewer even labeled the study “one of the 
three or four most important books on German history published by an American since 
1945.”176 
In West Germany, Thomas Nipperdey was as appreciative of Krieger’s approach as 
the American reviewers had been, and he classified the study as one of the outstanding works 
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in the area of the history of ideas that had been published in the preceding decade.177 And yet 
Nipperdey had slight reservations regarding Krieger’s perspective: the latter viewed the 
history of German liberalism from a strictly “liberal-democratic perspective.” This did not 
give due consideration to the conflict between liberty and unity in German history, the 
notorious nationale Frage. For the liberals in Germany had not only to “push through a 
constitution, but first to found a [national] state.”178 Finally, Nipperdey also pointed out the 
absent comparative perspective, adding that especially the French challenges to German 
liberalism in the nineteenth century deserved more attention. 
A few years later, Fritz Stern and George Mosse published their studies on 
intellectual origins and precursors of National Socialism. In his The Politics of Cultural 
Despair Stern focused on three representatives of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
cultural criticism, Paul de Lagarde, Julius Langbehn, and Arthur Moeller van den Bruck.179 
Stern argued that while historians in their search for the causes of National Socialism had 
thus far examined everything “from the dangers of Article 48 of the Weimar constitution to 
the role of Big Business,” they had not “sufficiently reckoned with the politically exploitable 
discontent which for so long has been embedded in German culture.”180 Lagarde, Langbehn, 
and Moeller van den Bruck were, according to Stern, uprooted intellectuals who felt 
alienated from the progress of modernity, rationalism, and science, and who hated above all, 
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liberalism. They wanted to overcome these evils of modernity by a “conservative 
revolution,” and their ideas taken together constituted what Stern termed the “Germanic 
ideology.”181 What proved fatal for the course of German history was that the National 
Socialists appropriated some elements of this ideology. Furthermore, the ideology also 
affected the “educated, civilized classes” who were thus likely to be attracted by at least 
some elements of National Socialism.182 Finally, while Stern conceded that “the conservative 
revolution was a European phenomenon,” he emphasized that “only in Germany did it 
become a decisive intellectual and political force.”183 
In contrast to Stern, George Mosse focused not only on intellectuals (or, as Stern had 
dubbed Lagarde, Langbehn, and Moeller van den Bruck, “‘anti-intellectual’ intellectuals”184) 
but on figures of high and popular culture alike.185 Mosse explicitly rejected Gerhard Ritter’s 
attempted Europeanization of National Socialist ideology and stated that “rather than to 
explain away this fact [that the völkisch movement had “deeply penetrated into the national 
fabric”] it would seem more profitable to ask how this could have been accomplished.”186 
Like Stern, Mosse emphasized that historians thus far had not taken National Socialist 
ideology seriously enough, either because they had regarded it as mere propaganda, or 
because they had “found these ideas so nebulous and incomprehensible that they have 
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dismissed them as unimportant.”187 The essential element in the “völkisch” ideology for 
Mosse was “the linking of the human soul with its natural surroundings, with the ‘essence’ of 
nature.”188 Mosse also devoted considerable attention to the dissemination of these ideas, for 
“education preeminently institutionalized the ideology. Before 1918, no political 
organization or group of like-minded people was as important as educators in anchoring the 
Germanic faith within the German nation.”189 And since “völkisch” ideas in the 1920s 
permeated not only the National Socialists but the entire German Right, the Nazi seizure of 
power in 1933 was anything but an accident for Mosse even though he made it clear that it 
was not inevitable, either.190 
American reviewers praised Stern’s The Politics of Cultural Despair as an “important 
contribution to the understanding of the roots of National Socialism” which at the same time 
paid attention to cultural pessimism beyond Germany.191 Yet the same reviewer sharply 
criticized Mosse for his “vastly exaggerated” conclusions, especially regarding Wilhelmine 
Germany, which that he had forced “into a Volkish strait jacket.”192 Klemens von Klemperer, 
a fellow émigré historian who belonged to Mosse and Stern’s generation, like them was 
educated in the United States, but unlike them was a conservative Catholic, added, “Just 
because it is understandable and indeed inevitable that in these days German history should 
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be written with the catastrophe in mind, it is up to the historian to exercise the necessary 
restraint.”193 
Klemperer’s reviews once again demonstrate the variety of opinions among German, 
or Central European, émigré historians that has often been obscured as a result of the 
exclusive focus on leading figures such as Hans Rosenberg, Felix Gilbert, Hajo Holborn, and 
Fritz Stern. More importantly, what both contemporary reviewers and some later observers 
noted regarding most of these intellectual and cultural histories was the conceptual problem 
of relating the German development to that of the “West.” For not only were few of the 
studies truly comparative in nature, but they also tended to gloss over illiberal and anti-
democratic traditions in the supposed model democracies of England and France.194 
In contrast to the United States, the reception of Stern’s and Mosse’s studies in 
Germany was by and large a non-reception. Historische Zeitschrift reviewed neither of the 
two, and even though The Politics of Cultural Despair was published in German in 1963, it 
seems not to have stimulated further research among German historians.195 Several factors 
might account for this fact: First, historians of Gerhard Ritter’s generation, whose influence 
was waning anyway during the 1960s, were likely to ignore studies that all too critically 
examined the ideological orientations of the German Bildungsbürgertum. Second, if German 
historians in the 1960s examined the roots of National Socialism, they generally focused on 
the Weimar Republic, debating, for example, whether the Social Democrats in the 1918 
                                                
193 Ibid., 609. The significance of Mosse’s Crisis emphasizes Saul Friedländer, “Mosse’s Influence on the 
Historiography of the Holocaust,” in Payne et al. (eds), What History Tells, 135. 
194 See Barkin, “German Émigré Historians in America,” 159. 
195 Fritz Stern, Kulturpessimismus als politische Gefahr. Eine Analyse nationaler Ideologie in Deutschland 
(Bern and Stuttgart, 1963). 
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revolution had failed to push through more democratic reforms—which might have 
decisively weakened anti-democratic forces in Germany instead of making the Nazi rise to 
power possible in 1933.196 Alternatively, they argued about missed opportunities and 
misguided policies at the end of the Weimar Republic.197 And third, historians of National 
Socialism were caught up in the fascism/totalitarianism debate—and both concepts did not 
pay much attention to ideology in a long-term perspective. Similarly, younger German 
historians such as Martin Broszat and Hans Mommsen focused on the structure of the 
National Socialist regime rather than its ideological roots.198 
And yet the non-reception of the American studies in intellectual and cultural history 
by the German contemporaries remains puzzling for another reason. After all, Krieger, Stern, 
and Mosse outlined a German Sonderweg, and even though theirs was ideological, one might 
have expected the German historians who in the 1970s developed a social and political 
Sonderweg thesis to pay more attention to it. What makes this lack of reception even more 
surprising is the fact that these German scholars were generally very aware of American 
literature on German history because of their contacts with American historians. 
In recent debates about the “brown roots” of German social history some younger 
German observers have explained Wehler’s and other social historians’ focus on structures 
                                                
196 See the studies on the German soviets 1918/19, which were published at the same time: Eberhard Kolb, Die 
Arbeiterräte in der deutschen Innenpolitik, 1918-1919 (Düsseldorf, 1962); and Peter von Oertzen, Betriebsräte 
in der Novemberrevolution. Eine politikwissenschaftliche Untersuchung über Ideengehalt und Struktur 
betrieblicher und wirtschaftlicher Arbeiterräte in der deutschen Revolution 1918/19 (Düsseldorf, 1963). 
197 In the 1950s and early 1960s, Karl Dietrich Bracher and Werner Conze clashed about the role of Chancellor 
Heinrich Brüning. Compare Bracher’s seminal Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik. Eine Studie zum Problem 
des Machtverfalls in der Demokratie (Villingen, 1955) and Conze’s articles “Die Krise des Parteienstaates in 
Deutschland 1929/30,” Historische Zeitschrift 178 (1954), 47-83; and “Brünings Politik unter dem Druck der 
großen Krise,” Historische Zeitschrift 199 (1964), 529-550. 
198 See Martin Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers. Grundlegung und Entwicklung seiner inneren Verfassung (Munich, 
1969); and Hans Mommsen, Beamtentum im Dritten Reich (Stuttgart, 1966). 
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and processes instead of agency and ideology by their allegiance to their teachers, above all 
Werner Conze and Theodor Schieder. Conze and Schieder had compromised themselves 
during the Nazi years and thus were not very interested in questions of agency and individual 
responsibility.199 By resorting to structural and process-oriented approaches, their students 
avoided these tricky issues—and remained in their advisers’ good graces. While these views 
on social history have been developed within a specific German context as an exercise in 
“intellectual parricide,” to borrow Charles Maier’s term,200 Steven Aschheim has recently 
provided a less polemical yet similar explanation. In his comparison of German-Jewish 
intellectual and cultural historians and German (non-Jewish) social historians, Aschheim has 
labeled Wehler’s and others’ brand of social history as being “at once skeptical and 
protective” and “a navigation exercise: formulating a necessarily critical narrative of the past 
while at the same time leaving questions of personal complicity and ideological and 
intellectual convictions relatively untouched.”201 
In contrast to these critics, I argue that Wehler and others tended to view intellectual 
history as an inappropriate approach for less opportunistic or even implicitly apologetic 
reasons. German historians of Wehler’s generation associated intellectual history—or rather 
Geistesgeschichte/Ideengeschichte—with an older German historiographical tradition, 
                                                
199 See Peter Schöttler, “Von der rheinischen Landesgeschichte zur nazistischen Volksgeschichte oder die 
‘unhörbare Stimme des Blutes,’” in Winfried Schulze and Otto G. Oexle (eds.), Deutsche Historiker im 
Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt am Main, 1999), 89-113; Götz Aly, “Theodor Schieder, Werner Conze oder die 
Vorstufen der physischen Vernichtung,” in ibid., 163-182; Berg, Der Holocaust und die westdeutschen 
Historiker, 563ff. 
200 Charles S. Maier, “Comment,” in Hartmut Lehmann and James van Horn Melton (eds.), Paths of 
Continuity: Central European Historiography from the 1930s to the 1950s (Cambridge, UK, 1994), 395. 
201 Steven Aschheim, “The Tensions of Historical Wissenschaft: The Émigré Historians and the Making of 
German Cultural History,” in Aschheim, Beyond the Border: The German-Jewish Legacy Abroad (Princeton, 
2007), 52. 
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namely Friedrich Meinecke’s, which they considered either potentially apologetic or simply 
not very fruitful heuristically.202 Within the German historiographical context of the 1950s 
and early 1960s, this assessment was certainly not entirely unfounded. 
In addition, the biographical background of the respective historians offers another 
explanation of their methodological and theoretical orientation. While Aschheim reveals very 
convincingly how the personal experiences of Fritz Stern, George Mosse, Peter Gay, and 
Walter Laqueur influenced their scholarly work, he fails to provide the same analysis for the 
slightly younger German social historians. Unlike the German-Jewish émigrés, this 
generation of German social historians had, of course, not been personally affected by Nazi 
anti-Semitism in the 1930s. Therefore they might have been less likely to attach overriding 
importance to this ideology as a causal factor. For the same generation’s historiography on 
National Socialism, one could posit a similar argument in explaining the relative neglect of 
its victims by non-Jewish German historians. For those growing up in the “society of 
perpetrators,” the focus on those perpetrators rather than the victims of National Socialism 
should not be too surprising. Finally, one has to note the age difference of ten to twenty years 
between intellectual/cultural historians (born in the late 1910s to mid-1920s) and social 
historians (born between ca. 1930 and 1940). This difference meant that as students, the latter 
encountered historical professions that had begun to pay more attention to the social sciences. 
These observations are neither a verdict in favor of social history nor one against intellectual 
                                                
202 See Paul Nolte, “Die Historiker der Bundesrepublik. Rückblick auf eine ‘lange Generation,’” Merkur 53 
(1999), 413-432; for Wehler’s statements on intellectual history, see his “Geschichtswissenschaft heute,” first in 
Jürgen Habermas, Stichworte zur geistigen Situation der Zeit (Frankfurt am Main, 1979) and later in Hans-
Ulrich Wehler, Historische Sozialwissenschaft und Geschichtsschreibung. Studien zu Aufgaben und Traditionen 
deutscher Geschichtswissenschaft (Göttingen, 1980), 13-41. For the debate about “structure” vs. 
“agency”/“intention” in a different context, see also Norbert Frei, ed., Martin Broszat, der “Staat Hitlers,” und 
die Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus (Göttingen, 2007). 
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and cultural history. Yet they offer an explanation that does not suspect the German social 
historians of Wehler’s generation a priori of ulterior motives. More generally, to label certain 
methodologies per se “apologetic” seems only possible through a very selective reception of 
historiographical developments of recent decades. The fourth chapter will continue the 
discussion of these questions. 
This survey of the postwar American field of modern Germany illustrates a number 
of issues. Although there was certainly no clear consensus, some specific interpretations 
existed, which many scholars adhered to. One of them was the unfortunate dominance of 
Prussia in Germany and in particular the disadvantageous role of the authoritarian Prussian 
elites. In addition, the development of liberalism in Germany and the significance of a 
distinct “Germanic ideology” preoccupied a number of intellectual and cultural historians. 
Implicitly or explicitly, Germany’s deviance from a “Western” trajectory provided a subtext 
to most of these intellectual and cultural histories. While not deterministic, these studies 
assumed that the causes of the rise of National Socialism were to be found primarily within 
the cultural traditions and history of the German people, albeit not completely isolated from 
the European context. In addition, many Americans argued that these causes did not solely 
develop during the turbulent Weimar years, but in fact originated already in the nineteenth 
century. 
Nevertheless, a broader range of views characterized the American field of modern 
Germany. Scholars such as Sidney Fay persistently opposed what they perceived as blatant 
anti-German pamphlets— an understandable albeit historically inaccurate response to Nazi 
Germany’s murderous path. Émigrés of the first (Klemens von Klemperer) and second 
generation (Klaus Epstein) cautioned against what they considered all-too-schematic 
 151 
critiques of German history. To be sure, immediately after World War II almost everyone 
thought the reconsideration of the recent German past to be crucial. But the directions in 
which American scholars took this reconsideration began to vary by the 1950s, a 
development that continued and grew ever-more complex during the following decades, 
which will become apparent in the chapter analyzing the German historical profession during 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
German Historians Encounter the United States during the 1950s and 1960s 
 
The analysis of the German and the American historical professions provided in the 
first two chapters has revealed the degree to which historians on both sides of the Atlantic 
attempted to (re-)establish intellectual and organizational ties with one another. As far as 
Americans were concerned, intellectual cooperation with Germans generally developed out 
of the desire to reintegrate German historians into an international scholarly community that 
had suffered tremendously during the interwar years and World War II. In addition, 
Americans often simply continued to value scholarly contacts with their German colleagues. 
Therefore they sometimes demonstrated considerable understanding if Germans had made 
certain concessions to National Socialist ideology in their writings, or had even belonged to 
National Socialist organizations. Sometimes, their own conservative political views helped 
facilitate intellectual rapprochements, in particular as the new bipolar world order regrouped 
previous alliances.  
As for the Germans, idealistic academic internationalism did not always constitute the 
main motivation for reaching out to the other side of the Atlantic. Some German scholars 
recognized all too well that a transatlantic orientation could be materially or politically 
advantageous, and that the conditions of the Cold War made it possible for them to rally 
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under the ideological umbrella of the “West.”1 In his attempt to find international partners for 
the journal Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte, editor Gerhard Ritter joined forces with the 
American church historians Roland Bainton and Harold Grimm. Both were Germanophiles 
who also harbored deep reservations about ethnic and religious diversity in American 
historiography and society.2 Whereas Ritter was clearly attracted by the similarly 
conservative ideological outlook of his American colleagues, Martin Göhring, founding 
director of the recently established Institut für Europäische Geschichte (IEG) in Mainz, was 
hoping for financial support when he wrote to Guy Stanton Ford, secretary general of the 
American Historical Association. Even though Göhring was motivated “by the question of 
organizing close contacts between American, English, French and German historians,” he 
also asked for a monetary contribution for the establishment of a library at the institute.3  
As mentioned in the first chapter, some established scholars resumed their contacts 
with American colleagues fairly soon after the end of the war. Some spent one or two 
semesters as visiting professors, while others went on lecture tours. A few historians 
participated in faculty exchange programs, sponsored by the various organizations that 
explicitly or implicitly aimed at exposing German academics to “Western” approaches. This 
chapter seeks to determine whether and how these older scholars were influenced by their 
                                                
1 See Karl Dietrich Erdmann, Toward a Global Community of Historians. The International Historical 
Congresses and the International Committee of Historical Sciences, 1898 – 2000 (New York, 2005), 139-195. 
For the political realm, see Ronald J. Granieri, The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and 
the West, 1949-1966 (New York, 2003). 
2 John L. Harvey, “Reformationsgeschichte Reformed? The Rebirth of Archiv of Reformationsgeschichte from 
Five Decades Past,” paper delivered at the Annual Conference of the Society of Reformation Research, 
Minneapolis, October 24-28, 2007. 
3 Martin Göhring to Guy Stanton Ford, 8 October 1951, Library of Congress, AHA papers, Box 174, Secretary 
File. He added that it was “our intention […] to achieve a revision of history’s interpretation by means of 
international cooperation, one of the most urgent tasks of our day.” 
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contacts with American academia and the United States more generally. The cases of these 
individuals differ from a younger generation of German historians insofar as the former did 
not always show the openness so characteristic of the latter. In some cases, it will also 
become apparent that established scholars went to the United States in order to promote 
certain views on German history. For some of them, travelling to the United States took on 
the form of a distinct mission. The historians introduced below range from far-Right 
(Walther Hubatsch) and nationalist-conservative (Gerhard Ritter) to moderate-conservative 
(Karl-Dietrich Erdmann) and comparatively liberal (Fritz Fischer4), which indicates that 
scholars of different persuasions maintained contacts with American colleagues. The 
inclusion of the medievalist Fritz Ernst illustrates that the German-American scholarly 
community extended beyond historians of modern Germany. 
Yet for a younger generation of Germans, born between the late 1920s and the early 
1940s, the United States came to embody something else. While one should not invoke the 
cliché of America as the “country of unlimited possibilities” (das Land der unbegrenzten 
Möglichkeiten), the proverbial phrase coined in the early twentieth century by the German 
banker Ludwig Max Goldberger, many Germans experienced their exchange visits as 
extremely enriching.5 They encountered not only a different academic system, but also an 
excitingly different culture in general. Many left the United States with a clear sense of what 
they had been missing in German society and academia, without uncritically embracing 
everything that was introduced to them. For most of the former exchange students, the United 
                                                
4 This designation refers to Fischer’s position within the West German historical profession of the 1950s and 
1960s; his overall political trajectory is decidedly more complex. 
5 Ludwig Max Goldberger, Das Land der unbegrenzten Möglichkeiten (Berlin, 1905). 
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States became and remained a place to which they would frequently return, and where they 
would develop and maintain many intellectual ties.6 This chapter therefore analyzes the 
encounters of this younger generation of German historians with the United States, during 
their student years as well as in their early professional careers. It asks to what extent these 
formative experiences influenced the scholarly work of these historians. Did they develop an 
interest in the area or time period they had studied at American universities? Did they borrow 
methodologically from American scholars they had encountered during their visits? Or did 
certain interpretations prevalent in the United States leave a mark on their later scholarship? 
The four historians on whose experience the section focuses are the two main protagonists of 
the Bielefelder Schule Jürgen Kocka and Hans-Ulrich Wehler, the liberal social and political 
historian Volker Berghahn, and Klaus Schwabe, a diplomatic historian and student of 
Gerhard Ritter. As for the older generation, the sample likewise illustrates the different 
background of historians developing ties to the United States.  
 
The Older Generations 
In contrast to other Germans of his generation, Ritter was well connected with the 
American historical profession. His personal papers include yearlong correspondence with a 
number of scholars on the other side of the Atlantic.7 As we have seen in the first chapter, 
                                                
6 See, for example, the comments by Jürgen Kocka, “Wir sind ein Fach, das nicht nur für sich selber schreibt 
und forscht, sondern zur Aufklärung und zum Selbstverständnis der eigenen Gesellschaft und Kultur beitragen 
sollte,” in Rüdiger Hohls and Konrad H. Jarausch (eds.), Versäumte Fragen. Deutsche Historiker im Schatten 
des Nationalsozialismus (Stuttgart and Munich, 2000), 384. 
7 Among them were Roland H. Bainton (New Haven), 1947-1967; Howard K. Beale (Madison), 1948-1956; 
Gordon Craig (Princeton), 1949-1966; Andreas Dorpalen (Columbus), 1948-1962; C.V. Easum 
(Madison/Bonn), 1953-1966; Howard M. Ehrman (Michigan), 1954/1955; Fritz Epstein 1947-1965; Klaus 
Epstein, o.D., 1965, 1967; Sidney Fay (Cambridge, MA), 1948-1950; Guy Stanton Ford (Washington DC), 
1938, 1947-1948; Harold J Grimm, 1948-1967; Felix E. Hirsch (New York), 1947-1966; Helmut Hirsch 
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Ritter repeatedly attempted to capitalize on these contacts in order to have his books 
published in the United States. When Ritter embarked on a lecture tour between January and 
May of 1953, it was obvious that he thought of himself as being on an important mission: the 
self-appointed spokesperson of the German historical profession set out to explain to 
American colleagues as well as the broader public what contemporary German historians 
thought and, subsequently, the proper way of understanding German history after the 
collapse of the Nazi regime.8 After the end of his trip, Ritter wrote to Hans Rothfels that his 
“U.S. trip [had] been fruitful in every respect, I believe, successful as well, and also 
delightful for me personally. I returned to Germany deeply impressed.”9  Of course, one can 
only speculate what made Ritter’s tour so “fruitful” and “successful”, and what impressed 
him, but it seems likely that the American audiences responded well to the Freiburg 
historian’s interpretations of German history and his comments on contemporary West 
Germany. Five years later, Ritter returned to deliver a series of lectures at Tulane University, 
Rice Institute (renamed Rice University two years later), and Ohio State University.10 During 
this visit, Louisiana State University Press expressed interest in publishing Ritter’s lectures, 
                                                                                                                                                  
(Chicago), 1955, 1957; Hajo Holborn (New Haven), 1939, 1959-1960; Georg Iggers, 1960-1963; Henry 
Kissinger (Cambridge, MA), 1953-1956; William L. Langer (Cambridge, MA), 1947-1965; Arthur S. Link 
(Princeton), 1966; Ralph H. Lutz, 1947, 1956/1957, 1962-1964; William H. Maehl (Lincoln), 1964-1967; 
Henry Cord Meyer (Claremont), 1948, 1954; Armin E. Mruck (Baltimore), 1960, 1962; Peter Paret (Princeton), 
1957-1959, 1967; Hans Rothfels, 1947-1967; Richard Salomon (Ohio), 1947, 1954; John L. Snell (New 
Orleans),1958-1967; Alfred Vagts (Sherman, Conn.), 1947-1967 (the years indicate the period of 
correspondence). 
8 Ritter lectured on “Lutheranism, Catholicism, and the Humanistic view of life”; “The political attitude of the 
German (academic) youth today”; “The Protestant church and its relations to public life in Germany today”;  
See the manuscripts in BAK, NL Gerhard Ritter, Box 225. 
9 Gerhard Ritter to Hans Rothfels, May 21, 1953, BAK, NL Hans Rothfels, Box 1. 
10 This time, Ritter’s lectures dealt with “The Problem of Militarism in Germany“; “The nature and the policies 
of the New German Army) ; “The historical roots of National Socialism” (o.O.); and “The political attitude of 
the German army 1914 – 1945: from obedience to revolt”—all of them politically “hot” topics. See the 
manuscripts in Ritter’s Nachlass, BAK, NL Gerhard Ritter, Box 228. 
 157 
but this never happened.11 Nevertheless, it seems clear that Ritter’s trips to the United States 
unfolded in a satisfactory way for the German historian. The high esteem in which many 
American colleagues held him became evident once again when in 1965 Ohio State 
University Press published his The German Problem, a collection of essays that had 
previously appeared in German. Three years earlier, Ralph Lutz of Stanford University had 
emphasized the significance of having Ritter’s essays available in English, since “Prussian 
militarism is still a subject which few American historians can present objectively to our 
present generation.”12    
In 1952/1953, Ritter’s colleague and later opponent Fritz Fischer toured several 
American universities on a trip organized by the Governmental Affairs Institute. This 
institute, which first operated under the auspices of the American Political Science 
Association and later as an independent organization, organized exchanges of political 
leaders and younger academics (participants had to be between 30 and 45 years of age) from 
Germany and Austria.13 Given the Governmental Affairs Institute’s links to political science, 
it was not surprising that Fischer came to meet social scientists as much as historians. The 
main goal of these tours was to familiarize the German guests with both the theoretical and 
methodological foundations of American political science and to reveal how academics in 
this field were connected to policy makers. In a letter to the University of Hamburg’s 
administration, in which Fischer asked for a leave of absence, he emphasized that “the 
                                                
11 See the correspondence in BAK Koblenz, NL Gerhard Ritter, Box 409, Folder “Amerikafahrt September – 
Oktober 1958.” 
12 Ralph Lutz to Gerhard Ritter, November 16, 1962, BAK, NL Gerhard Ritter, Box 353. 
13 For the origins and the development of the institute, see Henry J. Kellermann, Cultural Relations as an 
Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy: the Educational Exchange Program Between the United States and 
Germany, 1945-1945 (Washington, D.C., 1978), 138. 
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methods [of political science] in the United States is of great importance for the modern 
historian.”14 
Fischer’s stay first led him to the University of Virginia for ten weeks, where he 
received “a good and intensive introduction” to Political Science.15 He then spent nearly two 
months at Princeton, Yale, and Harvard, meeting with political scientists as well as historians 
working on German history. During the remaining three-and-a-half months, Fischer toured 
sixteen universities in the Midwest, the West Coast and Southwest, and finally, the South. At 
Berkeley, Fischer encountered David Hoggan, then a young visiting assistant professor, 
whom he found to be “excellent on German history.” Hoggan later went on to have a 
questionable career on the German far right, espousing the aforementioned dubious thesis 
regarding Hitler’s supposedly peaceful foreign policies (see chapter 2). Fischer’s trip ended 
at Columbia University, where he attended the illustrious seminar on European politics of 
émigré political scientist Franz Neumann, which attracted prominent scholars from several 
universities in and around New York City.16 
The generally positive, and at times even enthusiastic, tone of Fischer’s report was at 
least in part the likely result of Fischer’s gratitude toward the Governmental Affairs Institute. 
Still, what remains striking is Fischer’s repeated characterization of various scholars as 
                                                
14 See Fischer’s letter to the president of the University of Hamburg, in which he describes purpose and 
structure of the trip and asks for the permission to take a leave of absence. Letter, June 21, 1952, BAK, NL Fritz 
Fischer, Box 50. Fischer added that he had never been to the United States before and had not had a leave of 
absence in more than five years. 
15 Fritz Fischer, Report to the Governmental Affairs Institute, August 19, 1953, BAK, NL Fritz Fischer, Box 
109. 
16 Fritz Stern, Five Germanys I Have Known, 206, lists besides Neumann and Columbia’s historian of Eastern 
Europe Henry Roberts the scholars Hajo Holborn, Felix Gilbert, Herbert Marcuse, Leonard Krieger, H. Stuart 
Hughes, and Carl Schorske. Holborn told Fischer that he was “happy to learn that you have got safely back to 
the civilized eastern part of this country and I am looking forward to seeing you soon.” Hajo Holborn to Fritz 
Fischer, April 29, 1953, BAK, NL Fritz Fischer, Box 51. 
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“progressive” and “modern,” in contrast to others whom he perceived as “traditional” and 
“conservative”. Fischer also noted the different social backgrounds of students he 
encountered at Ivy League and other universities. Occasionally, he remarked on the 
atmosphere of the places he visited. At the University of Virginia, for example, he seemed to 
be impressed by “the abilities for students to discuss political and administrative problems 
freely.”17   
After having submitted his report, Fischer published an article on “subjectivity” and 
“objectivity” in American historiography—for several reasons a noteworthy text.18 
Apparently under the impression of his encounters with social scientists in the United States, 
Fischer drew a picture of a historical profession under pressure to justify its relevance vis-à-
vis the social sciences. Moreover, Fischer discussed Charles Beard’s critique of Friedrich 
Meinecke’s brand of historicism, which the American historian saw as fundamentally 
opposed to the spirit of the enlightenment. While Fischer admitted that Meinecke himself had 
drawn a sharp distinction between “Western positivist rationalism” and the German tradition 
of historicism,19 he still took the side of Meinecke against Beard. He distanced himself in 
particular from Beard’s famous dictum of “written history as an act of faith.”20 This, 
however, was precisely the charge Fischer’s opponents would level against him during the 
“Fischer Controversy” surrounding the German Empire in World War I. And while Fischer 
                                                
17 Fischer, Report to the Governmental Affairs Institute, August 19, 1953, 2. 
18 See Fischer’s article “Objektivität und Subjektivität. Ein Prinzipienstreit in der amerikanischen 
Geschichtsschreibung,” in Alfred Herrmann (ed.), Aus Politik und Geschichte. Festschrift für Ludwig 
Bergsträsser zum 70. Geburtstag (Düsseldorf, 1954), 167-182. 
19 The most thorough analysis of this complex subject is still Georg G. Iggers, The German Conception of 
History: The National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present (Middleton, Conn., 1968). 
20 This was the title of Beard’s 1933 AHA presidential address, subsequently published in American Historical 
Review 39 (1934), 219-231. 
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in his later work consistently emphasized the need to produce “critical” rather than 
“affirmative” historical texts, in this case he defended a historiographical approach that 
sought to “understand” rather than to “judge.” 
A year later, Waldemar Gurian, whom Fischer had come to know during his 1952/53 
tour, inquired whether he would be interested in a visiting professorship at Notre Dame.21 
After difficult negotiations with the University of Hamburg’s administration, which was not 
excited about Fischer’s request for yet another leave of absence, he spent the spring semester 
of 1955 in Indiana. During his two stays in the United States in the 1950s, Fischer managed 
to establish a number of contacts with American historians, such as Hans Gatzke, Gordon 
Craig, Hans Rosenberg, and Hajo Holborn. These ties would prove useful in the 1960s, when 
his magnum opus Griff nach der Weltmacht alienated him from most of his German 
colleagues.22 
Of course, exchange programs and visiting professorships were not limited to 
Germans working on modern history. Sponsored by a Rockefeller Foundation grant, the 
Heidelberg University medievalist Fritz Ernst visited a large number of universities across 
the United States, in order to “study institutions of higher learning and the general 
educational system of the country.”23 Ernst appeared to be particularly impressed by the 
“strength of the educational interests” at American universities; whereas in Germany 
education (Erziehung) consisted only of teaching (Unterricht), in the United States—and in 
                                                
21 Waldemar Gurian to Fritz Fischer, January 6, 1954, BAK, NL Fritz Fischer, Box 50. 
22 See Fischer’s list of acquaintances among American historians and political scientists, containing ca. 45 
names, without date (handwritten addition “likely 1952/53”) BAK, NL Fritz Fischer, Box 1. 
23 Fritz Ernst, “Report to the Rockefeller Foundation on my tour to the U.S.A.” without date, Leo Baeck 
Institute, New York, George L. Mosse Papers, Box 31/28. 
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Great Britain—teaching was only part of university education. His impressions ultimately 
confirmed his opinion that “certain reforms of the German universities (and secondary 
schools) [were] absolutely necessary.” Ernst emphasized two particularly important aims: 
German universities should significantly enlarge their faculties, in order to allow for a closer 
faculty-student interaction, and they should establish a “Studium Generale” (which he 
apparently based on the American college model, in order to provide students with a more 
comprehensive education).  
Yet Ernst devoted his time to more than merely educational reform questions. Similar 
to other German historians, he revealed an acute interest in American views on both 
contemporary Germany and German history, and he published the results in a long review 
essay of both academic and more popular studies. Ernst conceded that for many Americans 
the immediate impressions of National Socialism had altered their perspective on modern 
German history.24 Yet he also declared: “Those who have lived under a dictatorship know 
what resistance means. Those who have never lived under a dictatorship will hardly be able 
to comprehend it.”25 In this context Ernst cited Hans Rothfels’s The German Opposition to 
Hitler (published in 1948) as “the only scholarly account of the opposition to Hitler” without 
mentioning Franklin Ford’s AHR article that had appeared two years earlier.26 While Ernst’s 
review essay seemed to suggest a dichotomy between reliable historical works produced by 
historians who had lived through the Nazi dictatorship and studies written by foreigners 
                                                
24 Fritz Ernst, “Blick auf Deutschland: Ausländische Stimmen zur neuesten deutschen Geschichte,” Die Welt als 
Geschichte 10 (1950), 192-212, quote on 207. “We can understand that National Socialism has retroactively 
revised German history for many peope—we know how this has happened to ourselves.”   
25 Ernst, “Blick auf Deutschland: Ausländische Stimmen zur neuesten deutschen Geschichte,” 211. 
26 Franklin L. Ford, “The Twentieth of July in the History of the German Resistance,” American Historical 
Review 51 (1946), 609-626. 
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lacking this important dimension, he acknowledged the research of a number of American 
historians. Moreover, if Ernst criticized many American studies on German history as overly 
simplistic, he recognized that the emergence of these simplistic views was not too surprising. 
Perhaps most importantly, Ernst insisted that Germans today could no longer afford to ignore 
foreign views of German history—something that he believed previous generations had 
tended to do.27 All in all, this essay demonstrated that some German historians were no 
longer advocating the overly defensive positions characteristic of previous decades.   
Ernst returned to the United States 1955 to take up a visiting professorship at the 
University of Wisconsin.28 Most likely Chester Easum, who had taught in Madison since 
1927 and who at the time was serving as a cultural attaché at the American Embassy in Bonn, 
had arranged Ernst’s visit.  Yet the German historian also developed a good relationship with 
George Mosse, who had just arrived at Madison from the University of Iowa. Subsequently, 
Mosse even attempted to convince Ernst to accept a permanent appointment at the University 
of Wisconsin, since the history department wanted to strengthen its focus on Central 
European history. However, the German historian was not ready to give up his position at the 
University of Heidelberg.29  
                                                
27 Ernst, “Blick auf Deutschland: Ausländische Stimmen zur neuesten deutschen Geschichte,” 204: “Den Luxus 
der deutschen Generationen seit 1871, sich um das ausländische Urteil nicht zu kümmern, können wir uns heute 
nicht mehr leisten, und das nicht nur aus sogenannten taktischen Gründen.” 
28 See Fritz Ernst’s letter to Hans Rothfels, March 23, 1955, in which he showed himself impressed by 
Wisconsin’s history department. BAK, NL Hans Rothfels, Box 1.  
29 George L. Mosse to Fritz Ernst, April 6, 1956; Ernst to Mosse, May 25, 1956; Mosse to Ernst, May 28, 1956; 
and Ernst to Mosse, June 1, 1956. LBI, George L. Mosse Papers, Box 34/50. Mosse and Ernst also discussed the 
hire of a historian of modern Germany. Henry Cord Meyer, then at Pomona College, had just published his 
study on the Mitteleuropa concept and was the preferred choice, but ultimately did not accept the offer. Ernst 
commented on this development: “I regret very much that Meyer could not accept the position…Nowadays one 
has to be careful with American specialists of Germany who are of German ancestry, that they don’t have Nazi 
sympathies—which he [Meyer] certainly does not have.” It is unclear how Ernst came to this conclusion 
regarding American historians of German origins. 
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As the previous chapter has revealed, American historians of modern Germany were 
a rather diverse group, methodologically as well as politically. Thus, it might not be too 
surprising that even an arch-conservative such as Walther Hubatsch, a specialist in naval 
history at the University of Bonn who throughout his career remained a marginal figure 
within the West German historical profession, received an opportunity to teach in the United 
States: Hubatsch spent the spring semester of 1960 at the University of Kansas—and upon 
his return, he wrote about his experiences in a German newspaper.30 In an overall fairly 
sympathetic account, Hubatsch expressed his admiration of the “fairly uniform historical 
consciousness” among American citizens of different religious and ethnic backgrounds—an 
evaluation that might have come as a surprise to Americans themselves. Equally sweeping—
and unconvincing—was Hubatsch’s claim that college textbooks available in the United 
States did not conform to “scholarly standards.” The “proof” for this assertion was an 
appendix to a sourcebook edited by Louis N. Snyder (who had received his PhD under 
Walter Platzhoff at the University of Frankfurt in 1932), which erroneously labeled several 
countries in Africa and Asia as German colonies and protectorates.31 This admittedly rather 
embarrassing mistake, however, did little to diminish the overall value of the publication, 
which American historians reviewed rather positively. Instead, it seems likely that Hubatsch 
took offense to Synder’s introductions to the documents, which ran counter to his own views. 
Examples include Snyder’s brief vignettes on a number of World War I documents, which 
                                                
30 Walther Hubatsch, “Geschichte—Kein verstaubter Plunder. Historische Wissenschaft in den USA: Eindrücke 
eines deutschen Gastprofessors,” Die Welt, supplement “Geistige Welt,” July 2, 1960. 
31 Louis N. Snyder (ed.), Documents of German History (New Brunswick, 1958), 602. Here, a list of “German 
Colonies and Protectorates in 1911” included Madagascar, Cambodia, and Morocco. Despite this glaring 
mistake, Snyder’s sourcebook contained a reliable selection of documents, albeit with heavy emphasis on the 
German Empire and Nazi Germany. 
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were more critical of the German Empire’s actions than Hubatsch’s—in particular the 
introduction to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.32  
Despite such sweeping criticism, Hubatsch acknowledged the sophistication of the 
American historical profession, evidenced by some impressive studies produced by 
American historians of modern Europe, such as R.R. Palmer’s The Age of Democratic 
Revolution, 1760-1800. Yet like other German Conservatives of the time, he also fell back on 
the common argument that it was difficult, especially for younger American scholars, “to do 
justice to the complex historical events in Europe.” Rather than engaging a view held by an 
American colleague with whom they disagreed, historians such as Hubatsch—or Gerhard 
Ritter—simply declared it the result of a lack of empathy and understanding toward the 
conditions of European and particularly German history. This ability to empathize (einfühlen) 
was something foreigners supposedly often lacked.33 
Hubatsch’s guest professorship also seems to have made possible the translation of 
his study on the Central Powers in World War I, based on the lectures he had given while at 
Kansas as well as on an earlier contribution to a handbook on German history.34 Henry Cord 
Meyer, a student of Hajo Holborn who had written his dissertation on the history of the 
Mitteleuropa concept in Germany —which was immensely popular among political and 
economic elites during World War I—provided a surprisingly sympathetic preface to the 
                                                
32 See Snyder (ed.), Documents of German History, 335, 337, 341, and in particular 362/363 (the introduction to 
the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk). 
33 For a comparable response, see Ritter’s comments on Plessner’s Verspätete Nation or Hans Herzfeld’s 
criticism of Koppel Pinson’s Modern Germany in chapter 2. 
34 Walter Leo/Walter Bussmann (eds.), Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte, Vol. IV part 2 (Konstanz, 1955) 
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study.35 Meyer was probably not far off the mark when he noted that Hubatsch gave “an 
indication of the way Germans are likely to consider major aspects of their history in the 
twentieth century.”36 He conceded that Hubatsch’s views by no means constituted the 
consensus among German historians, mentioning Ludwig Dehio and Fritz Fischer (who had 
just published his magnum opus Griff nach der Weltmacht) as differing markedly from 
Hubatsch.37 Yet Meyer claimed that by engaging Hubatsch’s interpretations, American 
readers would “stand to lose only two expandable qualities—our ignorance and our 
prejudice.”38 Unfortunately for Hubatsch, not all American historians agreed. Reviewing the 
book in the Journal of Modern History, Hans Gatzke labeled it an example of apologist 
historiography still rampant in West Germany: “Reading the works of some German 
historians since World War II, one is impressed with the open-mindedness and objectivity 
with which they tackle touchy subjects in their nation’s past. But there are also still those 
who prefer to sweep under the rug that which they cannot face.”39 Gatzke’s damning 
evaluation referred to Hubatsch’s questionable assertions, such as the claim that the brutal 
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918 should be regarded as “an attempt to establish a provisional 
order along certain structural lines determined by the principle of recognizing nationalities as 
                                                
35 Henry Cord Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 1815-1945 (The Hague, 1955). 
36 Henry Cord Meyer, “Introduction,” in Walther Hubatsch, Germany and the Central Powers in the World War 
1914-1918 (Lawrence, 1963), xi. 
37 Interestingly, in Germany and the Central Powers in the World War, Hubatsch claimed that “few eras have 
been studied as thoroughly as the period from 1914 to 1918” and that “as a consequence historians can write 
about the war from a reasonably firm and definitive basis” (14). However, two years earlier Fritz Fischer had 
proved that the opposite was the case. 
38 Meyer, “Introduction”, xi. 
39 Hans W. Gatzke, “Review of Walther Hubatsch, Germany and the Central Powers in the World War, 1914-
1918,” Journal of Modern History 36 (1964), 101. 
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well as by the interests of state of the Central Powers.”40 Moreover, in his discussion of the 
German Empire’s war aims, Hubatsch categorically declared that “no chancellor adopted a 
program of annexations during the war”—a statement that was simply incorrect.41 That at 
least some American historians took offense to such a blatant apologia was not surprising. 
After all, even among those German historians tending toward a rather sympathetic 
evaluation of the German Empire’s foreign policies, Hubatsch occupied a fringe position. 
Despite such negative responses, it is evident that a pluralistic American historical profession 
offered space to German scholars of different backgrounds. One did not have to be politically 
progressive or even a historiographical iconoclast to find some like-minded colleagues on the 
other side of the Atlantic. 
The report of Karl Dietrich Erdmann on a four-week lecture tour during March and 
April of 1964 offers another glimpse into the experiences of established German historians in 
the United States (and Canada). The German Embassy in Canada had asked Erdmann, a 
leading historian of his generation and one of the most influential figures in the German 
historical profession, to counter talks given by the British historian A.L. Rowse at McGill 
University during the winter of 1962-63, which had supposedly implied a “collective 
condemnation” (Kollektivverurteilung) of German history.42 The Canadian audiences in 
Montreal, Ottawa, Kingston, and Toronto responded positively to Erdmann’s lectures, yet the 
echo in the United States turned out comparatively mixed. Erdmann reported that while the 
talk at Brandeis University had led to a “tough but fair discussion,” the “Fischer 
                                                
40 Hubatsch, Germany and the Central Powers in the World War 1914-1918, 108. 
41 Hubatsch, Germany and the Central Powers in the World War 1914-1918, 64. 
42 Report Karl Dietrich Erdmann, “Bericht über die Vortragsreise in Kanada und USA vom 17.3.-15.5.64,” 
April 18, 1964, BAK, NL Karl Dietrich Erdmann, Box 109. 
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Controversy” had overshadowed his visit at Yale. This controversy had taken on the form of 
a public scandal only when conservative German historians managed to orchestrate the 
cancellation of Fischer’s lecture tour to the United States.43 Hajo Holborn, the senior German 
historian at Yale, (correctly) perceived Erdmann to be on a more political than scholarly 
mission, and since the German government had recently canceled Fritz Fischer’s lecture tour 
to the United States for political reasons, Holborn openly regretted having arranged 
Erdmann’s visit at Yale.44 This episode, as well as the Fischer-Kontroverse as a whole, 
revealed American objections to political intervention in academic affairs.  
 
The Younger Generation 
While the visits of established historians only rarely took on such an almost 
contentious character, young German students encountered the United States in a very 
different way. Their experiences were made possible through the establishment of exchange 
programs during the postwar years. For example, the Smith-Mundt Act, passed by the U.S. 
Congress in January 1948, established for the first time “a worldwide peacetime program of 
informational and educational exchange.”45 Yet while exchange programs enabled young 
Americans to study in many different countries (and students from these countries to come to 
                                                
43 Philipp Stelzel, “Fritz Fischer and the American Historical Profession: Tracing the Transatlantic Dimension 
of the Fischer-Kontroverse,” Storia della Storiografia 44 (2003), 68-73. 
44 Hajo Holborn to Gerhart H. Seger (German Information Center, New York), March 18, 1964, BAK, NL Karl 
Dietrich Erdmann, Box 109. Holborn wrote “As you have probably heard, the American universities in which 
Professor Fritz Fischer was supposed to speak according to the wishes of the German Information Center, have 
decided to make it possible for Professor Fischer to undertake his lecture trip in this country. Probably under the 
circumstances I should not have invited Professor Erdmann, but we will make the two speeches possible in 
some fashion. The Fischer affair is a rather sad affair for German-American cultural relations and I am afraid 
that the German official agencies will be bothered with it for a long time to come.” 
45 Kellermann, Cultural Relations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy, 6. 
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the United States), in the case of West Germany they were “conceived and designed more 
sharply than any other program as an instrument of foreign policy.”46 The United States 
government first targeted politicians, business leaders, journalists, professors, attorneys, and 
others whom it considered to represent the German elites. Soon, however, the focus shifted 
increasingly towards the realm of education.47 Part of a broader development in the area of 
education in general, which sent German high school students and teachers to the United 
States as well, numerous German university students encountered the United States starting 
in the early 1950s (the Fulbright Program for West Germany began in 1952-53). While the 
exchange programs more and more came to target high school, the number of university 
students still remained significant. 
The scholars under review here were born between 1929 and 1941; they belong to the 
so-called “long generation” (Paul Nolte) of postwar West German historians.48 This 
generation shared fewer common generational experiences than other groups of academics 
that historians have recently identified for West Germany, such as the “Forty-Fivers,” whom 
A. Dirk Moses has classified as having been born between 1922 and 1932.49 Older 
representatives of this “long generation” had memories of Nazi Germany during peacetime 
and the Hitler Youth; some of them even participated in the Volkssturm during the very last 
                                                
46 Kellermann, Cultural Relations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy, 3. 
47 Brian M. Puaca, Learning Democracy: Education Reform in West Germany, 1945-1965 (New York, 2009), 
71 
48 Paul Nolte, “Die Historiker der Bundesrepublik: Rückblick auf eine ‘lange Generation,’” Merkur 53 (1999), 
413-431. 
49 A. Dirk Moses, “The Forty-Fivers: a Generation between Fascism and Democracy,” German Politics and 
Society 17 (1999), 94-126. See also his more recent study German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past (Cambridge, 
UK, 2007). 
 169 
stages of World War II.50 By contrast, those historians born in the late 1930s and early 1940s 
obviously remember the postwar rather than the war years. Yet historians of the “long 
generation” form a distinct group in the sense that they occupied influential roles in the West 
German historical profession beginning in the early 1970s while also striving to reach a 
broader audience as public intellectuals. In addition, most of them share an attitude of 
fundamental and consistent sympathy for the United States. This sympathy may have been 
weakened temporarily, by events such as the Vietnam War, but was never completely altered. 
In this respect, their sentiments resemble those among the postwar West German politicians 
who, like the former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, consistently maintained the significance of 
close German-American relations. They differ from those of the generation of 1968, who 
came to associate the United States with militarism and imperialism rather than with the 
Marshall Plan, American support during the Berlin Crisis of 1948, or student exchanges such 
as the Fulbright Program. 
Hans-Ulrich Wehler (born 1931) exemplifies this generation and its attitudes. For 
Wehler, who came to the United States on a Fulbright fellowship in 1952/53, Ohio 
University—and the way history was taught there—contrasted very favorably with the 
Universität Bonn. Working with a former student of the distinguished cultural historian 
Merle Curti whom Wehler recalls as the “best man in Athens,” he was introduced to 
interdisciplinary approaches.51 Typical for most German students in the United States at that 
time, he took courses in a number of different fields, including economics and journalism 
                                                
50 Hans-Ulrich Wehler describes the war years in “Eine lebhafte Kampfsituation”: Ein Gespräch mit Manfred 
Hettling und Cornelius Torp (Munich, 2006), 19-25.  
51 For the following see Wehler, “Eine lebhafte Kampfsituation,” 39; and interview with the author, July 2, 
2007.  
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(the latter of which he regarded as his future profession). As a Fulbright fellow, Wehler’s 
stay in the United States was to have a non-academic, “cultural” dimension as well. He was 
therefore placed with an American host family—“mainstream liberals,” according to 
Wehler—with whom he developed such a close relationship that he ultimately regarded them 
as second parents. While the international students, as Wehler recalls, were consciously 
isolated from the local population in Athens, by living with American families they were still 
somewhat integrated into the society.  
Yet Wehler’s experiences went far beyond Athens, Ohio. With an adventurousness 
and cleverness characteristic of both the historian and the human being, Wehler managed to 
obtain a social security card, which international students were not allowed to possess since 
they were not supposed to work. After finishing his studies at Ohio University, he first drove 
brand-new cars from the factory in Detroit to the West Coast, before hitchhiking his way 
back to the Midwest. Attracted by the atmosphere in California—“the tone was less rude than 
in Chicago or Detroit”—he decided to look for work there. Between July and December 
1953, he worked as a welder in North Hollywood, the only white person among African 
Americans and Mexicans. Through invitations, Wehler also came in contact with his 
colleagues’ families, and he remembers them as “amicable yet sometimes politically 
extremely narrow-minded.”52   
Klaus Schwabe (born in 1932) describes his time at Miami University (Ohio) in 
1952/53 in similarly positive terms, remembering in particular the friendly treatment by 
émigré scholars in a number of fields. Schwabe had been a student at Free University Berlin, 
                                                
52 Wehler, “Eine lebhafte Kampfsituation,” 41. 
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where he had heard lectures on the United States by Ernst Fraenkel, an émigré political 
scientist who had returned to West Germany in 1951.53 These lectures had aroused his 
interest in American history and society. “My first stay in the United States came about 
merely accidentally and seemed to me as a West-Berliner like winning in the lottery,” 
Schwabe remembers.54 Having left Germany during his fourth semester, Schwabe took 
classes on the junior level. Like Wehler, he immersed himself in a number of different areas, 
including American history, anthropology, sociology, economics, and literature. Schwabe 
consciously avoided German history while at Miami University and therefore did not 
establish contacts with any American historians of Germany; he was more interested in those 
fields he knew he would not be able to study at home.55 Yet the year at Miami University 
sparked his interest in American history, politics, and society. After his return to Germany 
Schwabe maintained a focus on some of the subjects he had encountered in Ohio; he later 
became a historian of twentieth century German and American history; his main works 
include a comprehensive account of American diplomacy toward Germany at the end of 
World War I, a short biography of Woodrow Wilson, and a synthetical study of twentieth 
century American foreign policy.56 
                                                
53 See Simone Ladwig-Winters, Ernst Fraenkel: ein politisches Leben (Frankfurt am Main, 2009). 
54 Klaus Schwabe, e-mail to the author, January 19, 2010. 
55 Klaus Schwabe, e-mail to the author, October 23, 2006. 
56 Klaus Schwabe, Deutsche Revolution und Wilson-Frieden 1918/19 (Düsseldorf 1972); an English translation 
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Volker R. Berghahn’s (born in 1938) experiences at the University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill in the late 1950s and early 1960s likewise left long-lasting impressions.57 
Berghahn came to Chapel Hill in the fall of 1959 and spent two academic years there. He 
concentrated primarily on history and political science, but he remembers a number of 
scholars from different disciplines who influenced him. His master’s thesis adviser was the 
political scientist Charles B. Robson, an expert on Germany and the author of a book on post-
World War II Berlin.58 The history department at the time had not yet hired a historian of 
modern Germany; Enno E. Kraehe who specialized in nineteenth century Central European 
history joined the University of North Carolina in 1964, while John L. Snell, a twentieth 
century diplomatic historian, did not arrive in Chapel Hill until 1968. Berghahn had come to 
North Carolina with a keen interest in right-wing radicalism in the Weimar Republic as well 
as the young Federal Republic, and chose the Waffen SS/HIAG as the topic for his thesis, for 
which he received a double master’s degree in history and political science.59 His impression 
of the university’s academic quality was overall positive, albeit with some exceptions. 
Berghahn was impressed by the global focus of UNC’s history department, a striking 
difference to the situation at German universities, where the overwhelming majority of 
historians wrote and taught exclusively German history. Yet he found the teaching style of 
most professors only moderately stimulating, and the students were expected to prove a 
mastery of facts rather than the ability to wrestle with conceptual questions. Moreover, some 
                                                
57 Interview Volker R. Berghahn, April 19, 2006. 
58 Charles B. Robson, Berlin: Pivot of German Destiny (Chapel Hill, 1960). Robson had received his PhD from 
UNC’s History Department in 1930 with a dissertation on The Influence of German Thought on Political 
Theory in the United States in the Nineteenth Century. 
59 Volker R. Berghahn, The Waffen-SS/HIAG, M.A. thesis, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill 1961. 
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of the scholars of Southern history struck Berghahn as very conservative, some even as 
racist, but at least as staunchly opposed to the Civil Rights movement gaining ground around 
the time. 
The late 1950s and early 1960s were an exciting time in North Carolina for precisely 
that reason. The Civil Rights movement affected Chapel Hill and its university as well—even 
though the peak of the movement was not reached until 1963-64.60 Nevertheless, Berghahn 
remembers entering restaurants with a group consisting of both African-American and white 
students, demanding that all of them be served. In addition, the recent German past was 
rather present, as several faculty members had been to Germany, either during the early 
1930s or after the end of the war. Suddenly it became even more immediate, when William 
Shirer’s bestseller The Rise and Fall of Nazi Germany was published. At Chapel Hill, this led 
to a public discussion in a large auditorium. The substantial and devastating criticism which 
most American historians leveled against Shirer had not yet resonated with the broader 
public—and maybe it never did.61 It seems, however, that the presence of the Nazi past did 
not influence American attitudes toward the young Germans, for Berghahn remembers a 
general hospitality. The relative importance attributed to extracurricular activities, which 
students at German universities were not used to pursuing, was also noteworthy for him. 
Despite the overall very positive experience in North Carolina, Berghahn never 
seriously contemplated attending graduate school in the United States. Returning to Europe 
                                                
60 See the account by John Ehle, The Free Men (New York, 1965). 
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had been a forgone conclusion for him, and he had already established contact with Francis 
Carsten, a German émigré historian now teaching at the University of London. Carsten was 
at the time working on a study on the German Army during the Weimar Republic, the 
Reichswehr, and since Berghahn intended to write his dissertation on the Stahlhelm, the 
largest veterans’ organization (as well as the largest paramilitary organization) in Weimar 
Germany, Carsten was the logical choice for an adviser.62 Berghahn received his PhD from 
the University of London in 1964, temporarily moved to Germany for his Habilitation, and 
taught in England until 1988, when he returned to the United States to accept an appointment 
at Brown University. 
Jürgen Kocka (born in 1941) came to Chapel Hill soon afterwards; he studied 
Political Science during the academic year 1964-65. While a student at Free University of 
Berlin, Kocka had come across a job advertisement from the University of North Carolina, 
where Charles B. Robson was looking for a graduate research assistant. In 1965 Kocka 
received his M.A. with a comparative thesis on financial aspects of federalism in West 
Germany and the United States.63 Like Berghahn, Kocka remembers the comparatively 
liberal atmosphere, with the Civil Rights Movement gaining momentum.64 And similar to his 
older colleague Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Kocka’s experience did not remain limited to the 
campus of his host university. After completing his M.A., Kocka taught German at Tougaloo 
                                                
62 Francis L. Carsten, Reichswehr und Politik, 1918-1933 (Köln, 1964); later published in English as The 
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64 Interview Jürgen Kocka, March 20, 2007. 
 175 
College, a historically African-American institution in Jackson, Mississippi. Kocka later 
stated that “ever since then the United States [had] been the first foreign country for me, in 
my capacity as a historian and otherwise.”65 And while he did not pay too much attention to 
historiographical trends among scholars of American history during this first stay, he traveled 
to Berkeley to visit Hans Rosenberg, who was already assuming the status of a foundational 
figure for younger German social historians. 
These examples taken together suggest that the first encounter with the United States 
had a strong impact on the young Germans. Clearly, the students became aware of the 
cultural and political differences between the two societies. To be sure, one of the purposes 
of especially the early student exchanges was to provide the Germans with an opportunity to 
witness a supposed model democracy at work.  Yet in some cases the cultural experience also 
included an introduction to racism in the American South. Academically, the Germans 
generally came in contact with a number of different disciplines, which the curriculum at 
their German universities usually did not allow. One cannot say that all students encountered 
methodological trends that had not yet reached the German historical profession. Some, such 
as Wehler, found their American host university more stimulating in this respect, whereas 
others, such as Berghahn, perceived most scholars as rather conventional. Yet the academic 
advising by their American professors seemed to surpass the treatment the students were 
used to in Germany; on average the distance between faculty and students was less 
pronounced in the United States. However, at these early stages of their careers, most 
Germans did not yet form long-lasting contacts with or even just get to know American 
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historians working on modern Germany. Some of the people of this sample have even 
indicated that they tried to avoid German history, since this was what they were able to study 
at home. While in the United States, the goal was to expand not just their cultural but also 
their academic horizons, and this meant either exploring other disciplines or studying 
American history, which at the time was rather difficult in West Germany, due to course 
offerings that only rarely included the United States.  
 
Return as Post-docs 
For the overwhelming majority of German historians, these student programs 
constituted only the beginning of regular exchanges. Many returned after having completed 
their PhDs in Germany, in order to either collect material for a second project in American or 
German-American history, or to work in safe distance from academic and administrative 
duties at their German universities. To this date, programs such as the John F. Kennedy 
Memorial Fellowship at Harvard (established in 1967) enable younger German historians to 
do just that. In fact, former fellows have generally had successful subsequent careers in 
Germany.66 Established German scholars came to appreciate places such as the Institute for 
Advanced Study in Princeton, where Felix Gilbert served as a transatlantic intermediary 
between 1962 and 1975, hosting historians such as Theodor Schieder and Thomas 
Nipperdey. Visiting professorships constituted another option to solidify one’s connections to 
the United States, which many Germans used repeatedly.    
Hans-Ulrich Wehler returned to the Unites States in 1962. During his exchange year 
at Ohio University ten years earlier, he had noticed that history textbooks in the United States 
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treated American imperialism as an “aberration.”67 He therefore decided to embark on a 
study of early American imperialism for his second book, the Habilitation. A fellowship by 
the American Council of Learned Societies provided the opportunity to work at Stanford 
University, the Library of Congress, and the National Archives. Long letters to his mentor 
Theodor Schieder during the fellowship tenure in 1962 and 1963 provide a comprehensive 
insight into Wehler’s views on American historians in particular and American society in 
general.  
At Stanford, Wehler was surprised by the absence of Jewish faculty members, and the 
near-absence of Jewish graduate students, in his opinion a result of an unofficial policy by 
the Board of Trustees. By contrast, Wehler found Berkeley “more open but also more 
European.”68 While he appeared to be impressed by the Europeanists working at both 
institutions, Wehler’s judgment on scholars of American history was decidedly critical: 
“Most of all the people in American history are terribly square and unreflected Hegelians 
with their [belief in the] god-given development of American history, so that even the 
beautiful weather for my wife and Markus [their son] cannot completely make up for it.”69 
However, Wehler’s reservations were not confined to historiographical issues. Writing about 
his acquaintances, he reported that “they tend[ed] to be on the “Left”, whatever this is 
supposed to mean in the United States, and the Left here is per se anti-German, with a hateful 
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acrimony to boot. In Europe, the Left is still able to align itself with nineteenth century 
humanism; here it is without grounding and without any historical sensibility.70  
To be sure, Wehler also followed the political developments in the United States with 
keen interest. The debate about American involvement in Vietnam and, during the early 
1960s, the Civil Rights movement could hardly escape anyone. On the latter issue Wehler 
remarked that  
the real problem in this country is the Negro question. In the last few months 
we time and again had to talk about German anti-Jewish policies, and I am—
God knows—not inclined to resort to apologetics. But the unshakeable self-
assurance that ‘in this country’ this would never be possible now seems utterly 
ridiculous. The stories that are currently reported almost daily from the South 
defy description. I cannot deny that this blow to the self-righteous arrogance 
of the so-called Liberals sometimes provides me with a certain satisfaction. 
These things happen everyday, for the whole world to see—not like in our 
case under the conditions of a totalitarian regime—and the counter-reaction 
remains rather weak. I assume that the white upper class in the South will only 
be convinced through counter-violence.71 
 
 Considering his harsh judgment, it is not surprising that Wehler concluded: “We are 
looking forward to our return. It will do us much good to escape the idiocy of American 
suburban life, to paraphrase Marx in a contemporary way, and to leave the American 
colleagues to their tedious positivism and their beloved ‘facts’”.72  
Evidently, Wehler had come to see the United States in a different light, compared to 
his first exchange year a decade earlier. One can only speculate on the exact reasons, for 
American society arguably had not changed all that much—certainly not for the worse, if one 
                                                
70 Hans-Ulrich Wehler to Theodor Schieder, October 1, 1962, BAK, NL Theodor Schieder, Box 354. 
71 Hans-Ulrich Wehler to Theodor Schieder, September 22, 1963, BAK, NL Theodor Schieder, Box 354. 
72 Hans-Ulrich Wehler to Theodor Schieder, September 22, 1963, BAK, NL Theodor Schieder, Box 354.
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uses standards of political progressiveness—since the early 1950s. Maybe his critical attitude 
was also a result of the progress that the West German society had made during the same 
time, slowly accepting the democratic political system and the country’s integration into the 
Western bloc.73 Yet whatever judgments Wehler may have rendered in his private 
correspondence, he never wavered in his public commitment to the rather close German-
American political relationship during the postwar decades. Even if some of the letters from 
the early 1960s seem to suggest otherwise, he did not accept the crude anti-Americanism 
espoused by parts of the German student movement of the 1960s and 1970s. Four decades 
later, Wehler still adhered to similar positions. He was unequivocal in his rejection of the 
“militancy of the Bush government”, especially the administration’s exploitation of the 
events of September 11, 2001 to pursue an aggressive foreign policy, and of the “missionary 
American nationalism” in general.74 Yet he also denounced Chancellor Schröder’s outspoken 
critique of the American invasion of Iraq, which he believed was merely a populist maneuver 
to ensure the reelection of the Red-Green Coalition. Wehler reminded the reader of the 
United States’ ability to exert “reckless self-criticism” in order to renew itself, and suggested 
a more diplomatic approach to transatlantic relations.75  
                                                
73 Arguably the most celebratory and teleological account of this development provides Heinrich August 
Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen. Band 2: Deutsche Geschichte vom ‘Dritten Reich’ bis zur 
Wiedervereinigung (München, 2000). 
74 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, “’Our Rising American Empire’: Amerikas missionarischer Nationalismus und das 
Dilemma der deutschen Fehlentscheidung,” in Id., Notizen zur deutschen Geschichte (München, 2007), 147-
158. 
75 See his essays written around the time of the second Iraq War “Europas Imperativ: Konfliktbereite 
Kooperation mit der amerikanischen Weltmacht,” and a review of a study on anti-Americanism, “Achtung: 
Sprengstoff Antiamerikanismus,” both in Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Notizen zur deutschen Geschichte, 139-147 and 
158-160. 
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While the tone of some of Wehler’s comments on the political situation in the United 
States and American society might already be surprising, his statement on the supposed 
positivism characteristic of historians of the United States is certainly more remarkable. After 
all, many of his later writings, most of all the programmatic texts, painted an American 
historical profession that was overall methodologically more advanced than its German 
counterpart. Wehler attacked in particular the leading representatives of diplomatic history in 
West Germany, such as Andreas Hillgruber and Klaus Hildebrand, as hopelessly old-
fashioned, arguing that in the United States this sub-field had successfully modernized 
itself.76 Here, he thought of the “Wisconsin School” of William A. Williams and his students, 
who believed that domestic factors shaped foreign policies, and in their works relied on 
economic or socioeconomic approaches. Rejecting the notion of a traditionally idealist 
American foreign policy, historians associated with the “Wisconsin School” focused on its 
course during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and interpreted American 
imperialist policies as primarily the result of business interests.77 In the context of the Cold 
War, their challenge proved similarly explosive as the Germans’ insistence on continuities in 
German history between 1871 and 1945.78 Wehler had met Williams and some of students 
                                                
76 See, for example, Wehler, “Vorwort zur zweiten Auflage,” in Wehler, Krisenherde des Kaiserreichs 1871-
1918. Studien zur deutschen Sozial- und Verfassungsgeschichte (Göttingen, 2nd ed., 1979), 12, where he 
emphasizes the “denkbar schmale Angebot an wahrhaft modernen politikhistorischen Arbeiten. . . . Lohnen sie, 
stammen sie oft aus den Vereinigten Staaten oder neuerdings aus England. Hierzulande müssen die Vertreter 
der ‘modernen Politikgeschichte’ noch einen erheblichen Nachholbedarf befriedigen." 
77 William A. Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (Cleveland, OH, 1959); Walter LaFeber, The New 
Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithaca, NY, 1963); Lloyd Gardner, Economic 
Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Madison, WI 1964). 
78 Volker R. Berghahn/Charles S. Maier, “Modern Europe in American Historical Writing,” in Anthony 
Molho/Gordon Wood (eds.), Imagined Histories: American Historians Interpret the Past (Princeton, NJ, 1998), 
393-414; 399. 
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while on the ACLS fellowship in 1962-63, and their discussions shaped Wehler’s 
understanding of imperialism, as he later acknowledged.79  
One should note, however, that the Wisconsin School only constituted a vocal and 
influential minority among American diplomatic historians. Many of them rejected both their 
methodology and their interpretation and appeared to have had much in common with the 
West German diplomatic historians Wehler deemed methodologically deficient.80 The next 
chapter will devote more space to this question of how American historians served as a foil 
against which Wehler often compared in particular his opponents within the German 
historical profession—and declared them insufficient. 
While Wehler’s opinion of his American colleagues remained ambivalent, the young 
German historian apparently managed to impress Berkeley’s history department enough for 
them to offer him a professorship. As Wehler reported to Schieder, Hans Rosenberg had told 
him that he “stood very favorably, above all because of my SPD book [Wehler’s dissertation 
on German Social Democracy and the nation state between the 1840s and World War I], but 
also because I was the youngest and had written the most (believe it or not: here they practice 
the horribly positivistic method of counting pages).”81 Ultimately Wehler declined the offer; 
apart from his reservations regarding life in the United States he correctly anticipated a 
                                                
79 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Bismarck und der Imperialismus (Köln, 1969), preface. Forty-five years later, Williams’ 
student Lloyd Gardner recalled Wehler’s visit to Madison and characterized the German historian as “very 
intense.” Interview Lloyd Gardner, September 18, 2006. 
80 A survey of the field of international relations fifteen years after the peak of the Wisconsin School provides 
Charles S. Maier, “Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations,” in Michael Kammen (ed.), 
The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States (Ithaca, NY, 1980), 355-387. 
81 Hans-Ulrich Wehler to Theodor Schieder, December 10, 1962, BAK, NL Theodor Schieder, Box 354. Just 
prior to his departure to the United States, Wehler had published the dissertation as Sozialdemokratie und 
Nationalstaat: Nationalitätenfrage in Deutschland von Karl Marx bis zum Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkriegs 
(Würzburg, 1962). 
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positive development of the German academic job market. Moreover, the homo politicus 
Wehler was drawn back to West Germany, as the outcome of Spiegel Affair of 1962 signaled 
the demise of postwar authoritarianism.82 
Back in Germany, however, Wehler encountered difficulties upon the completion of 
his study on the rise of American imperialism. The exact reasons are still not entirely clear: 
Wehler claims that the Habilitation commission at the University of Cologne’s history 
department objected to what they perceived as overly critical treatment of the United States, 
which they deemed unacceptable given West Germany’s indebtedness to the Cold War ally.83 
When Wehler published the study ten years later, Americans characterized it as an “excellent 
study”84 and a “subtle piece of scholarship that deserved the attention of American 
historians.”85 Moreover, Walter LaFeber, a protagonist of the “Wisconsin School” (and an 
advisee of Fred Harvey Harrington, not William A. Williams) had just published his book on 
the same topic.86 Some historians speculated that this prevented Wehler from submitting the 
                                                
82 The Spiegel Affair in October 1962 was caused by the arrests of the editor and several journalists of the 
Hamburg-based news magazine Der Spiegel who were accused of treason. The magazine had published an 
article in the that questioned the policies of Defense Secretary Franz Josef Strauss and claimed that the German 
army was incapable of defending the country against the Warsaw Pact. The Affair ultimately resulted in the 
resignation of Strauss and a ruling by the German Supreme Court that the arrests had violated the freedom of 
the press. See David Schoenbaum, The Spiegel Affair (New Yoork, 1968). 
83 Wehler, Historiker sollten auch politisch zu den Positionen stehen, die sie in der Wissenschaft vetreten,” in 
Hohls/Jarausch (eds.), Versäumte Fragen, 246-247; Wehler, Eine lebhafte Kampfsituation, 140-141. 
84 Thomas Schoonover, “Review of Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Der Aufstieg des amerikanischen Imperialismus: 
Studien zur Entwicklung des Imperium Americanum, 1865-1900,” Journal of American History 62 (1976), 
1011. 
85 Lloyd Ambrosius, Review of Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Der Aufstieg des amerikanischen Imperialismus: Studien 
zur Entwicklung des Imperium Americanum, 1865-1900,” American Historical Review 81 (1976), 212. 
86 LaFeber, The New Empire: an Interpretation of American Expansion. 
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study.87 Wehler explained upon its eventual publication in 1974 that he himself had hesitated 
to request the Habilitation on the basis of this work when he had become aware of a number 
of books published by historians of the “Wisconsin School”, partly based on the same 
sources and advancing similar interpretations.88 It should also be noted that Wehler, despite 
the rejection of his study on American imperialism, obtained his first appointment as a 
professor of American history at Free University Berlin in 1970, where he taught for one year 
before moving to Bielefeld. 
Whatever the reason, Wehler eventually had to embark on another project, German 
imperialism during Bismarck’s tenure as Chancellor. As Wehler emphasized in the 
introduction to this study, his analysis of imperialism in the German Empire owed much to 
his previous project examining the rise of the American empire during the same period.89 He 
also repeatedly referred to characteristics of American imperialism for comparative purposes, 
for example when he described the conflicts between imperialists and anti-imperialists during 
the 1890s, or when he sought to determine the domestic causes and side-effects of colonial 
expansion.90  
Despite his unwillingness to settle permanently in the United States, throughout his 
career Wehler remained among the German historians most closely connected to American 
colleagues and had intimate knowledge of the historiographical developments in the 
                                                
87 George W.F. Hallgarten, a historian of German imperialism who had emigrated from Germany to the United 
States in 1933, expressed this opinion in a letter to Karl Dietrich Erdmann, December 19, 1972, BAK, NL Karl 
Dietrich Erdmann, Box 160. 
88 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Der Aufstieg des amerikanischen Imperialismus: Studien zur Entwicklung des Imperium 
Americanum, 1865-1900 (Göttingen, 1974) 279. 
89 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Bismarck und der Imperialismus (Köln, 1969), 11. 
90 Wehler, Bismarck und der Imperialismus, 126 and 482-483. 
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American historical profession. Moreover, Wehler held several visiting professorships at 
American universities, such as Harvard (1972 and 1989), Princeton (1976), Stanford (1983 
and 2004), and Yale (1997). His selection as honorary foreign member of the American 
Historical Association in 2000 therefore not only recognized his significance for the West 
German historical profession, but also his role in the transatlantic scholarly community.91 
For Klaus Schwabe, the Habilitation also provided an impetus to return to the United 
States.92 In this second book project Schwabe analyzed German and American peace 
strategies at the end of World War I. His Doktorvater Gerhard Ritter had alerted him to the 
existence of crucial documents in the United States—Schwabe suspects that Ritter may have 
hoped to benefit from his student’s research as well, as he was working on the final volume 
of his magnum opus Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, which covered World War I.93 It was 
during this stay that Schwabe established the first working contacts with American historians 
of Germany such as Fritz T. and Klaus Epstein, John L. Snell, Hajo Holborn, and Gerhard 
Weinberg. Like Wehler, Schwabe received an ACLS fellowship, which brought him to 
Stanford University in 1965. Prior to that, he held visiting research professorships at 
Princeton (1963), where he became acquainted with the Woodrow Wilson biographer Arthur 
S. Link, and the University of Maryland (1964). He then moved on to Washington D.C. and 
finally Stanford, where he met two young historians of modern Germany, James J. Sheehan 
                                                
91 See Andreas Daum, “German Historiography in a Transatlantic perspective: interview with Hans-Ulrich 
Wehler,” Bulletin of the German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C. 26 (2000). This interview was 
conducted when Wehler received the AHA’s honor, and in it he reflected on the development of the 
transatlantic scholarly community.  
92 Klaus Schwabe, email to the author, January 19, 2010. 
93 Gerhard Ritter, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk: das Problem des “Militarismus” in Deutschland. Vol. IV: 
Die Herrschaft des deutschen Militarismus und die Katastrophe von 1918 (München, 1968). 
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and David Schoenbaum. Back at the University of Freiburg, Schwabe also taught American 
students (from Wayne State University) who were in Germany for a summer school, and 
U.S. servicemen from the University of Southern California. While Schwabe thus established 
contacts with scholars specializing in both German and American history, this second stay 
and the book that resulted from it led him to maintain a strong interest in American history 
throughout his career.94 As an established professor in West Germany, he repeatedly returned 
to the United States, to places such as Princeton (1979), where he held a research 
professorship; and Ohio State University (1984) and Georgetown University (1990), where 
he taught for two semesters. 
Like his older colleagues Wehler and Schwabe, Jürgen Kocka returned to the United 
States in order to embark on his second project. After receiving his doctorate in 1968, Kocka 
spent a year at Harvard University’s Charles Warren Center and at the School for Business 
Administration, where he worked on a comparative study of white-collar workers 
(Angestellte) in the United States and Germany between 1890 and 1940.95 While the largest 
part of the study focused empirically on the development of American white-collar workers, 
Kocka also intended to contribute to the discussion about the roots of National Socialism. As 
he stated in the English translation of the book, “Through the confrontation with the U.S. 
experience—economically similar, but socially and politically so dissimilar—it is possible to 
isolate, and interpret the special character of German white collar history from the late 
                                                
94 Accordingly, his Venia Legendi (permission to teach), which Schwabe received at the University of Freiburg 
on the basis on his second book/Habilitation, encompassed “modern and recent history, especially American 
history”.  
95 Jürgen Kocka, Angestellte zwischen Faschismus und Demokratie: Zur politischen Sozialgeschichte der 
Angestellten: USA 1890 bis 1940 im internationalen Vergleich (Göttingen, 1977). 
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nineteenth century though the triumph of National Socialism.”96 These remarks suggest that 
Kocka viewed his study as a contribution to the Sonderweg debate, which would unfold in 
the 1970s.  
At the Charles Warren Center, immigration historian Oscar Handlin became an 
important contact; at the School for Business Administration it was Alfred D. Chandler, 
whom Kocka met through the émigré historian of entrepreneurship Fritz Redlich.97 
Moreover, Kocka was fascinated by the “New Economic History” in general and by 
particular historians such as Donald McCloskey, David S. Landes, and Alexander 
Gerschenkron. By the mid-1970s, the New Cultural History also drew his attention. Apart 
from particular historiographical trends, Kocka remembers distinct differences between 
German and the American historical professions: the latter was more open and less organized 
along the lines of distinct “schools.” Moreover, Kocka perceived history and politics as more 
separated from each other than in West Germany, since some historians were 
methodologically “progressive” and stimulating yet politically conservative. All in all, he 
found the American field to have three main advantages: its less contentious atmosphere, its 
more open institutional organization, and finally, its openness to new directions in 
historiography, which Kocka perceived as pioneering. And despite—or maybe because of—
the alleged separation of scholarship and politics, Kocka believed that American 
contemporaries could be indispensable allies in the process of modernizing the West German 
historical profession that Kocka deemed to be necessary. 
                                                
96 Jürgen Kocka, White-Collar Workers in America 1890-1940: A Social-Political History in International 
Perspective (London, 1980), ii. 
97 Interview Jürgen Kocka, March 20, 2007; Kocka, “Nachruf Fritz Redlich”, Geschichte und Gesellschaft 5 
(1979), 167-171.  
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Like Wehler and Schwabe, Kocka returned repeatedly to the United States in the 
following decades, as a research fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton 
(1975/76) and the Institute for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford 
(1994/95); and as visiting professor at the University of Chicago (1984), the New School 
(1990), and UCLA (2009). 
Through their close relations with American historians of modern Germany, many of 
these Germans became themselves transatlantic intermediaries. After they had established 
themselves in the German historical profession, they often served as mentors for American 
graduate students researching in Germany. Other historians such as Hans Mommsen, who 
established connections with American colleagues later in his career and also frequently 
came to the United States as a visiting professor, in turn advised young Americans such as 
Thomas Childers and Eric Weitz while they conducted dissertation research in Germany. He 
also introduced some young Americans to the comparatively harsh German discussion style 
in research colloquia, as Christopher Browning remembers his experiences while being on a 
Humboldt Post-doc Fellowship in the spring of 1981.98 Similarly, the social historian 
Gerhard A. Ritter advised James J. Sheehan and Margaret L. Anderson during their research 
years in West Germany. And when Hans-Ulrich Wehler taught as a visiting professor at 
Princeton University in 1976, Charles Maier substituted for him in Bielefeld.99 
These American historians of roughly the same age cohort became permanent 
interlocutors and in parts close personal friends of especially proponents of the Bielefelder 
                                                
98 Christopher Browning, note to the author, January 27, 2010. Hans Mommsen was a fellow at the Institute for 
Advanced Study in 1972/73 and taught at Harvard (1974) and UC Berkeley (1978). 
99 Charles S. Maier, interviews with the author, October 30/November 1, 2006. 
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Schule. Teaching at prestigious American universities and training the next generation of 
American historians of modern Germany, this group included Gerald D. Feldman (Berkeley), 
Charles S. Maier (Princeton, Duke, Harvard), Henry A. Turner (Yale), and James J. Sheehan 
(Northwestern, Stanford). While the Bielefelder generally associated themselves in the West 
German historical profession with politically and methodologically like-minded historians, in 
the United States they cast a wider net, which could hold even the politically conservative 
and methodological rather traditional Henry Turner.   
More generally, the examples of Wehler, Schwabe, Berghahn, and Kocka reveal that 
an exchange year in the United States in most cases established the foundation for long-
lasting relationships with the country in general and its historians in particular. While the 
Germans usually became acquainted with American society and academic culture during 
their first visits, they formed working relationships with American historians as postdoctoral 
researchers. It seems that the age difference between Wehler and Schwabe (born in the early 
1930s) on the one hand and Berghahn and Kocka (born in the late 1930s and early 1940s), 
which led them to grow up in West Germany under very different circumstances, did not lead 
to diverging perceptions of the United States. Throughout their careers these historians 
maintained a generally sympathetic attitude toward the country and avoided both the crude 
anti-Americanism characteristic of parts of the 1968ers and the unreflected pro-Americanism 
of some German conservative politicians and journalists.  
This distinct political attitude went hand in hand with a certain historiographical 
position. In contrast to previous generations, whether that of Fritz Ernst (born in 1905) and 
Fritz Fischer (born in 1908) or Gerhard Ritter (born in 1888), this generation of historians 
adopted a non-defensive attitude toward German history in the United States. No German 
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historian of this younger generation ever resorted to the position that American colleagues 
might be at a disadvantage when writing German history, because of their lack of 
Einfühlungsvermögen. Scholarly disagreements certainly continued to exist, but they were 
not accompanied by the essentialist arguments older Germans had been likely to use.   
As a result of their visits to the United States, as well as their contacts with American 
scholars, all of these younger historians acquired a close familiarity with trends in the 
American historical profession, which many of their German colleagues never gained. 
Throughout their careers, these scholars reviewed American studies on German and 
American history in German journals, thus contributing to a greater German awareness of 
historiography in the United States.100 Since many of them became proponents of 
comparative history, the intimate knowledge of not only American historiography but also 
works on American history in particular proved useful. 
This familiarity with the American historical profession led some of the German 
scholars to develop an argument about the counterpart at home. In particular Wehler and 
Kocka often stressed the West German historical profession’s backwardness and thus its need 
to “modernize,” methodologically as well as interpretively. This goal, they contended, could 
be achieved by adopting historiographical trends prevalent in the United States. Hand in hand 
with this call for modernization went the argument that the Germans’ own project of history 
as Historische Sozialwissenschaft developed in cooperation and in agreement with American 
historians. The accuracy of this claim will be analyzed in the next chapter. 
                                                
100 See, for example, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, “Review of Dan P. Silverman, Reluctant Union. Alsace-Lorraine and 
Imperial Germany, 1871-1918,” Historische Zeitschrift 217 (1973), 450-451; Klaus Schwabe, “Review of 
Harold Stein, American Civil-Military Decisions. A Book of Case Studies,” Historische Zeitschrift 210 (1970), 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Walking Together on the Sonderweg: The Renewal of the West German Historical 
Profession as a Transatlantic Project? 
 
On 25 July 1974, Hans-Ulrich Wehler sent a project proposal to the Stiftung 
Volkswagenwerk (Volkswagen Foundation), in which he outlined the contours of a new 
journal Geschichte und Gesellschaft and asked for financial support. Wehler discussed the 
journal’s interdisciplinary orientation (“history is understood as a historical social science, in 
close cooperation with related social sciences, above all sociology, political science, and 
economics”) as well as its temporal focus (“the journal will primarily tackle problems of the 
period since the industrial and political revolutions of the late eighteenth century”).1 Arguing 
for the necessity of the new publication, Wehler explained how Geschichte und Gesellschaft 
intended to fill a gap in the landscape of academic journals: whereas sociological 
publications tended to neglect the historical dimension, their historical counterparts either 
focused too narrowly on a particular epoch or failed to grant the “new kind” of social history 
appropriate space. Moreover, the “quasi monopoly” of Historische Zeitschrift in the area of 
general history had led to a long-lasting “publication jam.” Not surprisingly, Wehler 
emphasized in particular the support his undertaking had received abroad: he listed an 
advisory committee consisting of nineteen scholars from six countries and various 
                                                
1 Hans-Ulrich Wehler to Stiftung Volkswagenwerk, 25 July 1974, BAK, NL Theodor Schieder, Box 1301. 
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disciplines. With nine members, American historians and social scientists constituted by far 
the largest group.1 
Even though the Volkswagen Foundation declined to support the new project, the 
first issue of Geschichte und Gesellschaft was published the following year.2 Arguably the 
most important brainchild of the Bielefeld School, it soon assumed the role of one of the 
leading historical journals in West Germany. More than the many other projects that Hans-
Ulrich Wehler, Jürgen Kocka, and other like-minded historians started during this time, 
Geschichte und Gesellschaft symbolized the successful arrival of Historische 
Sozialwissenschaft in the West German historical profession. By the late 1970s, the former 
mavericks had become part of the establishment. That historians in recent years have already 
begun to historicize the journal’s scope and development also testifies to its importance in the 
field.3 
How did this happen? Only a decade earlier, the notorious Fischer-Kontroverse had 
revealed the persistence of the old historiographical regime. Now a group of historians not 
only advanced new interpretations of late-nineteenth and twentieth century German history 
but also proposed to re-conceptualize the field of history as a historical social science. Their 
swift success—insofar as they managed to establish themselves as an important voice in the 
                                                
1 The list included the historians Gerald D. Feldman, David S. Landes, Charles S. Maier, Arno Mayer, Hans 
Rosenberg, James J. Sheehan, and Henry A. Turner; the sociologist Dietrich Rüschemeyer, a German who had 
come to the United States after receiving his PhD and taught a Brown University for thirty years; and Guido 
Goldman, a sociologist who in 1979 became the founding director of the Center for European Studies at 
Harvard University. 
2 G. Gambke (Stiftung Volkswagenwerk) to Hans-Ulrich Wehler, 6 December 1974, BAK, NL Theodor 
Schieder, Box 1301. 
3 Lutz Raphael, “Nationalzentrierte Geschichte in programmatischer Absicht: Die Zeitschrift ‘Geschichte und 
Gesellschaft. Zeitschrift für Historische Sozialwissenschaft’ in den ersten 25 Jahren ihres Bestehens,” 
Geschichte und Gesellschaft 26 (2000), 5-37. 
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West German historical profession—in the early 1970s was due to a number of factors, 
which this chapter seeks to illuminate. It begins by providing the institutional and intellectual 
background of the 1960s, including the enormous expansion of higher education in West 
Germany. The chapter then traces the intellectual and institutional development of the 
Bielefeld School’s Historische Sozialwissenschaft. It places the movement’s emergence in 
the context of broader historiographical processes during that decade, since calls for the 
profession’s methodological renewal were not limited to this particular group of social 
historians. The chapter also asks to what extent these reforms took place in a transatlantic 
context: were American historians of modern Germany active participants, sources of 
inspiration, or merely attentive observers?  
 
A Time of Transition 
Around 1960, the West German historical profession found itself in a phase of 
transition. The generation of Gerhard Ritter and Hans Rothfels, for whom the late German 
Empire and World War I had been formative historical influences, had reached the stage of 
active retirement. Now the age cohort of Theodor Schieder, Werner Conze, and Karl Dietrich 
Erdmann, who had grown up during the tumultuous Weimar years, had established itself as 
dominating the field. By the end of the 1950s, Schieder had become the editor of West 
Germany’s leading historical journal Historische Zeitschrift, Erdmann had—already in 
1950—assumed the same position for the journal Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 
and Werner Conze in 1957 had launched his influential Working Group for Social History 
(Arbeitskreis für Sozialgeschichte) at the University of Heidelberg. Subsequently, all of them 
chaired the Verband der Historiker Deutschlands (German Historians’ Association), 
Erdmann from 1962 to 1967, Schieder from 1967 to 1972, and Conze from 1972 to 1976. All 
 193 
three historians had made at least some concessions to the Nazi regime, and all of them 
managed to cover the brown spots in their biographies throughout their careers in the Federal 
Republic.4 Especially Conze and Schieder now conducted themselves as academic liberals in 
the sense that they mentored younger historians of very different political and 
methodological persuasions. During the 1960s, however, certain limits of what the 
historiographical establishment deemed acceptable, both interpretively and methodologically, 
still existed.  
The unfolding of the Fischer-Kontroverse about the origins and course of World War 
I illustrates this ambiguous state very well. The main points of contention were Fischer’s 
claim that the German Empire’s civilian leadership had by and large agreed with the military 
leadership’s far reaching war aims, and—above all—his assertion that the country bore a 
substantial part of the responsibility for the outbreak of the war.5 The controversy had begun 
with an article Fischer published in 1959, intensified with the appearance of Fischer’s 
magnum opus Griff nach der Weltmacht in 1961, and reached its peak in 1964.6 That year, 
Fischer’s opponents succeeded in cancelling his lecture to the United States, because they 
deemed it not to be in Germany’s national interest to have Fischer present his “distorted” 
views abroad.7 The outcome of this scandal is well-known: Fischer was ultimately able to 
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7 Ritter himself had urged the German Foreign Minister Schröder “to do something about the tour” because he 
did not think “it to be in the Federal Republic’s national interest” to let Fischer present his views abroad. See 
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travel to the United States on funds provided by the American Council of Learned Societies 
organized by Fritz Stern and Klaus Epstein. The incident improved Fischer’s standing 
enormously among the next generation of West German historians who were students at the 
time. “We followed Fischer,” Gerd Krumeich (born in 1945) remembered, “because he 
irritated the elderly gentlemen who taught about subjects that the young considered outdated, 
such as the ‘demonic nature of power,’ about ‘German spirit,’ and ‘German fate,’ about 
Bismarck’s historical greatness and such issues.”8 The controversy was also the first of its 
kind to be conducted so extensively via non-academic outlets, as historians argued in 
newspapers, magazines, and even on television.9   
Yet the controversy also illuminates the mechanisms with which conservative 
German historians battled these unwanted views on modern German history. Early in the 
debate, for example, the editors of the two most important scholarly journals, Theodor 
Schieder of Historische Zeitschrift and Karl Dietrich Erdmann of Geschichte in Wissenschaft 
und Unterricht, had corresponded about how to most effectively counter Fischer’s 
interpretation. Schieder and Erdmann tried to decide which journal was to print which 
rebuttal of Fischer, and Erdmann had proposed an article by Erwin Hölzle, a historian so 
compromised by his Nazi past that he had been unable to acquire a position at any West 
                                                                                                                                                  
Gerhard Ritter to Gerhard Schröder, January 17, 1964, in Klaus Schwabe and Rolf Reichardt (eds.), Gerhard 
Ritter. Ein politischer Historiker in seinen Briefen (Boppard, 1984), 587. 
8 Gerd Krumeich, “Das Erbe der Wilhelminer. Vierzig Jahre Fischer-Kontroverse: um die deutschen Ziele im 
Ersten Weltkrieg stritten sich die Historiker, weil man vom Zweiten geschwiegen hatte,“ Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, November 4, 1999, 56. 
9 For the Fischer-Kontroverse as a public debate, see Klaus Grosse Kracht, Die zankende Zunft. Historische 
Kontroversen in Deutschland nach 1945 (Göttingen, 2005), 47-67. 
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German university.10 As Erdmann stated rather bluntly, one could “under no circumstances 
do without it [the article’s publication], if we are interested in a balanced evaluation of the 
German Empire during World War I, for both historical and political reasons.” Erdmann 
added that “in case this resulted in diplomatic problems (which I don’t expect), these would 
be outweighed by the political value of the publication of Hölzle’s article.”11 Still, the same 
German historians tried very hard to avoid or at least limit these potential diplomatic 
disturbances. 
Thus, when at the height of the debate Gerhard Ritter inquired why Historische 
Zeitschrift had repeatedly granted Fritz Fischer the opportunity to advance his views on the 
German Empire’s policies during World War I, he received a telling response. Theodor 
Schieder admitted that his decision had been motivated by the fact that “most American 
historians have a completely distorted view of our profession. Above all, they believe that 
there is still an ongoing controversy between ‘reactionary’ and ‘progressive’ historians.” 
Therefore it was important “to demonstrate very clearly that the German historical profession 
is overwhelmingly critical of Mr. Fischer but does not exclude him from the debate.”12 That 
leading figures within the West German historical profession had done just that when they 
were secretly trying to torpedo Fischer’s lecture tour to the United States belied Schieder’s 
statement allegedly favoring a free scholarly discourse. 
                                                
10 Some American historians were well aware of Hölzle’s past. See the letter from Fritz T. Epstein to Günther 
Franz, November 1, 1975, emphasizing “dass Herr Hölzle die rassistische Politik des Dritten Reiches gebilligt 
und literarisch unterstützt hat. Die Einstellung von Herrn Hölzle ist den führenden amerikanischen 
Deutschlandhistorikern. . . .  wohlbekannt.” BAK, NL Erwin Hölzle, Box 26. 
11 Karl Dietrich Erdmann to Theodor Schieder, December 27, 1961, BAK, NL Schieder, Box 235. Hölzle’s 
article appeared as “Das Experiment des Friedens im Ersten Weltkrieg 1914-1917,” Geschichte in Wissenschaft 
und Unterricht 13 (1962), 465-522. 
12 Theodor Schieder to Gerhard Ritter, November 9, 1964, BAK, NL Schieder, Box 243. 
 196 
The Fischer-Kontroverse therefore expanded the interpretive boundaries of the West 
German historical profession. Regardless of how plausible Fischer’s arguments appear after 
fifty years, the debate’s outcome signaled an interpretive pluralization of West German 
historiography. At the same time, Fischer’s was a brand of diplomatic history that paid only 
limited attention to the social and economic foundations of the German Empire’s foreign 
policy, although it discussed the influence of industrialist pressure groups. This is not to say 
that Fischer “failed” to provide a methodologically more “modern” study, but simply to 
emphasize that he went against prevailing wisdom interpretively but only to some extent 
methodologically.13 A younger generation of historians would challenge the historiographical 
establishment during the next decade—the period under review in this chapter. They were in 
the position to do so because higher education, and therefore the historical profession, in 
West Germany had undergone a significant quantitative, institutional change. 
 
The Intellectual Genesis of the Bielefelder Schule 
The methodological and interpretive “agenda” of the young historians already began 
to develop before the institutional context had been established. In the case of the Bielefelder 
Schule, one can see the intellectual roots in a number of publications as early as the mid-
1960s. One could argue that only because the intellectual project Bielefelder Schule had been 
in the making for several years, the school’s protagonists could establish their 
historiographical project at an impressive pace, once they had acquired institutional 
                                                
13 Calling Fischer’s somewhat traditional methodology “a blessing in disguise,” Volker Berghahn has argued 
that Fischer was ultimately successful because he beat the historiographical “old guard” with its own weapons, 
i.e. diplomatic documents. See Volker R. Berghahn, “Fritz Fischer und seine Schüler,” Neue Politische 
Literatur 19 (1974), 143-154, quote 148.  
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influence. For only a decade after the foundation of the University of Bielefeld, many 
contemporaries viewed the Bielefelder Schule not just as representing a new and interesting 
historiographical development, but as part of the West German historical profession’s 
establishment. The focus on a few selected “big ideas” presented in a limited number of 
publications does not imply that “great books make historiography,” since historiographical 
changes need their proper institutional context, as we will see in the next section of this 
chapter. Yet in retrospect it appears that the early publications of the Bielefelder, that is, the 
publications prior to the actual emergence of the Bielefelder Schule, foreshadow the main 
elements of that school. 
For the intellectual development of at least two representatives of the Bielefelder 
Schule, Hans-Jürgen Puhle and Jürgen Kocka, one also needs to give credit to Gerhard A. 
Ritter (no relation to the conservative Gerhard Ritter). Ritter, a historian of the German labor 
movement, of German and British parliamentarianism, and of the German welfare state, had 
studied at the Free University Berlin during the 1950s and completed his PhD under Hans 
Herzfeld with a dissertation on the German labor movement in Wilhelmine Germany.14 In 
Berlin, he also came to know Hans Rosenberg, then on a visiting professorship, and 
developed close professional and personal ties with him.15 After he had received his first 
professorship in 1962, Ritter became a key figure in the development of social history in the 
                                                
14 Gerhard A. Ritter, Die Arbeiterbewegung im Wilhelminischen Reich. Die Sozialdemokratische Partei und die 
Freien Gewerkschaften, 1890-1900 (Berlin, 1959). 
15 Gerhard A. Ritter, “Hans Rosenberg 1904-1988,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 15 (1989), 282-302. A framed 
photo of Hans Rosenberg, standing next to a bust of his Doktorvater Friedrich Meinecke, hangs on a wall in 
Ritter’s office, expressing an intellectual tradition in which one can place the social historian. See also Gerhard 
A. Ritter (ed.), Friedrich Meinecke: Akademischer Lehrer und emigrierte Schüler: Briefe und Aufzeichnungen 
1910 – 1977 (München, 2006) 
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Federal Republic.16 Free from ambitions to establish a historiographical “school” and averse 
to polemics, Ritter trained a large number of social historians who to this date hold chairs in 
many German history departments.17 Member of countless academic advisory boards and 
chairman of the German Historians’ Association from 1976 to 1980, Ritter’s institutional 
influence within the historical profession can hardly be overestimated. Yet he was never a 
controversialist, and, as Jürgen Kocka remarked in the introduction to his Festschrift, also 
rejected the label of the “revisionist.”18 In the often-contentious atmosphere of the West 
German historical profession during the 1970s and 1980s, Ritter remained a universally 
respected figure. 
In retrospect, the edition of Eckart Kehr’s collected essays, edited by Wehler in 1965 
under the programmatic title Der Primat der Innenpolitik (The Primacy of Domestic Politics) 
marked a significant early step in the genesis of Historische Sozialwissenschaft.19 Kehr had 
been an unusually productive historian: at the time of his untimely death at age 31, he left 
behind one book, an unpublished manuscript that was later lost, and more than a dozen 
articles. But more importantly, the Meinecke student Kehr had been a methodological and 
                                                
16 His survey on social history in the Federal Republic still is the vantage point for anyone interested in the 
subject. Gerhard A. Ritter, “Die neuere Sozialgeschichte in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” In Jürgen Kocka 
(ed.), Sozialgeschichte im internationalen Überblick. Ergebnisse und Tendenzen der Forschung (Darmstadt, 
1989), 19-88. 
17 See Ritter’s Festschrift, Jürgen Kocka et al. (eds.), Von der Arbeiterbewegung zum modernen Sozialstaat. 
Festschrift für Gerhard A. Ritter zum 65. Geburtstag (München, 1994). Ritter’s students include Kocka, Puhle, 
Klaus Tenfelde, Wilhelm Bleek, Karin Hausen, Clemens Wurm, Marie-Luise Recker, Rüdiger vom Bruch, 
Merith Niehuss, Peter Longerich, Margit Szöllösi-Janze, and Johannes Paulmann. 
18 Jürgen Kocka, “Vorwort,” in Id. et. al (eds.) Von der Arbeiterbewegung zum modernen Sozialstaat, vi. 
19 Hans-Ulrich Wehler (ed.), Der Primat der Innenpolitik: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur preussisch-deutschen 
Sozialgeschichte im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Berlin, 1965). 
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interpretive outsider within the historical profession of the Weimar Republic.20 His advocacy 
of a “primacy of domestic politics,” namely his insistence that German imperialist foreign 
policies resulted from the Empire’s domestic socioeconomic situation, did not sit well with 
his colleagues, who were convinced that diplomacy constituted a fairly autonomous sphere. 
By contrast, Kehr argued that the combined material interests of the heavy industrialists and 
Prussian agrarian elites (the Junker) led to the pursuit of an aggressive naval policy during 
the last decade of the nineteenth century. Moreover, in order to explain this primacy of 
domestic politics, Kehr drew not only on Max Weber but also Karl Marx, which led Gerhard 
Ritter to comment that Kehr should pursue his Habilitation in the Soviet Union.21 
Interpretively, Kehr’s negative evaluation of the Empire’s naval policies as an important 
aspect of German imperialism set him at odds with an historical profession intent on rejecting 
the notorious War Guilt paragraph of the Versailles Treaty. Unsurprisingly, in this situation 
an indictment of main aspects of the German Empire’s prewar foreign policies was most 
unwelcome.22   
Ironically, the author of the preface to the Kehr volume was Hans Herzfeld, in the 
1960s the chairman of the Historische Kommission zu Berlin, who edited the series in which 
the volume appeared. Forty years earlier, however, Herzfeld had been a rabid German 
                                                
20 For the most recent biographical sketch of Kehr, see Ritter (ed.), Friedrich Meinecke: Akademischer Lehrer 
und emigrierte Schüler, 92-97. 
21 Gerhard Ritter to Hermann Oncken, September 24, 1931, in Schwabe/Reichardt (eds.), Gerhard Ritter: Ein 
politischer Historiker in seinen Briefen, 237: “It seems to me that this gentleman should complete his 
Habilitation in Russia rather than Königsberg. For this is where he belongs: an Edelbolschewist [Marxist of the 
heart], so very dangerous for our historical profession.” 
22 See Wolfgang Jäger, Historische Forschung und politische Kultur in Deutschland. Die Debatte 1914-1980 
über den Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkrieges (Göttingen, 1984), which focuses more on the academic discourse; 
Ulrich Heinemann, Die verdrängte Niederlage. Politische Öffentlichkeit und Kriegsschuldfrage in der 
Weimarer Republik (Göttingen, 1983), which places more emphasis on the political context of coming to terms 
with defeat. 
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nationalist, as well as the author of a study that had accused the Social Democrats of 
betraying the German Empire during World War I by slowly abandoning their unconditional 
support for the government’s war aims—views that pitted him strongly against Kehr.23 To be 
sure, Herzfeld belonged to those “de-radicalized” German conservatives, to follow Jerry 
Muller’s term, who adapted to the new conditions of the Federal Republic and played a 
generally constructive role in the postwar historical profession.24 Thus he now acknowledged 
Kehr as “one of the most significant figures among the non-conformists of the Weimar 
Republic’s historiography.”25  
The rehabilitation of an original and controversial historian by republishing his 
important writings in itself constituted a worthy enterprise. Yet one can also read Wehler’s 
introductory analysis of Kehr as an early articulation of his own ideas regarding the renewal 
of the West German historical profession and the role he was to play in this undertaking. 
Describing the Weimar iconoclast’s reception by his German contemporaries, Wehler 
remarked that Kehr “had to recognize that his provocative methodology and style, which due 
to its candor refrained from any consideration, had to meet with stiff resistance.”26 Judgments 
of Wehler’s own role in the West German historical profession during the 1970s would take 
a very similar form. As we will see, some of his colleagues objected to both Wehler the 
methodological reformer and Wehler the polemicist. Methodologically, Wehler characterized 
                                                
23 Hans Herzfeld, Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie und die Auflösung der Einheitsfront im Ersten Weltkrieg 
(Leipzig, 1928). In a letter to Alfred Vagts, George Hallgarten, a friend of Kehr’s, pointed out the irony of 
Herzfeld’s involvement in the edition and emphasized the antagonism between Herzfeld and Kehr during the 
1920s. George W. F. Hallgarten to Alfred Vagts, March 3, 1966, BAK, NL Alfred Vagts, Box 9. 
24 Jerry Z. Muller, The Other God That Failed: Hans Freyer and the Deradicalization of German Conservatism 
(Princeton, NJ, 1987). 
25 Hans Herzfeld, “Vorwort,” in Wehler (ed.), Der Primat der Innenpolitik, v. 
26 Wehler, “Vorwort,” in Id. (ed.), Der Primat der Innenpolitik, 8. 
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Kehr as influenced by Marx, but insisted that his prime role model was Max Weber—as was 
the case for Wehler himself. Again, when Wehler commented that Kehr’s approach led him 
“occasionally to premature conclusions,” yet “enabled him to gain much more important 
insights,” it corresponded not only with the perception of some of Wehler’s contemporaries, 
but also with Wehler’s self-perception—at least with the self-perception he gained in 
retrospect.27 After all, he recently acknowledged his surprise about the self-confidence with 
which he had fought for his historiographical positions.28 Interpretively, Wehler emphasized 
Kehr’s conviction regarding the “oftentimes fatal persistence of certain historical continuities 
in Germany,” a belief both historians shared as well, and which Wehler would articulate 
forcefully in a number of his later writings.29 
A year later, in 1966, Wehler edited the volume Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte, 
which already indicated a rejection of the West German historiographical status quo and the 
invention of a progressive tradition.30 Yet since at the time Wehler had not reached 
professorial status and taught as Schieder’s Assistent at the University of Cologne, his 
iconoclasm had to remain within certain limits. Consequentially, the collection included 
contributions of a few older historians who counted at least methodologically as progressive. 
Paying respect to the historiographical establishment, the volume contained a programmatic 
essay on social history by Werner Conze, whose specific conception of this historical 
subfield the Bielefelder would later reject. Moreover, Conze’s seminal article on the “social 
                                                
27 Wehler, “Vorwort,” in Id. (ed.), Der Primat der Innenpolitik, 27. 
28 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Eine lebhafte Kampfsituation. Ein Gespräch mit Manfred Hettling und Cornelius Torp 
(München, 2007), 84: “If I have to look up something in my own texts, because someone has asked me for a 
quote, I’m always surprised about the certainty with which we argued for something.” 
29 Wehler, “Vorwort,” in Id. (ed.), Der Primat der Innenpolitik, 27. 
30 Hans-Ulrich Wehler (ed.), Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte (Köln, 1966). 
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preconditions of socialism in Germany” also made its way into the volume. Next to Conze, 
Eckart Kehr and Rudolf Stadelmann represented an even older German strand of social 
history. In addition, Hajo Holborn’s article on social aspects of German idealism and Hans 
Rosenberg’s famous analysis of the “pseudo-democratization” of the Prussian Junker stood 
for the progressive German historiographical tradition that had been forced into emigration. 
Excerpts from Jürgen Habermas’ seminal study The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere not only signaled the interdisciplinary character of the new enterprise, but had also a 
broader political implication. Habermas, whom Wehler had known since the 1940s, had 
already gained the status of a public intellectual, and the “critical” political role that Wehler 
defined for a future, modern social history was one that Habermas already practiced. Wehler 
invoked Theodor Mommsen’s famous phrase of the “duty to political pedagogy” and 
declared that social history would have to develop a “critical relationship” vis-à-vis 
contemporary society.31  
The one other sociologist represented in the volume was Guenther Roth, a young 
German who had come to the United States as a student in 1953 and had taken his PhD at 
Berkeley under the supervision of émigré sociologist and Max Weber expert Reinhard 
Bendix.32 Roth’s dissertation on Social Democracy in Imperial Germany had appeared three 
years earlier and had first coined the phrase “negative integration” in reference to the Social 
Democrats’ precarious role in the German Empire, but was never translated into German.33 
                                                
31 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, “Einleitung,” in Id. (ed.), Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte, 15.  
32 See Guenther Roth, “Partisanship and Scholarship,” in Bennett M. Berger (ed.), Authors of Their Own Lives: 
Intellectual Autobiographies by Twenty American Sociologists (Berkeley, 1990), 383-409. 
33 Guenther Roth, Social Democrats in Imperial Germany: A Study in Working Class Isolation and National 
Integration (Totowa, NJ, 1963). 
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Finally, the volume offered a number of articles by younger historians who did not become 
partisans of Historische Sozialwissenschaft, but nevertheless represented a new 
historiographical beginning. Historians such as Thomas Nipperdey, Wolfgang Sauer, 
Reinhart Koselleck, and Hans Mommsen constituted a rather heterogeneous group and 
pursued different research interests but had already made a name for themselves in their 
respective areas. In sum, the contributors of the volume illustrate the stage of the 
historiographical project Historische Sozialwissenschaft in the late 1960s—a few nods 
toward the “establishment,” references to older progressive outsiders within the profession, 
to émigrés as well as scholars from other disciplines, and finally to various historians of 
roughly the same generation (born around 1930), who constituted the profession’s cutting 
edge without forming a distinct “camp.” 
The volume Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte was part of the so-called “Yellow 
Series” (Gelbe Reihe), started in 1965 by the publisher Kiepenheuer & Witsch. This was an 
academic series that appealed to university students in five disciplines (economics, 
psychology, sociology, literature, and history), introducing them to fresh approaches and 
topics. Wehler and Habermas served as editors for the historical and sociological series 
respectively. Already early in his career, Wehler thus gained editorial influence. As he 
acknowledged forty years later, he had recognized that in order to transform the West 
German historical profession, prolific writing and clear positions had to go hand in hand with 
access to publications: “You have to fight for your convictions, and this means in our 
profession: You have to somehow gain access to the media.”34 The case of the “Yellow 
                                                
34 Wehler, Eine lebhafte Kampfsituation, 76. 
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Series” also reminds us of the extent to which chance can play a role in the genesis of 
institutional influence. Dieter Wellershoff, editor of Kiepenheuer & Witsch, had initially 
asked Wehler to serve as editor, yet Wehler had not felt ready to fulfill that role, prior to the 
completion of his Habilitation. However, the three slightly older historians Wehler suggested 
instead (Reinhart Koselleck, Rudolf Vierhaus, and Thomas Nipperdey) declined, so that 
Wellershoff ultimately came back to Wehler, who accepted this time.35  
In 1967, another future Bielefeld historian, Hans-Jürgen Puhle published his 
dissertation on the Agrarian League (Bund der Landwirte) and the German Conservative 
Party in the German Empire. Advised by Gerhard A. Ritter, Puhle analyzed how agrarian 
conservatives in Wilhelmine Germany adapted their political strategies to the changing 
conditions of the parliamentary system. The study quite explicitly followed the Sonderweg 
paradigm, as Puhle argued that “the peculiar combination of agrarian and altpreussisch 
conservatism and nationalist ideology [had been] a characteristic of German history 
exclusively, and had only been able to develop under the political and societal conditions in 
Germany.”36 In particular Puhle emphasized the extent to which the Agrarian League had 
integrated radical biological anti-Semitism into its propaganda and had thus significantly 
contributed to the acceptance and popularity of this type of rabid anti-Semitism within the 
German society. Even though Puhle focused on the two decades prior to the outbreak of 
World War I, he also conceived his study as a contribution to the search for the origins of 
German fascism. Not coincidentally he therefore concluded the analysis with the statement 
                                                
35 Wehler, Eine lebhafte Kampfsituation, 75. 
36 Hans-Jürgen Puhle, Agrarische Interessenpolitik und preussicher Konservatismus im wilhelminischen Reich 
(1893-1914): ein Beitrag zur Analyse des Nationalismus in Deutschland am Beispiel des Bundes der Landwirte 
und der Deutsch-Konservativen Partei (Hannover, 1966), 9-10.  
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that “already in the German Empire has the German state received the birth defect from 
which, according to Ernst Fraenkel’s phrase, the Weimar Republic suffered, and of which it 
died.“37 
If Puhle conceived of his study as Sonderwegian, it was also received as such; the 
reviewer in Central European History claimed that it “contribute[d] very significantly to the 
growing debate on continuity in modern German history.”38 And if historians did not accept 
all of Puhle’s conclusions—some argued that the search for the roots of National Socialism 
should be conducted in Southern Germany rather than in Prussia—or thought that he at times 
overstated his case, nobody objected to his continuity argument.39  
Having served as a mentor for younger German (as well as American) social 
historians for two decades, Hans Rosenberg through his Grosse Depression und Bismarckzeit 
strongly influenced the intellectual trajectory of what was to become the Bielefelder Schule.40 
On the one hand, Rosenberg’s interpretation of economic trends in late nineteenth century 
Central Europe—a preliminary sketch, as he emphasized in the preface—led to a large 
number of empirical studies in the next decade. Together with a number of important articles, 
the study offered a vantage point to scholars who analyzed the role of pre-industrial elites in 
                                                
37 Puhle, Agrarische Interessenpolitik und preussicher Konservatismus im wilhelminischen Reich (1893-1914), 
289. 
38 John C. G. Röhl, “Review of Hans-Jürgen Puhle, Agrarische Interessenpolitik und preussischer 
Konservatismus im wilhelminischen Reich (1893-1914),“ Central European History 1 (1968), 182-186, quote 
on 184. 
39 Peter G. Thielen, “Review of Hans-Jürgen Puhle, Agrarische Interessenpolitik und preussicher 
Konservatismus im wilhelminischen Reich (1893-1914),” Historische Zeitschrift 207 (1968), 494-495; Herman 
Lebovics, “Review of Hans-Jürgen Puhle, Agrarische Interessenpolitik und preussicher Konservatismus im 
wilhelminischen Reich (1893-1914),” Journal of Modern History 41 (1969), 257-260; Theodor Hamerow, 
“Review of Hans-Jürgen Puhle, Agrarische Interessenpolitik und preussicher Konservatismus im 
wilhelminischen Reich (1893-1914),” American Historical Review 73 (1968), 846. 
40 Hans Rosenberg, Grosse Depression und Bismarckzeit. Wirtschaftsablauf, Gesellschaft und Politik in 
Mitteleuropa (Berlin, 1967). 
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nineteenth and early twentieth century Germany.41 On the other hand, and maybe more 
importantly, Grosse Depression und Bismarckzeit was methodologically pioneering. “What 
proved fascinating,” Heinrich August Winkler wrote in his obituary of Rosenberg, “was the 
daring attempt by a historian to open his profession to the theories offered by the systematic 
social sciences.”42 Lastly, even though Rosenberg did not explicitly use the term, the study 
together with his earlier writings also helped construct the Sonderweg concept.43 Regardless 
of its tentative character, the study was very well received on both sides of the Atlantic, 
where historians recognized the vistas Rosenberg had opened.44 Aptly, given his intellectual 
influence on them, Rosenberg dedicated Grosse Depression und Bismarckzeit to the students 
he had taught at Free University Berlin in 1949/50—a group that included Gerhard A. Ritter, 
Otto Büsch, Gerhard Schulz, Gilbert Ziebura and others, most of whom Rosenberg had 
stayed in close touch with ever since. 
A work of intellectual rather than social or economic history, Georg G. Iggers’ 
seminal study on historical thinking in nineteenth and early-twentieth century Germany, 
published in 1968, also has to be counted among the important books preceding the 
establishment of the Bielefelder Schule. By articulating a comprehensive critique of the 
“German conception of history,” Iggers helped legitimize an alternative conception, 
                                                
41 See also his “Die Pseudodemokratisierung der Rittergutsbesitzerklasse,” in Wehler (ed.), Moderne deutsche 
Sozialgeschichte, 289-308. 
42 Heinrich August Winkler, “Hans Rosenberg: A Pioneer in the Historical Sciences,” Central European 
History 24 (1991), 1-23, quote 18. 
43 Hans, Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy: the Prussian Experience 1660-1815 
(Cambridge, MA, 1958). 
44 Theodore S. Hamerow, “Review of Hans Rosenberg, Grosse Depression und Bismarckzeit. 
Wirtschaftsablauf, Gesellschaft und Politik in Mitteleuropa,” Journal of Modern History 40 (1968), 660-661; 
Werner Conze, “Review of Hans Rosenberg, Grosse Depression und Bismarckzeit. Wirtschaftsablauf, 
Gesellschaft und Politik in Mitteleuropa,” Economic History Review 21 (1968), 653-654.  
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ultimately manifesting itself in the Kritische Geschichtswissenschaft à la Bielefeld.45 Shortly 
before the publication of this magnum opus, Iggers had already declared the “decline of the 
classical national tradition in German historiography” in the wake of the Fischer-
Kontroverse.46 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Iggers remained a decidedly sympathetic 
observer of the West German social historians, and since he was the leading American 
authority on German historiography, his stance contributed significantly to the American 
perception of the Bielefelder as the vanguards of progressivism.47 
The following year, Jürgen Kocka articulated his methodological and interpretive 
ideas in his massive dissertation on white-collar workers and the managerial elite of the 
Siemens Company. Like Hans-Jürgen Puhle, Kocka was a student of Gerhard A. Ritter at the 
Free University Berlin. The study’s first sentence already revealed Kocka’s iconoclasm. 
Referring to Ranke’s famous dictum, Kocka conceded that “every historical work strives first 
above all to show ‘how it actually happened,’” but then contrasted this “undifferentiated 
curiosity” with an epistemological approach derived from Jürgen Habermas’ Analytische 
Wissenschaftstheorie.48 Methodologically, Kocka conceived of his work as situated between 
history and sociology, and Max Weber’s theory of bureaucracy as an organizational system 
provided its basic conceptual framework. Even though he focused on the case of Siemens, 
                                                
45 Georg G. Iggers, The German Conception of History: The National Tradition of Historical Thought from 
Herder to the Present (Middletown, CT, 1968). 
46 Georg G. Iggers, “The Decline of the Classical National Tradition of German Historiography,” History and 
Theory 6 (1967), 382-412. 
47 These texts include Georg G. Iggers, New Directions in European Historiography (Middletown, CT, 1975); 
Id., “Introduction”, in Id., The Social History of Politics: Critical Perspectives in West German Historical 
Writing Since 1945 (Middletown, CT, 1984), 1-45, as well as numerous book reviews. 
48 Jürgen Kocka, Unternehmensverwaltung und Angestelltenschaft am Beispiel Siemens 1847-1914.  Zum 
Verhältnis von Kapitalismus und Demokratie in der deutschen Industrialisierung (Stuttgart, 1969). 
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Kocka attempted to articulate general hypotheses about industrial bureaucratization and its 
role in the modernization of the German economy. The significance of Kocka’s study was 
therefore not lost on historians on both sides of the Atlantic.49 After the completion of this 
study, Kocka, who had followed Gerhard A. Ritter as his Assistent to the University of 
Münster, began to work on a comparative study on German and American white collar 
workers, before taking up a position at Bielefeld in 1972. 
In retrospect, Hans-Ulrich Wehler slim volume Das deutsche Kaiserreich often 
appears as the representative or even foundational publication of Historische 
Sozialwissenschaft. Yet it was Wehler’s Habilitation on Bismarck und der Imperialismus, an 
analysis of the German Empire’s colonial policies during the 1880s, which set the 
historiographical tone for the 1970s and contained most of the views upon which Wehler 
would elaborate on during that decade.50 The introduction of the study offered a clear 
articulation of what Wehler regarded to be the proper role of the historian—offering a 
“critical” rather than an “affirmative” historical perspective—and how the German historical 
profession previously had failed to fulfill this role. Following Eckart Kehr’s Primat der 
Innenpolitik, Wehler emphasized the extent to which German imperialism was determined by 
domestic conditions, yet he also conceded the importance of global economic developments. 
Ultimately, the study sought to contribute to a “general theory of imperialism.” Like so many 
                                                
49 Hans Jaeger, “Review of Jürgen Kocka, Unternehmensverwaltung und Angestelltenschaft am Beispiel 
Siemens 1847-1914,” Historische Zeitschrift 218 (1974), 443-444; Gerald D. Feldman, “Jürgen Kocka, 
Unternehmensverwaltung und Angestelltenschaft am Beispiel Siemens 1847-1914,” Journal of Social History 5 
(1971), 127-132;  Peter N. Stearns, “Jürgen Kocka, Unternehmensverwaltung und Angestelltenschaft am 
Beispiel Siemens 1847-1914,” Journal of Modern History 44 (1972), 611-612. Sterns remarked, however, that 
there was “danger in writing of developments in this period with an eye even implicitly cocked to the rise of 
Nazism.”  
50 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Bismarck und der Imperialismus (Köln, 1969). 
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social historians of his generation working on the German Empire, Wehler was inspired by 
Hans Rosenberg, whose Grosse Depression und Bismarckzeit outlined the socioeconomic 
interpretation of the late nineteenth century.51 This “great depression” of the 1870s 
constituted for Wehler the basis of the colonial expansion of the German Empire, developing 
from informal to formal domination. With reference to Max Horkheimer and Jürgen 
Habermas, Wehler mentioned the “critical theory,” which he had developed in the course of 
his work on German imperialism, and which, “motivated by an interest in a reasonably 
organized future society” attempted to “critically approach the past and the present 
societies.”52 In Bismarck und der Imperialismus, Wehler simultaneously fought two 
historiographical battles: he argued against interpretations casting Bismarck in the benign 
light of the wise and skillful statesman, and he attempted to correct what he considered the 
overly personalistic historiography on the German Empire in which the “great man” 
Bismarck was deemed responsible for the course of events.53   
Despite its later influence on the historiography of the German Empire, the study was 
almost rejected by the University of Cologne’s Habilitation Commission.54 Three historians 
of the university’s history department provided written evaluations: Wehler’s mentor 
Theodor Schieder, Erich Angermann, a historian of the United States, and the medievalist 
Theodor Schieffer. Schieder found himself in the difficult position of having to comment on 
a study which not only offered a reinterpretation of a crucial period in modern German 
                                                
51 Hans Rosenberg, Grosse Depression und Bismarckzeit. Wirtschaftsablauf, Gesellschaft und Politik in 
Mitteleuropa (Berlin, 1967). 
52 Wehler, Bismarck und der Imperialismus, 14. 
53 Wehler, Bismarck und der Imperialismus, 35-36. 
54 Wehler, Eine lebhafte Kampfsituation, 140-141. 
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history and of Chancellor Bismarck, but which also represented a critique of the 
historiographical status quo in West Germany, of which Schieder himself was a part. 
Realizing the extent to which Wehler’s full-scale assault on the West German historical 
profession also constituted an attack on himself, Schieder repeatedly assured when discussing 
Wehler’s call for a socioeconomic approach that he himself “had time and again advocated 
its use within the historical profession.”55 Having done this, Schieder also felt entitled to 
point out its limitations, and took issue with Wehler’s labeling of reservations about such 
methods as “extremely provincial.” Similarly, Schieder was not fully convinced by Wehler’s 
model of “social imperialism,” as he doubted the exclusively manipulative character, as well 
as the domestic origins, of Bismarck’s colonial policies. Instead, Schieder claimed: “It 
remains true that in the age of Bismarck one can still speak of a ‘primacy of foreign politics’ 
in a limited sense, even if the Chancellor identified the reason of state quite 
unselfconsciously with the maintenance of its domestic power structure.”56 Unsurprisingly, 
Wehler’s condemnatory sketch of previous German scholarship met with criticism: Schieder 
argued that Wehler depicted German historiography as a whole simply as a reflex to 
calamitous political developments, and that German historicism for him merely constituted a 
form of escapism—a view which Schieder believed ignored numerous and significant 
exceptions. Finally, Schieder criticized that Wehler’s “polemics missed the mark by far on 
numerous occasions,” and that “socioeconomic arguments often masked moralistic 
                                                
55 Theodor Schieder, “Gutachten über die Habilitationsschrift von Herrn Dr. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, ‘Bismarck 
und der Imperialismus. Die deutsche überseeische Expansion in ihrem sozialökonomischen Zusammenhang’” 
December 18, 1967, 2; BAK, NL Theodor Schieder, Box 96. 
56 Schieder, “Gutachten über die Habilitationsschrift von Herrn Dr. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, ‘Bismarck und der 
Imperialismus, 6. 
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judgments.” Despite his substantial criticism, Schieder recommended the acceptance of 
Wehler’s study “without reservations.” Regardless of how one evaluates Schieder’s and 
Wehler’s respective historiographical positions, the fact remains that Schieder’s report 
testifies to his impressive academic liberalism—a character trait Wehler deeply appreciated 
and emphasized when Schieder’s writings of the 1930s resurfaced after his death.57  
The evaluation by Erich Angermann took on a very similar form. It complimented 
Wehler on a “significant scholarly achievement” that had the potential to serve as the vantage 
point of a fruitful discussion, which West German historiography badly needed. Angermann 
praised Wehler’s deep knowledge of modern economic history’s theoretical foundations, as 
well as his familiarity with American imperialism, which enabled Wehler to maintain a truly 
comparative perspective throughout much of the study. Yet Angermann had reservations in 
three different areas: he criticized what he perceived as Wehler’s narrow focus on 
socioeconomic processes—for Angermann an equally unsatisfying approach as one 
privileging “high politics” or ideology. Moreover, the reviewer complained about Wehler’s 
“unnecessarily aggressive and polemical attitude,” which in his opinion often missed the 
target. Finally, Angermann criticized Wehler’s at times incomprehensible jargon, which he 
                                                
57 For the debate about German historians’ concessions to and work for the Nazi regime, see Winfried 
Schulze/Otto Gerhard Oexle (eds.), Deutsche Historiker im Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt am Main, 1999); for 
Wehler’s portrayal of Schieder, see his “Nationalsozialismus und Historiker,” in the same volume, 306-339; as 
well as the interview “Historiker sollten auch politisch zu den Positionen stehen, die sie in der Wissenschaft 
vertreten,” in Rüdiger Hohls/Konrad H. Jarausch (eds.), Versäumte Fragen: Deutsche Historiker im Schatten 
des Nationalsozialismus (Stuttgart, 2000), 244-248, and Wehler, Eine lebhafte Kampfsituation, 47-52 and 58-
60. 
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blamed on the author’s embededness in social science literature. Nevertheless, Angermann 
also recommended the acceptance of Wehler’s Habilitation “without reservation.”58  
Whereas Schieder’s and Angermann’s assessment of the study’s problems remained 
within the norm, Theodor Schieffer offered a devastating evaluation of both content and 
form. Moreover, the medievalist’s reservations mirrored those of many of Wehler’s later 
critics. Schieffer conceded that Wehler’s study constituted a “respectable and interesting, yet 
also unbalanced achievement.” Yet he remarked that he had “never been confronted before 
by such a rudis indigestaque moles [a raw and confused mass] … The author has simply 
poured the whole material that he has collected in front of his reader and in particular in the 
second chapter gets on the reader’s nerves with a flood of quotations, in which the same is 
repeated a hundred times.” Moreover, Schieffer castigated Wehler for “burying the already 
exhausted reader under an avalanche of references”—something Wehler would carry on 
through his multivolume Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte. But this was not all: 
 “The naïve self-confidence that reveals itself is somewhat disarming. 
Apparently it has not occurred to him at all that Bismarck’s marginal 
comment on the ‘ink diarrhea,’ which he quotes on page 467, actually applies 
to himself … Instead of at least striving toward an objective understanding of 
an epoch that has veered away from us, he gives way to his affects, mixes 
pretentious style with derisive, sweeping judgments and scolds other 
historians with an arrogance that mutatis mutandis would have done credit to 
Walter Frank.”59  
 
                                                
58 Erich Angermann, “Gutachten über die Habilitationsschrift von Herrn Dr. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, ‘Bismarck 
und der Imperialismus. Die deutsche überseeische Expansion in ihrem sozialökonomischen Zusammenhang’” 
March 8, 1968, BAK, NL Theodor Schieder, Box 96. 
59 Walter Frank (1905-1945) had been one of the leading Nazi historians and head of the Reichsinstitut für die 
Geschichte des neuen Deutschlands, the main Nazi historical institution. Once he had reached a position of 
influence, he viciously attacked his academic teachers who kept a distance to the regime.  
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Schieffer concluded that “it goes without saying that this shapeless mass, as which the 
study presents itself today, has to be molded into a manageable and enjoyable text of about 
300 pages, and that it has to be freed from its polemical and theorizing style, so that it can 
actually be published.”60  
Responding to this philippic, Schieder assured Schieffer that he had had “a serious 
conversation with Mr. Wehler and had gained the impression that he was willing to engage in 
some soul-searching.” Schieder therefore asked Schieffer to moderate his demands somewhat 
so that Wehler would have a chance of fulfilling them prior to the Habilitation colloquium. 
Schieder emphasized that he, too, had “felt irritation and anger” while reading the study, but 
that he believed it to be “a scholarly achievement that can be accepted.” Schieder, who was at 
the time a visiting fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study Princeton, added that “in this 
country—I mean the United States—this jargon is not such a forgone conclusion, either, as 
Mr. Wehler would like to make us believe. I have already met a fair number of impressive 
historians of a very different kind.”61  
Despite the critical (yet ultimately positive) evaluations, the Habilitation procedure 
was far from over. A majority of the commission, consisting of several faculty members of 
the arts and sciences, at first opposed the study. When Schieder stressed Wehler’s other 
publications and his editorial achievements (the Yellow Series), the commission agreed to 
admit him to the Habilitation colloquium. Wehler’s talk before faculty members of the entire 
arts and sciences, discussing “Conceptions of war from Clausewitz to Ludendorff,” 
                                                
60 Theodor Schieffer, “Korreferat zur Habilitation ‘Bismarck und der Imperialismus. Die deutsche überseeische 
Expansion in ihrem sozialökonomischen Zusammenhang’ von Dr. Hans-Ulrich Wehler” March 5, 1968, BAK, 
NL Theodor Schieder, Box 112. 
61 Theodor Schieder to Theodor Schieffer, March 8, 1968, BAK, NL Theodor Schieder, Box 112. 
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culminated in a dramatic showdown, in which a professor of Byzantine history claimed that 
“only the Jew Albert Einstein” and the atomic bomb had been responsible for the 
radicalization of warfare.62 Ultimately, the faculty approved Wehler’s Habilitation by a 
narrow vote. If this analysis has traced the various stages of Wehler’s Habilitation in such a 
detailed way, it was to shed some light on the contingencies surrounding even the most 
successful academic careers. The episode also illustrates the irony that Theodor Schieder, 
whom many younger historians viewed as representing the old methodological and political 
guard, must be credited with saving Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s career.63     
When the study was published, several historians on both sides of the Atlantic 
recognized its importance, but the response did not just contain praise. Hans Herzfeld’s 
comprehensive review in Historische Zeitschrift acknowledged the study’s significance, and 
he added—somewhat oddly—that the fact that Wehler had recognized Bismarck as the 
“centrally predominating figure of the German development speaks for Wehler as a 
historian,” as if this recognition was the litmus test a historian working on the German 
Empire had to pass.64  Yet at the same time Herzfeld formulated a number of reservations. He 
criticized that Wehler had simply replaced the outdated “primacy of foreign politics” with the 
equally dogmatic “primacy of domestic politics.” As a result, history “disintegrated into 
                                                
62 Wehler, “Historiker sollten auch politisch zu den Positionen stehen, die sie in der Wissenschaft vertreten,” in 
Hohls/Jarausch (eds.), Versäumte Fragen, 247-248; Id., Eine lebhafte Kampfsituation, 140-143. 
63 It had not been the first time, either: in 1962, Wehler had been in danger of losing the prestigious ACLS 
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64 Hans Herzfeld, “Review of Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Bismarck und der Imperialismus,” Historische Zeitschrift 
210 (1970), 725-728, quote on 725. 
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economic history, which then dominated the history of society.”65 Interestingly, Herzfeld had 
more serious reservations regarding Wehler’s methodology than his interpretations. In a 
move remarkable for someone with Herzfeld’s scholarly biography, he conceded that 
Wehler’s critique of Germany’s “special development”—deviating from the Western 
democracies—was largely justified. On the other hand, he declared Wehler’s theory of 
imperialism, stressing the domestic sphere and economic aspects, was “ultimately 
unacceptable” for a historian convinced of “a real—that is equal—interdependence of the big 
historical factors.”66 Proving his familiarity with American scholarship on the matter, 
Herzfeld asked whether one should not prefer William L. Langer’s narrower definition of 
imperialism over William A. Williams’, who in his studies on American imperialism—like 
Wehler—emphasized socioeconomic interests over diplomatic factors.67 Herzfeld’s 
preference was clear, as he added that recently published U.S. State Department documents 
had clearly disproven Williams. Ultimately Herzfeld wondered whether historiography based 
on such a “strict theory” could really “do justice to the manifold facets of a period a hundred 
years past.”68  
While Herzfeld represented the old historiographical guard—albeit one that had made 
a number of important interpretive and methodological concessions—reviewers of a younger 
generation welcomed the study more warmly. Wolfgang J. Mommsen proved to be 
impressed by the “almost frightening profusion of the material” and praised Wehler for 
                                                
65 Herzfeld, “Review of Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Bismarck und der Imperialismus,” 726. 
66 Herzfeld, “Review of Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Bismarck und der Imperialismus,” 727. 
67 Williams’ best known work remains The Tragedgy of American Diplomacy (Cleveland, OH, 1959). At the 
time of the review, Carl Schorske had just edited selected writings by Langer, Explorations in Crisis: Selected 
Papers in International History (Cambridge, MA, 1969). 
68 Herzfeld, “Review of Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Bismarck und der Imperialismus,” 728. 
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having “approached the subject with a far more thorough theoretical framework and a much 
broader definition of the problem than his predecessors.”69 Mommsen found Wehler’s 
argument regarding the domestic motivations of the German Empire’s colonial 
undertaking—the notorious “social imperialism”—convincing, even though he thought 
Wehler tended to overrate the overall significance of colonialism, which Mommsen believed 
to have been merely a marginal element for the Empire. More generally, his criticism focused 
on the wealth of material, including overly long footnotes, whose organization was 
insufficient and often made the reader miss the forest for the trees. Similarly, Mommsen 
complained about “a multiplicity of explanatory models which have not been combined with 
final clarity and which tend to confuse rather than to enlighten.”70 Despite these reservations, 
Mommsen clearly believed that Wehler had made a significant contribution not only to the 
historiography of the German Empire, but also to the methodological modernization of the 
West German historical profession.  
Hans Medick, a later proponent of Alltagsgeschichte, whose emergence in the early 
1980s would trigger a hostile response from the Bielefelder Schule, provided the most 
comprehensive and appreciative assessment of the study. Placing the study into its recent 
historiographical context, Medick was even more dismissive of the works of Fritz Fischer 
and the Fischer Controversy than Wehler would later be, criticizing not only the 
methodological traditionalism of Fischer and his opponents, but also questioning the 
                                                
69 Wolfgang J. Mommsen, “Review of Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Bismarck und der Imperialismus,” Central 
European History 2 (1969), 366-372, quotes on 367. 
70 Mommsen, “Review of Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Bismarck und der Imperialismus,” 372. 
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interpretive progress in the controversy’s wake.71 In complete agreement with Wehler 
regarding the methodological deficiencies of the West German historical profession, Medick 
only pointed out that the study could have drawn even more on the social sciences, and that 
for example Wehler had not utilized the possibilities provided by Critical Theory enough. 
But he also sided with Wehler regarding the interpretive tendency of the study. Medick 
concluded his generally enthusiastic review by emphasizing that Wehler’s work “not only 
signifies a breakthrough to new departures in West German historiography but strikes yet 
another blow for the conquest of methodological, theoretical, and practical parochialism in 
history as well as in the other social sciences.”72  
Compared to these responses, the American reception of Wehler’s study was less 
enthusiastic. Otto Pflanze thought that Wehler’s revisionism clearly overshot his mark, that 
Bismarck und der Imperialismus signaled the replacement of Hegel within German 
historiography by Marx, and that historians now “faced the prospect of an all-out economic 
determinism.”73 Thus he took consolation from Hegel’s recognition that thesis and 
antithesis—the latter provided by Wehler—were ultimately, and inevitably, superseded by 
synthesis.74 More specifically, some American diplomatic historians were as horrified as 
their German counterparts by Wehler’s attack on their cherished Primat der Aussenpolitik 
                                                
71 Hans Medick, “Review of Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Bismarck und der Imperialismus,” History and Theory 10 
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and were thus quick to disqualify the German iconoclast as “neo-Marxist.”75 While this 
characterization of Wehler was unfounded, it demonstrates the reservations of several 
American historians toward the emerging kritische Geschichtswissenschaft. It also reveals 
that during the late 1960s and 1970s, the specter of Marxism, or neo-Marxism, haunted 
American and German diplomatic historians alike.76  
In retrospect, these publications outlined the contours of a future Historische 
Sozialwissenschaft fairly accurately. Already prior to his first professorial appointment, 
Wehler had been not only a prolific author, but also an extraordinarily productive editor. The 
opportunities provided by a professorial position as well as by the University of Bielefeld 
would allow for an even further increase of publications. These projects will be discussed 
below.  
 
The Institutional Context 
The 1960s and early 1970s saw an unprecedented expansion of higher education in 
West Germany. This was a result of a number of reasons: existing universities proved less 
and less able to provide adequate learning conditions for the rising number of incoming 
students; cities and sometimes even larger towns recognized the economic value of an 
institution of higher education; the West German state governments perceived educational 
policy as a central area in which to develop a distinct profile; and the foundation of new 
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universities promised to facilitate the implementation of educational reforms.77 In addition, 
the federal government was concerned that the country had fallen behind in educational 
matters, and that in the context of the Cold War this “education deficit” (Bildungsrückstand 
was the contemporary catchphrase) also threatened the country’s security.78  
To counter this deficit, German states expanded existing universities and founded 
new ones. The idea was to not only enable more young people to attend a university, but also 
to allow those who lived in remote and rural areas to do so by way of commuting. 
Accordingly, the federal and the state governments often chose to establish universities in 
smaller towns such as Osnabrück, Lüneburg, Konstanz, Bayreuth, Trier, and Bielefeld. 
Almost all of these institutions emerged on the outskirts of the respective towns. Not only 
was it easier to find the necessary construction space, but the new “campus universities” 
were supposed “to reestablish the intellectual community of faculty and students.”79 In 
reality, it proved difficult to realize these lofty goals, as the explosion of student numbers 
turned universities by the 1970s into more rather than less anonymous institutions. The 
overall number of students in West Germany almost tripled between 1960 (291,000) and 
1975 (841,000).80 The faculty-student ratio declined: in the humanities, the number of 
professorships rose from 801 (1966) to 1375 (1975), whereas the number of students 
increased from 48,000 (1966) to 141,000 (1975).81   
                                                
77 Christoph Oehler, “Die Hochschulentwicklung nach 1945,” in Christoph Führ/Carl-Ludwig Furck (eds.), 
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Still, throughout the 1960s educational planners often conceptualized the new 
institutions as “reform universities”—places where faculty and students were supposed to 
interact more closely, and where the separation of research and teaching should no longer 
exist.82 These reform universities, many of which were founded in North Rhine-Westphalia, 
included the ones in Bochum, Düsseldorf, Bremen, and Bielefeld. For Bielefeld, the North 
Rhine-Westphalian minister of education Paul Mikat asked Helmut Schelsky, arguably the 
most influential postwar sociologist, to develop the concept for a new university.83 As much 
an academic as a public intellectual, Schelsky had coined the catchphrase skeptische 
Generation (“skeptical generation,” referring to the German youth of the 1950s, who 
according to Schelsky rejected utopian ideals, focused on pragmatism and thus ultimately 
lead to a normalization of German society). Schelsky had caught Mikat’s attention with the 
inaugural lecture he had delivered at the University of Münster, in which he discussed the 
extent to which the Humboldt’s educational ideas could be realized under the social 
conditions of the Federal Republic.84  
Schelsky envisioned an institution focusing on excellence in specific fields, rather 
than covering as many academic disciplines as possible. Second, he proposed to organize 
research in a collaborative and interdisciplinary fashion. Bielefeld’s Institute for 
Interdisciplinary Research (Institut für Interdisziplinäre Forschung), founded to that end, was 
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the first of its kind in West Germany. Third, the university was to aim at excellence in both 
research and teaching. To realize the former, the faculty would alternate between a year of 
teaching and a year of research. For the latter goal, Schelsky’s concept set forth a strict 
faculty-student ratio of 1:30.85 Not all of these ambitious goals proved attainable; in 
particular the maximum enrollment had already changed in the planning stages from 3500 to 
10,000, preventing the realization of the desired close faculty-student interaction. The 
politicization of universities after 1968, which affected the situation in Bielefeld as well, 
further contributed to Schelsky’s disillusionment and led to his return to the University of 
Münster.86 
These far-reaching structural changes affected the field of history quantitatively. The 
number of professorships (in all subfields, form ancient to modern history) increased from 80 
in 1960 to 210 in 1975, and the number of untenured lecturers rose from 90 to 230. In 1973, 
43% of all full professors were born between 1929 and 1941—a statistic that underscores yet 
another generational shift emerging in the late 1960s and early 1970s.87 In modern history 
alone, the number of professorships rose from 33 (1960) to 71 (1970).88 Subsequently, this 
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enormous expansion of the historical profession helped create the precondition for 
methodological reorientations. 
 
Between Crisis and Reform: Wozu noch Geschichte? 
Given these institutional conditions, one might have expected West German 
historians to abound in optimism. Yet the early 1970s saw a number of very different 
statements regarding the state and future of historiography. History as a discipline seemed to 
lose much of its public relevance as a Leitwissenschaft, i.e. an academic field that provided 
the public—or at least the educated public—with intellectual guidance. Instead, during the 
1960s the social sciences, above all sociology and political science, threatened to take over 
this role, as representatives of these disciplines became more and more visible in the media. 
Even worse, educational reformers in some German states attempted to abolish history as a 
subject in secondary education; the goal was its integration into a broader, new subject 
“society studies” (Gesellschaftslehre).89 
Moreover, the relationship between the “1968ers” and the historical profession was a 
best ambivalent. Historians tended to respond as negatively to the questionable methods—
interrupting lectures, etc.—of some of the 1968ers as their colleagues in other disciplines. In 
response to the radicalization of many West German universities during that time, some 
historians switched political allegiances. Thomas Nipperdey, in the early 1960s a reform-
oriented Social Democrat, in 1970 helped establish the Association for Academic Freedom 
(Bund Freiheit der Wissenschaft), which fought above all against the “democratization” of 
West German universities favored by many on the Left, but also offered space to academics 
                                                
89 Grosse Kracht, Die zankende Zunft, 81-83,  
 223 
as far on the right as their opponents were on the left.90 One of the key issues of contention 
was the full professors’ (Ordinarien) far-reaching influence in administrative matters, which 
left-leaning reformers wanted to curtail. They suggested the establishment of governing 
bodies consisting of one-third professors, untenured faculty, and students respectively.91 
Their opponents claimed that the privileged position of full professors within the university 
administration constituted an institutional necessity.92 
Yet historians objected to far more than just the questionable classroom behavior and 
demands of student co-determination by the 1968ers. The popularity of (Neo-)Marxism in all 
its shades also proved anathema to almost every single professor of history in West 
Germany. Since decisions about professorial appointments were still heavily influenced by a 
small number of historians, it came as no surprise that by the mid-1970s, only one “openly 
Marxist” West German historian had become a full professor, Reinhard Kühnl at the 
University of Marburg. In fact, his appointment had caused a veritable scandal. Ernst Nolte, 
then a professor at Marburg’s history department, publicly denounced Kühnl as a political 
pamphleteer unworthy of a professorship. Nolte’s opposition to Kühnl’s Habilitation led to a 
prolonged tug-of-war that was carried out not only in the respective university committees 
but also through numerous letters-to-the-editor in daily papers.93 When Nolte’s initiative 
failed to prevent Kühnl’s appointment, he left Marburg for the Free University Berlin. Still, 
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Kühnl remained outside of the mainstream historical profession, publishing his books at 
small left-wing presses instead of prestigious publishing houses.94 Rejecting particularly neo-
Marxist theories of fascism, Heinrich August Winkler, then a younger historian in his late 
thirties, represented what even scholars considered to be methodological and political 
progressives thought about the reliance on Marxism in historiography.95 It may be tempting 
to attribute the near-absence of Marxist historians in West Germany exclusively to the still 
prevailing political conservatism, as well as to the near-absence of a Marxist tradition within 
twentieth century German historiography. Apart from the—certainly important—history of 
the profession, the polarization caused by Cold War and the ideological confrontation with 
East German historians in particular made the reception of Marxism among the Western 
colleagues rather unlikely. However, one should also point out that even foreign historians 
with neo-Marxist leanings did not take notice of the German variant, which may indicate 
something about the latter’s quality.96 
Yet West German historians, especially those with conservative political views, found 
themselves beleaguered by much more than just unruly students and the occasional Marxist 
colleague. More significantly, the political shift in the Federal Republic, which placed a 
Social Democrat in the offices of the Federal President and the Chancellor for the first time, 
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severely worried many of them. In 1971, when President Gustav Heinemann called for 
corrections of high school history textbooks, which he thought had previously paid too little 
attention to the “losers” of German history who had unsuccessfully fought for more political 
freedom, conservative historians were outraged.97 In a letter to the German Historians’ 
Association executive board, naval historian Walther Hubatsch took offense at the 
“preposterousness” of Heinemann’s request, demanded an official response from the 
Association, and enclosed a self-addressed reply envelope with a stamp featuring—very 
appropriately—Leopold von Ranke.98 In his response to Hubatsch, Chairman Schieder 
argued that it was not the Association’s function to act as a corrective of politicians’ 
statements, but that historians should express their concerns as individuals. And that was 
precisely what the Chairman did himself. In an article for the conservative Protestant weekly 
Christ und Welt Schieder warned that “the invocation of revolutionary traditions, if done at 
the wrong time, might easily endanger the democratic state. What in the past has been an 
uprising for freedom and justice may in the present be turned into an appeal for an anarchist 
uprising against the very same free state, which a liberal state sees itself doomed to 
powerlessness against its illiberal enemies.”99 While Schieder’s stance against political 
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demands on historiography appears laudable, one might add that he was less principled than 
it seemed. His role during the Fischer-Kontroverse just a few years earlier revealed his 
awareness of historiography’s political implications and his willingness to battle 
historiographical interpretations that he thought might damage West Germany’s reputation 
“abroad” and affect German national identity negatively.100 Historians on both sides of the 
political spectrum rejected a conflation of historiography and politics if the respective 
political bent ran counter to their own beliefs. During the early 1970s, conservative historians 
generally objected to liberal and leftist demands, just as in the 1980s left-liberal historians 
would denounce conservative politicians calls for a national identity bolstered by identifiable 
historiographies, as we will see in chapter 5.  
In a lecture given at the biannual convention of the German Historians’ Association, 
Reinhart Koselleck, an intellectual historian at the University of Bielefeld (but not associated 
with scholars belonging to the Bielefeld School), expressed his concerns regarding a “crisis 
of history as a distinct discipline.”101 Koselleck argued that the neglect of the respective 
historical dimensions by other disciplines—economics, philology, and sociology—had 
isolated the field of history from these neighboring disciplines. Similar to the slightly 
younger social historians, Koselleck (born in 1923) urged his colleagues to draw upon 
theories prevalent in neighboring disciplines. He deemed it indispensable to reintegrate 
economics into social history, to draw upon the insights of modern linguistics, and even to 
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develop a historically informed anthropology, as Michel Foucault had done.102 Yet he 
expressed severe skepticism regarding the ability of history as a discipline to provide people 
with “immediate instructions on how to act in the future” (unmittelbare 
Handlungsanweisungen für morgen).103 This skepticism set Koselleck apart from the social 
historians, and may also account for the fact that, in contrast to them, he never sought the 
spotlight as a public intellectual.104  
Five years later his colleague Thomas Nipperdey posed the same question. In contrast 
to Koselleck, Nipperdey not only offered a forceful plea for the educational necessity of 
history, but also objected strongly to the political use of historiography. He decried the 
“fashionable inversion” of this political use. Nipperdey argued that while historians had often 
written on behalf of the nation, current historiography tended toward “inverted nationalism.” 
Against historians who, according to Nipperdey, adopted “the gesture of a prosecutor” in 
their writings, he declared: “Scholarship insists, against all partisanship, on its claim for 
objectivity.105 Yet for Nipperdey this objectivity did not rule out a “social function” of 
history in the sense that it could—and even should—provide citizens with a sense of identity: 
“This identity can only correspond to a pluralistic and tolerant basic consensus of our society, 
to freedom and democracy, not in the sense of a presentist belief in progress, but in that sense 
that democracy is, under present conditions, the most humane and improvable political 
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state.”106 Regardless of the plausibility of this statement, which cannot be discussed in this 
context, it was obvious that Nipperdey’s relativizing position ran counter to the social 
historians’ ambitions. 
Yet at the same time a number of historians adopted a less pessimistic tone and 
advocated a new, reformed historiography. While the precise contours of the favored 
historiographical project differed, all of these proponents shared a highly critical attitude 
toward the historiographical practice of the previous decades. In 1971, Wolfgang J. 
Mommsen (born in 1930) delivered his inaugural lecture at Düsseldorf University with the 
programmatic title Die Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Historismus (The Historical 
Profession beyond Historicism). By launching this fairly strong critique of the West German 
historical profession’s current state, Mommsen, a student of Theodor Schieder, found himself 
in a difficult position. After all, his claim that “German historiography until very recently had 
been stuck in the consciousness of the 1920s” could be perceived as a criticism of Schieder, 
who had helped shape the postwar West German historical profession.107 He thus explicitly 
credited Schieder as one of the few West German historians who had recognized the 
necessary epistemological and methodological renewal of the discipline. While Mommsen in 
general adopted a moderate tone, he clearly distinguished between a historiography that 
affirmed existing conditions and an alternative that sought to achieve societal change. It was 
obvious that Mommsen’s sympathies lay with the second alternative. Therefore he conceived 
of history as a “critical social science” (kritische Sozialwissenschaft). “Critical” was a 
recurring term in this text, and for Mommsen the “critical function” of historiography was to 
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provide an “indirect, yet medium- or long-term more effective critique of the respective 
ruling, or only prevailing values, ideologies, and historical conceptions.”108 As an example, 
Mommsen referred to the enormous influence that the idea of the nation had exerted and was 
still exerting on societies.  
By no means did Mommsen envision a wholesale embrace of all prevailing trends 
within the social sciences; he sharply dismissed what he perceived as ahistorical tendencies 
within certain areas of sociology, in particular empirical social research. However, 
commenting on the debates among German (Jürgen Habermas, Ralf Dahrendorf) and 
American (C. Wright Mills, Seymour Martin Lipset) sociologists, Mommsen found a reason 
for optimism, since the social scientists increasingly rediscovered the importance of a 
historical scope. Therefore he claimed that “in the reconstruction of historical formations 
from a perspective of today’s societal situation it [historiography] can offer a valuable 
corrective for primarily system-related social research.”109 Yet in order to enter a mutually 
beneficial partnership with the social sciences, historiography could no longer afford to 
neglect the heuristic tools of the social sciences. With this position—which he did not 
concretize—Mommsen echoed simultaneous efforts by American historians to redefine the 
relationship between their discipline and the social sciences.  
In the United States scholars of diverse methodological backgrounds such as Richard 
Hofstadter and David Landes explored the degree to which historiography should be 
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conceived as a social science.110 As was the case in West Germany, the answers to this 
question differed significantly. Landes and Tilly, who conducted a survey of ca. 600 
historians, sent out a questionnaire whose first question asked the respondents whether they 
considered themselves “a social scientist, a humanist, or something of both?” Younger 
historians often identified themselves as “social scientists,” whereas their older colleagues 
tended to gravitate toward the “humanists.” The irritated response by a senior historian 
revealed that some of this group considered the question itself reprehensible: “I do not 
consider myself as a ‘social scientist’ because (1) I think it is a vile term, (2) some of the 
most fatuous academics I know so proclaim themselves; nor do I think of myself as a 
‘humanist’—although I certainly cherish humanistic values. I am a historian. That is enough 
of a ‘little box’ for me.”111 As will become apparent below, many German historians held 
similarly negative views on this issue. 
In 1974, three years after his inaugural lecture, Mommsen outlined the contours of 
“the historical profession in an industrial society.” Mommsen argued along the lines of his 
earlier text regarding historiography’s necessary interdisciplinary orientation, and took a 
clear position in the curricular battles raging in the 1970s. Defending the value of history 
within the West German educational system—which some educational reformers 
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questioned—he argued that since the historical profession was undergoing a profound 
methodological renewal, the replacement of history as a school subject was even less 
justified than it had been before.112 Like his lecture, the essay included a bow to Mommsen’s 
academic teacher Theodor Schieder, who had warned against historiography’s “premature 
ideologization” and suggested instead a “sober analysis of societal structures.”113 On the 
other hand, Mommsen’s emphasis on historiography’s “emancipatory function” clearly set 
him apart from Schieder. That a historian like Mommsen, neither methodologically nor by 
temperament a radical, adopted these positions illustrates the degree to which many 
historians of his generation believed in the ineptitude of traditional historiography to grapple 
with the complexities of modern societies. 
The historiographical direction Dieter Groh (born in 1932) outlined in his volume 
Kritische Geschichtswissenschaft in emanzipatorischer Absicht was similar to Mommsen’s. 
Groh had been a student and later Assistent of Werner Conze, but had moved away from his 
mentor methodologically and interpretively. In many ways, his text constituted a sketch 
rather than an elaborate program, but Groh articulated several characteristics of a future 
historiography. Groh rejected a “superficial eclecticism” among historians whom he saw as 
arbitrarily relying on social science theories to counter the “theory deficit.”114 However, 
when Groh dismissed mid-range theories (Theorien mittlerer Reichweite) in favor of an 
“anticipation of future possibilities,” these possibilities remained too vague to enter the 
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mainstream discussion among historians interested in such questions. On the other hand, 
Groh’s recommendation of “critical distance to the status quo” echoed similar statements of 
Mommsen and the Bielefelders.115 Throughout the next decades, Groh remained a 
sympathetic yet slightly distant observer of the Bielefelder Schule, more associated with 
French than American historiography, and closer to unorthodox British Marxists such as Eric 
Hobsbawm. His influential article on the Sonderweg testifies to Groh’s position.116   
Castigating the state of the West German historical profession and suggesting an 
interpretive rather than methodological renewal of the profession, a 1972 collection of essays 
by Fritz Fischer student Imanuel Geiss was very different in tone.117 In the preface, Geiss 
illustrated the historical profession’s supposed illiberalism with a personal example: having 
initially planned to write his Habilitation on Prussian-German historiography from Ranke to 
Ritter, Geiss was discouraged by sympathetic American and German colleagues who 
predicted that he would severely hurt his career prospects by launching an attack on main 
figures of the profession. He therefore decided to switch to a less risky area and completed a 
widely acknowledged study on decolonization in Africa.118 These reservations appear 
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plausible; not coincidentally it was an American historian who in the late 1960s published a 
comprehensive study on German historiography.119 
Two years later Geiss (born in 1931) edited a number of articles by a group of mostly 
even younger historians at the University of Hamburg, under the programmatic title 
Ansichten einer künftigen Geschichtswissenschaft (Perspectives of a Future Historical 
Profession). Already the volume‘s introduction revealed—compared to Mommsen—a less 
conciliatory stance, decrying the “orthodoxy of German historians as heralds and apologists 
of the Third Reich.”120 Similar to other programmatic publications, the authors of this 
volume diagnosed the West German historical profession with a “theory deficit.” They then 
proceeded to outline tasks and methods of a critical historiography, which they recommended 
to rely on Freud, Marx, and the French Annales School.121 
 Maybe the aggressive tone that Geiss adopted throughout the text was responsible, 
but it is noteworthy that neither of the two volumes were reviewed in Historische Zeitschrift, 
which otherwise considered contributions of various authors to the historiographical 
modernization debate. Whatever the reason, the non-response of the profession’s 
establishment to Geiss’s provocations constituted a marked difference to how it reacted to 
Wehler’s challenges. Historians critical of Historische Sozialwissenschaft realized during the 
1970s that the Bielefeld historian at least had to be reckoned with—ignoring him would not 
have worked.  
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Considering the power structures of the West German historical profession, Geiss 
significantly weakened his career chances by denouncing historians whom the overwhelming 
majority of scholars still deemed to embody the positive tradition of German historiography. 
Unfortunately, his adviser Fritz Fischer’s influence on job appointments never matched that 
of Fischer’s colleagues Schieder, Conze, and Erdmann. As a result, Geiss only received a 
professorship at the University of Bremen, where the atmosphere was, even by the standards 
of the early 1970s, extremely politicized, and where he clashed with radical leftist student 
groups. After having been attacked by conservatives throughout the 1960s, Geiss now found 
himself harshly criticized by the Left, a circumstance that by the 1980s had turned him into 
an ardent conservative himself, deploring the “new orthodoxy” of left-liberal historians.122   
It should be mentioned that most, but not all historians reflecting on the relationship 
of history and the social sciences specialized in nineteenth and twentieth century German 
history. Winfried Schulze’s (born in 1942) introductory text Soziologie und 
Geschichtswissenschaft constituted an early modernist’s contribution, proposing the 
integration of sociology and history under the umbrella historical social science, yet without 
abandoning all distinctions between both.123 Moreover, some scholars of ancient and 
medieval history simply practiced an interdisciplinary form of historiography, without 
necessarily publishing programmatic statements announcing a “paradigm shift.” It seems that 
for historians working on modern Germany, especially periods and topics that were 
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politically charged, methodological battles often became linked to arguments about the 
political dimension of historiography.  This was a dimension ancient and medieval historians 
tended to be less interested in.124 
These various examples illustrate that calls for interdisciplinary work could be heard 
throughout the West German historical profession. The proposed methodological 
reorientation at the time appeared to be a generational project, for almost all of historians 
demanding a closer cooperation with the social sciences had been born between 1930 and 
1940. While by no means all scholars of that generation endorsed these views, and while not 
everyone arguing for interdisciplinary historiography would later heed his own call, 
historians of a more traditional methodological orientation began to worry about the future of 
their discipline. The protagonists of the Bielefelder Schule in particular would draw their ire, 
as they appeared to be among the most outspoken proponents of the methodological 
reorientation and soon followed with studies that realized what they had demanded in their 
programmatic statements. 
 
Establishing the Bielefelder Schule 
The actual establishment of the Bielefelder Schule unfolded after 1971. That year, 
Hans-Ulrich Wehler left the Free University of Berlin, where he had held a professorship in 
American history since the previous year, and moved to Bielefeld. The financial situation at 
the university in the early 1970s was excellent, thus it was possible to assemble a team of 
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people who were either politically progressive or at least methodologically interesting. In 
September 1971, Wehler himself expressed the pioneering spirit of the time in a letter to 
Theodor Schieder, in which he outlined the plans for the history department. Reporting that 
“Koselleck has just accepted our offer, and we are all extremely relieved,” Wehler listed the 
various scholars the department attempted to lure to Bielefeld. Therefore he was confident 
that by 1973, it would have assembled “a good team.” And since Wehler had negotiated an 
extremely favorable deal with the university—he would alternate between a year of teaching 
and a year of research—and there were also “abundant financial resources for books,” 
Wehler expressed contentment and optimism regarding his future.125 
Jürgen Kocka joined the departing the following year. After the completion of his 
dissertation in 1968, he had returned to the United States to conduct research for his 
Habilitation. Kocka had spent a year at Harvard University’s Charles Warren Center and at 
the School for Business Administration, where he worked on a comparative study of white-
collar workers (Angestellte) in the United States and Germany between 1890 and 1940.126  
Already an impressively productive historian, Kocka published a short book on German 
society during World War I.127 Thus, at age 32, Kocka was a full professor and author of 
three monographs. Throughout the 1970s, he continued to work on white-collar worker and 
entrepreneurs during the phase of industrialization in Germany.128 Moreover, and at least as 
importantly, Kocka remained involved in the methodological debates within the West 
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German historical profession, advocating theoretical sophistication and interdisciplinary 
orientation.129  
Indeed, not every historian at Bielefeld’s history department shared Wehler’s and 
Kocka’s interests. Reinhart Koselleck, who joined the department in 1972, pursued 
epistemological studies and launched the multi-volume encyclopedia Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe.130 Without a doubt an innovative historian who had a large circle of 
followers, he simply did not have much in common with Wehler and Kocka. One of the 
legendary anecdotes surrounding Bielefeld’s history department was of Wehler and 
Koselleck never sharing an elevator together—they would not have known what to talk 
about.131 Barely 31 years old, Klaus Hildebrand, a specialist in German foreign relations in 
the twentieth century and the author of a widely acclaimed study on colonial enterprises of 
Nazi Germany, was hired in 1972 for the chair in contemporary history.132 While in 
Bielefeld, Hildebrand published a brief survey of Nazi Germany’s foreign policies, which 
placed the Nazi period in the broader context of German history since 1871 and also 
emphasized the domestic developments as significantly influencing foreign policies. In his 
analysis, Hildebrand did not fully embrace a Primat der Innenpolitik—which he conceded to 
be heuristically fruitful for Wehler’s study on late nineteenth century imperialism—but he 
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emphasized the degree to which diplomatic historians had previously neglected these factors. 
Now, he argued, “we know how functionally dependent, sometimes even directly and 
intentionally, diplomatic actions have been put to service for domestic considerations.”133 
Despite this short-lived proximity to some of the Bielefelder’s positions, Hildebrand had very 
little in common methodologically with Wehler and Kocka. He became later one of the most 
outspoken defenders of diplomatic history as an autonomous field.134 In addition, their 
personalities proved incompatible; the outspoken Wehler and the reserved Hildebrand did not 
get along socially.135 Ultimately, Hildebrand left Bielefeld in 1974 for a chair at the 
University of Frankfurt. He later clashed with Wehler in a number of historiographical 
debates with strong political undertones, culminating in Wehler’s extremely unflattering 
portrayal of Hildebrand in his long essay on the 1980s Historikerstreit.136  
Christoph Klessmann, Hildebrand’s successor at Bielefeld, was much less of a 
methodological traditionalist and developed a strong interest in social history, yet he did not 
“officially” participate in the enterprise Historische Sozialwissenschaft. Klessmann had 
received his PhD at the University of Bochum with a study on Nazi cultural policies and 
Polish resistance in the Generalgouvernment. He continued his interest in the relations 
between Poles and Germans in his Habilitation on Polish miners in the Ruhr region between 
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the 1870s and World War II.137 At a time when West German historians focused either on the 
Federal Republic or on its Easter counterpart, Klessmann wrote the first integrated account of 
postwar Germany, the first volume covering the postwar decade, the second continuing until 
1970.138 
In this context, a few terminological comments are in order: how and when did the 
Bielefelder Schule acquire its name? Hans-Ulrich Wehler has repeatedly emphasized that the 
term “Bielefeld School” had indeed been an American invention, not a brand name used by 
the school’s protagonists themselves.139 It appears that the American historian Alan Mitchell 
first used a similar label in the early 1980s, in a review of David Blackbourn’s and Geoff 
Eley’s Mythen deutscher Geschichtsschreibung, a study later published in expanded form as 
The Peculiarities of German History. In this review, Mitchell referred to Bielefeld as “the 
Vatican City of the so-called ‘Kehrite’ or ‘critical’ school.”140 A few years earlier James J. 
Sheehan had characterized German historians concerned with structural flaws of the German 
Empire’s political and social system as the “new orthodoxy”—an implicit yet obvious 
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reference to Wehler and other like-minded historians.141 In a similar vein, Konrad H. 
Jarausch had warned of the danger of replacing “the old orthodoxy with this new one.”142  
These pronouncements seem to corroborate Wehler’s statement that “internally [i.e. at 
the University of Bielefeld], we did not have the sense of building a school. Rather, we felt 
we had to seize the opportunity and try to reach the media.”143 Yet whoever must be credited 
with coining the label Bielefelder Schule, the second sentence of Wehler’s statement clearly 
betrays awareness of the possibilities that the conditions of the early 1970s offered. Once 
Wehler and Kocka were settled at Bielefeld, they were able to use the institutional platform 
to advance their historiographical project, and as they had recognized the importance of 
gaining access to the media, they started a number of enterprises in this area. This is why 
they established the journal Geschichte und Gesellschaft and the monograph series Kritische 
Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft. Today, the web address www.bielefelder-schule.de links 
to Bielefeld’s history department. 
 
The Politics of Publishing 
A project not directly associated with Historische Sozialwissenschaft, but decidedly a 
contribution to the historiographical “invention of tradition,” was the series Deutsche 
Historiker, which Hans-Ulrich Wehler edited. The first five volumes were published in 1971 
and 1972; four additional volumes appeared in 1980 and 1982. Each volume contained 
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biographical portraits of seven to eight individuals. The series focused on three groups of 
scholars: the traditional “big names” of the German historical profession in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries; scholarly outsiders, who now received the recognition that a 
traditionalist historical profession had been unwilling to grant them; and finally, scholars of 
other disciplines who were thought to have exerted noticeable influence on German 
historiography. Only the leading Nazi historian Walter Frank fit in none of these categories, 
but served as the example for a completely politicized profession. As always, Wehler quite 
explicitly stated the project’s goal: the series was supposed to offer brief and reliable 
introductions to important German historians, to broaden the disciplinary horizon by 
including important outsiders, and to contribute to the ongoing discussion about 
historiography’s societal role. Ultimately Wehler argued that it was crucial to acquire 
familiarity with the disciplinary past, before one could ultimately achieve a break, begin a 
reorientation, and implement a “paradigm change.” All of this was necessary, as “not few of 
us believe[d] new knowledge-guiding interests, research emphases, and methods to be 
essential.”144  
The choice of scholars covered in the series was programmatic, as were the authors 
writing about them. With few exceptions, Wehler assembled a group of younger historians, 
thus emphasizing the project’s distance from the West German historiographical 
establishment. In addition, several foreign—mostly American—scholars became part of the 
team, thus symbolizing not just a generational change but also the internationalization of the 
discipline. Instead of asking a former student of Gerhard Ritter’s to provide an essay about 
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the Doktorvater, Wehler turned to Andreas Dorpalen, who had already published widely on 
German historiography, including Heinrich von Treitschke and Gerhard Ritter.145    
As was to be expected, the portraits of the historical profession’s “great men” tended 
to be critical reassessments. Georg Iggers’ essay on Heinrich von Treitschke emphasized the 
degree to which the Prussian historian, as a public intellectual, had influenced the German 
Empire’s educated elites with his anti-British sentiments and his support for the Empire’s 
naval policies. Ernst Schulin’s portrait of Friedrich Meinecke argued that his work might 
have had greater innovative potential had Meinecke been inclined to more highly appreciate 
Enlightenment values, and Jürgen Kocka’s evaluation of Otto Hintze distinguished between 
the reactionary citizen and the progressive historian.146 
By contrast, while the essays on scholarly outsiders by no means were simply 
hagiographic, the emphasis clearly lay on the historians’ innovative potential, which a 
narrow-minded profession had previously been unwilling or unable to acknowledge. One 
example was Wehler’s essay on Eckart Kehr. The unorthodox Marxist Arthur Rosenberg, 
who began his career as an ancient historian before moving to contemporary history, and 
whose study on the early Weimar Republic was rediscovered in the 1960s, also received 
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acknowledgement, as did the historian of imperialism and Rosenberg’s fellow émigré George 
W. F. Hallgarten.147 
The purpose of the series was not lost on the older generation of historians who still 
held the institutional command of the profession. Volker R. Berghahn’s essay on Ludwig 
Dehio, depicting him as somewhat of a mandarin and bon vivant, aroused the ire of Theodor 
Schieder, who sent Berghahn a personal letter expressing his irritation.148 However, the 
debate regarding this historiographical invention of tradition cannot be reduced to a 
generational issue. In a review of several volumes of the series, Detlef Junker (born in 1939) 
dismissed the alleged correlation between political conservatism and methodological 
orientation—toward historicism—and insistence on historiographical “objectivity.” The 
development of the German historical profession, Junker claimed, revealed that 
“conservative” and “liberal” historians often held similar views about the possibility and 
desirability of strict objectivity.149 
The monograph series Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft also underscored 
the swift arrival of the Bielefelder within the West German historical profession. Started in 
1972, the series offered young historians the opportunity to publish their dissertations, which 
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Wehler believed would not have appeared in traditional historical monograph series.150 Yet 
Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft did more than that: older scholars, such as the 
economic historian Wolfram Fischer, whose studies on industrialization became the series’ 
first volume, were able to publish selected articles. Hans Rosenberg’s early studies on 
nineteenth century liberalism appeared in the series, as well as the Festschrift on the occasion 
of his seventieth birthday, and Wehler’s rejected first Habilitation on the rise of American 
imperialism.151 The majority of authors were methodologically and politically close to the 
series editors. Yet Wehler’s main counterpart Thomas Nipperdey was able to publish 
collected essays, which, as one reviewer noted, attempted to “move German historiography 
beyond the sterile extremes of moralizing critique versus apologetics” and constituted a 
sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit critique of the Bielefelder Schule.152 This suggests 
that one did not have to be a partisan of the Bielefelder to gain access to their publication 
venues, even though a certain proximity did not hurt, either.  
The foundation of Geschichte und Gesellschaft (GuG) was arguably the most 
significant project accompanying the rise of Historische Sozialwissenschaft. It took place 
during the second Gründerzeit of the post-World War II West German historical profession 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s.153 The establishment of a number of new journals was 
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partly the consequence of a relative abundance of resources. As a result, some historical 
epochs now received their own publications: the early modern period, for example, the 
Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung. More importantly, however, the increase in journals 
reflected the desire of some historians to broaden the scholarly landscape.154 
The project of founding Geschichte und Gesellschaft, in order to advance “history as 
a social science,” however, differed from the other efforts unfolding around the same time. 
Whether their proponents admitted it or not, GuG possessed a clear anti-establishment bent. 
Almost immediately upon its inception, it became the publication its founders had wanted to 
create—a place where leading scholars not only presented innovative research but also 
argued about the methodological contours of the profession. In 1976, Thomas Nipperdey 
published his influential critique of Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s Das deutsche Kaiserreich, and in 
the early 1980s, Hans Medick, by then a proponent of the emerging Alltagsgeschichte, 
launched his call for a reorientation of historical scholarship. Later in the same decade, GuG 
was the only scholarly journal offering a forum to the protagonists of the notorious 
Historikerstreit. 
Moreover, while the emerging Historische Sozialwissenschaft managed to establish 
other publication outlets as well, GuG was certainly its “flagship.” Enterprises such as the 
monograph series Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft also became success stories; 
as of March 2010, 194 volumes had appeared. Yet only the journal symbolized the project to 
redefine the disciplinary boundaries. As we have seen, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, the driving 
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forced behind the ambitious undertaking, had already gained editorial experience while at the 
University of Cologne during the 1960s, when he had been responsible for the historical 
subseries of Kiepenheuer & Witsch’s so-called “yellow series” (Gelbe Reihe), which aimed 
at introducing students to key problems in modern history as well as methodology.  
The events surrounding the foundation of Geschichte und Gesellschaft illustrate the 
contemporary mechanisms of the German historical profession very well. In July 1974 
Wehler submitted his proposal to the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk, asking for financial support. 
Arguing for the necessity of the new publication, Wehler explained how Geschichte und 
Gesellschaft intended to fill a gap in the landscape of academic journals: whereas 
sociological publications tended to neglect the historical dimension, their historical 
counterparts either focused too narrowly on a particular epoch or failed to grant the “new 
kind” of social history appropriate space. Moreover, the “quasi monopoly” of Historische 
Zeitschrift (HZ) in the area of general history had led to a long-lasting “publication jam.”155  
The foundation turned to Theodor Schieder, who at that time had been the editor of HZ for 
fifteen years, for an evaluation of Wehler’s proposal. In other words, the foundation asked 
Schieder to comment on a project possibly leading to unwelcome competition for his own 
journal. In a comprehensive response Schieder defended HZ against the explicit and implicit 
criticism raised by Wehler. He denied that HZ had neglected social history, he pointed out 
that several of the younger German historians involved in the establishment of Geschichte 
und Gesellschaft had been able to publish in HZ, and he emphasized that his journal was of 
course in close contact with numerous foreign scholars, even though it did not have a 
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formalized committee as GuG did. Ultimately, Schieder voiced some doubts regarding 
GuG’s economic prospects, but nevertheless admitted that the foundation of such a journal 
might serve a good purpose.156 It is unclear whether or not the foundation’s decision was 
based on Schieder’s evaluation, but a few months later, Stiftung Volkswagenwerk notified 
Wehler that it was unable to provide financial assistance.157 
Nevertheless, Geschichte und Gesellschaft soon established itself as one of the 
leading German historical journals. Since Hans-Ulrich Wehler in the 1980s discarded the 
editorial correspondence—an incredible move for a historian, yet understandable if one 
considers Wehler’s eagerness to control his own historicization—we cannot properly 
reconstruct the journal’s early years.158 Discussions among the three managing editors, 
initially Wehler, Hans-Jürgen Puhle, and Wolfgang J. Mommsen, will therefore remain 
unknown. Still, one can easily recognize the appeal the new journal had for its readers. It 
featured a “discussion forum,” in which historiographical trends were discussed or important 
new publications were reviewed, and it had a modern, simple layout. These aspects 
distinguished the journal from the old-fashioned Historische Zeitschrift, whose pages at the 
time had still to be cut open with scissors.    
These examples suggest that the proponents of Historische Sozialwissenschaft 
realized early on that in order to achieve their goal, the production of innovative scholarship 
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would not suffice. The successful promotion of their work through a number of different 
strategies would prove to be similarly important. As Hans-Ulrich Wehler put it in 2007, he 
had realized that “one had to fight for one’s convictions, and in our professions this means: 
one has to somehow gain access to the means of publication.”159 Subsequently, these 
historians not only attempted to disseminate their views through academic publications but 
also addressed a broader public through contributions in quality newspapers. 
 
Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 
While it was obviously not an editorial product, Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s Das deutsche 
Kaiserreich often appears to have been the foundational cornerstone of the Bielefelder 
Schule. This was not the case, as we have seen, but the book nevertheless became for many 
observers the emblematic product of Historische Sozialwissenschaft. Therefore it elicited 
numerous responses in the form of comprehensive review essays. Last but not least, Das 
deutsche Kaiserreich was a commercial success; by 1975, 25,000 copies were sold, and by 
1994, seven editions had been published.  
Wehler himself stated in the book’s introduction that he attempted in this “problem-
oriented historical structural analysis” to contribute to the “explanation of this disastrous 
German Sonderweg” between 1871 and 1945.160 At the same time Wehler understood 
historiography as having an “emancipatory function,” sharpening the critical consciousness 
of citizens in a democracy.161 Das deutsche Kaiserreich was less a coherent narrative than a 
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programmatic sketch for further research, but it also provided a summary of recent 
historiography, accomplished by younger historians since the mid-1960s. At the same time, 
Wehler’s study was a scathing polemic against “traditionalists,” “neo-traditionalists,” and 
“neo-historicists,” labels he attributed to what he considered old-school political and 
diplomatic historians. 
According to Wehler, the fundamental problem of the German Empire was 
Bismarck’s and the old elite’s victory against the liberal bourgeoisie in the Prussian 
constitutional conflict of the 1860s. After the war of unification in 1870/1871, which Wehler 
interpreted as a “preventive war of domestic political integration,” Bismarck succeeded in 
establishing an “autocratic, half-absolutist, pseudo-constitutionalism” which developed after 
his resignation into an authoritarian polycracy.162 What proved fatal in the long run for 
German history was that, according to Wehler, a personal continuity persisted in many areas 
even after the revolution of 1918, and the “traditional elites” thus were able to serve as 
Steigbügelhalter (“holders of the stirrup”) for Adolf Hitler in 1933. 
To be sure, Wehler did not propose a linear development of German history towards 
the National Socialist abyss; he did not speak of any sort of “inevitability.” But he provided a 
fairly schematic view of the German empire, and his employment of numerous heuristic 
concepts certainly increased this impression: Wehler interpreted Bismarck’s rule as a 
“Bonapartist regime,” and his government pursued a Sammlungspolitik (a “policy of 
collection” of all bourgeois counterrevolutionary forces) in order to fend off the democratic 
forces. Moreover, the government reacted to the “Great Depression”—Hans Rosenberg’s 
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term—which lasted from the mid-1870s through the mid-1890s, with economic policies 
labeled “organized capitalism.” Finally, Wehler explained the German Empire’s foreign 
policy with the theory of “social imperialism:” domestic tensions should be averted by a 
successfully aggressive foreign policy. Here Wehler’s reliance on the Primat der Innenpolitik 
concept of Eckart Kehr was again evident.163 
Not surprisingly, Wehler’s study met with considerable resistance within the German 
historical profession. The diplomatic historians Klaus Hildebrand and Andreas Hillgruber 
attacked Wehler’s notion that the German Empire’s foreign policy resulted from its domestic 
situation, and they also denied Wehler’s claim that political history should be dependent on 
(and subordinated to) social history.164 Thomas Nipperdey, for two decades Wehler’s most 
distinguished opponent, chastised the Bielefelder for what he considered Wehler’s overly 
deterministic and reductionist argumentation, and above all for his acting “simultaneously as 
prosecutor and judge” – according to Nipperdey, Wehler was conducting “a trial against the 
great-grandfathers.”165 He also considered Wehler’s relentless criticism of the Prussian-
German elites and his anti-nationalist stance as problematic und thus labeled him Treitschke 
redivivus (reversed Treitschke).166 
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American historians were able to respond to the social historians’ challenge in a more 
sober manner. After all, it was not their great-grandfathers whom Wehler had put on trial. 
But this did not mean that Americans fully embraced the concepts and interpretations 
advanced by the German social historians. As far as it is possible to generalize, Americans 
welcomed the “fresh air” that Wehler and his followers brought into German historiography, 
but at the same time they cautioned against exaggerations and blind spots. In an overall fairly 
positive review, Konrad H. Jarausch argued that while Das deutsche Kaiserreich comprised 
useful “conceptual guides for [future] research, many of Wehler’s constructs are still highly 
questionable, and though they contain important partial truths, they are too fragile for the 
erection of an entire Wilhelmian façade” – a reference to Wehler’s reliance on Eckart 
Kehr.167 Eventually Wehler, “because of his justified animus against conventional wisdom, 
[…] has consciously overstressed the negative entries on the balance sheet” of the German 
Empire.168 An English edition of Das deutsche Kaiserreich was published twelve years later, 
in 1985. Apparently, several translators were unable to please Wehler, and the text went 
through multiple revisions, which accounted for the enormous delay.169 Still, the final result 
did not read as well as the German original, and furthermore the debate on the German 
Empire had already moved in other directions.   
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Programmatic Statements and First Responses 
Understandably, as historians’ personalities matter in the process of gaining 
professional influence, the tone of a historical work also contributes to its reception. Since 
Jürgen Kocka usually expressed his criticism of the historiographical status quo more 
diplomatically than Hans-Ulrich Wehler, his studies never triggered the same fierce 
reactions, even though Kocka’s distance from “traditionalist” diplomatic historians was 
certainly no less significant. One example was the reception of his Klassengesellschaft im 
Krieg, a study that drew on Karl Marx to a greater extent than most other contributions of the 
Bielefelder. The diplomatic historian Andreas Hillgruber concluded his review with the 
telling statement: “Many intelligent thoughts in this study will certainly inspire further 
research in social history. Nevertheless, the question remains whether the methodological 
and theoretical effort has not been overdone, and whether the same results could have been 
achieved without it.”170 
Like Wehler, Kocka also repeatedly articulated his vision of a social history. 
Combining several articles he had written between 1966 and 1975, he published a 
programmatic text, Sozialgeschichte, in 1977. In this volume Kocka first outlined a few 
epistemological questions, before turning to the development of social history in German 
historiography since the late nineteenth century.171 Kocka explicitly distanced social history 
from the Strukturgeschichte that Werner Conze has advocated since the late 1950s. This 
move, while certainly grounded in methodological differences, also had a strategic function, 
as Conze had been one of the few “modernizers” of the profession. Now Wehler and Kocka 
                                                
170 Andreas Hillgruber, “Review of Jürgen Kocka, Klassengesellschaft im Krieg. Deutsche Sozialgeschichte 
1914-1918,” Historische Zeitschrift 220 (1975), 758. 
171 Jürgen Kocka, Sozialgeschichte. Begriff – Entwicklung – Probleme (Göttingen, 1977). 
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managed in tandem to outpace him in this capacity. Kocka then distinguished between 
Sozialgeschichte as “history of an area/a segment” (Geschichte eines Teilbereichs) and 
Sozialgeschichte as history of society (Geschichte ganzer Gesellschaften). Finally, the 
younger Bielefelder articulated his position regarding the societal purpose of historiography, 
cautioning against demands to provide West Germans with an identifiable past. While Kocka 
argued for a “limited political mandate” of historiography, in the sense that it should help 
stabilize a liberal-democratic society through historical education, he objected to both its 
complete politicization and the notion that apolitical historiography was either possible or 
even desirable.172 
Not surprisingly, Werner Conze himself provided a first response. Yet his review in 
Historische Zeitschrift hardly engaged the volume. At the end of what was a summary rather 
than a critique, Conze concluded: “The decidedness of his argumentation is impressive. 
Polemics are used generously. This calls for answers.”173 But Conze himself did not attempt 
to provide one. Thomas Etzemüller has argued that by the late 1970s, Conze—as well as 
Theodor Schieder—realized that they were no longer at the forefront of the methodological 
debates, even though they still occupied important positions within the West German 
historical profession. Instead, they thought it to be upon the next generation to argue about 
historiography’s direction, and Conze was therefore pleased to see the British historian 
Richard J. Evans (born in 1947) articulate a critique of the Bielefelder.174 As the Bielefelder 
                                                
172 Kocka, Sozialgeschichte, 112-131. 
173 Werner Conze, “Review of Jürgen Kocka, Sozialgeschichte,” Historische Zeitschrift 229 (1979), 96-97. 
174 Werner Conze, “Review of Richard J. Evans (ed.), Society and Politics in Wilhelmine Germany,” 
Vierteljahrshefte für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 66 (1979), 288-290. For the context, see Thomas 
Etzemüller, Sozialgeschichte als politische Geschichte, 341-343.   
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themselves would notice during the next decade, the transition from historiographical 
challenger to historiographical establishment could unfold quite suddenly, and the 
consequences for the new members of the establishment were not always welcome. 
But even now the response that the Bielefelder elicited on the other side of the 
Atlantic was not just simple agreement. On the one hand, Kocka’s manifesto 
Sozialgeschichte was received as a “very personal, intelligently argued statement of belief 
that reflects the liberality and social seriousness of a good deal of historical writing of the 
younger group of West German historians.”175 On the other hand, Gordon Craig noted in his 
review of a Fritz Fischer Festschrift that the “preoccupation with continuity . . . threaten[ed] 
to become an obsession.”176 Such a remark, while not directly aimed at the Bielefelder, 
signaled emerging American reservations about the focus of Germany’s alleged deviation 
from a Western development, for the “continuity thesis” and the “Sonderweg thesis” were 
closely related. 
Already the 1972 Historikertag in Regensburg had illustrated the issue of American 
support for West German social historians very well. On a general level, this conference saw 
debates between those historians who believed the West German historical profession to be 
under-theorized and those who did not.177 A particularly good example was the discussion 
surrounding the concept of “Organized Capitalism” that Wehler, Kocka, and others first 
                                                
175 Georg G. Iggers, “Review of Jürgen Kocka, Sozialgeschichte,” American Historical Review 84 (1979), 414. 
176 Gordon Craig, “Review of Imanuel Geiss and Bernd-Jürgen Wendt (eds.), Deutschland in der Weltpolitik 
des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts,” American Historical Review 81 (1976), 403. 
177 Berghahn, “Fritz Fischer und seine Schüler,” 148.  
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promoted for the study of the German economy from the 1870s to the early 1920s.178 They 
invited two younger American historians, Gerald Feldman of Berkeley and Charles S. Maier, 
then at Harvard. This was in itself remarkable, since foreign historians participating in panels 
at the Historikertag still constituted somewhat of an exception. Yet, as Maier recalls, the 
Americans arrived at Regensburg feeling “enlisted” by the Bielefelder to support their new 
historiographical direction.179 Ultimately, Maier and Feldman became the contributors most 
critical of the concept, and they made their skepticism quite explicit. Feldman articulated 
“serious terminological and conceptual reservations” and criticized that “in many ways the 
term organized capitalism, as Wehler and Kocka use it, is so all-encompassing that it loses 
almost all its meaning.”180 
Such reservations, articulated before the publication of Wehler’s Das deutsche 
Kaiserreich, already anticipated American attitudes toward the Sonderweg thesis, which 
overall never gained many supporters in the United States. This is a surprising fact, 
especially if one considers that the Bielefelder Schule was arguably the German 
historiographical school with the closest ties to American historians. As Hans-Ulrich Wehler 
remarked when he received the AHA honorary foreign membership in 2000,  
the transatlantic dialogue between American and German historians since the 
late 1940s is based on the fundamental experiences of the political generations 
that lived through the Nazi dictatorship, World War II, the postwar years, and 
                                                
178 See Gerald D. Feldman, “Der deutsche Organisierte Kapitalismus während der Kriegs- und Inflationsjahre,” 
in Heinrich August Winkler (ed.), Organisierter Kapitalismus. Voraussetzungen und Anfänge (Göttingen, 
1974), 150-171, and the contributions by Wehler, “Der Aufstieg des Organisierten Kapitalismus und 
Interventionsstaates in Deutschland,” 36-57; Kocka, “Organisierter Kapitalismus oder Staatsmonopolistischer 
Kapitalismus? Begriffliche Vorbemerkungen,” 19-35; and Winkler, “Einleitende Bemerkungen zu Hilferdings 
Theorie des Organisierten Kapitalismus,” 9-18, in the same volume. 
179 Charles S. Maier, Interview with the author, October 30/November 1, 2006. 
180 Feldman, “Der deutsche Organisierte Kapitalismus während der Kriegs- und Inflationsjahre,” 150 and 152. 
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the founding of the Federal Republic. These common experiences led to close 
contacts; I am someone who has profited immensely from them. The 
generations of Carl Schorske, Leonard Krieger, Hajo Holborn, Arno Mayer, 
Jim Sheehan, Henry Turner, Gerald Feldman, Charles Maier, and others have 
influenced in a lasting way the political generation in Germany to which I 
belong.181  
 
Similarly, American accounts of German historiography have generally pictured the 
Bielefelder as almost exclusively embodying its progressive tradition. In contrast to the 
Bielefelder themselves, they generally did not emphasize the “American connection” of this 
school. Yet there was still a clear tendency to depict the German social historians as fighting 
the good fight.182 
In light of these pronouncements, one has to ask whether the Bielefelder Schule for 
theoretical and methodological purposes borrowed from American historiographical 
examples. To some degree, this was certainly the case. For his study on American white-
collar workers between 1890 and 1940, Jürgen Kocka was significantly influenced by fellow 
researchers at Harvard’s Charles Warren Center led by Oscar Handlin, as well as by Alfred 
D. Chandler’s School of Business Administration.183 Similarly, Hans-Ulrich Wehler built on 
his knowledge of debates by American historians about American imperialism for his 
Habilitation on Bismarck und der Imperialismus.184 In fact, being familiar with both the 
                                                
181 Andreas Daum, “German Historiography in Transatlantic Perspective,” 121. 
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extant literature and—in person—the “Wisconsin School” of William A. Williams and his 
students, Wehler had written a study about the rise of American imperialism between the 
1860s and the 1900s first, before turning to the German Empire.185 Moreover, and more 
importantly, in his programmatic statements on the methodological renewal of German 
historiography, Wehler often used developments within the American historical profession as 
a positive counterexample, or at least as a continuous reference point.186 By no means did he 
endorse all new trends arising in the United States; Wehler was, for example, highly critical 
of the more dogmatic cliometricians.187 But he always praised what he perceived as a greater 
openness among American historians in adopting new theories and methods—unless this 
openness led them to embrace Michel Foucault.188 
Yet as Wehler began to outline his concept for a synthetic Gesellschaftsgeschichte, he 
did not explicitly rely on theories or concepts prevailing in the American historical 
profession. More generally, while Max Weber was reintroduced in West German Political 
Science and Sociology via the United States by Talcott Parsons and others, this was not the 
case in the historical profession.189 Wehler encountered Weber not in the United States, but 
through his Doktorvater Theodor Schieder and sociologist René König at the University of 
                                                
185 This study was later published as Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Der Aufstieg des amerikanischen Imperialismus. 
Studien zur Entwicklung des Imperium Americanum 1865-1900 (Göttingen, 1974); see also Wehler, “Historiker 
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186 See Hans-Ulrich Wehler, “Geschichte und Soziologie,” in Wehler, Geschichte als Historische 
Sozialwissenschaft (Frankfurt am Main, 1973), 9. 
187 Wehler, “Geschichte und Ökonomie,” in Wehler, Geschichte als Historische Sozialwissenschaft, 62. 
188 See Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Historisches Denken am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts (Göttingen, 2000). 
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Cologne.190 Similarly, Jürgen Kocka developed his version of social history in a German 
rather than a German-American context.191 Although both Wehler and Kocka were much 
more aware of new trends in both United States history and social sciences than most of their 
German colleagues, this familiarity apparently did not directly affect their respective 
conceptions of Sozialgeschichte. 
Regarding the interpretive dimension, it appears that American historians ultimately 
contributed more to the remodeling than the construction of the Bielefelder Schule. Among 
these scholars was Gerald Feldman, who, as we have seen, turned out to be an early and 
outspoken critic of the concept of “Organized Capitalism” that Wehler, Kocka, and others 
first promoted at the German Historikertag in 1972 for the study of the German economy 
from the 1870s to the early 1920s.192 Feldman’s own work on World War I and German 
inflation also led him to question the strong emphasis on continuities between 1871 and 1945 
and to instead characterize World War I as an important caesura in German history.193  
The Bismarck biographer Otto Pflanze questioned the heuristic value of the concepts 
of Sammlungspolitk, Sozialimperialismus, and Bonapartismus, which Wehler employed in 
his seminal Das deutsche Kaiserreich.194 More generally, Pflanze remained suspicious of the 
                                                
190 Wehler, Eine lebhafte Kampfsituation, 127f.; Wehler outlines his concept of Gesellschaftsgeschichte in 
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Historische Sozialwissenschaft project, cautioning against a “drifting into the magnetic fields 
of generalization.”195 One might speculate whether it was a coincidence that Pflanze was able 
to publish his comprehensive critique of Wehler in Historische Zeitschrift, which Bismarck 
biographer Lothar Gall had edited since 1975. Pflanze’s nationality could have increased the 
appeal of his positions, as it contradicted the methodological and interpretive proximity 
between American historians of modern Germany and the proponents of Historische 
Sozialwissenschaft that Wehler repeatedly stressed. Gall himself had already articulated his 
own reservations regarding the “Bonapartism” concept in his journal a few years earlier.196 
Two students of Klaus Epstein, Margaret Anderson and Kenneth Barkin, published a 
comprehensive critique of both the kleindeutsche perspective and the anti-Catholic bias, 
which they saw as not limited to but also represented by the Bielefelder Schule.197 Finally, 
when James J. Sheehan argued in his classic study on German liberalism against recent 
scholarship, which tended to “explain the liberals’ failure in terms of their moral 
deficiencies,” this critique applied to the Bielefelder Schule as well.198  
All this suggests that even though transatlantic contacts were undoubtedly significant 
for the Bielefelder, they did not manifest themselves decisively in their works. And yet, the 
“American connection” served a specific purpose during the fierce controversies that 
accompanied the establishment of the Bielefelder Schule within the German historical 
profession in the late 1960s and afterward: it became both a reference point and a label, 
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197 See Margaret Anderson and Kenneth Barkin, “The Myth of the Puttkamer Purge and the Reality of the 
Kulturkampf,” Journal of Modern History 54 (1982), 647-686. 
198 James J. Sheehan, German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago, 1978), 2. 
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which the Bielefelder attached to themselves. Applying a clever promotional strategy, the 
Bielefelder pictured themselves not only as the “critical” and “interdisciplinary” school of 
modern German history, but also as the most international, or more specifically the most 
“Americanized,” one.199 Accordingly, the Bielefelders’ opponents, “avowed historicists” 
such as Thomas Nipperdey and traditional diplomatic historians such as Andreas Hillgruber 
could only embody the opposite. A closer look at the numerous programmatic statements by 
Wehler, Kocka, and others reveals a repeated emphasis on their opponents’ lack of a critical 
stance, an interdisciplinary orientation, and a sufficiently international perspective.200 When 
the “traditionalists” took issue with the project of history as a social science, the Bielefelder 
responded that this very definition of history was widely accepted in the United States, 
implying that only a few old-fashioned Germans refused to accept a development that had 
become common wisdom abroad.201 In reality, however, some Americans were as suspicious 
of the Bielefelders’ Historische Sozialwissenschaft as the German “conservatives.”202 
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These remarks are not meant to diminish the existence or the significance of the 
transatlantic scholarly contacts that West German historians in general and the Bielefelder 
Schule in particular have maintained throughout the last decades. Instead, they suggest that 
historians, in order to be successful (i.e., to reach a wider audience), must not only produce 
convincing scholarly work, they must also promote it well. The Bielefelder clearly succeeded 
in both areas. Part of the Bielefelders’ promotional strategy was to claim the American 
historians of modern Germany as allies in their progressive historiographical enterprise. Even 
though this was a considerable oversimplification, it worked, as most historiographical 
surveys illustrate.203 
Ultimately, by the late 1960s, German and American historians had different views of 
the stage at which the reconsideration of modern German history had arrived. The revisionist 
impulse, initially much stronger on the American side, was now increasing within the West 
German historical profession. An American observer later wrote about the Fischer-
Kontroverse as the “declaration of independence” for younger German historians204—and he 
was certainly correct: by the late 1960s, the Germans of Wehler’s generation had declared 
their independence, but had yet to fight most of the revolutionary wars. By contrast, 
American historians took the controversy as a sign that West German historians had finally 
achieved the long overdue pluralization of their profession. Most Americans no longer saw 
                                                                                                                                                  
I find it a perceptive statement of the differences between History and the social sciences and a timely reminder 
of the limits to which History can or should be made into a social science.” John L. Snell to Theodor Schieder, 
December 31, 1971, BAK, NL Schieder, Box 175. 
203 Main examples include Iggers, “Introduction,” in The Social History of Politics, ed. Iggers; Retallack, 
“Social History with a Vengeance?”; Roger Fletcher, “Recent Developments in West German Historiography”; 
Moeller, “The Kaiserreich Recast.” 
204 Theodore Hamerow, “Guilt, Redemption, and Writing German History,” American Historical Review 88 
(1983), 66. 
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the front lines as running between apologetic reactionaries on the one side and revisionist 
progressives on the other. For the Americans, by the late 1960s the revolution was already 
over. 
In West Germany, however, the fierce historiographical debates continued into the 
1980s. The Bielefelder were still arguing with methodological and political conservatives, 
who since the 1970s seemed to gain support among an important constituency, the non-
professional audience. The supposedly outdated biographical genre became fashionable 
again, much to the dismay of the Bielefelder who did not believe very much in its heuristic 
value. In addition, the social historians received competition in the area of political 
progressivism, as historians of everyday life and gender historians also claimed to pursue an 
emancipatory historiographical enterprise. These debates are at the center of the next chapter. 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
The 1980s: In Defense of Intellectual Hegemony 
 
By the late 1970s, the Bielefelder Schule had become a fixture within the West 
German historical profession. Its protagonists did not—and never would—constitute the 
dominant “new orthodoxy,” as unsympathetic observers liked to lament.1 But hardly a decade 
after the school’s founding the Bielefelder had clearly established themselves as an important 
historiographical camp in the Federal Republic. Despite Bielefeld’s only mildly appealing 
geographical location—Hans-Ulrich Wehler himself liked to refer to it as the “East-
Westphalian steppe”—it assumed the status of a pilgrimage site for many students of history, 
in particular those with an interest in theory and interdisciplinary work. To be sure, 
Historische Sozialwissenschaft did not constitute the only attraction at the university; 
Reinhart Koselleck and the sociologist Niklas Luhmann gained a large number of followers 
as well. The Bielefelder Schule did, however, unquestionably shape the intellectual profile of 
both the history department and the university to a significant extent.2 
                                                
1 Imanuel Geiss, “Unsere ‘Neue Orthodoxie’ ist heute viel illiberaler als ihre akademischen Väter nach 1945,” 
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die Krise des Kaiserreichs,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 5 (1979), 418-433, designation of “orthodoxy” 
424/425. 
2 See the student day recollections by Gustav Seibt, “Bielefeld im Raketenwinter 1983/84,” and by Valentin 
Groebner, “Theoriegesättigt. Angekommen in Bielefeld 1989,” in Stefan Schlak/Sonja Asal (eds.), Was war 
Bielefeld? Eine ideengeschichtliche Nachfrage (Göttingen, 2009), 171-178 and 179-189. 
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In addition, the Bielefelder Schule had also gained a prominent space in the West 
German intellectual sphere, and by the early 1980s, its protagonists published regularly in 
newspapers and magazines. The weekly Die Zeit and the monthly magazine Merkur in 
particular offered these historians a forum to review important new studies and to comment 
on historical-political issues. The editors of these publications knew that they could always 
expect resolutely argued articles, written for a broader audience. Together with other like-
minded historians such as Hans Mommsen, Wolfgang J. Mommsen, and Heinrich August 
Winkler, the Bielefelder constituted a distinct part of the Federal Republic’s left-liberal 
intelligentsia. Though certainly differing in temperament, none of these historians was one to 
dodge a controversy, and all of them self-confidently fought for a politically progressive 
historiography. 
The 1980s, however, saw a number of challenges for these historians, which this 
chapter will survey. What made the Bielefelders’ intellectual position so difficult was the 
combination of continuing conservative criticism on the one hand and new historiographical 
competition from the Left on the other. The charge of methodological traditionalism or even 
apologetics, so conveniently and generously employed against diplomatic historians, could 
not be used against neo-Marxists, historians of everyday life, and women’s historians. 
Indeed, the political proximity of the Bielefelder and their progressive critics may have added 
to the acrimony of their debates. The controversies of the 1980s also serve as a reminder of 
the interrelationship between historiography and politics: in West Germany, the SPD found 
itself caught between the resurgent CDU and the newly established Green Party, which had 
emerged from the new social movements of the 1970s. The situation within the West German 
historical profession was strikingly similar: the social historians were caught between their 
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old conservative foes (most of whom did indeed sympathize with the CDU) and “alternative” 
historiographical movements, whose members were often close to the Greens.1 This 
observation does not necessarily imply institutional affiliations, since many of the historians 
of the different camps did not belong to the respective parties. However, an ideological 
affinity certainly existed that created a three-cornered contest. 
 
Establishment Completed 
In 1979, Jürgen Habermas edited the two-volume anthology Stichworte zur geistigen 
Situation der Zeit (Observations on the Spiritual Situation of the Age), presenting essays of 
thirty-two academics, commentators, and writers of the “contemplative Left,” who 
considered the label “intellectual” a badge of honor rather than a dirty word.2 Born between 
1922 and 1940, almost all of the contributors belonged to the 1945ers, whose political 
positions in the Federal Republic can be labeled “reformist.” This stance distinguished them 
from the 1968ers and their at times radical critique of the Federal Republic’s political and 
societal conditions. The Stichworte volumes featured prominent novelists such as Martin 
Walser and Uwe Johnson, theologians Dorothee Sölle and Jürgen Moltmann, social scientists 
Ralf Dahrendorf and Klaus von Beyme, literary scholars Fritz J. Raddatz and Karl-Heinz 
Bohrer, and contributions by three historians, Hans Mommsen, Wolfgang J. Mommsen, and 
Hans-Ulrich Wehler.  
                                                
1 The connection between political and methodological position emphasizes Aldelheid von Saldern, “Schwere 
Geburten. Neue Forschungsrichtungen in der bundesrepublikanischen Geschichtswissenschaft,” Werkstatt 
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In an essay on the “burden of the past” Hans Mommsen argued that the Federal 
Republic’s intellectual development had not kept up with its enormous economic and social 
progress. For Mommsen, the coming to terms (Bewältigung) with the Nazi past had to unfold 
“not as a one-time enlightenment, but as a recurring examination of the causes and 
mechanisms of the fascist rule.”3 His brother Wolfgang, then director of the German 
Historical Institute in London, offered a comparison of German and British self-conceptions 
in the late 1970s and argued that apart from an exaggerated pride, Germans were still lacking 
the necessary aplomb in dealing with radical political forces, as illustrated by the 
Berufsverbote for left-wing radicals during the 1970s.4 Both Mommsens expressed positions 
fairly common among left-liberal intellectuals at the end of the decade. The optimism of the 
early 1970s, when the Brandt-Scheel government had for many signaled a liberalization of 
the Federal Republic, had receded.  
While Hans and Wolfgang J. Mommsen tackled topics of a broader political nature, it 
was Hans-Ulrich Wehler who contributed a long essay on the development and state of the 
West German historical profession.5 The leading spokesman of the Bielefelder drew the well-
known picture of developments up to the 1970s, emphasizing the profession’s initial 
backwardness which had only been rectified in the wake of the Fischer-Kontroverse and—in 
Wehler’s opinion—the much more decisive methodological battles of the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. Wehler paid tribute to Theodor Schieder and Werner Conze, who had provided 
                                                
3 Hans Mommsen, “Die Last der Vergangenheit,” in Habermas (ed.), Stichworte zur “geistigen Situation der 
Zeit,“ 164-184, quote on 184. 
4 Wolfgang J. Mommsen, “’Wir sind wieder wer.’ Wandlungen im politischen Selbstverständnis der 
Deutschen,” in Habermas (ed.), Stichworte zur “geistigen Situation der Zeit,” 185-208. 
5 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, “Geschichtswissenschaft heute,” in Habermas (ed.), Stichworte zur “geistigen Situation 
der Zeit,” 709-753. 
 267 
his own generation with institutional protection and thus enabled them to advance new 
methods and more critical views of German history. He applauded the fact that social and 
economic history had become firmly established within the profession’s mainstream, and that 
“traditional political history’s predominance” was a thing of the past. However, when 
discussing more recent developments, in particular what Wehler perceived as the beginning 
of the conservative backlash, he lost his previous, relative restraint.  He castigated the 
“shabby McCarthyism,” which he thought had pervaded the profession since mid-decade, 
and which suspected left-liberal historians of Marxist-Leninist leanings. This attitude, 
according to Wehler, was not limited to the usual suspects (such as Walther Hubatsch), but 
also included younger historians, such as Winfried Baumgart and Klaus Hildebrand.6 
Moreover, in an updated version of this text that appeared the following year in one of 
Wehler’s many essay collections under the programmatic title Historische Sozialwissenschaft 
und Geschichtsschreibung, he radicalized his position even further. Now Wehler also 
included the rather “centrist” Thomas Nipperdey in a loose group of essentially reactionary 
historians, whom he accused of hiding their value judgments behind the demand for scholarly 
objectivity instead of explicating their own positions.7  
Apart from directly engaging some of his opponents, Wehler’s essay also had the 
purpose of providing a counter-point to another, more conservative text with a similar scope. 
Two years earlier, Werner Conze had surveyed the conditions and results of post-war East 
                                                
6 Wehler, “Geschichtswissenschaft heute,” in Habermas (ed.), Stichworte zur “geistigen Situation der Zeit,” 
709. 
7 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, “Zur Lage der Geschichtswissenschaft in der Bundesrepublik 1949-1979,” in Id. (ed.), 
Historische Sozialwissenschaft und Geschichtsschreibung. Studien zu Aufgaben und Traditionen deutscher 
Geschichtswissenschaft (Göttingen, 1980), 13-40 and 299-317.
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and West German historiography in his keynote speech at the German historians’ convention 
and then published the text in Historische Zeitschrift. Conze’s take on the West German 
historical profession’s modernization differed significantly from Wehler’s, and he therefore 
did not fail to mention that by far not all younger historians had participated in the 
Bielefelder’s enterprise.8 What aroused Wehler’s ire, however, was Conze’s assertion that 
criticism of previous apologetic tendencies had, among some West German historians, turned 
into “the desire to put the politically responsible of the generation of the grand- and great-
grandfathers in front of a tribunal set up by subsequent generations.” More generally, the 
much-invoked “Revision des deutschen Geschichtsbilds” (revision of the German conception 
of history) had unfolded “partly masochistically, partly superficially.”9 Ostensibly presenting 
a neutral survey of the profession’s development, the outgoing President of the Historians’ 
Association clearly expressed his dissatisfaction with many of the recent historiographical 
trends in the Federal Republic, including the Bielefelder Schule. In response, Wehler attacked 
Conze as well, accusing him of a tendency toward “a striking black-and-white 
perspective”—a criticism Wehler’s opponents usually leveled against the Bielefelder.10 It 
should also be noted that while the text was already exceedingly polemical, Wehler reserved 
his extensive footnotes for even more aggressive charges—a characteristic that became his 
trademark. 
                                                
8 Werner Conze, “Die deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft seit 1945. Bedingungen und Ergebnisse,” Historische 
Zeitschrift 225 (1977), 1-28. On page 22, Conze remarked that many younger historians did not adhere to the 
“erroneous antithesis of the ‘primacy of domestic politics.” 
9 Conze, “Die deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft seit 1945. Bedingungen und Ergebnisse,” 14 (both quotes). 
Here, Conze echoed Thomas Nipperdey, who had likewise accused Wehler of “conducting a trial against the 
great-grandfathers.” Nipperdey, “Wehlers ‘Kaiserreich’: eine kritische Auseinandersetzung,” Geschichte und 
Gesellschaft 1 (1975), 542.   
10 Wehler, “Zur Lage der Geschichtswissenschaft in der Bundesrepublik 1949-1979,” 308. 
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Even by his own previous standards, Wehler’s style was exceedingly harsh, and his 
text prompted his mentor Theodor Schieder to chide him in a private letter. When Wehler 
invoked his Doktorvater’s formative influence, Schieder wrote, he should keep in mind that 
Schieder himself had always tried to maintain a more consensual style, mediating between 
generations as well as between historians of the same generation who held different 
positions. In an almost paternal tone, Schieder reminded his former student that one “always 
had to assume that even the ones whom you accuse of conservatism operate from the 
common basis on which we all stand.” Schieder added: “It appears to be some sort of a 
trauma of yours that every dissenting opinion immediately marks a relapse into times past” 
and advised Wehler that “historiography cannot be understood only from the perspective of 
political conflicts.” Ultimately he asked Wehler to “take this letter as an admonition, but as a 
well-intentioned one, for you as well as for all of us historians.”11 
Without a doubt, the polemical attacks on—perceived or real—“traditionalists” 
remained Wehler’s trademark, but the Bielefelder and his colleagues of Geschichte und 
Gesellschaft did not resort to close-minded editorial illiberalism. Accordingly, the journal 
routinely offered opponents of Historische Sozialwissenschaft a chance to advocate their 
positions. In fact, Thomas Nipperdey had published his comprehensive critique of Wehler’s 
Kaiserreich volume in the journal’s fourth issue, and Karl-Georg Faber objected to Wehler’s 
Stichworte article in the Bielefelders’ journal. A few years later, Hans Medick articulated his 
views on Historische Sozialwissenschaft’s weaknesses and the opportunities provided by 
cultural anthropology; and, at the peak of the Historikerstreit, Ernst Nolte was able to 
                                                
11 Theodor Schieder to Hans-Ulrich Wehler, November 25, 1980, BAK, NL Theodor Schieder, Box 386. 
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respond to harsh review essays by Hans Mommsen and Wolfgang Schieder.12 Despite the 
aggressive style with which the Bielefelder often conducted their scholarly disputes, their 
editorial policies reflected a belief in the unrestricted exchange of ideas, something that not 
all editors of West German historical journals practiced. 
Two years after Wehler’s polemical survey, Wolfgang J. Mommsen offered yet 
another account of the West German historical profession’s current state. It appeared in 
Geschichte und Gesellschaft, for which Mommsen also served on the editorial board, which 
in some ways made this a slightly odd exercise. It should be noted however, that it was 
certainly common practice at the time to ask like-minded historians to provide texts that 
conformed with a journal’s general leaning. Only two years earlier, the editor of Geschichte 
in Wissenschaft und Unterricht Karl Dietrich Erdmann had instructed Klaus Hildebrand to 
provide an essay aiming at the so-called structuralist historians of National Socialism, above 
all Hans Mommsen and Martin Broszat, of whom Erdmann disapproved. The editor 
explicitly asked for a scathing text, “with a decent amount of irony.”13 Hildebrand’s 
subsequent article—a conference report on the notorious meeting of historians of National 
Socialism at Cumberland Lodge—led to a protracted and highly polemical exchange with 
Hans Mommsen and his brother Wolfgang who, as director of the German Historical Institute 
                                                
12 Thomas Nipperdey, “Wehlers ‘Kaiserreich.’ Eine kritische Auseinandersetzung,” Geschichte und 
Gesellschaft 1 (1975), 539-560; Karl-Georg Faber, “Geschichtswissenschaft als retrospektive Politik? 
Bemerkungen zu einem Aufsatz von Hans-Ulrich Wehler,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 6 (1980), 574-585; 
Hans Medick, “"Missionare im Ruderboot"? Ethnologische Erkenntnisweisen als Herausforderung an die 
Sozialgeschichte,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 10 (1984), 295-319; Ernst Nolte, “Das Vor-Urteil als "strenge 
Wissenschaft". Zu den Rezensionen von Hans Mommsen und Wolfgang Schieder,” Geschichte und 
Gesellschaft 15 (1989), 537-551. 
13 Karl Dietrich Erdmann to Klaus Hildebrand, July 23, 1979, BAK, NL Karl Dietrich Erdmann, Box 160. 
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in London, had organized the conference and disputed Hildebrand’s account.14 Hildebrand’s 
contributions ultimately became so condescending—he stated, for example, that he would 
not continue a discussion with Wolfgang J. Mommsen until the latter had done sufficient 
archival research and substantiated his views on National Socialism—that even Erdmann, the 
debate’s initiator, asked him to tone them down.15 
Focusing on modern history, Mommsen observed the main currents within the 
profession since 1945. The theme of West German historiography now having caught up 
with international and particularly Western (i.e. American, British, and French) scholarship 
was strikingly similar to Wehler’s.16 Emphasizing the pluralization of the field in the wake of 
the Fischer-Kontroverse and other debates of the 1960s, Mommsen evaluated the 
Bielefelder’s contribution to the profession’s methodological renewal overwhelmingly 
positively. In his discussion of interpretive issues, he adopted an occasionally somewhat 
distant position, in particular regarding the contested question of continuity between the 
German Empire and National Socialism. Moreover, Mommsen had earlier introduced the 
term “Kehrites” to denote a number of younger social historians who emphasized domestic 
                                                
14 Klaus Hildebrand, “Nationalsozialismus ohne Hitler?,” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 31 (1980), 
289-305; “Externus” [Hans Mommsen], “Hildebrands Lied – oder: wie die GWU ihre Leser informiert,” 
Geschichtsdidaktik 5 (1980) 325-327; Karl Dietrich Erdmann, “Antwort an einen Dunkelmann: wie informiert 
die GWU ihre Leser,” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 32 (1981), 197-198; Klaus Hildebrand, “Noch 
einmal: zur Interpretation des Nationalsozialismus,” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 32 (1981), 199-
204 “Externus” [Hans Mommsen], “Die GWU und ihre Frontberichterstatter: Fortsetzung eines 
‘Gedankenaustauschs,’” Geschichtsdidaktik 6 (1981), 233-238; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, “Die ‘reine Wahrheit’ 
über das nationalsozialistische Herrschaftssystem?,” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 32 (1981), 738-
741; Klaus Hildebrand, “Die verfolgende Unschuld,” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 32 (1981), 
742. 
15 Hildebrand, “Die verfolgende Unschuld,” 742. Karl Dietrich Erdmann to Klaus Hildebrand, August 4, 1981, 
BAK, NL Karl Dietrich Erdmann, Box 160. Erdmann wrote: “Since you are supposed to have the last word in 
this debate, you should alter the tone of your argument for the sake of effect. You should place yourself on a 
higher level than Mommsen and argue mostly in a factual manner, and plausibly for our readers.” 
16 Wolfgang J. Mommsen, “Gegenwärtige Tendenzen in der Geschichtsschreibung der Bundesrepublik” 
Geschichte und Gesellschaft 7 (1981), 149-188; reference to international scholarship on 165. 
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factors in their explanations of German imperialism—a label many of the alleged “Kehrites” 
rejected.17  
Ultimately, Mommsen’s essay illustrated that left-liberal West German historians 
never formed a completely homogeneous group. The charge of the existence of a “reigning 
orthodoxy” was more of a conservative rhetorical device than an accurate reflection of the 
West German historiographical landscape. Yet they generally stood fairly unified against 
their conservative colleagues, as various debates during the 1980s would reveal. Lastly 
Mommsen’s article also revealed the tendency of many of the left-liberal historians to 
historicize their own achievements of the late 1960s and 1970s early, which may at least 
partly explain why their interpretation of the historical profession’s development has been so 
successful. In the United States, sympathetic observers such as Georg G. Iggers, provided 
historiographical surveys, which led to a similar result: the emphasis on the West German 
historical profession’s methodological progress during that time became inextricably linked 
with Historische Sozialwissenschaft.18 
 
                                                
17 Wolfgang J. Mommsen, “Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy before 1914,” Central European 
History 6 (1973), 3-43, definition of the “Kehrites” on 8. The label was also used by Geoff Eley, “Die 
‘Kehrites’ und das Kaiserreich: Bemerkungen zu einer aktuellen Kontroverse,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 4 
(1978), 91-107; and rejected by Hans-Jürgen Puhle, “Zur Legende von der ‘Kehrschen Schule,’” Geschichte 
und Gesellschaft 4 (1978), 108-119. 
18 Of course, the main actor in the process of self-historicization was Hans-Ulrich Wehler, whose article in 
Habermas’ Stichworte zur geistigen Situation der Zeit was only one of many similar texts. For the United 
States, see Georg G. Iggers, “Introduction,” in Id. (ed.), The Social History of Politics: Critical Perspectives in 
West German Historical Writing since 1945 (Dover, NH, 1985), as well as numerous other texts by the same 
author. For a discussion of the legitimizing function of historiographical writings, see also Christoph 
Conrad/Sebastian Conrad, “Wie vergleicht man Historiographien,” in Id. (eds.), Die Nation schreiben. 
Geschichtswissenschaft im internationalen Vergleich (Göttingen, 2002), 25-26.  
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Winds Of Change – from All Directions 
In 1982, the end of the coalition between Free Democrats and Social Democrats 
brought a center-right government to power and a historian, Helmut Kohl—who liked to 
insist that he was actually Dr. Kohl—into the office of the Chancellor. Part of Kohl’s 
political agenda was to initiate a geistig-moralische Wende (an intellectual and moral turn) in 
the Federal Republic, in order to undo what he considered to be the damage caused by the 
1968ers. This turn also encompassed the desire to establish a new attitude toward the German 
past, which many critics feared might ultimately be a rather old one and lead to the 
relativization of German guilt.19 These critics took Kohl’s notorious statement that he felt 
gratitude about the “mercy of late birth” (Kohl had been born in 1930) as proof for his 
unwillingness to continue the Vergangenheitsbewältigung of his predecessors.20 In his very 
first governmental address Kohl emphasized the importance of historical reflection for the 
German nation. To that end, he announced his plans to establish a “house of history” (Haus 
der Geschichte) in Bonn, which would chronicle the development of the Federal Republic. 
Some historians took the starting point of 1945 as a sign that the new government was no 
longer interested in keeping the memory of National Socialism present.21  
Kohl’s “politics of the past,” in retrospect, did not change the perspectives of most 
Germans on 20th century German history, nor did it alter the overall responsible ways in 
which the German government under Kohl and his successors dealt with the country’s 
                                                
19 The broader context provides Edgar Wolfrum, Geschichtspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Der 
Weg zur bundesrepublikanischen Erinnerung 1948-1990 (Darmstadt, 1999), 303-345. 
20 This was a quote from a speech Kohl gave at the Knesset on January 24, 1984. In the context of the speech, 
Kohl meant to say that the time of his birth prevented him from becoming implicated in National Socialist 
crimes. To label this phrase apologetic thus seems unfair. 
21 Bundestag Plenarprotokoll, 9. Wahlperiode, 121. Sitzung, October 13, 1982, 7227. I would like to thank 
Jacob Eder for providing me with a copy of the transcript. 
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historical legacy. It would thus be tempting to dismiss left-liberal responses as mere hysteria. 
Yet Kohl’s rhetoric regarding a “normalization” of the Federal Republic’s relationship with 
the Nazi past, as well as his proposed projects, seemed to suggest that a distinctive break with 
the previous Social Democratic-Liberal governments was underway. Apart from the Haus 
der Geschichte in Bonn, Kohl’s agenda encompassed the foundation of a German Historical 
Museum in Berlin, and the historians who were asked to serve on the advisory boards were 
almost exclusively conservatives who had repeatedly denounced what they considered to 
have been an excessive focus on historical continuity between 1871 and 1945.  
Kohl relied in particular on the advice of Michael Stürmer, a historian at the 
University of Erlangen who early in his career had been counted among the left-liberals and 
in his Habilitation had expressed views on the German Empire quite similar to Wehler’s.22 It 
appears, however, that negative experiences with educational reformers at the University of 
Kassel in the early 1970s had soon turned Stürmer into a conservative. He left Kassel for the 
University of Erlangen, where he became a colleague of Walther Peter Fuchs, the 
Chancellor’s Doktorvater, who introduced Stürmer to Kohl. By the early 1980s, Stürmer had 
adopted the geopolitical argument that the German Empire’s location in Central Europe, the 
notorious Mittellage, was a key reason for its restlessness.23 Apart from his political and 
interpretive metamorphosis, Stürmer also readjusted the focus of his writings. He continued 
to publish scholarly work on the German Empire, but also wrote op-ed pieces in medium-
quality newspapers and magazines such as Die Welt and Bunte. It seems fair to say that by 
                                                
22 Michael Stürmer, Regierung und Reichstag im Bismarckstaat 1871-1880. Cäsarismus oder 
Parlamentarismus (Düsseldorf, 1974).  
23 Michael Stürmer, Das ruhelose Reich 1866-1918 (Berlin, 1983). 
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the 1980s Stürmer had become as much of a journalist as a historian.24 Of the four 
conservative historians at the center of the Historikerstreit—and one has to emphasize that 
they had little in common besides being politically right of center—Stürmer was the most 
politically conscious one, and he emphasized the connection between the past, its current 
interpretation, and the latter’s significance for the future. Complaining that the Federal 
Republic suffered from a deficient historical identity, he contended that “in a country without 
history, whoever supplies memory, shapes concepts, and interprets the past, will win the 
future.”25 What Stürmer argued in an often rather mannered style, bore striking resemblance 
to Wehler’s own position. Both historians were convinced that West Germans had to 
continue to draw important lessons from the past. They differed, however, regarding the 
question of exactly which lessons had to be learned. 
Historians of the left-liberal “camp,” such as Hans Mommsen, expressed their 
dissatisfaction with this new approach to create an “identifiable” German past á la Stürmer, 
which they feared would discontinue reflections on the rise of National Socialism.26 Jürgen 
Habermas criticized the one-sided selection of historians advising the museum’s 
conceptualization, which was not representative of the historical profession, pointing out that 
Jürgen Kocka served as the liberal fig leaf on a board of conservatives.27 Of course, Ronald 
Reagan’s disastrous visit to the Bitburg cemetery in 1985 only exacerbated concerns on the 
                                                
24 On Stürmer’s intellectual development, see Volker R. Berghahn, “Geschichtswissenschaft und grosse 
Politik,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 11/1987, March 14, 1987, 25-37. 
25 Michael Stürmer, “Geschichte in einem geschichtslosen Land,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 25, 
1986. 
26 Hans Mommsen, “Verordnete Geschichtsbilder. Historische Museumspläne der Bundesregierung,” 
Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 37 (1986), 13-24. 
27 Jürgen Habermas, “Eine Art Schadensabwicklung. Apologetische Tendenzen in der deutschen 
Zeitgeschichtsschreibung,” Die Zeit, July 7, 1986. 
 276 
Left. After representatives of the Federal Republic had not been allowed to participate in the 
fortieth anniversary of V-Day in June of 1984, Chancellor Kohl invited President Reagan to 
visit the military cemetery in Bitburg and lay a wreath as part of the V-E Day celebrations 
forty years after the end of World War II. After all, the West German government argued, the 
Federal Republic had time and again proven to be a reliable NATO ally. Unfortunately, the 
cemetery also provided a resting place for almost fifty members of the Waffen SS, which 
made the proposed visit a highly problematic enterprise.28 The choice of the Bitburg 
cemetery, it should be noted, was the result of inadequate staff preparation.  Nevertheless, the 
West Germans insisted that a cancellation would amount to a diplomatic affront, whereas 
prominent representatives of Holocaust memory in the United States, such as Elie Wiesel, 
appealed to Reagan not to travel to Bitburg.29 Ultimately, Kohl and Reagan combined visits 
to Bitburg and the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp, but this did little to placate their 
critics. For them the Bitburg controversy, together with Kohl’s museum projects, symbolized 
a distinct shift of the West German political culture. The fact that some prominent politicians 
in Kohl’s CDU speculated about reversing elements of Brandt’s Ostpolitik, including a 
possible renegotiation of the Eastern borders of a future unified Germany, only enhanced the 
suspicions on the Left.  
 
                                                
28 Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity (Cambridge, 
MA, 1988), 7-16. 
29 American responses to the affair are collected in Geoffrey H. Hartman (ed.), Bitburg in Moral and Political 
Perspective (Bloomington, IN, 1986). 
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The Revival of Biographies and Prussia 
If the political climate seemed to have become significantly more conservative, 
developments within the historical profession did not offer much cause for optimism either. 
Apart from continuing conservative attacks on the Bielefelder Schule, these years witnessed a 
rediscovery of the biographical genre among historians, much to the dismay of the social 
historians who saw the biographical approach as heuristically problematic.30 Lothar Gall 
published his enormously successful Bismarck biography, the earnings from which enabled 
him to acquire a Porsche sports car.31 Ernst Engelberg, the doyen of methodologically and 
politically dogmatic East German historiography, most likely would have purchased a 
different automobile, but his surprisingly sympathetic portrayal of the Iron Chancellor also 
sold well on the other side of the Iron Curtain.32 As an American reviewer remarked, 
Engelberg’s study advanced “conclusions much more likely to have pleased A. O. Meyer or 
Hans Rothfels, than, let us say, Erich Eyck,” which indicated Engelberg was closer to the 
conservative Bismarck enthusiasts than to the Chancellor’s liberal critics.33 And Fritz Stern’s 
dual biography of Bismarck and his banker Gerson Bleichröder, while by no means offering 
                                                
30 This attitude was not limited to the Bielefelder and would not change in the subsequent decades, either. In the 
preface of his seminal Hitler biography, Ian Kershaw recounts Hans Mommsen’s reservation about the 
biographical approach. Ian Kershaw, Hitler: Hubris, 1889-1936 (London, 1998), xviii. 
31 Information provided by Prof. Wolfram Siemann, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, January 20, 
2001. 
32 Lothar Gall, Bismarck. Der weisse Revolutionär (Berlin, 1980); Ernst Engelberg, Bismarck. Urpreusse und 
Reichsgründer (Berlin, 1985). Engelberg’s merciless reactions to supposed renegades within the East German 
historical profession are chronicled by Martin Sabrow, Das Diktat des Konsenses. Geschichtswissenschaft in 
der DDR, 1949-1969 (München, 2001). 
33 Hans A. Schmitt, “Review of Ernst Engelberg, Bismarck. Urpreusse und Reichsgründer,” Journal of Modern 
History 59 (1987), 622-624, quote on 622. Compare Arnold Oskar Meyer, Bismarck: der Mensch und der 
Staatsmann (Leipzig, 1944); Hans Rothfels, Bismarck, der Osten, und das Reich (Darmstadt, 1960); and Erich 
Eyck, Bismarck and the German Empire (London, 1950). 
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a hagiographic interpretation, also belonged to the genre of narrative-driven historical works 
that became commercially highly successful.34  
In a review of both Stern’s and Gall’s studies Jürgen Kocka therefore reflected upon 
the difficulties for Historische Sozialwissenschaft of maintaining the necessary 
terminological and theoretical sophistication without losing access to a broader audience.35 
And Hans-Ulrich Wehler, without failing to mention the merits of Gall’s Bismarck 
biography, also listed a number of interpretive inconsistencies. Wehler’s main criticism, 
however, concerned Gall’s frequent use of the adjective sober, for example when asserting to 
purport a “sober perspective.” With this claim, Wehler argued, Gall situated himself outside 
the debates surrounding Bismarck’s policies and implied a bias among other historians 
advancing different interpretations. Wehler’s criticism seems plausible, yet one has to keep in 
mind that the Bielefelder himself often resorted to similar rhetorical strategies: he liked to 
argue, for instance, that a “cost-benefit analysis” had convinced him of the “superiority” of a 
certain argument or theory—this phrase was an integral part of Wehler’s repertoire.36 
Ultimately, Wehler explained the success of Gall’s study with its appearance during the so-
called Preussenwelle (Prussia wave) that arrived in West Germany in the late 1970s. It 
manifested itself in a number of well-attended exhibitions, such as the Preussenausstellung 
                                                
34 Fritz Stern, Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichröder, and the Building of the German Empire (New York, 
1977). 
35 Jürgen Kocka, “Bismarck-Biographien,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 7 (1981), 572-581. 
36 See, for example, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, “Kritik und kritische Anti-Kritik,” Historische Zeitschrift 225 (1977), 
347-384, quote on 358. 
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in Berlin in 1981, as well as best-selling books focusing on different aspects of Prussian 
history, by the journalists Sebastian Haffner and Bernt Engelmann.37 
This increasing nostalgia for Prussia severely worried the social historians, who 
regarded it as a misguided attempt to rehabilitate historical traditions that had proven so 
calamitous. Hans-Ulrich Wehler articulated his reservations about this trend in a collection of 
essays with the title Ist Preussen wieder chic? (Is Prussia chic again?).38 The volume 
presented generally polemical texts previously published in scholarly journals and 
newspapers. This frequent re-publication of texts became Wehler’s trademark—by 2010, 
nine such volumes had appeared.39 Wehler left little doubt about his position, deploring the 
recent development that the Prussian “authoritarian state” now reappeared in a “golden 
frame.” He emphatically denied the necessity of any recourse to what he considered a 
sanitized Prussian history in order to construct a positive West German historical identity. On 
the contrary, for Wehler this historical identity necessitated a distinct break with the 
authoritarian Prussian tradition.40  
 
                                                
37 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, “Galls ‘Bismarck’—Vorzüge, Grenzen und Rezeption einer Biographie,” 
Geschichtsdidaktik 6 (1981), 205-212. Sebastian Haffner, Preussen ohne Legende (Hamburg, 1979); Bernt 
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39 Aus der Geschichte lernen? Essays (München, 1988); Die Gegenwart als Geschichte. Essays (München, 
1995); Politik in der Geschichte. Essays (München, 1998); Die Herausforderung der Kulturgeschichte 
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Unterschichten? Neue Essays zur deutschen Geschichte (München, 2010). 
40 Wehler, “Nicht verstehen! – der Preussennostalgie widerstehen!,” in Id., , Ist Preussen wieder chic?, 67-71. 
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Leftist Dissent 
By the early 1980s, the Bielefelder Schule was used to battling conservatives. What 
was new about this decade was that for the first time the progressive social historians also 
came under attack from various groups of historians on the Left. The subsequent rivalry 
among scholars who shared many values as well as opponents, and who held the similar view 
that historiography was supposed to have an “emancipatory” rather than an “affirmative” 
function, might account for the acrimony of these debates. In addition, conservatives readily 
drew on the arguments of Leftist critics, despite the fact that the interpretive commonalities 
between those critics and themselves were quite limited. 
The first challenge arose from a number of young, un-orthodox Neo-Marxist British 
historians, Geoff Eley, Richard Evans, and David Blackbourn. In 1978, Evans had published 
a collection of essays, including contributions by Eley, Blackbourn, and himself, which 
sought to correct some of the Bielefelder’s assumptions about the German Empire as well as 
the continuity question.41 Shortly thereafter Eley and Blackbourn combined two texts 
targeting even more explicitly the alleged “myths of German history.” The work’s 
publication in German as a small paperback assured a wide reception in West Germany.42 An 
unsympathetic historian remarked twenty-five years later that while the Bielefelder had 
argued, “Germany was bad,” the British neo-Marxists had responded, “Germany was bad—
and so was England.”43 This verdict points to the important fact that the British critics did not 
                                                
41 Richard J. Evans (ed.), Society and Politics in Wilhelmine Germany (London, 1978). 
42 David Blackbourn/Geoff Eley, Mythen deutscher Geschichtsschreibung. Die gescheiterte bürgerliche 
Revolution von 1848 (Frankfurt am Main, 1980). An expanded English edition was published as The 
Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth Century Germany (Oxford, 
1984).  
43 Gerald D. Feldman, Interview with the author, November 17, 2006. 
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only disagree with the Bielefelders’ take on the German Empire, in particular the alleged 
weakness of the bourgeoisie, but they also took issue with what they considered to be an 
overly rosy picture of nineteenth century Britain.44 Although both historians set out to correct 
the received wisdom regarding the Wilhelmine Empire, they differed argumentatively and 
stylistically. Blackbourn was more measured than Eley on both counts, which is why the 
ensuing debate focused on the latter scholar.  
Without assessing the validity of the respective arguments, a few comments on the 
unfolding of the debate are in order. First, the temperament of the participants accounted for 
much of its harshness. Both Eley and Wehler were talented polemicists, and Eley was, like 
the Bielefelder, fond of the footnote-blow. For example, commenting on Wehler’s claims 
regarding the sociology of social imperialism, Eley remarked that these were “mere 
assertions backed by no empirical research.”45 While Wehler was used to his political 
positions being castigated, such criticism struck a nerve. Moreover, the fact that the British 
historian published his first critique of Wehler at the age of 25 had to appear preposterous to 
the older historian who subsequently resorted to condescension.46 In a later response to Eley, 
Wehler remarked that while he and other German historians criticized by Eley had given the 
British historian “as the younger one sufficient time to defend himself,” the closed season 
                                                
44 Geoff Eley, “The British Model and the German Road: Rethinking the Course of German History Before 
1914,” in Blackbourn/Eley, The Peculiarities of German History, 62-74. Konrad H. Jarausch/Michael Geyer, 
Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Histories (Princeton, 2003), 98-99. 
45 See Geoff Eley, “Defining Social Imperialism. Use and Abuse of an Idea,” Social History 3 (1976), 65-90; 
quote on 89, footnote 107. 
46 Geoff Eley, “Sammlungspolitik, Social Imperialism, and the Navy Law of 1898,” Militärgeschichtliche 
Mitteilungen 15 (1974), 29-63. 
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was now over and the time had come for a harsh counter-attack.47 Ironically, Wehler, whom 
conservative West German historians previously had suspected of harboring Marxist 
leanings, and whose theoretical eclecticism had allowed him to borrow from Marx if he 
considered it heuristically fruitful, now attacked Eley for his supposedly dogmatic neo-
Marxism.48   
Of course, seen from the West German conservative perspective, these controversies 
among leftists of different shades elicited enormous glee. Werner Conze reviewed Evans’ 
volume and devoted a third of his text to a summary of the British historian’s criticism of the 
Bielefelder’s “new orthodoxy.”49 The conservative daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
reported with unrestrained Schadenfreude on this unexpected challenge to the overly self-
critical take on modern German history advanced by the Bielefelder.50 The book even 
became the subject of a radio broadcast, and the 1982 convention of the German Historians’ 
Association devoted a panel to the discussion.51 And in a review of the expanded English 
version of Eley’s and Blackbourn’s book, Thomas Nipperdey praised the resulting debate’s 
relativization of several of the Bielefelders’ positions: the German Sonderweg, the 
overemphasis on the feudal and pre-bourgeois elements’ influence, and the underestimation 
of the bourgeoisie. The irony of this unlikely alliance between the “neo-historicist” 
                                                
47 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, “’Deutscher Sonderweg’ oder allgemeine Probleme des westlichen Kapitalismus,” 
Merkur 35 (1981), 478-487 and 760, again in Id., Ist Preussen wieder chic?, 19-32.  
48 Wehler, “’Deutscher Sonderweg’ oder allgemeine Probleme des westlichen Kapitalismus,” 480-481. 
49 Werner Conze, “Review of Richard J. Evans, Society and Politics in Wilhelmine Germany,“ Vierteljahrshefte 
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50 Eberhard Straub, “Woher aber kam der Nationalsozialismus? Englische Historiker über Mythen deutscher 
Geschichtsschreibung,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 9, 1980; Id., “Die eingebildeten Leiden der 
Deutschen,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 22, 1981. 
51 Eley/Blackbourn, “Introduction,” in Id. The Peculiarities of German History, 2 
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Nipperdey and the British neo-Marxists was not lost on the German historian. Yet since 
Blackbourn, Evans, and Eley were “good historians,” Nipperdey concluded, their—in his 
opinion—questionable ideological disposition did not matter.52 In light of all this, it appeared 
that what Jürgen Habermas had concurrently termed the neue Unübersichtlichkeit (new 
complexity) of the political realm had affected historiography on modern Germany as well.53  
 
American Critics 
In less strident form, interpretive criticism of the Bielefelder Schule also emerged on 
the other side of the Atlantic, voiced by historians who did not belong to the Left. As we 
have seen in the previous chapter, American responses to the Bielefelder’s main works had 
generally been respectful, but never entirely uncritical. But now the voices rejecting various 
aspects of the Bielefelder’s positions became louder. In 1982, Otto Pflanze published a 
trenchant critique of several heuristic models employed by Wehler in his analyses of the 
German Empire.54 As a fellow at the Munich Historisches Kolleg in 1980/81, where he had 
been working on the second volume of his comprehensive Bismarck biography, Pflanze had 
organized a conference on the “domestic problems of Bismarck’s Empire,” which led to a 
volume collecting views quite different from Wehler’s.55 Now he voiced doubts regarding 
the concepts of Sammlungspolitk, Sozialimperialismus, and Bonapartismus, which Wehler 
                                                
52 Thomas Nipperdey, “Review of Geoff Eley/David Blackbourn, The Peculiarities of German History,” 
Historische Zeitschrift 249 (1989), 434-437. 
53 Jürgen Habermas, Die Neue Unübersichtlichkeit. Kleine politische Schriften V (Frankfurt am Main, 1985). 
54 Otto Pflanze, “Bismarcks Herrschaftstechnik als Problem der gegenwärtigen Historiographie,” Historische 
Zeitschrift 234 (1982), 561-599. 
55 Otto Pflanze (ed.), Innenpolitische Probleme des Bismarck-Reiches (München, 1983). 
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employed in his seminal Das deutsche Kaiserreich.56 More generally, Pflanze was suspicious 
of the Historische Sozialwissenschaft project, cautioning against a “drifting into the magnetic 
fields of generalization.”57  
The same year, Margaret Anderson and Kenneth Barkin, two former students of 
Klaus Epstein, published a comprehensive critique of both the kleindeutsche perspective and 
the anti-Catholic bias, which they saw as not limited to, but also represented by, the 
Bielefelder Schule.58 Ironically, Anderson and Barkin had first submitted their manuscript to 
the American Historical Review, whose editor at the time was Otto Pflanze. Pflanze rejected 
the manuscript for a number of reasons, and in justifying his decision he characterized 
“Wehler and his associates” as pursuing “a ‘socialist’ oriented historiography.” The so-called 
“Kehrites,” Pflanze argued, were in fact not very much influenced by Kehr—their “sources 
[were] Karl Marx, Talcott Parsons, Reinhard Bendix, and the ‘Frankfurt School’ of 
sociology.”59 Pflanze’s judgment was curiously wrong, yet very revealing. Both Parsons and 
Bendix were instrumental in introducing and popularizing Max Weber among American 
social scientists—Parsons had also provided the first English translation of Max Weber’s 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism in 1930—but the source of influence on the 
Bielefelder was of course Weber himself, whom Wehler and Kocka discovered as students in 
                                                
56 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Das deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918 (Göttingen, 1973). 
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West Germany, not in the United States. Nor was the impact of the Frankfurt School (with 
the exception of Jürgen Habermas) on the Bielefelder particularly significant, even if Wehler 
wrote in his Bismarck und der Imperialismus that he aimed at developing a “critical theory” 
of imperialism.60 The same was true for Karl Marx, whom Wehler, Kocka (slightly more so), 
and like-minded historians regarded as a potential source of inspiration, without ever 
succumbing to the danger of dogmatism.61 Pflanze seems to have been deceived by Wehler’s 
remark that a historian could learn more from Marx than from Ranke, which in the context of 
the late 1960s served more as a provocation of the West German historiographical 
establishment than as an actual statement of faith.62 Moreover, Wehler’s as well as Heinrich 
August Winkler’s responses to Geoff Eley and David Blackbourn revealed the skepticism of 
left-liberal West Germans toward a heavy reliance on Marx.63 Only three years earlier, 
Winkler had published a trenchant critique of neo-Marxist concepts of revolution and fascism 
with the telling subtitle “on the revision of Historical Materialism.64 Pflanze’s assessment, 
while inaccurate, therefore betrays some of the concerns the traditionalist American historian 
apparently harbored regarding the Bielefelder Schule—the label “socialist” clearly possessed 
a negative connotation. 
                                                
60 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Bismarck und der Imperialismus (Köln, 1969), 14. 
61 The work most inspired by Marx was Kocka’s Klassengesellschaft im Kriege. Deutsche Sozialgeschichte 
1914-1918 (Göttingen, 1973). 
62 Wehler, Bismarck und der Imperialismus, Introduction.  
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Mythen deutscher Geschichtsschreibung”; Heinrich August Winkler, “Der deutsche Sonderweg. Eine 
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However, one should note that, despite his role as the editor of the American 
Historical Review, by the early 1980s Pflanze was no longer in touch with the intellectual 
currents within the American historical profession. Thus his views were not necessarily 
typical of American historians of modern Germany. As in West Germany, in the United 
States the leading historians by then were mostly born between 1930 and the early 1940s, 
training graduate students at places such as Berkeley (Gerald Feldman), Stanford (James 
Sheehan), Yale (Henry Turner), and UNC Chapel Hill (Konrad H. Jarausch). With Geoff 
Eley and Michael Geyer, the University of Michigan had attracted two even slightly younger 
historians, who turned its history department into an attractive place to study Germany. Still, 
Pflanze’s voice was one of many in the growing transatlantic chorus of critics who attacked 
certain tenets of the Bielefelder Schule.  
 
The “Barefoot Historians” 
Yet another group of historians with whom the Bielefelder had to contend and who 
came primarily from a leftist background were the Alltagshistoriker (historians of everyday 
life). The appearance of Alltagsgeschichte illustrated once again the influence of political 
conditions on scholarship. Just as the spirit of the 1960s had led scholars to embrace 
structural history and modernization theories, the rising skepticism toward modernity and its 
effects on individuals helped spur the emergence of historians who became interested in 
history from the bottom up.65 Some of the local groups emerging around the time were 
situated in the “alternative” West German milieu of environmentalist and pacifist activists. 
                                                
65 Thomas Lindenberger, “’Alltagsgeschichte’ oder: als um die zünftigen Grenzen der Geschichtswissenschaft 
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The historian of everyday life’s local orientation found expression in the slogan “dig where 
you stand,” coined by the Swedish journalist Sven Lindquist, who had published a “manual 
for researching one’s own history” in 1978.66 Whereas the Bielefelder and other historians in 
their orbit had tended toward the United States, historians of everyday life received 
inspiration from the British history workshop movement, whose flagship History Workshop 
Journal had begun publishing in 1976.67 Alltagsgeschichte was a diverse historiographical 
movement and developed simultaneously within and outside West German history 
departments. Even in retrospect, Thomas Lindenberger, one of the participants in this new 
enterprise, declared attempts to precisely define what Alltagsgeschichte stood for to be futile. 
The new movement defied categorization because its members had, depending on the 
respective regional and local situation, varying interests—and forming a distinct 
historiographical school was clearly not a priority.68  
Accordingly, the Bielefelder tended to distinguish between good (i.e., professional) 
and bad (i.e., amateur) historians of everyday life. The former were often social historians 
with impeccable credentials, such as Lutz Niethammer and Hans Medick, whose studies 
could not be dismissed as lacking scholarly rigor.69 And of course nobody denied the 
significance and sophistication of the Bayern-Projekt, which Martin Broszat initiated at the 
                                                
66 A German translation appeared as Grabe, wo du stehst. Handbuch zur Erforschung der eigenen Geschichte 
(Bonn, 1989). 
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Institut für Zeitgeschichte in the mid-1970s, and which analyzed the National Socialist 
regime from below.70 The Bayern-Projekt also revealed that while there might have been a 
conceptual danger for historians of everyday life to succumb to nostalgia (arguably 
particularly problematic for the Nazi period), in practice this did not happen. If Bielefeld 
symbolized the center of progressive social history in West Germany, Göttingen became the 
equivalent for Alltagsgeschichte. There, at the Max-Planck-Institut für Geschichte, director 
Rudolf Vierhaus had assembled a number of historians of everyday life, including Alf 
Lüdtke, Hans Medick, Peter Kriedte, and Jürgen Schlumbohm, who produced widely 
acknowledged scholarship. With the inclusion of the American historian David Sabean, a 
research fellow between 1976 and 1983, the institute even had a slightly transatlantic 
character.71 And since Georg Iggers had become a frequent visitor at the Institute (and 
ultimately divided his time between Göttingen and Buffalo), the foremost American observer 
of German historiography was present to chronicle the developments.72  
Charges against the historians of everyday life concerned methodological as well as 
interpretive aspects. Interpretively, social historians (not only from the Bielefeld camp) 
argued that, in their attempt to do justice to the losers of historical processes, proponents of 
Alltagsgeschichte tended to glorify the “little man” and the “little woman,” whose less 
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appealing sides remained neglected. Not surprisingly, it was Wehler who coined the 
memorable phrase that historians of everyday life turned “peasant bandits into heroes.”73  
The desire to portray the lower classes in sympathetic light often resulted in exaggerated 
identification at the expense of analysis. Jürgen Kocka diagnosed a “generally anti-analytical 
attitude” among these historians.74 Proponents of Historische Sozialwissenschaft also took 
issue with what they perceived as an excessive fear of “modernity.” While they would later 
admit that Alltagsgeschichte’s insistence on the costs of progress had led them to reevaluate 
their own positions to a degree, the first response was rejection. In Wehler’s case, dismissal 
became mixed with considerable condescension – he coined the label “barefoot historians,” 
clearly implying a lack of sophistication.75 Finally, Wehler criticized that historians of 
everyday life had yet to produce a synthetical work on nineteenth or twentieth century 
Germany. In fact, he argued, Alltagsgeschichte lacked the ability to provide an integrative 
synthesis, according to Wehler the “pinnacle of historiography,” because it did not possess a 
distinct paradigm. Accordingly, historians could “only tell stories of everyday life, but not a 
German history of the everyday life from 1800 to 1980.”76 Since the historiographical 
debates of the last decade have often questioned the desirability of such master narratives, in 
particular with a strictly national focus, this alleged deficit of Alltagsgeschichte today seems 
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excusable.77 Perhaps more importantly, historians of everyday life never strove to produce a 
synthesis, a fact that makes Wehler’s complaint seem gratuitous. Yet at the time, Thomas 
Nipperdey had just published the first volume of his Deutsche Geschichte, and Wehler was in 
the process of writing his Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte.78 For many historians, 
especially those eager to reach a wider audience, the publication of a comprehensive 
interpretation of German history was the ultimate goal. 
How deep the scars of the debates between social historians and historians of 
everyday life had become could be seen during the late 1990s, when German historians for 
the first time broached the history of their profession during the Nazi years. In this debate 
Theodor Schieder’s intellectual contribution to Nazi measures of ethnic cleansing in Poland, 
which had been discovered a few years earlier, became widely known.79 To be sure, the shift 
in attitude among some of the progressive historians seemed puzzling: they had never shied 
away from dismantling the historical profession’s traditions, but now resorted to a curiously 
defensive and empathetic position vis-à-vis those incriminated historians with whom they 
had had personal relationships.  Commenting on Wehler’s defense of his mentor Schieder, 
Peter Schöttler acidly remarked on the irony that the protagonist of Historische 
Sozialwissenschaft argued for an empathetic (verstehend) approach, something that 
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throughout his career he had so adamantly rejected.80 Schöttler was not only arguing for the 
sake of historical justice and accuracy, but he also recognized an opportunity to settle old 
scores, as he had belonged to the first generation of “barefoot historians” who in the early 
1980s had fallen victim to the Bielefelders’ invectives.81 
 
Women’s History 
If the Bielefelder had deemed historians of everyday life insufficiently professional 
and articulated this in no uncertain terms, the response to women’s history seemed to take a 
slightly different form: the social historians sometimes preferred to ignore rather than engage 
the new historiographical direction.82 Nevertheless, Geschichte und Gesellschaft published 
an issue on “women in the nineteenth and twentieth century history” in 1981, which by West 
German standards was quite early.83 Hans-Ulrich Wehler provided the preface, in which he 
acknowledged the necessity of the West German historical profession to catch up with 
developments in Western Europe and the United States. He was undoubtedly correct; 
compared to the United States, women’s history as a distinct field emerged rather late, just as 
women in the American historical profession had started to organize earlier.84 Consequently, 
Karin Hausen began her 1981 survey of women’s history in the United States by deploring 
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the backwardness of the West German historical profession.85 It is also true that some were 
more backward than others: in contrast to other journals, such as Historische Zeitschrift, in 
which women’s history remained non-existent, Geschichte und Gesellschaft offered the new 
historiographical direction at least some space.86 Yet only rarely did the Bielefelder 
contemplate what women’s historians (or gender historians) might have to offer to 
Historische Sozialwissenschaft. Instead, they focused on conferences from which male 
scholars were excluded, in order to deplore the new movement’s “irrational elements.” 
Jürgen Kocka even went so far as to liken the exclusion of male historians from the 1981 
meeting of women’s historians at the University of Bielefeld to the exclusion of Jewish 
scholars in Nazi Germany.87 By drawing this dubious comparison, Kocka revealed not only 
his lacking awareness of the reasons why female historians deemed it necessary to meet 
among themselves, but he also ignored the fact that in the American historical profession 
such events were widely accepted, common practice, as several participants of the Bielefeld 
conference pointed out in response.88  
As had been the case with the other historiographical challenges to Historische 
Sozialwissenschaft, the Bielefelder practiced “initially rejection and defamation, later 
enrichment and integration,” which meant at least partial acceptance.89 In 1986, an updated 
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edition of Jürgen Kocka’s volume Sozialgeschichte appeared. In the last chapter, which 
discussed historiographical developments in the previous decade (the book had originally 
been published in 1977), Kocka conceded that women’s history counted among the “most 
important new approaches,” but added that its challenge to the historical profession had 
unfolded “at times in a utopian and exaggerated manner, and in contradiction to the basic 
principles of scholarly work.”90 The professionalization argument, employed against 
historians of everyday life, played an important role in this discussion as well. 
Just when the debates between social historians and their respective challengers were 
raging, the Norwegian social scientist Johan Galtung famously contrasted four distinctive 
intellectual styles, constructing the ideal types of the “Saxonic”, the “Teutonic”, the “Gallic”, 
and the “Nipponic” intellectual style.91 Among other elements, Galtung distinguished 
between the rather conversational style of debate in Anglo-American academia and the more 
contentious style of debate within its German counterpart. But apart from these—alleged or 
imagined—peculiarities of German academia, structural characteristics of the university 
system also seem to have contributed to the acrimony of these debates. The historical 
profession in West Germany was, despite the expansion of the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
still a comparatively manageable world, in which a small number of scholars exerted 
significant influence on the distribution of jobs. The existence of few powerful “middle-aged 
boys networks” constricted the establishment of new historiographical directions. Moreover, 
by 1980 the vast majority of full professors were far from retirement, which led to very few 
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job openings. Finally, the decreasing funding for universities made the creation of new 
academic position almost impossible. These factors explain why most historians of everyday 
life and women’s historians were ultimately prevented from gaining a permanent institutional 
foothold. 
From the Bielefelders’ perspective, their recently gained position within the historical 
profession had to be defended. While during the early 1970s they had felt that time was on 
their side, it now seemed that Historische Sozialwissenschaft was losing ground, even more 
so outside than within the confines of the academic discipline. Apart from interpretive 
disagreements, the 1980s also saw a slow shift of German history’s “vanishing point” from 
1933 to 1941.92 American as well as German historians began to direct their attention to the 
genesis of the Holocaust. As a consequence, the issues of the Nazi rise to power and of the 
continuities between German Empire and Nazi Germany became less pressing, and the 
Bielefelder began to lose their position on the cutting edge of research. Lastly, as soon as the 
“family feuds” among left-of-center historians of different shades had receded, the next battle 
with conservative scholars was about to begin.  
 
The Historikerstreit – Restoring Old Dichotomies? 
If the debates of the early 1980s seemed to suggest that the historiographical “camps” 
had become increasingly diversified, the Historikerstreit restored the previous dichotomy and 
split the West German historiographical profession along one distinct line, “conservatives” 
vs. “left-liberals”. This debate, characterized more by its acrimonious nature than by its 
                                                
92 See Helmut Walser Smith, “The Vanishing Point of German History: An Essay on Perspective,” History and 
Memory 17 (2005), 269-295, esp. 283-288. 
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contribution to historiographical progress, seemed to revolve around the question of National 
Socialism’s singularity.93 Yet in reality, what was at stake went far beyond particular 
historiographical questions. It was the intellectual hegemony of left-liberal academics, who 
had fought for the establishment of a critical rather than affirmative “use” of modern German 
history, and who saw their achievements endangered. This is not to say that the 
Historikerstreit was entirely irrelevant from a scholarly point of view. As Ulrich Herbert has 
convincingly argued, the objection to Nolte’s obvious apologetics ultimately resulted in 
increasing research on the mechanics of the Holocaust.94 Still, the debate was primarily a 
political one, and in this evaluation historians on both sides of the divide agreed—Hans-
Ulrich Wehler termed it “primarily a political battle for the self-conception of the Federal 
Republic and the political consciousness of its citizens,” while for the conservative 
diplomatic historian Andreas Hillgruber, Jürgen Habermas’ articles, which had started the 
controversy, were “not grounded in scholarship, but politically motivated.”95 
Since the development of the Historikerstreit has been recounted multiple times, a 
few comments may suffice.96 Alarmed by Chancellor Kohl’s “politics of the past” during the 
                                                
93 The title of the volume representing the main contributions suggested just that. See Reinhard Piper (ed.), 
“Historikerstreit.” Die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der nationalsozialistischen 
Judenvernichtung (München, 1987). 
94 Ulrich Herbert, “Der Historikerstreit. Politische, wissenschaftliche und biographische Aspekte,” in Martin 
Sabrow/Ralf Jessen/Klaus Grosse Kracht (eds.), Zeitgeschichte als Streitgeschichte. Grosse Kontroversen seit 
1945 (München, 2003), 94-113. 
95 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Entsorgung der deutschen Vergangenheit? Ein polemischer Essay zum Historikerstreit 
(München, 1988), 10; Andreas Hillgruber, “Für die Forschung gibt es kein Frageverbot,” Rheinischer 
Merkur/Christ und Welt, October 31, 1986. 
96 The most recent balanced account provides Klaus Grosse Kracht, Die zankende Zunft. Historische 
Kontroversen in Deutschland nach 1945 (Göttingen, 2005), 91-114. The controversy was also observed by 
British and American scholars of German history: Richard J. Evans, In Hitler’s Shadow: West German 
Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past (New York, 1988); Charles S. Maier, The 
Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity (Cambridge, MA, 1988). 
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previous years, as well as several essays by Ernst Nolte, Jürgen Habermas attacked what he 
considered the “apologetic tendencies of West German contemporary history.”97 Habermas 
lumped together a fairly heterogeneous group of four historians who he claimed represented 
the historiographical shift toward apologia. Ernst Nolte, author of a highly regarded, 
comparative study on fascism, oscillated between history and philosophy. Michael Stürmer’s 
scholarly work focused more on nineteenth century than on contemporary history, even 
though he touched upon these issues in the many articles he published in non-academic 
venues. Of the four historians, the Kohl adviser Stürmer was the only public intellectual, 
whose presence in the media matched Habermas’ and the Bielefelders’. Finally, Andreas 
Hillgruber—as well as Klaus Hildebrand, who vehemently defended him—were rather 
traditional diplomatic historians. Of the four, only Nolte was a true apologist, advancing 
increasingly outrageous arguments trivializing National Socialism and the Holocaust, all 
under the guise of philosophical speculation and rhetorical questions.98 
Regardless of its factual accuracy, Habermas’ article triggered an avalanche of 
responses, in which the tone adopted by historians on the Left as well as on the Right became 
increasingly agitated. The Historikerstreit also revealed that the trenches in which the 
combatants were fighting (the military terminology seems appropriate given the tenor of the 
debate) had already been dug around 1968. Andreas Hillgruber, for example, accused Jürgen 
Habermas of writing in the style of “APO pamphlets” (referring to texts by the leftist Extra-
                                                
97 Jürgen Habermas, “Eine Art Schadensabwicklung. Apologetische Tendenzen in der deutschen 
Zeitgeschichtsschreibung,” Die Zeit, July 7, 1986. 
98 Ernst Nolte, “Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 6, 1986; Id., 
Der europäische Bürgerkrieg, 1917-1945. Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus (Berlin, 1987). 
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Parliamentary Opposition of the late 1960s).99 Habermas had never had any connection to 
student radicalism, but both Hillgruber (in Cologne) and Nolte (in Marburg and later Berlin) 
had been victims of left-wing students who had launched vicious campaigns against them, 
distributing leaflets and interrupting lectures. In the 1970s, Nolte had been a founding 
member of the Bund Freiheit der Wissenschaft, a conservative organization of university 
professors attempting to curb the influence of the student movement on West German 
universities. Ultimately, the debate led to a consolidation of the left-liberal and conservative 
historiographical camps, with the former regaining some of the ground it had lost in the 
previous years. On the left-liberal side, the debate unified experts on National Socialism such 
as the “functionalist” Hans Mommsen and the “intentionalist” Eberhard Jäckel, who had 
previously had significant interpretive disagreements, but who both considered Nolte’s 
position fundamentally wrong. For the broader public, the controversy offered the rare 
spectacle of prominent scholars launching salvos at each other in the press.100 
The Historikerstreit was a very German affair—this verdict holds true in at least two 
respects. It refers to the way in which the debate unfolded, with both sides simultaneously 
fanning the flames and accusing the opponents of polemics, thus proving Johan Galtung’s 
theory regarding the teutonic academic style. The controversy was also German insofar as 
American—or other foreign—historians participated in the debate not through direct 
interventions but only through reviews of the protagonists’ works that were at the center of 
the debate. Moreover, American and British historians took stock of the controversy only 
                                                
99 Andreas Hillgruber, “Jürgen Habermas, Karl-Heinz Janssen, und die Aufklärung Anno 1986,” Geschichte in 
Wissenschaft und Unterricht 37 (1986), 725-738, quote 725. 
100 Many of the contributions in daily and weekly newspapers are collected in Piper (ed.), “Historikerstreit.” 
For an analysis of the Historikerstreit as a “media debate,” see Grosse Kracht, Die zankende Zunft, 91-114. 
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after the dust had settled.101 But once they began to comment on the debate, they were 
unanimous in their opposition to Ernst Nolte’s apologetics, even though Habermas received a 
fair share of criticism as well. Similar to the Fischer-Kontroverse more than 20 years earlier, 
the Historikerstreit thus in sum affirmed the “progressive” transatlantic alliance of historians. 
All of the debates reviewed above concerned West German historiography’s 
methodological and interpretive dimension. Yet the free-floating intelligentsia within the 
historical profession was of course firmly embedded in its institutional structures, and during 
the 1980s this dimension received increasing attention as well. While conservative West 
German historians usually lost the debates conducted outside the narrow confines of 
scholarly journals, because their left-liberal colleagues tended to dominate the discourse in 
daily and weekly newspapers, they were much more successful behind the scenes. By the 
1980s, they had managed to engineer conservative majorities in most historical institutions’ 
academic advisory boards. While this may appear, especially to American readers, as an 
overly political interpretation of these academic processes, the mode of thinking in particular 
camps was something left-liberals and conservatives shared. This would continue well into 
the 1990s. Klaus Hildebrand, whose contacts with and even exposure to the American 
historical profession had been distinctly limited, became the chairman of the German 
Historical Institute’s advisory board in Washington D.C. in 1993.102 While academic politics 
of this sort had traditionally gone more or less unnoticed, in the stormy climate of the 1980s 
                                                
101 Exemplary are the contributions by Gordon Craig, “The War of the German Historians,” New York Review of 
Books, January 15, 1987, a review of the books by Hillgruber and Stürmer that figured in the Historikerstreit; 
Charles S. Maier, “Immoral Equivalence: Revisiting the Nazi Past for the Kohl Era,” The New Republic, 
December 1, 1986, 36-41. 
102 For a list of advisory boards of the most important historical institutions, see the appendix in Hohls/Jarausch 
(eds.) Versäumte Fragen, 503-516.  
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Hans-Ulrich Wehler castigated these developments, which he claimed had not just led to 
ideological conformity but also brought second-rate historians into influential positions.103 
Of course, the question of what constitutes first- and second-rate very much depends 
on the position of the observer. Yet it is striking that academic advisory boards of German 
Historical Institutes were sometimes comprised of historians with very little—if any—
connection to the country where the institute was located. Klaus Hildebrand’s chairmanship 
at the GHI in Washington D.C seems to have been a result of his successful academic politics 
rather than his familiarity with American history or the American historical profession. More 
generally, a comparison of the academic advisory boards of institutions both inside and 
outside Germany reveals a near omnipresence of a few distinguished names, almost all of 
whom could be counted as conservative. This observation underscores the fact that despite 
some statements to the contrary, there never was a “prevailing orthodoxy” within the West 
German historical profession. 
The historiographical battles surrounding Historische Sozialwissenschaft did of 
course not end with unification. But what changed during the 1990s was the correlation 
between methodological and political positions. When Hans-Ulrich Wehler vehemently 
rejected a cultural history based on Michel Foucault, he did not argue with historians of a 
distinct political persuasion.104 In fact, many representatives of a younger generation, who 
tended toward cultural rather than social history, regarded the close connection between 
historiography and politics as somewhat outdated. And while many historians of Wehler’s 
                                                
103 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, “Neokonservative Wissenschaftspolitik. Eine Anmerkung zum Historikerstreit,” 
Merkur 41 (1987), 1091-1096. 
104 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Die Herausforderung der Kulturgeschichte (München, 1998). 
 300 
generation had sought and gained access to non-academic publication venues, the succeeding 
cohort seemed to be much less interested in the role of public intellectuals—something 
Wehler deplored.105 While many of the Bielefelder’s generation had ostentatiously 
challenged the preceding generations, now younger scholars were more quietly venturing in 
new directions, politely ignoring the social historians’ objections. The atmosphere at the 
conference “Das Deutsche Kaiserreich in der Kontroverse – Probleme und Perspektiven,” 
which was held in Berlin in January 2007 on the occasion of Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s 75th 
birthday, illustrates this change quite well. When the honored historian, together with Jürgen 
Kocka, once again launched a tirade against cultural historians (the term used was 
Kulturalisten, which had a derogatory connotation), the response of the audience, where 
historians in their thirties and forties were in the majority, ranged between amusement and 
boredom.106 It was obvious that this younger generation did not deem it necessary to continue 
the old debates.  
 
                                                
105 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Eine lebhafte Kampfsituation. Ein Gespräch mit Manfred Hettling und Cornelius Torp 
(München, 2006), 184. 
106 Personal observation at the conference. See also the conference report “Das Deutsche Kaiserreich in der 
Kontroverse – Probleme und Perspektiven,” January 11-13, 2007, Berlin, H-Soz-u-Kult, January 25, 2007, 
http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/tagungsberichte/id=1469; and the conference volume, Sven Oliver 
Müller/Cornelius Torp (eds.), Das Deutsche Kaiserreich in der Kontroverse (Göttingen, 2009). 
CONCLUSION 
 
Rethinking Modern German History: a Transatlantic Enterprise? 
 
This dissertation has provided an account of the German-American scholarly 
community of modern German history between the end of World War II and the 1980s. 
Within this community, the study has traced the intellectual and institutional development of 
the Bielefelder Schule, a group of social historians with close ties to scholars on the other 
side of Atlantic. By following the Bielefelders’ establishment within and their impact on the 
West German historical profession, the dissertation has combined a national and a 
transnational focus in order to contribute to the growing literature on postwar West German 
historiography. As I have argued in the previous chapters, the prevailing notions about the 
transatlantic scholarly community do not adequately capture its complexities. Conceiving of 
this community in a more differentiated way also leads us to correct some assumptions about 
the Bielefelder Schule. Yet before I summarize my findings, we should briefly recall the 
prevailing images of the German-American community of historians and the Bielefelder 
Schule. 
 As Ernst Schulin put it succinctly, “Anglo-American critical interest in German 
history influenced and assisted in the modernization of West German historical writing.”1 
Virtually every single account of postwar German-American historiography echoes this point 
                                                
1 Ernst Schulin, “German and American Historiography in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” in 
Lehmann/Sheehan, An Interrupted Past, 31. 
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of view.1 This has created the impression of American historians providing some sort of 
developmental aid to their German colleagues, who were slowly moving along on their “long 
way West:” throughout the postwar years, Americans consistently intervened on behalf of 
those German historians who proposed a “critical” perspective on the German past. During 
the 1960s’ Fischer-Kontroverse about the origins and the course of World War I, Americans 
sided with Fritz Fischer, who was initially very isolated within the German historical 
profession. As late as the Historikerstreit of the 1980s, American historians were unanimous 
in their opposition to Ernst Nolte’s apologetics regarding the singularity of National 
Socialism and the Holocaust.2  
These prevailing notions about the role of American scholars of modern German 
history have also shaped my own perspective on this topic. An article growing out of my 
M.A. thesis argued along the lines of the same German-American historiographical 
dichotomy.3 However, critics of this position have correctly argued that it implicitly or 
explicitly casts American historians of modern Germany as impartial observers of West 
German historiography and as neutral arbiters in the notoriously fierce debates among their 
German colleagues.4 Ultimately, such an interpretation assumes that the physical distance 
                                                
1 See Wolfgang J. Mommsen, The Return to the Western Tradition: German Historiography since 1945 
(Washington, D.C., 1991); Georg Iggers, “Introduction”, in Id., The Social History of Politics: Critical 
Perspectives in West German Historical Writing Since 1945 (Leamington Spa, 1985), 1-45; Andreas Daum, 
“German Historiography in Transatlantic perspective: interview with Hans-Ulrich Wehler”, Bulletin of the 
German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C., 26 (2001), 121f.; Jürgen Kocka, Sozialgeschichte: Begriff – 
Entwicklung – Probleme (Göttingen, 1977), 40. 
2 See Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity 
(Cambridge, MA, 1988); Gordon Craig, “Review of Ernst Nolte, Der europäische Bürgerkrieg,” 
Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 36 (1988), 772-773. 
3 Philipp Stelzel, “Fritz Fischer and the American Historical Profession: Tracing the Transatlantic Dimension of 
the Fischer-Kontroverse,” Storia della Storiografia 44 (2003), 67-84. 
4 John L. Harvey, Contribution to an H-German discussion, April 5, 2006. 
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from the studied country somehow facilitates a more “objective” perspective, an argument 
that simply reverses the previous conservative German claim of foreigners lacking proper 
understanding of and empathy for the peculiarities of German history. Following this 
critique, my research has indeed revealed a more complex picture and has led me to suggest 
an alternative conceptualization of the post-World War II German-American community of 
historians.  
The Bielefelder Schule appears in most accounts as embodying the progressive West 
German historiographical tradition. This observation is generally linked to the school’s 
emergence within a transatlantic scholarly context. Historische Sozialwissenschaft, the 
argument goes, successfully modernized the West German historical profession, because it 
provided a “critical” perspective on the German past, re-conceptualized historiography in an 
interdisciplinary fashion, and internationalized the field by drawing on American influences 
and bringing American scholars into the conversation. As we have seen, this perception has 
been the result of many texts written by the Bielefelder Schule’s protagonists, other left-
liberal historians of the same generation, and sympathetic American observers. Yet my 
research suggests that we need to conceive of the role of American historians in the genesis 
of the Bielefelder Schule in a less one-dimensional way. 
 
A Transatlantic Conversation 
The decades under review in this dissertation witnessed the establishment and 
consolidation of a large and diverse German-American scholarly community. The creation of 
a continuous transatlantic conversation, in which the national background of the participants 
became less and less important, unquestionably constitutes an impressive achievement. To 
dismiss American historians as lacking the proper understanding of the peculiarities of 
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German history today would be perceived as unacceptable. While national historiographical 
and of course societal traditions continue to influence the work of historians studying 
countries other than their own, the essentialist critique, which mostly conservative Germans 
leveled against disagreeable foreign perspectives, has lost its effectiveness. As we have seen, 
as late as the early 1960s, even an émigré historian such as Klaus Epstein viewed American-
born historians as disadvantaged when analyzing complex events in German history. Yet 
most historians of his age cohort, and certainly the overwhelming majority of scholars of the 
succeeding generations, deemed such an argument to be inappropriate.  
As German historians realized that intellectual isolation and the dismissal of 
American—and other foreign—perspectives on German history was no longer a viable 
option, they increasingly co-opted American colleagues who happened to share their views. 
Gerhard Ritter’s successful attempt to reestablish the journal Archiv für 
Reformationsgeschichte through a transatlantic group of Reformation scholars constitutes 
one such example. Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s selection of members for Geschichte und 
Gesellschaft’s consulting committee, which ultimately contained nine American scholars, 
belongs to a similar category. To emphasize this strategic dimension should not be 
understood as merely a cynical reduction of innocent and even idealistic international 
scholarly cooperation to academic politics. Of course, German historians often reached out to 
their colleagues on the other side of the Atlantic because of shared interests and approaches. 
But American historians could also assume the role of useful allies or “court of appeals,” in 
particular during the many hard-fought historiographical debates.5   
                                                
5 Other foreign historians could serve in the same role. This constitutes one of two main reasons why Eley’s, 
Blackbourn’s, and Evans’ critique of the Sonderweg paradigm warmed the hearts of German conservatives. 
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When Theodor Schieder recommended émigré historian Klaus Epstein for several 
Lehrstühle in the Federal Republic, he knew that the American would not push revisionism 
beyond the limits that Schieder and other moderate conservatives deemed acceptable. 
Similarly, Otto Pflanze’s dismissal of Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s Bismarck interpretation was 
particularly valuable for the Bielefelder’s conservative West German critics. After all, it was 
articulated by one of the Americans, who were generally believed to fall in line with the 
proponents of Historische Sozialwissenschaft. It did not matter that Pflanze himself was 
largely out of touch with American historiographical developments of the time. What 
mattered was that he could be cast as an objective outside observer. Again, these remarks are 
not meant to reduce international scholarly cooperation to its function within academic 
politics. But American colleagues often became supposedly impartial scholarly arbiters, 
whose opinion conveniently served to bolster the respective German position—of 
conservatives and of progressives. 
While an outside perspective does not guarantee more convincing scholarship, it at 
least can enable historians to deal with politically or morally sensitive issues at an earlier 
time. Hans W. Gatzke’s study Drive to the West, completed in 1947 and published in 1950, 
anticipated many of Fritz Fischer’s arguments of the 1960s regarding the German Empire’s 
war aims in World War I.6 This observation is certainly not limited to historiography on 
modern Germany. Similarly, it was less difficult for the American historian Robert Paxton to 
                                                                                                                                                  
British historians could hardly be accused of an apologetic stance toward Imperial Germany. The critics’ neo-
Marxist orientation provided even more reason for satisfaction, since the Bielefelder were attacked by fellow 
“progressives.” 
6 Hans W. Gatzke, Germany’s Drive to the West: A Study of Germany’s Western War Aims during the First 
World War (Baltimore, Md., 1950). The study grew out of a dissertation directed by William L. Langer at 
Harvard. 
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tackle the delicate question of French collaboration with the Nazi regime in Vichy than for 
French scholars, who were affected by their societal taboos regarding this topic.7 These 
different implications resulting from writing one’s own as opposed to someone else’s history 
should not be neglected. Of course, the postwar American historical profession also included 
German émigrés, who in dealing with Germany did write their own history. Yet approaching 
the “German problem” from abroad meant to be unrestricted by the unspoken rules of the 
West German historical profession.  
For all these reasons, we should not assume that German and American historians 
were working in synchroneity toward or against a certain goal. Instead, we should think of 
them as proceeding on different trajectories. Immediately after World War II, and for about 
the following two decades, American historians were likely to believe in a German 
Sonderweg. For some, this Sonderweg manifested itself in German militarism and an 
unhealthy influence of the military elite on political developments, as Gordon Craig argued 
in the 1950s. Other historians, such as Leonard Krieger, Fritz Stern, and George Mosse, 
ventured into the realm of ideas and attributed the calamitous “special path” to a “German 
mind” or a “Germanic ideology.” None of these historians contended that the decline into the 
National Socialist abyss was an inevitable result of these historical developments. But the 
claim of a peculiar German trajectory existed implicitly or explicitly in all of these studies. 
Moreover, while the American historical profession was diverse enough to offer space to 
German historians of all political shades, Americans also carefully observed the ways in 
which their West German colleagues broached delicate areas of German history. 
                                                
7 Robert Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944 (New York, 1972); for the 
historiographical context see Sarah Fishman (ed.), France at War: Vichy and the Historians (Oxford/New York, 
2000). 
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Subsequently, they did not shy away from criticizing what they perceived as apologetic 
tendencies and from praising critical ones. 
As a result, by the late 1960s, German and American historians had different views of 
the stage at which the reconsideration of modern German history had arrived. The revisionist 
impulse, initially much stronger on the American side, now increased within the West 
German historical profession. Theodore Hamerow later wrote about the Fischer-Kontroverse 
as the “declaration of independence” for younger German historians—and he was certainly 
correct: By the late 1960s, the Germans of Wehler’s generation had declared their 
independence from their conservative predecessors.8 Yet the revolutionary wars were just 
about to begin. By contrast, American historians regarded the controversy as a sign that West 
German historians had finally achieved the long overdue pluralization of their profession. 
Many Americans no longer saw the front lines as running between apologetic reactionaries 
on the one side and revisionist progressives on the other. For the Americans, by the late 
1960s the revolution was already nearing its conclusion. 
Therefore we should view American historians of modern Germany as attentive 
observers rather than active participants during the West German historiographical revolution 
of the 1960s and early 1970s. When younger German historians during those years attempted 
to modernize the West German historical profession, they tended to be less in tune with their 
American colleagues than they claimed. Many Americans were impressed by the creative 
energy, which in particular Kocka and Wehler unleashed upon their discipline. But they 
                                                
8 Theodore Hamerow, “Guilt, Redemption, and Writing German History,” American Historical Review 88 
(1983), 53-72; quote 66. 
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generally did not subscribe to Historische Sozialwissenschaft and by and large refused to 
follow the West German iconoclasts on their Sonderweg. 
Ultimately, the German-American scholarly community of modern Germany 
resembles other loose, that is, unorganized transatlantic collectives. In his study on the 
intellectual exchange between American and European social reformers in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, Daniel T. Rodgers has identified “perception, misperception, 
translation, transformation, co-optation, preemption, and contestation” as its defining 
features.9 All of them characterized the field of post-1945 German-American historiography 
as well. 
While this study has analyzed the transatlantic community primarily from a German 
perspective, we also need to ask what American historians gained from the transatlantic 
conversation. Many Americans who studied with German émigrés have emphasized the 
invaluable training in thorough German Quellenkritik (source criticism). Moreover, through 
academic contacts of their advisers, as well as exchange programs funded by the West 
German state, young American historians often received the opportunity to study and 
research in Germany. This cooperation on a practical level benefited successive generations 
of Americans, who were also able to form their first academic contacts with German 
colleagues. Dissertations on German history written exclusively based on monographs and 
printed sources available in American libraries soon became a thing of the past. The depth of 
American research on German history has unquestionably increased over the last decades. 
                                                
9 Daniel T. Rodgers, “An Age of Social Politics,” in Thomas Bender (ed.), Rethinking American History in a 
Global Age (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2002), 260. 
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Finally, young Americans who survived the trenches and snipers of the notorious German 
Oberseminar (research colloquium) were armed and ready for all future conferences. 
What is the state of the German-American scholarly community of modern German 
history today? In the Federal Republic, more historians are aware of historiographical 
developments in the United States than in previous decades. Germans are more likely to 
follow debates among American colleagues, read American monographs, journal articles, 
and book reviews. The number of Germans contributing articles and reviews to American 
journals has increased as well. Conversely, American historians of Germany—at least if they 
work at research institutions—are generally familiar with the most recent work in the Federal 
Republic. This state of affairs embodies a striking contrast to the situation of the field 
Germanistik (German Literature), where Germans hardly pay attention to their American 
colleagues. Remaining provincialism on both sides of the Atlantic, which would be difficult 
to deny, is a problem not only haunting the German-American community of historians. As 
Richard J. Evans has recently shown, many European historians remain confined to their 
respective national scholarly networks, often hardly paying attention to scholarship abroad, 
not even in the particular country whose history they specialize in.10 But it is safe to say that 
the extended transatlantic conversation of the last decades has increased the mutual 
awareness. 
 
                                                
10 Richard J. Evans, Cosmopolitan Islanders: British Historians and the European Continent (Cambridge, UK, 
2009). 
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The Bielefelder Schule:  Achievements, Limitations, Legacy 
The question of the achievements, limitations, and legacy of the Bielefelder Schule is 
more complicated. The answer depends on the observer’s methodological position as much 
as it does on the interpretive and political views. In the Federal Republic, many historians of 
the middle generation (born in the 1950s and early 1960s) today seem to believe that 
Historische Sozialwissenschaft will only continue to occupy those with historiographical 
interest. The Bielefelder Schule’s focus on a Prussian-dominated German nation state appears 
to be outdated, as does its emphasis on history’s socioeconomic dimension. However, since 
the historical professions in the Federal Republic and the United States have taken several 
methodological turns over the last three decades, it is conceivable that social and economic 
history will again become more popular. Yet regardless of these speculations, an assessment 
of the Bielefelder Schule’s achievements should distinguish an interpretive, a 
methodological, and a political dimension. 
Our perspectives on the German Sonderweg have changed considerably since this 
interpretation was first articulated. Many historians have abandoned the concept altogether. 
Even its previously most forceful advocates have in the meantime modified their positions.11 
However one evaluates the specific elements of this paradigm today—and despite numerous 
funeral eulogies, it is not completely dead—one fact seems hard to deny: the fierce debates 
triggered by the Bielefelders’ insistence on the peculiarities of German history have been 
impressively fruitful. While not all historiographical controversies result in heuristic 
                                                
11 See, for example, the conclusion in the fourth volume of Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s Deutsche 
Gesellschaftsgeschichte. Vol. 4: Vom Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges bis zur Gründung der beiden deutschen 
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progress, this one certainly did. By advocating their positions intelligently as well as 
forcefully (which included taking advantage of institutional resources), Wehler, Kocka, and 
other historians in their orbit ultimately forced everyone else to at least engage with them. 
Conversely, the criticism articulated by historians of very different methodological and 
political persuasions against this conception required the Bielefelder to reexamine their own 
assumptions. Despite all initial resistance and polemics, the proponents of Historische 
Sozialwissenschaft proved nevertheless capable of modifying many of their previously 
cherished positions. Even if Hans-Ulrich Wehler had, in his Deutsche Kaiserreich, promoted 
the “primacy of domestic politics,” in the third volume of Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte 
he spoke of an “interdependence of domestic and foreign politics.”12 Ultimately, the 
controversies often led the combatants to refine their respective interpretations. The two 
multi-volume histories of Germany, written by Wehler and his eternal counterpart Thomas 
Nipperdey, are the prime example for this mutually beneficial outcome.13 
Finally, one has to recognize that the Bielefelder wrestled with questions that at the 
time were particularly pressing, or “relevant,” to use the contemporary term. Referring to 
topics pursued by historians of everyday life in the 1980s, Kenneth Barkin in 1990 acidly 
remarked that “if contemporary German historians can choose to write about village 
Spinnstuben or urge us to become missionaries in rowboats, it is because the big question 
                                                
12 Compare Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918 (Göttingen, 1973), 184; and Wehler, 
Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte. Vol. 3: Von der ‚Deutschen Doppelrevolution’ bis zum Beginn des Ersten 
Weltkriegs 1849-1914 (München, 1995), 965f. 
13 Paul Nolte, “Darstellungsweisen deutscher Geschichte. Erzählstrukturen und ‘master narratives’ bei 
Nipperdey und Wehler,” in Christoph Conrad/Sebastian Conrad (eds.), Die Nation schreiben. 
Geschichtswissenschaft im internationalen Vergleich (Göttingen, 2002), 236-268. 
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was addressed for a good three decades.”14 The “big question” was of course how the Nazi 
rise to power had been possible, and Barkin—in my opinion correctly—pointed to the 
impossibility of escaping this question after World War II. 
Similar to the interpretive dimension, the methodological positions of the Bielefelder 
seem dated to many contemporary observers. Despite the sometimes-plausible criticism of 
the disadvantages of large-scale socioeconomic approaches, one needs to remember in which 
historiographical context they developed. To ridicule some of the proponents of Historische 
Sozialwissenschaft for their reliance on modernization theories would be similar to 
dismissing cultural historians for their dependence on Michel Foucault, who may very well 
be equally passé ten or twenty years from now. In both cases, historians followed theoretical 
and methodological trends of the time, or mere “fashions,” as their critics would claim. 
Observing the historiographical landscape of the last decades, one is struck by the recurrence 
of utterly similar arguments in methodological debates. Representatives of the historical 
profession’s establishments will routinely dismiss proponents of new approaches as 
“fashionable,” whereas the accused in return will level the charge of “traditionalism” against 
their critics. To alter a famous phrase by Marx, we can therefore argue that “men (and 
women) write their own historiography, but they do not write it as they please, they do not 
write it under the circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly 
encountered, given, and transmitted from the past.” Of course, this does not imply any 
historiographical determinism. Instead, it serves as a reminder that historians do not work in 
                                                
14 Kenneth Barkin, “German Émigré Historians in America: The Fifties, Sixties, and Seventies,” in Hartmut 
Lehmann/James J. Sheehan (eds.), An Interrupted Past: German Speaking Refugee Historians in the United 
States after 1933 (Cambridge, UK, 1991), 149-169, quote 157-158. 
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a vacuum, but in their choice of topics as well as approaches are profoundly influenced by 
the times in which they live.    
Any evaluation of the Bielefelder Schule’s legacy would be incomplete without the 
consideration of historiography’s political dimension and the relationship between historians 
and their societies. For the engagement of the leading figures of Historische 
Sozialwissenschaft in public debates of various kinds remains extraordinary. Wehler’s and 
Heinrich August Winkler’s vehement objection to the admission of Turkey into the European 
Union during the last years only constitutes the latest example for their participation in public 
debates. The generational explanation, advanced by Dirk Moses and the political theorist Jan-
Werner Müller, appears convincing. The “1945ers” on both the Left and the Right, whether 
historians, social scientists, or philosophers, saw it as crucial to engage in public debates in 
order to shape the historical and political consciousness of West German citizens. Arguably, 
the experience of war, postwar, and reconstruction offered the lesson that the civic 
engagement of intellectuals could help maintain the stability of the democratic German 
state.15 Historians of this generation such as Wehler and Hans and Wolfgang J. Mommsen, 
believed—correctly, in my view—that they had to become involved in the transformation of 
a polity. They assumed that West German attitudes about the nation’s recent past would 
directly affect the success or failure of the democratic state. By battling real—and sometimes 
perceived—apologists, they contributed to the innere Demokratisierung (inner 
democratization) of the Federal Republic. 
                                                
15 A. Dirk Moses, German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past (Cambridge, UK, 2007); Jan-Werner Müller, Another 
Country: German Intellectuals, Unification, and National Identity (New Haven, 2000). 
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By contrast, the next generation, which had grown up in such a stable democracy, 
was more likely to take West Germany’s political conditions for granted. Therefore Hans-
Ulrich Wehler frequently deplores the fact that in the Federal Republic, today few historians 
aspire to fulfill role of the public intellectual.16 To be sure, there are still regular 
commentators on historical-political issues. Among the Left-liberals, Ulrich Herbert and 
Norbert Frei cover topics related to National Socialism and its legacy, whereas Martin 
Sabrow assumes a similar role for the GDR. The moderate Conservative Paul Nolte has 
followed his Doktorvater Wehler’s footsteps at least regarding his recurrent presence in the 
media. Nolte’s frequent interventions in debates about societal reforms in the Federal 
Republic even transcend Wehler’s activities in this area—but he remains an exception to the 
rule.17 Further on the Right, Andreas Rödder regularly writes for the conservative daily 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, yet without matching Michael Stürmer’s intellectual 
presence and impact or assuming Stürmer’s role as a political adviser.  
In addition, historians in Germany today, just like German society at large, are 
wrestling with other questions than Wehler’s generation. The legacy of National Socialism 
no longer occupies the central place it once did. While it remains important, it has become 
one of several themes occupying intellectuals and the media. The integration of migrant 
workers into German society, the reform of the welfare state, and, linked to the latter issue, 
the persistent social inequality within German society are but a few topics that have gained 
increasing attention in the last two decades. Historians still comment on these problems, as 
                                                
16 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Eine lebhafte Kampfsituation. Ein Gespräch mit Manfred Hettling und Cornelius Torp 
(München, 2006), 184.  
17 Paul Nolte, Generation Reform. Jenseits der blockierten Republik (München, 2004); Id., Riskante Moderne. 
Die Deutschen und der neue Kapitalismus (München, 2006). 
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far as they relate to their research interests, and thus Wehler’s complaint does not accurately 
depict the current situation. 
Yet perhaps one has to move away from the narrow academic debates and the 
feuilleton sections of German quality papers to assess the actual significance of the 
Bielefelder Schule. As in many other cases, popular culture may offer us some clues: On 
October 30, 2008, the comedian Harald Schmidt, host of a popular German TV show similar 
to David Letterman’s “Late Show,” used Playmobil plastic toy figures to reenact the plot of 
the fifth volume of Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s Gesellschaftsgeschichte.18 Introducing his audience 
even to the University of Bielefeld’s reform concept and to the author’s academic biography, 
Schmidt offered a fairly accurate account of Wehler’s arguments regarding the 
transformation of German society after World War II. It would be difficult to make a more 
convincing argument for the influence of the Bielefelder Schule on the Federal Republic. 
 
 
                                                
18 http://lesesaal.faz.net/wehler/autor_videos.php?vid=5&vidblock=3; accessed April 22, 2010. 
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